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This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/07/2019 at 12:44:31 (UTC).

DARRYL TURMAN VS EDISON ELECTRIC COMPANY

Case Summary

On 03/27/2017 DARRYL TURMAN filed a Contract - Other Contract lawsuit against EDISON ELECTRIC COMPANY. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is MONICA BACHNER. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****5422

  • Filing Date:

    03/27/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Other Contract

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

MONICA BACHNER

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

TURMAN DARRYL

Defendants and Respondents

EDISON ELECTRIC COMPANY REPRESENTED BY

EDISON ELECTRIC COMPANY

 

Court Documents

STATEMENT OF DAMAGES

12/14/2017: STATEMENT OF DAMAGES

Proof of Service

1/5/2018: Proof of Service

PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

1/8/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

1/8/2018: NOTICE TO DEFENDANT OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND ORDER TO SERVE DEFENDANT BY PUBLICATION

4/17/2018: MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND ORDER TO SERVE DEFENDANT BY PUBLICATION

TENTATIVE RULING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND AN ORDER TO SERVE VIA PUBLICATION IS DENIED.

6/22/2018: TENTATIVE RULING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND AN ORDER TO SERVE VIA PUBLICATION IS DENIED.

STATEMENT OF DAMAGES

7/24/2018: STATEMENT OF DAMAGES

NOTICE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT

7/24/2018: NOTICE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT

Unknown

10/30/2018: Unknown

Statement of Damages (Personal Injury or Wrongful Death)

1/16/2019: Statement of Damages (Personal Injury or Wrongful Death)

Request for Entry of Default / Judgment

1/16/2019: Request for Entry of Default / Judgment

Unknown

2/13/2019: Unknown

Proof of Service by Mail

4/17/2019: Proof of Service by Mail

Notice

4/26/2019: Notice

Order

5/15/2019: Order

Proof of Service by Mail

5/22/2019: Proof of Service by Mail

REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

11/30/2017: REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL

9/19/2017: PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL

71 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 06/05/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department 71, Monica Bachner, Presiding; Case Management Conference - Held - Continued

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  • 06/05/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department 71, Monica Bachner, Presiding; Order to Show Cause Re: (Failure to File Request Ent of Def) - Held - Continued

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  • 06/05/2019
  • Minute Order ( (ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: FAILURE TO REQUEST ENTRY OF DEFAULT ...)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/05/2019
  • Certificate of Mailing for (Minute Order (ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: FAILURE TO REQUEST ENTRY OF DEFAULT ...) of 06/05/2019); Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/22/2019
  • Proof of Service by Mail; Filed by Darryl Turman (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/17/2019
  • Proof of Service by Mail; Filed by Darryl Turman (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/17/2019
  • Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Darryl Turman (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/17/2019
  • Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Darryl Turman (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/17/2019
  • Notice of Hearing (Menacing Dog) (for Default Judgment sand Order to Show Cause, Case Management Conference); Filed by Darryl Turman (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/15/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department 71, Monica Bachner, Presiding; Hearing - Other (for Sanctions and Order to serve defendants by publication) - Held - Motion Granted

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135 More Docket Entries
  • 05/26/2017
  • Minute Order

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  • 05/26/2017
  • Minute order entered: 2017-05-26 00:00:00; Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/07/2017
  • Notice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/07/2017
  • OSC-Failure to File Proof of Serv; Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/07/2017
  • NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

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  • 04/07/2017
  • ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING

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  • 03/29/2017
  • Order on Court Fee Waiver (Superior Court); Filed by Clerk

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  • 03/29/2017
  • ORDER ON COURT FEE WAIVER

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  • 03/27/2017
  • Complaint; Filed by Darryl Turman (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/27/2017
  • COMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC655422    Hearing Date: February 23, 2021    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

DARRYL TURMAN,

vs.

EDISON ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al.

Case No.: BC655422

Hearing Date: February 23, 2021

Defendant Southern California Edison Company’s unopposed demurrer to the first amended complaint is sustained with leave to amend.

Defendant’s motion to strike is moot.

Defendant Southern California Edison Company, erroneously sued as Edison Electric Company (“Defendant”), demurs to both causes of action in the first amended complaint (“FAC”) filed by Plaintiff Darryl Turman (“Plaintiff”). Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute the causes of action, it cannot be ascertained from the allegations whether the contract was oral or implied in conduct, and the causes of action are uncertain. (Notice of Demurrer pgs. 2-3.)

Defendant’s 10/29/20 request for judicial notice of rulings and documents filed in this case is granted. (RJN, Exhs. A, B, C D.) However, the Court will not take judicial notice of the truth of the matters asserted in the court’s records.

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in the instant action on March 27, 2017. On January 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name) to correct the name of Defendant. On February 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed his FAC in which he appears to allege a single cause of action for breach of oral/binding implied contract. (FAC pgs. 3-4.) The FAC also refers to “covenant of good faith and fair dealing,” however, it is not clear if Plaintiff alleges a breach of this covenant as a separate cause of action. In addition, while the complaint included breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as the 2nd cause of action, these pages are omitted from the FAC. Accordingly, the Court construes Plaintiff’s FAC as alleging a single cause of action of breach of oral/binding implied contract. Plaintiff alleges that on or about March 2015, an oral agreement was made between Plaintiff and Scott Hayashi (“Hayashi”) and that on or about March 2015, Defendant breached the agreement in the manner set forth in the attachment. (FAC ¶¶BC-1, BC-2.) Plaintiff alleges he performed all obligations to defendant by submitting medical records that indicated treatment for the injuries and lost wages as requested by Defendant’s representative Hayashi. (FAC ¶BC-3.) Plaintiff alleges he was damaged by Defendant’s breach because it made him unable to meet the two-year statute of limitations to file a personal injury negligence claim and due to Defendant’s representative’s misleading representations pertaining to a settlement for the out of pocket cost of the medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering. (FAC ¶BC-4.)

Plaintiff alleges he filed a personal injury claim relating to his accidentally stepping into a hole in a utility box with Defendant in October 2013 at which time he was assigned Hayashi as a representative. [The Court notes in the Complaint Plaintiff alleges he filed the claim in 2014 and the injury occurred in October 2013.] Plaintiff alleges Hayashi advised him there was no need to file a personal injury lawsuit because of the possibility of reaching an agreement once the claim had been investigated. Plaintiff alleges he agreed to meet with Hayashi in March 2015 at the site of the incident, and at time Plaintiff noticed the box had been repaired, which Hayashi purposely did with the intention of deceiving Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges Hayashi admitted Defendant was at fault and agreed to compensate Plaintiff for his medical bills, which were estimated at $30,000 at that particular time, which constituted a binding implied contract and oral agreement. Plaintiff alleges he thereafter tried contacting Hayashi for payment and to discuss the terms of the settlement; however, Hayashi’s strategy was to purposely delay the agreed upon obligation, so the statute of limitations would run on Plaintiff’s right to file a personal injury action against Defendant. (FAC, Attachment.)

The Court notes Plaintiff’s FAC omits and alters allegations from the complaint relating to the promises made by Hayashi in March 2015. Specifically, Plaintiff previously alleged Hayashi only asked how much Plaintiff’s out-of-pocket expenses were, that they discussed an incentive payment, that they discussed additional payment if additional surgery was needed, and that Hayashi agreed to discuss payment options with Defendant and that he would get back as soon as possible with an answer for a settlement. (Complaint, Attachment, pg. 4.)

Breach of Oral/Binding Implied Contract (1st COA)

“The standard elements of a claim for breach of contract are: ‘(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) damage to plaintiff therefrom.’” (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.) “A cause of action for breach of implied contract has the same elements as does a cause of action for breach of contract, except that the promise is not expressed in words but is implied from the promisor’s conduct.” (Yari v. Producers Guild of America, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 172, 182.) “An oral contract may be pleaded generally as to its effect, because it is rarely possible to allege the exact words. [Citation.]” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Plaintiff failed to allege facts suggesting the existence of a contract between him and Defendant. Plaintiff only alleges that Defendant’s representative admitted fault for Plaintiff’s injuries and that Hayashi told Plaintiff Defendant would compensate him for his medical expenses. However, Plaintiff does not allege he accepted this offer by Hayashi. Moreover, taking into account Plaintiff’s previous assertions in response to Defendant’s motion to strike, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation Hayashi agreed Defendant would pay Plaintiff’s medical bills contradicts with his previous judicial admissions, and is insufficient to allege the existence of a contract. (Demurrer, pgs. 1, 3, 5, citing Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981), 123 Cal.App.3d 593, RJN, Exh. D.) Plaintiff’s admissions in the documents subject to judicial notice confirm Plaintiff’s original allegations; namely, that Hayashi only agreed that he would check with his boss Paul Penolten regarding a possible payment to Plaintiff, and not that Hayashi agreed Plaintiff would be paid for his medical expenses. (Demurrer, pg. 6; RJN, Exh. D.) Plaintiff’s amended allegation that Hayashi instead promised Plaintiff Defendant would fully pay Plaintiff’s medical expenses conflicts with his judicial admissions and is subject to demurrer. In addition, even in alleging the contract itself, Plaintiff failed to allege the terms of the agreement or their legal effect, including the amount Defendant allegedly agreed to pay Plaintiff, which varies in the FAC from $30,000 to more.

Plaintiff alleges the contract was both oral and implied and the factual allegations do not establish whether the contract was oral or implied. (C.C.P. § 430.10(g) [A demurrer lies where “[i]n an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.”]) The Court notes Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff must “allege in detail the facts from which the promise is implied” to plead a cause of action for an agreement implied from conduct. (Demurrer, pgs. 4-5, citing Requa v. Regents of the Univ. of California (2012) 213 Cal. App. 4th 213, 227-228 (“Requa”) and Foley v. Interactive Data Corp (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 663-664, 675.) However, these cases do not set forth a detailed pleading requirement for the cause of action, rather they involve cases in which the reviewing Court found sufficient facts relating to the promise implied had been alleged to state a cause of action. Rather, in Requa the Court found the plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient because, “[i]n pleading a cause of action on an agreement implied from conduct, only the facts from which the promise is implied must be alleged.” (Requa v. Regents of University of California, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at 228.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that in 2015, Hayashi orally promised Plaintiff Defendant would pay Plaintiff’s medical expenses for Plaintiff’s injury and that Plaintiff, in reliance on this representation, did not file a personal injury claim against Defendant prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. However, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s allegation that Hayashi made a promise to Plaintiff for such payment conflicts with his previous judicial admissions that Hayashi would check with his supervisor as to whether a payment to Plaintiff could be made. As such, Plaintiff’s allegations are subject to demurrer.

Plaintiff bears the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility of amendment. (See Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The Court notes Plaintiff has not filed an opposition addressing how the defects in the pleading can be cured via amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met his burden. However, given this is the first instance the Court is addressing Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s pleading on its merits since the previous demurrer was rendered moot by Plaintiff’s filing of the FAC and given Plaintiff’s self-represented status, the Court, in its discretion, grants Plaintiff leave to amend.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer to the 1st cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

Motion to Strike

In light of the ruling on demurrer, the motion to strike is moot.

Dated: February _____, 2021

Hon. Monica Bachner

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: BC655422    Hearing Date: October 05, 2020    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

DARRYL TURMAN,

vs.

EDISON ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al.

Case No.: BC655422

Hearing Date: October 5, 2020

Defendant Southern California Edison Company’s demurrer to the Complaint and motion to strike portions of the Complaint are moot.

Defendant Southern California Edison Company, erroneously sued as Edison Electric Company (“Defendant”), demurs to both causes of action in the Complaint. Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute the causes of action, it cannot be ascertained from the allegations whether the contract was oral or implied in conduct, and the causes of action are uncertain. (Notice of Demurrer pgs. 2-3.) Plaintiff filed the Complaint on March 27, 2017. Plaintiff filed an Amendment to the Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name) to correct the name of Defendant from Edison Electric Company to Southern California Edison. Defendant filed the demurrer and motion to strike on February 18, 2020. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on February 21, 2020. A plaintiff is entitled to amend a pleading at least once without leave of court before the answer or demurrer is filed; or if defendant demurs, before the opposition is due on the hearing on the demurrer. (CCP § 472(a).) Thus, the demurrer and the motion to strike are moot.

Dated: October _____, 2020

Hon. Monica Bachner

Judge of the Superior Court