BRIAN C. PEARCY VS WILLIAM MUSHARBASH

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: KC069677    Hearing Date: January 13, 2020    Dept: O

Defendants William Musharbash and Town Square M. Properties, LLC’s petition to compel arbitration and stay court proceeding is GRANTED.

Defendants William Musharbash and Town Square M. Properties, LLC (“Defendants”) petitions to compel arbitration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2.

A written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract. (CCP § 1281.) The court must grant the petition to compel arbitration unless it finds either: no written agreement to arbitrate exists; the right to compel arbitration has been waived; grounds exist for revocation of the agreement; or litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting rulings on common issues. (CCP § 1281.2.)    

The petition to compel arbitration, consequently, functions as a motion and is to be heard in the manner of a motion, i.e., the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion. (CCP § 1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413-14.) Section 1281.4 provides, “if a court of competent jurisdiction… has ordered arbitration of a controversy… the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had.”

Defendants contend Plaintiff Law Offices of Brian C. Pearcy, APC (“Plaintiff”), by and through its principal Brian C. Pearcy, entered into a contract on July 5, 2001 to arbitrate all claims and disputes. (See Declaration of Scott Talkov (“Talkov Decl.”) ¶ 5, Ex. 1.) In the contract, the parties agreed to arbitrate disputes arising from the contract, including those for fees. (Ibid.) The matter shall be submitted to binding arbitration before the arbitration panel of the Riverside County Bar Association. (Ibid.) Specifically, the arbitration provision reads as follows:

Any and all disputes of any nature whatsoever concerning the services provided by the Law Offices of Brian C. Pearcy, APC and/or charges therefor shall be submitted to binding arbitration before the arbitration panel of the Riverside County Bar Association.

Despite this clear provision, the parties disagree about which entity should hear this case in arbitration. Defendants contend that the language of the Agreement states without ambiguity that this matter should be heard in front of the Riverside County Bar Association (“RCBA”). Plaintiff contends that this matter be heard in front of the Riverside County Bar Association Dispute Resolution Service, Inc. (“Dispute Resolution Service”) because Dispute Resolution Service handles non-MFAA arbitration matters. However, Plaintiff fails to explain to the Court why Dispute Resolution Service should handle the arbitration other than suggesting that some individual named Lisa told him so. (See Talkov Decl. Ex. 18.)

The Court finds that there exist valid arbitration agreements that cover the claims asserted. An arbitration should be conducted before a panel of the RCBA. If, within 30 days of this order, the RCBA declines to provide a panel because it is limited to handling exclusively MFAA arbitration matters, the parties are ordered to meet and confer to provide the Court with an approved arbitration service within 60 days. If the parties cannot agree, the Court will order a status conference within 90 days and set the matter for a Court trial.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.