On 10/05/2017 CANYON VINEYARD ESTATES I, LLC filed a Property - Other Real Property lawsuit against JOHN PAUL DEJORIA, . This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Santa Monica Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is NANCY L. NEWMAN. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Pending - Other Pending
Los Angeles County Superior Courts
Santa Monica Courthouse
Los Angeles, California
NANCY L. NEWMAN
CANYON VINEYARD ESTATES I LLC
MOUNTAINS RESTORATION TRUST
CALIFORNIA COSTAL COMMISSION
CITY OF MALIBU
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEJORIA JOHN PAUL
JENKINS & HOGIN
CLINTON DEWITT W.
MITCHELL E. RISHE
GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER
RISHE MITCHELL E.
HUGHES CAROLINE K.
BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP
11/27/2017: Request for Judicial Notice
1/12/2018: Minute Order
4/6/2018: Request for Judicial Notice
5/4/2018: Case Management Statement
7/24/2018: Notice of Joinder
7/25/2018: Request for Judicial Notice
8/6/2018: Case Management Statement
9/28/2018: Request for Judicial Notice
at 09:00 AM in Department P; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses - Not Held - Taken Off Calendar by PartyRead MoreRead Less
at 10:00 AM in Department P; Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) - Not Held - Advanced and Continued - by CourtRead MoreRead Less
at 10:00 AM in Department P; Conference ((informal with court)) - Not Held - Advanced and Continued - by CourtRead MoreRead Less
Notice (of Withdrawal of Certain Counsel); Filed by MOUNTAINS RESTORATION TRUST (Legacy Party)Read MoreRead Less
Notice (NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE OF INFORMAL DISCOVERY CONFERENCE); Filed by CANYON VINEYARD ESTATES I, LLC (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
at 3:00 PM in Department P; Court OrderRead MoreRead Less
Minute Order ( (Court Order re: Continuance)); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
Certificate of Mailing for (Minute Order (Court Order re: Continuance) of 05/09/2019); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
at 08:30 AM in Department P; Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings - Held - Motion GrantedRead MoreRead Less
Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore (Carmen Yung CSR #3436); Filed by CANYON VINEYARD ESTATES I, LLC (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
Proof-Service/Summons; Filed by CANYON VINEYARD ESTATES I, LLC (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
Proof-Service/Summons; Filed by Attorney for PlaintiffRead MoreRead Less
Proof-Service/Summons; Filed by CANYON VINEYARD ESTATES I, LLC (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
Summons; Filed by PlaintiffRead MoreRead Less
Civil Case Cover SheetRead MoreRead Less
Summons Filed; Filed by Attorney for PlaintiffRead MoreRead Less
Complaint FiledRead MoreRead Less
Complaint; Filed by CANYON VINEYARD ESTATES I, LLC (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
Notice of Pending Action; Filed by Attorney for PlaintiffRead MoreRead Less
Notice of Lis Pendens; Filed by PlaintiffRead MoreRead Less
Case Number: SC128181 Hearing Date: February 02, 2021 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Canyon Vineyard Estates I, LLC v. John Paul Dejoria, et al.
CASE NUMBER: SC128181
MOTION: Attorney General’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs
HEARING DATE: 2/3/2021
“All fines, penalties, attorney's fees, if any, as authorized by law, and costs of investigation paid to the Attorney General pursuant to Section 12598 shall be used by the Department of Justice solely for the administration of the Attorney General's charitable trust enforcement responsibilities.” (Gov. Code, § 12586.2.) “The Attorney General shall be entitled to recover from defendants named in a charitable trust enforcement action all reasonable attorney's fees and actual costs incurred in conducting that action, including, but not limited to, the costs of auditors, consultants, and experts employed or retained to assist with the investigation, preparation, and presentation in court of the charitable trust enforcement action.” (Gov. Code, § 12598(b) [emphasis added].) “Attorney's fees and costs shall be recovered by the Attorney General pursuant to court order. When awarding attorneys' fees and costs, the court shall order that the attorney's fees and costs be paid by the charitable organization and the individuals named as defendants in or otherwise subject to the action, in a manner that the court finds to be equitable and fair.” (Gov. Code, § 12598(c) [emphasis added].) “The court may award to the prevailing party in any action authorized by this section the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees.” (Civ. Code, § 815.7(d) [emphasis added].)
In determining whether requested fees are reasonable, courts consider the following factors: (1) the number of hours spent on the case, (2) reasonable hourly compensation for the attorney, (3) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (4) the skill displayed in presenting them, and (5) the extent to which the litigation precluded other employment by the attorney. (Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 865, 880.)
Request for judicial notice
The Attorney General seeks judicial notice of Exhibit A, This Court’s order on Defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment and Exhibit C, the grant deed from Defendant John Paul Dejoria to Defendant Mountains Restoration Trust. These documents are judicially noticeable, therefore, the Court Grants the Attorney General’s request for judicial notice.
Basis for attorney fees
The Attorney General moves for attorney’s fees under Government Code sections 12586.2, 12598, the terms of the Grant Deed, and Civil Code section 815.7. The Attorney General argues that it is entitled to attorney’s fees because it was the prevailing party. The Court entered judgment in favor of the Attorney General and other Defendants on March 16, 2020. (See 3/16/2020 Judgment.)
Plaintiff does not dispute that the Attorney General is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under 12598, and instead argues that the Attorney General’s intervention in this action was unnecessary. “The primary responsibility for supervising charitable trusts in California, for ensuring compliance with trusts and articles of incorporation, and for protection of assets held by charitable trusts and public benefit corporations, resides in the Attorney General. The Attorney General has broad powers under common law and California statutory law to carry out these charitable trust enforcement responsibilities.” (Gov. Code, § 12598(a).) “The Attorney General shall be entitled to recover from defendants named in a charitable trust enforcement action all reasonable attorney's fees and actual costs incurred in conducting that action, including, but not limited to, the costs of auditors, consultants, and experts employed or retained to assist with the investigation, preparation, and presentation in court of the charitable trust enforcement action.” (Gov. Code, § 12598(b).) “Attorney's fees and costs shall be recovered by the Attorney General pursuant to court order. When awarding attorneys' fees and costs, the court shall order that the attorney's fees and costs be paid by . . . the individuals named as defendants in or otherwise subject to the action, in a manner that the court finds to be equitable and fair.” (Gov. Code, § 12598(c).) The Attorney General has demonstrated that it was required to intervene in this action to carry out its trust enforcement responsibilities.
Plaintiff further argues that the Attorney General is not entitled to attorney’s fees under the Grant Deed because the Attorney General was not a party under the original Deed. In reply, the Attorney General responds that the Grant Deed contains covenants that run with the land and that since Plaintiff took title to the real property subject to the attorney’s fees provision and the Attorney General prevailed in enforcing the open space conservation easement, it is entitled to attorney’s fees under that provision as well.
The provisions contained in Chapter 4, relating to conservation easements, are to be liberally construed. (Civ. Code, § 816.) Civil Code section 815.7, provides that “The court may award to the prevailing party in any action authorized by this section the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees.” (Civ. Code, § 815.7(d).) The language used here with the term “may” makes attorney’s fees discretionary. Plaintiff argues that the Attorney General is not entitled to attorney’s fees under this section because the Attorney General is not the owner or the grantor of the easement, citing the language in Civil Code § 815.7(b). However, this ignores that all of the provisions in this chapter are to be liberally construed. The Attorney General has shown that it is entitled to attorney’s fees under the terms of the Deed, the Government Code, and may also recover attorney’s fees pursuant to this Court’s discretion under Civil Code section 815.7.
Reasonableness of attorney’s fees and rates
The Attorney General seeks $189,675 in attorney’s fees and $5,552.88 in costs. “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records. [Citations omitted.]” (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Affidavits of the plaintiffs' attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009 [quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp. (9th Cir.1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407].) The Attorney General actively litigated this case since it filed its answer on June 21, 2018. Moreover, the Attorney General only seeks attorney’s fees for time incurred by Caroline Hughes. (See Mot. at 10:1-16., see also Hughes Decl.) The Attorney General provides evidence that Hughes spent 702.5 hours on this matter and only seeks attorney’s fees for 632.25 hours at an hourly rate of $300. The Court finds that the hourly rate and the amount of fees sough are reasonable. The motion for attorney’s fees and costs is GRANTED.
Case Number: SC128181 Hearing Date: August 11, 2020 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Canyon Vineyard Estates I, LLC v. John Paul DeJoria, et al.
CASE NO.: SC128181
MOTION: Cross-Complainant Mountains Restoration Trust’s Motion for Summary Adjudication
On February 1, 2018, Defendant Mountains Restoration Trust (“MRT”) filed a Cross-Complaint against Canyon Vineyard Estates I, LLC (“Canyon Vineyard”) asserting causes of action for (1) violation of Civil Code section 815.7, seeking injunctive relief and damages, and (2) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200.
MRT alleges that in 2001, John Paul DeJoria sold twelve parcels of coastal and canyon land to MRT for $1,000,000. (Cross-Compl. ¶¶ 7-9.) The land was appraised for $13,000,000 and the remaining $12,000,000 value was donated to MRT. (Id. ¶ 9.) DeJoria included a conservation easement, binding on all future owners, that would preserve the property as open space in perpetuity. (Id. ¶¶ 7-9.) MRT obtained a loan of $1,060,000 from Centennial Bank (“Bank”) secured by a deed of trust against the Subject Property (“Deed of Trust”). (Cross-Compl. ¶16.) From 2002 to 2008, MRT was the owner of the property and the holder of the conservation easement. (Id. ¶ 17.) In 2008, the Bank foreclosed on the property and Malibu Horizon Trust, purchased the property for $1,379,153.54 in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. (Id. ¶ 18.) After the foreclosure, MRT was no longer the owner of the Property, but it remained the owner and holder of the Conservation Easement that binds the Property and remains the owner and holder of the Conservation Easement. (See id. ¶ 19.)
MRT alleges that in April 2008, Malibu Horizon Trust conveyed its interest to Canyon Vineyard. (Id. ¶ 20.) “Canyon Vineyard has since allowed homeless encampments and trash to accumulate on the Subject Property and MRT has expended resources clearing encampments and trash.” (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff further alleges that “Canyon Vineyard has taken steps to commence commercial development of the Subject Property with residential uses, in direct contradiction of the Conservation Easement that continues to restrict the use of the Subject Property to ‘natural open space.’” (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23-29.).
BASIS FOR THE MOTION
MRT moves for summary adjudication on first cause of action for a violation of Civil Code section 815.7 on the grounds that there are no triable issues of material.
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1).)
“The supporting papers shall include a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts which the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence. The failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement may in the court's discretion constitute a sufficient ground for denial of the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(b)(1); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(c)(2) & (d).)
“On a motion for summary judgment [or summary adjudication], the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) For the purposes of summary judgment or summary adjudication, a plaintiff meets it initial burden “of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1).) “The defendant or cross-defendant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1).)The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if they can show that there is no triable issue of material fact or if they have a complete defense thereto. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfiend Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)
When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the Court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except evidence to which the Court has sustained an objection, as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1).)
Canyon Vineyard submits an objection to a portion of Exhibit 1 attached to the declaration of David Ezekiel Schlai. Objection number 1 is OVERRULED.
MRT submits evidentiary objections to Canyon Vineyards undisputed material facts. “All written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion.” (See CRC Rules of Court, Rules 3.1354(b), 3.1352.) Since it does not appear that MRT is objecting to evidence filed in support of Canyon Vineyard’s opposition, but rather disputing the additional facts submitted by Canyon Vineyard as legal conclusions and not facts, the Court treats these “objections” to the “facts” as disputed for the purpose of this motion.
REquest for Judicial Notice
MRT requests judicial pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452 and 453 of Exhibits 1-3 and 9-13. These documents are judicially noticeable as court records and as official records. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the request for judicial notice.
Canyon Vineyard requests judicial notice of Exhibits A-C. Exhibits A-C are judicially noticeable as official records. Therefore, the Court GRANTS this request for judicial notice.
MRT argues that it is entitled to summary adjudication on its first cause of action for violation of California Civil Code Section 815.7 because Canyon Vineyard has threatened the open-space protections of the conservation easement established by the Grant Deed.
Section 815.1 of the Civil Code defines a conservation easement as “any limitation in a deed, will, or other instrument in the form of an easement, restriction, covenant, or condition, which is or has been executed by or on behalf of the owner of the land subject to such easement and is binding upon successive owners of such land, and the purpose of which is to retain land predominantly in its natural, scenic, historical, agricultural, forested, or open-space condition.” (Civ. Code, § 815.1 (emphasis added).) Section 815.2 further states that a “conservation easement shall be perpetual in duration.” (Civ. Code, § 815.2(b).) “A conservation easement is an interest in real property voluntarily created and freely transferable in whole or in part for the purposes stated in Section 815.1 by any lawful method for the transfer of interests in real property in this state.” (Civ. Code, § 815.2(a).) Furthermore, a “conservation easement . . . shall constitute an interest in real property notwithstanding the fact that it may be negative in character.” (Civ. Code, § 815.2(b).)
Under Civil Code section 815.7(b) an “[a]ctual or threatened injury to or impairment of a conservation easement or actual or threatened violation of its terms may be prohibited or restrained, or the interest intended for protection by such easement may be enforced, by injunctive relief granted by any court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding initiated by the grantor or by the owner of the easement.” (Civ. Code, § 815.7(b).) Furthermore, “the holder of a conservation easement shall be entitled to recover money damages for any injury to such easement or to the interest being protected thereby or for the violation of the terms of such easement.” (Civ. Code, § 815.7 (c).) Pursuant to Civil Code Section 816, the Court liberally construes the chapter governing conservation easements.
Whether MRT has proved every element of its cause of action
To prevail on its section 815.7(b) claim, MRT has to present evidence either there is a “[a]ctual or threatened injury to or impairment of a conservation easement” or “actual or threatened violation of” the terms of the conservation easement, or “the interest intended for protection by such easement.” (Civ. Code, § 815.7(b).). MRT must also present evidence that it is the owner or the grantor of the easement. (Id.) A grantor or owner of the easement may enforce the terms of the easement “by injunctive relief granted by any court of competent jurisdiction” (Id.)
MRT has established that it is the owner of the conservation easement. (UMF 1, 3 Schlais Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) MRT further argues that there is no dispute of material fact that Canyon Vineyard threatened injury to the conservation easement, identifying three actions undertaken by Canyon Vineyard. MRT presents evidence that Canyon Vineyard entered into various agreement to sell Tuna Canyon to developers in 2008, 2014, and 2016. (UMF 7-8, 9-12. AOE ex. 4 CVE001589-1615; CVE001581, Ex. 14 at 205:14-25.) MRT also provides evidence that Canyon Vineyard marketed the property to potential buyers as available for development despite the express terms of the conservation easement. (See UMF 16, 18, see generally AOE ex. 7, CVE001153.)
In their motion, MRT argues the marketing of the property and attempts to sell the property for development were threats to the terms of the conservation easement. MRT also argues that Canyon Vineyard’s attempts to rezone the property also constituted threatened harm. MRT provides the application for which Canyon Vineyard used to apply to rezone Tuna Canyon for any other zoning that would permit the owner to develop each parcel with an economically viable use residential development. (MF 19, Ex. 8 - CVE001498.) Finally, MRT argues that Canyon Vineyard filed a quiet title action on the property to lift the open-space restrictions imposed by the conservation easement. In its quiet title action, Canyon Vineyard sought relief that the DeJoria Deed did not create conservation easement and that the 2008 “foreclosure sale extinguished . . . the use restrictions” set forth in the Grant Deed; and that CVE owns Tuna Canyon “free and clear of all non tax related encumbrances.” (VAC at pp. 18-19.)
Here, the terms of the conservation easement contained in the grant deed state that “[t]he real property granted hereunder shall be held in perpetuity as natural open space . . ..” (UMF 3 Ex. 1.) The Court finds that when viewed in totality, each of the individual actions taken by Canyon Vineyard are sufficient to demonstrate that Canyon Vineyard threated the conservation easement imposed by the grant deed. The Conservation easement binds all future owners and Canyon Vineyard’s attempts to market the property as a property that can be potentially developed for residential use is in direct conflict with the terms of the conservation easement. Furthermore, Canyon Vineyard’s attempts to rezone the property for residential development threatens the easement because developing the property for private, residential use would on a superficial level, allow Canyon Vineyard and/or future buyers of the property to take immediate steps to change the landscape and the character of the land. Finally, Canyon Vineyard’s attempts to obtain a declaratory judgment finding a perpetual conservation easement as extinguished was an action constituting direct harm to the conservation easement. Here, MRT has met its initial burden of establishing all elements of its claim.
As relief under section 815.7, MRT argues that it is entitled to an injunction. When a grantor or owner of a conservation easement has shown that a party has threatened injury or actually injured a conservation easement, the owner or grantor of the conservation easement may enforce the terms of the easement by injunctive relief granted by any court of competent jurisdiction. The terms of the statute are permissive and not mandatory. “A permanent injunction is a determination on the merits that a plaintiff has prevailed on a cause of action . . . against a defendant and that equitable relief is appropriate. [citation omitted]” (DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Kaleidescape, Inc. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 697, 721.) A party seeking a permanent injunction must show threatened irreparable harm. (Ibid.) “Moreover, a permanent injunction is appropriate if the misconduct is ongoing or likely to recur . . ..” (People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1, 45, as modified (Mar. 10, 2017).) Real property is treated as unique. (See Stewart Dev. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 266, 273.)
Here, MRT has shown that Canyon Vineyard threatened the conservation easement. MRT argues that it is entitled to an injunction because damages would not be sufficient to compensate MRT, or the public, from any threatened or actual violations of the open-space condition of Tuna Canyon. MRT also argues that an injunction is needed to prevent recurring harm. MRT argues that since Canyon Vineyard is the current owner of the property, it is likely to resume its attempts to market and sell the property in ways that are inconsistent with the terms of the conservation easement such that MRT would have to expend more time relitigating issues.
The burden is shifted to Canyon Vineyard to show that there is a dispute of fact or an affirmative defense to MRT’s cause of action.
Whether Canyon Vineyard has shown that there is a dispute of fact or that Canyon Vineyard has a complete defense
Canyon Vineyard argues that there are triable issues of material facts as to whether the injunctions sought by MRT are proper under Civil Code section 815.7. Canyon Vineyards, however, does not contest the underlying facts (or actions taken) that MRT alleges threatened the conservation easement, but rather the import of those various actions. Instead, Canyon Vineyard argues that MRT’s requested injunctions are either not supported by the law, unconstitutional, or both.
Canyon Vineyard argues that MRT does not have standing. However, the statute allows MRT, as the holder of the conservation easement, to seek injunctive relief. The Court previously determined that MRT “continues to hold the conservation easement.” (1/24/20 Order, at p. 10.) Therefore, the Court determines that MRT has standing to maintain this cause of action and seek injunctive relief.
Canyon Vineyard further argues that its marketing of the property, alone, does not constitute actual or threatened injury to the conservation easement. Canyon Vineyard specifically argues, “No amount of brochures or advertising can change the fact that prior to development of the land, there are many intervening steps that must be taken, including rezoning, permitting and environmental mitigation.” Canyon Vineyard also argues that it has not actually harmed the open space protections. However, Canyon Vineyard does not dispute that the terms used in its marketing materials are in direct contravention of the terms of the conservation easement. The advertising of twelve ultra-luxury residential estates is not synonymous with natural open space. MRT only needs to show threatened injury. Canyon Vineyard’s multiple attempted sales of Tuna Canyon to developers, marketing of the property for residential use, and legal attempts to rezone and extinguish the conservation easement all demonstrate that the harm is not speculative but very real.
Canyon Vineyard also argues that its marketing of the property does not give MRT standing to claim injury because MRT was not a potential buyer. As noted above, the statute allows MRT as the owner of the conservation easement to seek injunctive relief to protect the conservation easement. Here, Canyon Vineyard has failed to show that there is a dispute of material fact as to whether its actions constitute “[a]ctual or threatened injury to or impairment of a conservation easement or actual or threatened violation of its terms . . . or the interest intended for protection by such easement” (Civ. Code, § 815.7(b).) Since Canyon Vineyard has failed to meet its burden, MRT is entitled to summary adjudication.
In light of Canyon Vineyard’s actions in marketing and attempting to sell the property for residential use, the Court finds that an injunction is appropriate to prevent recurring harm. The Court will issue an injunction preventing Canyon Vineyard from marketing or attempting to market the property as potentially open for development, as well as taking legal steps to rezone the property and/or extinguish the conservation easement.
MRT is entitled to its attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code section 815.7(d). As set forth herein, MRT is the prevailing party to litigation seeking to enforce and protect a conservation easement. (Id.).
MRT has established that there is no dispute of material facts as to the first cause of action. Therefore, MRT’s motion for summary adjudication is granted. The proposed language of the injunction is narrowly tailored to protect MRT’s interests, namely, preventing Canyon Vineyards “from exploring, pursuing, developing, or marketing any uses of the Subject Property inconsistent with and in violation of the Conservation Easement’s terms.”
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