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This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/08/2019 at 04:28:23 (UTC).

DANIEL HASSO VS YIOLA AWABDY

Case Summary

On 10/05/2017 DANIEL HASSO filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against YIOLA AWABDY. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Pomona Courthouse South located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is DUKES, ROBERT A.. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****9683

  • Filing Date:

    10/05/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Pomona Courthouse South

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

DUKES, ROBERT A.

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

HASSO DANIEL

Defendants

AWABDY YIOLA

CITY OF NAITONAL FINANCE

DAWOOD JAMAL

CITY NATIONAL FINANCE A NEVADA CORP.

CITY NATIONAL FINANCE A CALIFORNIA CORP..

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorney

CREAMER MICHAEL ESQ.

Defendant Attorney

YRUNGARAY BEJAMIN ESQ.

 

Court Documents

Opposition

7/11/2018: Opposition

Declaration

7/11/2018: Declaration

Reply

7/16/2018: Reply

Reply

7/16/2018: Reply

Tentative Ruling

7/24/2018: Tentative Ruling

Notice of Ruling

7/30/2018: Notice of Ruling

Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default

8/24/2018: Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default

Declaration

8/24/2018: Declaration

Opposition

9/20/2018: Opposition

Declaration

9/24/2018: Declaration

Reply

9/24/2018: Reply

Tentative Ruling

10/1/2018: Tentative Ruling

Notice of Case Reassignment and Order for Plaintiff to Give Notice

10/1/2018: Notice of Case Reassignment and Order for Plaintiff to Give Notice

Notice

10/22/2018: Notice

Stipulation to Continue Trial/FSC [and Related Motion/Discovery Dates] Personal Injury Courts Only (Department 91, 92, 93, 97)

4/25/2019: Stipulation to Continue Trial/FSC [and Related Motion/Discovery Dates] Personal Injury Courts Only (Department 91, 92, 93, 97)

3 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 04/25/2019
  • [Proposed Order] and Stipulation to Continue Trial, FSC (and Related Motion/Discovery Dates) Personal Injury Courts Only (Central District); Filed by DANIEL HASSO (Plaintiff)

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  • 10/22/2018
  • Notice (Re: Reassignment); Filed by DANIEL HASSO (Plaintiff)

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  • 10/01/2018
  • at 08:31 AM in Department O; Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default (CCP 473.5) - Held - Motion Granted

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  • 10/01/2018
  • at 08:31 am in Department O, Dukes, Robert A., Presiding; Motion To Set Aside Default - Motion Granted

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  • 10/01/2018
  • Notice of Case Reassignment and Order for Plaintiff to Give Notice

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  • 10/01/2018
  • Tentative Ruling

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  • 10/01/2018
  • Notice of Case Reassignment & Ord; Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/01/2018
  • Notice of Case Reassignment and Order for Plaintiff to Give Notice; Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/01/2018
  • Notice of Case Reassignment and Order for Plaintiff to Give Notice; Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/01/2018
  • Minute order entered: 2018-10-01 00:00:00; Filed by Clerk

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51 More Docket Entries
  • 01/04/2018
  • Declaration (RE MEET AND CONFER IN SUPPORT OF 30-DAY AUTOMATIC EXTENSION OF TIME TI FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADIN ); Filed by Attorney for Defendant

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  • 01/04/2018
  • Declaration; Filed by Defendant

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  • 12/26/2017
  • Declaration; Filed by YIOLA AWABDY (Defendant)

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  • 12/26/2017
  • Declaration (RE MEET & CONFER IN SUPPORT OF 30 DAY AUTOMATIC EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A RESPONSIVE PLEADING ); Filed by Attorney for Defendant

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  • 12/04/2017
  • OSC-Failure to File Proof of Serv; Filed by Clerk

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  • 12/04/2017
  • OSC-Failure to File Proof of Serv; Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/06/2017
  • Notice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/06/2017
  • Notice-Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/05/2017
  • Complaint; Filed by DANIEL HASSO (Plaintiff)

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  • 10/05/2017
  • Complaint Filed

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: KC069683    Hearing Date: January 12, 2021    Dept: O

Plaintiff Daniel Hasso’s motion to compel Defendant Jamal Dawood’s responses to request for production of documents, set one is GRANTED.

Plaintiff Daniel Hasso (“Plaintiff”) moves the court to compel Defendant Jamal Dawood (“Defendant”) to further respond to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, particularly Requests No. 1, 2, and 4 (“Requests”).

CCP § 2031.310 allows a party to file a motion compelling further answers to a demand for production of documents if it finds that the response is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or an objection in the response is without merit or too general. The motion shall be accompanied with a meet and confer declaration. (CCP § 2031.310(a)(2).)

Objections must be specific. A motion to compel lies where objections are 'too general.' (CCP § 2030.300(a)(3).) If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully answer the requests. (Coy v. Sup.Ct. (Wolcher) (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221; Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (Stendell) (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) If the responding party objects to the demand for inspection of an item or category of item, the response shall, if necessary, include a privilege log that provides sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of the claim. (CCP § 2031.240.)

A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production. (CCP § 2031.220.)

A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. (CCP § 2031.230.) This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. (Id.) The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item. (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s Responses to the Requests (“Responses”) were either false in stating there are no documents or were boilerplate attorney-client privilege objections without any merit.

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that Defendant failed to include any privilege log for the responses he asserts are privileged. Thus, it is questionable whether Defendant’s assertion of privilege is valid.

Furthermore, these later assertions of attorney-client privilege were not included as objections in the initial responses. As Plaintiff points out, Defendant and his counsel failed to assert such a privilege in the initial Responses. In fact, Defendant’s only objections at that time for the Responses in dispute were argumentative, vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. Such failure to assert attorney-client privilege fatally waives the objection. (CCP § 2031.300(a).) Defendant is ordered to provide further code compliant responses as to these Requests, and the motion is GRANTED as to Requests 1, 2 and 4.

Plaintiff Daniel Hasso’s motion to compel Defendant Jamal Dawood’s responses to request for special interrogatories, set four is GRANTED.

Plaintiff Daniel Hasso (“Plaintiff”) moves the court to compel Defendant Jamal Dawood (“Defendant”) to further respond to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, particularly Requests No. 15-20 (“Requests”).

CCP § 2030.300 allows a party to file a motion compelling further answers to interrogatories if it finds that the response is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or an objection in the response is without merit or too general. The motion shall be accompanied with a meet and confer declaration. (CCP § 2030.300(b).)

Each answer in the response must be “as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.” (CCP § 2030.220(a),(b).)

When a party asserts the attorney-client privilege it is incumbent upon that party to prove the preliminary fact that a privilege exists. (Evid. Code § 917.) Once the foundational facts have been presented, i.e., that a communication has been made in confidence in the course of the attorney-client relationship, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential, or that an exception exists. (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s Responses to the Requests (“Responses”) were highly evasive and incomplete. Plaintiff also specifically contends that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to these Requests because the Requests do not seek the contents of the communications between Defendant and counsel for CKR Resource, a third party to this litigation, but only the frequency and method of communication between Defendant and the counsel for CKR Resource.

Defendant contends that it properly asserted the attorney-client privilege in his Responses. However, he only does so by attempting to distinguish the case cited by Plaintiff for the proposition. The court is unconvinced that the distinction Defendant raised is material to Plaintiff’s motion. For one, as Plaintiff points out, the principle that independent facts related to the communication with an attorney are not protected by attorney-client privilege is long-held principle under California law. (See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 625, 640; Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 219-20; Suezaki v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 166.) The Requests only asks for information of facts independent of the communication with an attorney. Furthermore, Defendant does not provide any case citations that would support his conclusory claim that his assertion of attorney-client privilege was proper. In fact, Defendant has failed to establish any preliminary facts in his Opposition that the privilege even exists under the standard delineated by California law. Finally, it is uncertain to what extent there may be sensitive information in the recitation of independent facts related to the communication with the counsel for CKR Resource: Plaintiff is not requesting to see the communications themselves here through these interrogatories and is merely requesting the identities of individuals who may be percipient witnesses, and general nature of the documents without any specifics.

Thus, Plaintiff’s motion shall be GRANTED and Defendant is ordered to provide further code compliant responses.

Plaintiff Daniel Hasso’s motion to compel Defendant City National Finance (NV Corp.)’s responses to special interrogatories, set four is GRANTED.

Plaintiff Daniel Hasso (“Plaintiff”) moves the court to compel Defendant Jamal Dawood (“Defendant”) to further respond to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, particularly Requests No. 15-20 (“Requests”). The motion shall be accompanied with a meet and confer declaration. (CCP § 2030.300(b).)

Each answer in the response must be “as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.” (CCP § 2030.220(a),(b).)

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s Responses to the Requests (“Responses”) were highly evasive and incomplete, particularly Defendant failed to fully respond to the multiple sections of the interrogatories regarding disclosure of method of communication and identity of the participants.

Defendant contends that it had fully complied with the responses. While the court agrees that CCP § 2030.060 is controlling on the issue of compound questions regarding specially prepared interrogatories,[1] this objection was not raised until the Opposition. Such failure to timely assert this objection fatally waives the objection. (CCP § 2031.300(a).)

Thus, Defendant is ordered to provide further code compliant responses as to these Requests, and the motion is GRANTED.


[1] Plaintiff contends that Smith v. Superior Court (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 6 is instead controlling. The court disagrees as Smith has been superseded by CCP § 2030.060(f).

Case Number: KC069683    Hearing Date: September 21, 2020    Dept: O

Plaintiff Daniel Hasso’s motion to strike defendant City National Finance (CA Corp.)’s answer is DENIED.

Plaintiff Daniel Hasso (“Plaintiff”) moves to strike the answer of Defendant City National Finance, a California corporation (“Defendant”) because it is now a suspended corporation.

While Plaintiff provides case law in the form of Palm Valley Homeowners Association v. Design MTC (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 553, which states that a suspended corporate status disables a corporation from participating in any litigation activities, nothing in the case states that a suspended corporate status nullifies a previously properly filed and served answer. At the time the Answer was filed here, the corporation was represented by counsel and was (as far as the Court knows) an active corporate entity. As such, the Answer was and is proper. Simply because a corporation later becomes suspended or appears to be not represented does not, per se, give the Court any authority to strike any pleading absent some authorizing statute. No such authority has been cited.

If the Defendant fails to appear at trial through counsel, then the Answer may be stricken and matter can be proved up by Plaintiff. If the Defendant is not responding to discovery, then an appropriate noticed motion specific to the discovery issue and a request for sanctions provided under the Discovery code may be made. If the Defendant disobeys a rule of Court mandating an appearance, then there may be authority to strike the pleading under Code of Civil Procedure section 575.2. However, this generic motion to strike an otherwise valid answer is without authority.

Motion is DENIED.

Plaintiff Daniel Hasso’s motion for terminating sanctions is DENIED.

Plaintiff Daniel Hasso (“Plaintiff”) moves for issue, evidentiary, and/or terminating sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 against Defendant City National Finance, a Nevada corporation (“Defendant”).

If anyone engages in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process, the court may impose monetary sanction, issue sanction, evidence sanction, terminating sanction, and contempt sanction. (CCP § 2023.030.) “[T]here are effective… remedies for spoliation of evidence, including the evidentiary inference that evidence destroyed by a party is unfavorable to that party (Evid. Code, § 413), the potent sanctions for abuse of discovery (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023), the punishment of attorneys who are involved in their clients' spoliation of evidence, and criminal penalties for spoliation of evidence (Pen. Code, § 135).” (Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 12.)

A court's exercise of inherent power to dismiss for misconduct need not be preceded by violation of a court order… The decision whether to exercise the inherent power to dismiss requires consideration of all relevant circumstances, including the nature of the misconduct (which must be deliberate and egregious, but may or may not violate a prior court order), the strong preference for adjudicating claims on the merits, the integrity of the court as an institution of justice, the effect of the misconduct on a fair resolution of the case, and the availability of other sanctions to cure the harm…

When the plaintiff has engaged in misconduct during the course of the litigation that is deliberate, that is egregious, and that renders any remedy short of dismissal inadequate to preserve the fairness of the trial, the trial court has the inherent power to dismiss the action. Such an exercise of inherent authority is essential for every California court to remain a place where justice is judicially administered. 

(Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 736, 764 – Terminating sanctions proper where a party hired an investigator to surreptitiously obtain confidential documents.)

“A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction.” (Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (20015) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 279.)

Beyond allegedly false discovery responses, Plaintiff has not provided the Court a clear roadmap on the specific evidence for his conclusory accusations against Defendant. Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of Defendant’s intentional and deliberate spoliation of evidence. Plaintiff’s assertions in his moving papers are merely based on conjecture as to what Defendant may have as evidence but they fail to provide this Court with clear evidentiary support as to why Plaintiff would reasonably hold that belief. Beyond conjecture, the Court cannot find any willful conduct – at this time -- by Defendant to warrant the granting of terminating sanctions, or even the lesser relief that an issue sanction should be ordered in this case.

Motion is DENIED.

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