BRIAN MATHEW WALKER, ET AL. VS LINCOLN TRANSPORTATION SERVICES INC., ET AL.

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: *******3458 Hearing Date: October 28, 2022 Dept: 74

*******3458 BRIAN MATHEW WALKER vs LINCOLN TRANSPORTATION SERVICES

Defendant Lincoln Transportation Services, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Adjudication

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED.

Background

On April 17, 2019, Plaintiff Brian Mathew Walker and Veronica Walker filed this action against Defendants Lincoln Transportation Services Inc. and the Estate of Carlos Hernandez Canizares. The complaint alleged three causes of action: (1) motor vehicle negligence, (2) general negligence, and (3) loss of consortium. The complaint alleges that the Defendants negligently operated a vehicle, which resulted in a vehicle collision and caused severe injuries to the Plaintiffs.

On November 17, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to the Complaint, Fictitious/Incorrect Name, naming Doe 2 as Laufer Group International Ltd. and Doe 3 as Aramsco, Inc. On June 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed Requests for Dismissal as to Defendant the Estate of Carlos Hernandez Canizares, Aramsco, Inc., and Laufer Group International Ltd.

On May 11, 2021, the Court denied Defendant Lincoln Transportation Services, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication.

Motion

On July 1, 2022, Defendant Lincoln Transportation Services filed the instant motion for summary adjudication. The Notice of Motion indicates that Defendant moves for summary adjudication “on the limited grounds that Lincoln Transportation's financial liability is capped at $15,000.00 pursuant to California's permissive user statutes. Lincoln Transportation's request is brought on the grounds that even if Lincoln Transportation is deemed the legal owner of the subject tractor involved in the instant vehicle collision, California's permissive use statutes California Vehicle Code 17150 and 17151 limits Plaintiffs' recovery against Lincoln Transportation to $15,000.00.” (Not. at 2:2-7.)

Opposition

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue there is no statutory basis or legal authority for the Court to grant the requested summary adjudication, Defendant is a motor carrier subject to federal permissive user laws including the required Form MCS-90 endorsement, Defendant has a non-delegable duty to safely operate vehicles on the road, there remain triable issues of fact as to Defendant’s ownership of the tractor, and Defendant’s evidence is inadmissible.

Reply

In reply, Defendant argues MCS-90 is inapplicable, it did not have a non-delegable duty, common ownership, management, or control of the tractor is irrelevant, it cannot be liable for negligent entrustment, Plaintiffs’ evidence is highly objectionable, and Defendants’ evidence is admissible and sufficient.

Evidentiary Objections

The parties’ evidentiary objections are immaterial to the Court’s disposition of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. 437c(q).)

Motion for Summary Adjudication

Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) In analyzing such motions, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) Thus, summary judgment or summary adjudication is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. 437c(c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.)

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc. 437c(f)(1).)

Defendant’s Motion is Procedurally Improper and the Court Cannot Grant the Adjudication Sought

Defendant seeks summary adjudication that “Plaintiff’s recoverable damages are limited to $15,000.00 under California's permissive use statutes.” (Mot. at 12:12-13. See Id. at 14:20-22 (“Lincoln Transportation respectfully requests that the Court adjudicate that if Lincoln Transportation is liable at all to Plaintiffs’, Lincoln Transportation's liability is limited to $15,000.00.”); Not. at 1:28-2:7 (“Defendant . . . will move this Court for an order granting summary adjudication pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 437c(f) on the limited grounds that Lincoln Transportation's financial liability is capped at $15,000.00 pursuant to California's permissive user statutes.”).)

Specifically, Vehicle Code section 17151(a) provides “[t]he liability of an owner, bailee of an owner, or personal representative of a decedent imposed by this chapter and not arising through the relationship of principal and agent or master and servant is limited to the amount of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) for the death of or injury to one person in any one accident and, subject to the limit as to one person, is limited to the amount of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) for the death of or injury to more than one person in any one accident and is limited to the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000) for damage to property of others in any one accident.”

As argued by Plaintiff in opposition, Defendant’s motion is procedurally improper. (Opp. at 8:19-9:11.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(f)(1) provides “[a] motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” The only statutory provision that allows a motion for partial summary adjudication is Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(t), which requires a strict process not followed here. (Code Civ. Proc. 437(c)(t) (“Notwithstanding subdivision (f), a party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to this subdivision.”).) Defendant does not address Plaintiff’s argument in its reply. Defendant contends its motion “is not a reiteration of its previous Motion for Summary Judgment,” (Reply at 2:5-6), which is immaterial to the procedural issue here.

Defendant’s request for summary adjudication does not dispose of a cause of action and does not address an issue of duty. The statute’s reference to affirmative defenses applies when a plaintiff moves for summary adjudication. (Code Civ. Proc. 437c(f)(1) (“A party may move for summary adjudication as to . . . one or more affirmative defenses . . . if the party contends . . . that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action . . .”).) The only damages capable of resolution by summary adjudication are those for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294. (Code Civ. Proc. 473c(f)(1) (“A party may move for summary adjudication as to . . . one or more claims for damages, . . . if the party contends . . . that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code.”); DeCastro West Chodorow & Burns, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 410, 421 (“We also conclude that in order to give effect to the first sentence of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1), the second sentence must also be read in conjunction with the first sentence, so that the reference to ‘a claim for damages’ must be qualified as referring to the previously defined claim for punitive damages.”).) Accordingly, Defendant cannot obtain an order capping Plaintiff’s available damages as part of a motion for summary adjudication, the only issue presented for summary adjudication. (DeCastro, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at 422 (“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1), does not permit summary adjudication of a single item of compensatory damage which does not dispose of an entire cause of action.”).)

The motion is therefore DENIED. The Court shall not address the parties’ arguments on the merits.

Case Number: *******3458 Hearing Date: March 9, 2022 Dept: 74

*******3458 BRIAN MATHEW WALKER vs LINCOLN TRANSPORTATION SERVICES

Defendant’s Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED. Trial is CONTINUED to October 17, 2022, at 10:00 a.m. The Final Status Conference is CONTINUED to October 7, 2022, at 8:30 a.m.

Case Number: *******3458    Hearing Date: May 11, 2021    Dept: 74

*******3458 BRIAN MATHEW WALKER vs LINCOLN TRANSPORTATION SERVICES

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, Summary Adjudication

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED. The court finds there are triable issues of material facts including but not limited to the existence of a non-delegable duty and ownership of the tractor-trailer.

Rulings on Evidentiary Objections

1. Plaintiffs’ Objections

   1. As to the Declaration of Joseph A. Duque

      1. Sustained: 3, 14, 15

      2. Overruled: 1, 2, 4-13

   2. As to the Declaration of Joey Villareal

      1. Sustained: 32

      2. Overruled: 1-29

2. Defendant LTS’s Objections

   1. As to the Declaration of David Azizi

      1. Sustained: none

      2. Overruled: 1-9

   2. As to the Declaration of Lew Grill

      1. Sustain: none

      2. Overruled: 1-13

Case Number: *******3458    Hearing Date: January 11, 2021    Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

INITIAL NOTE: This is not a tentative ruling. It is being posted with the tentative rulings to give Counsel notice not to appear. This is a final order and the case is being transferred.

After review of the court file, the Court makes the following order:

Department 31 of the Personal Injury Court has determined that the above entitled action is complicated based upon the number of pretrial hearings and/or the complexity of the issues presented.

AT THE DIRECTION OF DEPARTMENT 1:

This case is hereby transferred and reassigned to the following Independent Calendar Court in THE CENTRAL DISTRICT, JUDGE MICHELLE WILLIAMS COURT presiding in DEPT. 74 of the STANLEY MOSK Courthouse, for all purposes except trial. Department 1 hereby delegates to the Independent Calendar Court the authority to assign the cause for trial to that Independent Calendar Court.

Any pending motions or hearings, including trial and status conferences, will be reset, continued or vacated at the direction of the newly assigned Independent Calendar court.

Upon receipt of this notice, counsel for Plaintiff shall give notice to all parties of record.

COUNSEL ARE TO NOTE THAT EVEN IF THE CASE SUMMARY STILLS SHOWS DEPARTMENT 31 WITH FUTURE HEARINGS, COUNSEL ARE TO CONSIDER THEM TO BE OFF CALENDAR UNTIL THE NEW COURT SAYS OTHERWISE.

DATED: January 11, 2021 ___________________________

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: *******3458    Hearing Date: August 12, 2020    Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

1. Background

   Plaintiffs, Brian Matthew Walker and Veronica Walker filed this action against Defendants, Lincoln Transportation Services, Inc. the Estate of Carlos Hernandez Canizares, and Does 1-25 for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident. On 6/27/19, Plaintiffs filed an Amendment to Complaint naming Lincoln Transport Phoenix Inc. as Doe 1. On 5/8/20, Plaintiffs then filed a Request for dismissal as to Defendant Lincoln Transport Phoenix, Inc. (“Lincoln Phoenix”) only.

   Plaintiffs now move to compel the depositions of Defendant Lincoln Transportation Services, Inc.’s (“LTS”) employees, Jose Cardenas (“Cardenas”) and Joey Villareal (“Villareal”), and request sanctions in the amount of $3,060.00.

2. Motion to Compel Depositions

1. Moving Argument

Plaintiffs provide that on 5/4/20 they noticed the depositions of LTS’s employees to take place on 5/20/20, but LTS has failed to provide its employees for deposition. Plaintiffs assert that LTS owned the subject tractor trailer that collided in Plaintiff Brian Walker’s truck. Further, Plaintiffs state that it is undisputed that Lincoln Phoenix and LTS share common ownership, control and management and Cardenas and Villareal maintain identical positions making their depositions necessary to this action. Regarding Cardenas, Plaintiffs contend that LTS is unreasonably refusing to produce Cardenas for his deposition by asserting that Cardenas cannot appear because of his age and COVID-19 concerns, as Plaintiffs have offered to have the deposition proceed via video conference. Regarding Villareal, Plaintiffs contend LTS is unreasonably refusing to produce Villareal for volume two of his deposition because while Villareal was produced as a PMK for Lincoln Phoenix, the deposition was not completed and was agreed to be rescheduled to a future date. Plaintiffs argue that these depositions are necessary for Plaintiffs to oppose LTS’s pending motion for summary judgment.

1. Opposing Argument

Defendant LTS argues that its motion for summary judgment, currently pending for 12/17/20, primarily focuses on a choice of law argument to determine whether California or Arizona law applies, and that as a result, the subject depositions are not necessary to oppose the summary judgment motion. Pertaining to Villareal, LTS asserts that Villareal is the vice president for both LTS and Lincoln Phoenix, and that on 12/13/19 Plaintiffs conducted the deposition of Villareal, during which Villarreal answered questions regarding his position with both LTS and Lincoln Phoenix. LTS contends that a stipulation was never entered into on the record to permit the deposition to continue on another day and time. Pertaining to Cardenas, LTS states that it agreed to produce Cardenas for the deposition, and that he will be produced following the lifting of the Stay at Home order when it is safe to do so. LTS asserts that Cardenas has a right to be in the same room as defense counsel during the deposition, but it is not safe to do so during this time.

As of 8/7/20, the court has not received any reply.

1. Analysis

1. Deposition of Jose Cardenas

CCP ; 2025.450(a) provides, “If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.” Further, CCP ; 2025.450 requires the Court to compel the deposition unless it finds Defendant served a valid objection under ;2025.410.

Here, Plaintiffs noticed the deposition of Cardenas on 5/4/20 to proceed on 5/20/20. LTS states only that it is not refusing to produce Cardenas, but that it will only produce him when LTS deems it is safe to do so. This is not an objection under CCP ; 2025.410, and LTS fails to otherwise to cite authority showing the objection is valid. The court notes that California Rules of Court, Emergency Rule 11 states, “Notwithstanding any other law, including Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.310(a) and (b), and rule 3.1010(c) and (d), a party or nonparty deponent, at their election or the election of the deposing party, is not required to be present with the deposition officer at the time of the deposition.” Cardenas, thus, has the election to have the deposition proceed remotely if he wishes to do so and can have his counsel present or not as he chooses. The court concludes that video depositions are sufficient for all parties to meet their right to discovery as well as their right to representation by counsel. Nonetheless, the court understands the parties’ concerns regarding the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and orders the parties to meet and confer to find conditions acceptable to both parties to proceed with the deposition remotely for public safety. The court reminds the parties of the court’s powers under CCP Section 177.5 should the parties not comply with the court’s order.

Furthermore, regarding LTS’s argument that the deposition is unnecessary to oppose its summary judgment motion, LTS fails to cite any authority to support the notion that it can unilaterally decide that Cardenas’s deposition is unnecessary to oppose the motion and fail to produce him. Discovery that is relevant to the case as a whole is appropriate even though the discovery might not be pertinent to a pending motion for summary judgment unless and until the party seeking to block such discovery obtains a protective order.

Plaintiffs’ Counsel and Defense Counsel are ordered to work together to schedule a time, date, and location for the deposition. The deposition must go forward within thirty days. If Counsel are unable to resolve the scheduling issue, Plaintiffs’ Counsel may set the deposition on Plaintiff’s Counsel’s terms with five days’ notice to Defendant’s Counsel (extended per Code if by other than personal service), and with California Rules of Court, Emergency Rule 11 in mind.

1. Deposition of Villareal

Pursuant to CCP ; 2025.610(a), natural persons may generally be deposed only one time during the course of litigation. Code of Civ. Proc. ;2025.610(a) (“Once any party has taken the deposition of any natural person, including that of a party to the action, neither the party who gave, nor any other party who has been served with a deposition notice pursuant to Section 2025.240 may take a subsequent deposition of that deponent.”). However, when good cause is shown for obtaining a second deposition, the Court “may grant leave to take a subsequent deposition.” (CCP ; 2025.610(b).)

In this case, Plaintiffs seek to compel Villareal to appear for a second deposition. Admittedly, Plaintiffs already deposed Villareal on 12/13/19. Plaintiffs do not set forth any grounds to establish good cause to order Villareal to appear for a second deposition after already being deposed and answering questions regarding Lincoln Phoenix and LTS. (See Opp. Duque Decl. ; 11, Exh A.) Plaintiffs contend primarily that the parties agreed to reschedule Villareal’s deposition to a later date. However, the deposition transcript shows only that counsel stated on the record, “[w]e are not going doing [sic] a stip on this case.” (Mot. Exh. 2, p. 105:19-20.) Therefore, there is no evidence that the parties agreed to continue Villareal’s deposition at a later date or time.

Plaintiffs’ motion is denied as to Villareal.

1. Sanctions

CCP ; 2025.450(g)(1) requires the Court to impose sanctions unless it finds the deponent acted with substantial justification or there are circumstances that render imposition of sanctions unjust.

Here, Plaintiffs request sanctions in the total amount of $3,060 against LTS and/or its attorney of record. However, given that Plaintiffs’ motion is only granted in part, and LTS’s COVID-19 concerns regarding Cardenas’s deposition, the court finds sanctions are unwarranted in this matter.

Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at sscdept31@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

Dated this 12^th day of August, 2020