This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/27/2022 at 11:52:42 (UTC).

BOBBY GOSSAI VS RAFIK BELFEROUM, ET AL.

Case Summary

On 11/22/2021 BOBBY GOSSAI filed an Other lawsuit against RAFIK BELFEROUM. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Torrance Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are DEIRDRE HILL and GARY Y. TANAKA. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    *******0855

  • Filing Date:

    11/22/2021

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Other

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

DEIRDRE HILL

GARY Y. TANAKA

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

GOSSAI BOBBY

Defendants

BELFEROUM RAFIK

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK

KNAUSS JOANNE M

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Defendant Attorneys

BEEBE TOD V

KNAUSS JOANNE MIRRAS

 

Court Documents

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON DEMURRER - WITH MOTION TO STRIKE (CCP 430.10); HEA...)

6/21/2022: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON DEMURRER - WITH MOTION TO STRIKE (CCP 430.10); HEA...)

Opposition - OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S (CHASE) DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

6/6/2022: Opposition - OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S (CHASE) DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Opposition - OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S (BELFEROUM) MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

6/6/2022: Opposition - OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S (BELFEROUM) MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Opposition - OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S (CHASE) MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

6/6/2022: Opposition - OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S (CHASE) MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Opposition - OPPOSITION JOINT TO DEFENDANT'S (KNAUSS'S) DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

6/6/2022: Opposition - OPPOSITION JOINT TO DEFENDANT'S (KNAUSS'S) DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Opposition - OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S (BELFEROUM) DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

6/6/2022: Opposition - OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S (BELFEROUM) DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Reply - REPLY OF RAFIK BELFEROUM TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITIONS TO DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE

6/14/2022: Reply - REPLY OF RAFIK BELFEROUM TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITIONS TO DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE

Reply - REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

6/14/2022: Reply - REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

Reply - REPLY OF JOANNE KNAUSS TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITIONS TO DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE

6/14/2022: Reply - REPLY OF JOANNE KNAUSS TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITIONS TO DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE

Reply - REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT

6/14/2022: Reply - REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT

Complaint

11/22/2021: Complaint

Summons - SUMMONS ON COMPLAINT

11/22/2021: Summons - SUMMONS ON COMPLAINT

Civil Case Cover Sheet

11/22/2021: Civil Case Cover Sheet

Challenge To Judicial Officer - Peremptory (170.6)

12/14/2021: Challenge To Judicial Officer - Peremptory (170.6)

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER RE: CCP 170.6 CHALLENGE) OF 12/15/2021

12/15/2021: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER RE: CCP 170.6 CHALLENGE) OF 12/15/2021

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE: CCP 170.6 CHALLENGE)

12/15/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE: CCP 170.6 CHALLENGE)

Motion to Strike (not initial pleading) - NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT

12/20/2021: Motion to Strike (not initial pleading) - NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT

Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10) - NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT; DEMURRER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF AND DECLARATION OF TOD V. BEEBE RE MEET AN

12/20/2021: Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10) - NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT; DEMURRER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF AND DECLARATION OF TOD V. BEEBE RE MEET AN

21 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 09/21/2022
  • Hearing09/21/2022 at 08:30 AM in Department B at 825 Maple Ave., Torrance, CA 90503; Case Management Conference

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  • 06/21/2022
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department B, Gary Y. Tanaka, Presiding; Hearing on Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10) - Held

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 06/21/2022
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department B; Hearing on Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10) - Held

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  • 06/21/2022
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department B; Hearing on Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10) - Held

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  • 06/21/2022
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10); Hea...)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/14/2022
  • DocketReply (in Support of Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint); Filed by JP Morgan Chase Bank (Defendant)

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  • 06/14/2022
  • DocketReply (to Opposition to Demurrer to Complaint); Filed by JP Morgan Chase Bank (Defendant)

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  • 06/14/2022
  • DocketReply (of Rafik Belferoum to Plaintiff's Oppositions to Demurrer and Motion to Strike); Filed by Rafik Belferoum (Defendant)

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  • 06/14/2022
  • DocketReply (of Joanne Knauss to Plaintiff's Oppositions to Demurrer and Motion to Strike); Filed by Joanne M Knauss (Defendant)

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  • 06/06/2022
  • DocketOpposition (Joint To Defendant's (Knauss's) Demurrer and Motion To Strike Plaintiff's Complaint); Filed by Bobby Gossai (Plaintiff)

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18 More Docket Entries
  • 12/20/2021
  • DocketNOTICE OF HEARING ON DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT; DEMURRER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF AND DECLARATION OF TOD V. BEEBE RE MEET AND CONFER REQUIREMENT; Filed by JP Morgan Chase Bank (Defendant)

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  • 12/15/2021
  • Docketat 08:50 AM in Department M, Deirdre Hill, Presiding; Court Order

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  • 12/15/2021
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Court Order re: CCP 170.6 Challenge)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 12/15/2021
  • DocketCertificate of Mailing for ((Court Order re: CCP 170.6 Challenge) of 12/15/2021); Filed by Clerk

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  • 12/14/2021
  • DocketChallenge To Judicial Officer - Peremptory (170.6); Filed by Joanne M Knauss (Defendant)

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  • 11/22/2021
  • DocketNotice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case; Filed by Clerk

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  • 11/22/2021
  • DocketSummons (on Complaint); Filed by Clerk

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  • 11/22/2021
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by Bobby Gossai (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/22/2021
  • DocketOrder on Court Fee Waiver (Superior Court); Filed by Clerk

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 11/22/2021
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Bobby Gossai (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: *******0855 Hearing Date: June 21, 2022 Dept: B

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT

Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Tuesday, June 21, 2022

Department B Calendar No. 1

PROCEEDINGS

Bobby Gossai v. Rafik Belferoum, et al.

*******0855

  1. JP Morgan Chase Bank’s (“Chase”) Demurrer to Complaint

  2. JP Morgan Chase Bank’s Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint

  3. Joanne M. Knauss’s (“Knauss”) Demurrer to Complaint

  4. Joanne M. Knauss’s Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint

  5. Rafik Belferoum’s (“Belferoum”) Demurrer to Complaint

  6. Rafik Belferoum’s Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint

    TENTATIVE RULING

    Defendants’ Demurrers to Complaint are sustained with 20 days leave to amend, in part, and without leave to amend, in part.

    Defendants’ Motions to Strike Portions of Complaint are moot.

    Background

    Plaintiff filed his Complaint on November 22, 2021. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff is the trustor and beneficiary of a trust. The trustee, Mohamed E. Aboselim, has an account at Chase – the account name is identified as “The Bobby Gossai Special Needs Trust, Mohamed Aboselim, Trustee.” Defendant Belferoum was allegedly a former employee of the trustee Aboselim. Defendant Belferoum made scans of five pages of bank records (two deposit slips made by Aboselim, one check signed by Aboselim and payable to Darrell Hernandez, and two pages of bank statements addressed to Aboselim as trustee at his Hawthorne post office box) and sent the scans to his attorney Knauss. Plaintiff alleges causes of action for: 1. Invasion of Privacy – Intrusion into Private Affairs; 2. Invasion of Privacy – Improper Dissemination of Private Records; 3. Theft of Confidential Information – Hacking; 4. Conspiracy; 5. Violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200; 6. Fraudulent Conduct; 7. Negligence; 8. Violation of California Privacy Act; 9. Unfairness -Unfair Information Practices.

    The first through fourth causes of action are alleged against Belferoum. (The Court notes that, while the second cause of action does not specify the party or parties to whom the cause of action is directed, all the allegations are made solely against Belferoum.) The fourth through sixth causes of action are directed against Knauss. The seventh through ninth causes of action are directed against Chase.

    Request for Judicial Notice

    Defendants Belferoum and Knauss’s requests for judicial notice are granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d). However, the requests for judicial notice have no relevance to the issues at hand. The Court notes that there is no showing that Plaintiff is on the vexatious litigant list.

    Meet and Confer

    Defendants Knauss and Belferoum set forth meet and confer declarations in sufficient compliance with CCP 430.41 and CCP 435.5. (Decls., Joanne Mirras Knauss, 3.) Defendant Chase set forth a meet and confer declaration in sufficient compliance with CCP 430.41. (Decl., Tod V. Beebe, 3-4.) The Court notes that the declaration does not appear to support an attempt to meet and confer as to the motion to strike in compliance with CCP 435.5.

    Demurrer

    A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. (Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) In testing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The Court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.App.4th 634, 638.) Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer. (C.C.P., 430.10(e); Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1126.)

    Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case "with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.) "Whether the plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant to ruling upon the demurrer." (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.) Under Code Civil Procedure 430.10(f), a demurrer may also be sustained if a complaint is “uncertain.” Uncertainty exists where a complaint’s factual allegations are so confusing they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)

    Defendant demurs to the second, fifth, and eighth causes of action on the ground that the causes of action fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and that the causes of action are uncertain.

    Demurrer of All Defendants

    As to all causes of action, the demurrers are sustained based on Plaintiff’s lack of standing. “[A] trust beneficiary cannot sue in the name of the trust. But a trust beneficiary can bring a proceeding against a trustee for breach of trust. Moreover, it is well established, and this court has held, that a trust beneficiary can pursue a cause of action against a third party who actively participates in or knowingly benefits from a trustee's breach of trust.” Estate of Bowles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 684, 691–92 (internal citations omitted). “Ordinarily, when a third party acts to further his or her own economic interests by participating with a trustee in such a breach of trust, the beneficiary will bring suit against both the trustee and the third party. However, it is not necessary to join the trustee in the suit, because ‘primarily it is the beneficiaries who are wronged and who are entitled to sue....’ [Citation.] The liability of the third party is to the beneficiaries, rather than to the trustee, ‘and the right of the beneficiaries against the [third party] is a direct right and not one that is derivative through the trustee.’ [Citation.]” (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 467, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 329; see also Bowles, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 694, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 [“[T]he beneficiary's cause of action is independent and not derivative through the trustee; therefore, the trustee is not a necessary party to the action. [Citations.]”].) Thus, “‘when the claim being asserted rests in whole or in part on alleged breaches of trust by the trustee, a beneficiary has standing to pursue such a claim against either (1) the trustee directly, (2) the trustee and third parties participating in or benefiting from his, her, or its breach of trust, or (3) such third parties alone.’” King v. Johnston (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1500–1501.

    Here, Plaintiff is suing as the beneficiary of the trust, but has not alleged facts demonstrating that the trustee has breached the trust, and that the Defendants are acting in concert with the trustee, or that the trustee has refused to assert a claim on behalf of the trust.

    Demurrer of Belferoum/Demurrer of Knauss (4th Cause of Action only)

    First Cause of Action for Invasion of Privacy – Intrusion into Private Affairs

    Second Cause of Action for Invasion of Privacy – Improper Dissemination of Private Records

    “California recognizes four common law claims for invasion of privacy: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) appropriation of another's name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity given to another's private life; and (4) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.” ACS Systems, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 137, 147, fn. 3.

    “The elements of a common law invasion of privacy claim are intrusion into a private place, conversation, or matter, in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. In determining the existence of “offensiveness,” one must consider: (1) the degree of intrusion; (2) the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion; (3) the intruder's motives and objectives; (4) the setting into which the intrusion occurs; and (5) the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded. Actionable invasions of privacy must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right. Thus, the extent and gravity of the invasion is an indispensable consideration in assessing an alleged invasion of privacy. The impact on the plaintiff's privacy rights must be more than “slight or trivial.”

    Whether a legally recognized privacy interest is present in a given case is a question of law to be decided by the court.... Whether plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances and whether defendant's conduct constitutes a serious invasion of privacy are mixed questions of law and fact. If the undisputed material facts show no reasonable expectation of privacy or an insubstantial impact on privacy interests, the question of invasion may be adjudicated as a matter of law.” Mezger v. Bick (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 76, 86–87.

    As to the first and second causes of action, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of a recognized privacy interest, as a matter of law. Plaintiff is not the owner of the account because Plaintiff is not the trustee. The account name is identified as “The Bobby Gossai Special Needs Trust, Mohamed Aboselim, Trustee.” Plaintiff has not demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the matters which were allegedly intruded upon or disseminated. Plaintiff contends that the acts of Defendant intruded upon his “private affairs,” but has not described what “private affairs” were intruded upon by the alleged acts of copying bank records of an account that was not owned by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not clearly stated what personal information of Plaintiff’s that was disseminated or intruded upon by Defendant.

    Therefore, the demurrer to the first and second causes of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

    Third Cause of Action for Theft of Confidential Information – Hacking

    Penal Code section 502 makes unlawful a variety of kinds of “tampering, interference, damage, and unauthorized access to lawfully created computer data and computer systems.” Pen. Code, 502(a). Again, this cause of action fails to state sufficient facts for the reasons already set forth above. There are insufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendant unlawfully accessed data and/or a computer system that actually belonged to Plaintiff as opposed to the “The Bobby Gossai Special Needs Trust, Mohamed Aboselim, Trustee.” In addition, the documents attached to the Complaint appear to demonstrate physical scanning of documents rather than hacking into a computer data and/or system.

    Therefore, the demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

    Fourth Cause of Action for Conspiracy

    “Although conspiracy to commit a tort is not a separate cause of action from the tort itself, alleging a conspiracy fastens liability on those who agree to the plan to commit the wrong as well as those who actually carry it out. [ ] The elements of a civil onspiracy are the formation and operation of the conspiracy and damage resulting to plaintiff from an act done in furtherance of the common design. The major significance of a conspiracy cause of action lies in the fact that it renders each participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrong ... regardless of the degree of his activity. The essence of the claim is that it is merely a mechanism for imposing vicarious liability; it is not itself a substantive basis for liability. Each member of the conspiracy becomes liable for all acts done by others pursuant to the conspiracy, and for all damages caused thereby.” Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 303, 323–24 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Conspiracy, however, is not an independent cause of action. When a plaintiff otherwise states a cognizable cause of action for a civil wrong, he or she may allege conspiracy as a basis of liability as to more than one defendant.” Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 172–173.

    The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained without leave to amend because Civil Conspiracy is not an independent cause of action. In addition, the Court notes that there are no facts to show formation and operation of the conspiracy. Also, no independent cause of action that would support liability against Defendants has been stated. Leave to amend is provided to allege facts of the conspiracy within the independent causes of action.

    Demurrer of Knauss (5th and 6th Causes of Action)

    Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200

    “California Business and Professions Code Sections 17000, et seq., and 17200, et seq., states [sic] that unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices.” Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 618–19. “By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business act or practice, the UCL “borrows” rules set out in other laws and makes violations of those rules independently actionable. [Citation.] However, a practice may violate the UCL even if it is not prohibited by another statute.” Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com. v. Insomniac, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 803, 835.The unfair competition law is independent of the Unfair Practices Act and other laws. Its remedies are “cumulative ... to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state” ( 17205), but its sanctions are less severe than those of the Unfair Practices Act. Prevailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution. ( 17203; see ABC Internat. Traders, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1247, 1268 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 931 P.2d 290].) Plaintiffs may not receive damages, much less treble damages, or attorney fees.” Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 179.

    Plaintiff has failed to identify an unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice committed by demurring Defendant. In addition, Plaintiff has improperly sought damages in connection with this cause of action.

    Therefore, the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

    Sixth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Conduct

    “A complaint for fraud must allege the following elements: (1) a knowingly false representation by the defendant; (2) an intent to deceive or induce reliance; (3) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (4) resulting damages.” Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1807, 1816. “Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in the proper manner and the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged with sufficient specificity to allow defendant to understand fully the nature of the charge made.” Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157. Plaintiff must state facts which “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.

    Plaintiff alleges generally that Defendant fraudulently obtained information, again based on his flawed theories of accessing an account belonging to “The Bobby Gossai Special Needs Trust, Mohamed Aboselim, Trustee.” However, Plaintiff has not alleged the specific facts necessary to state a cause of action for Fraud. Plaintiff has not alleged the specific facts as to what material misrepresentations were made. Plaintiff has not alleged the specific facts to “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645. Plaintiff has not alleged specific facts to demonstrate knowledge of the falsity of the representations, intent to defraud, justifiable reliance, and resulting damages.

    Therefore, the demurrer to the sixth cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

    Demurrer of Chase

    Seventh Cause of Action for Negligence

    “To state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must allege (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff's damages or injuries. [Citation.] Whether a duty of care exists is a question of law to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Alvarez v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 941, 944. “The relationship of bank and depositor is founded on contract, which is ordinarily memorialized by a signature card that the depositor signs upon opening the account. This contractual relationship does not involve any implied duty to supervise account activity or to inquire into the purpose for which the funds are being used and entails no contractual obligation to persons other than the account holder. It follows that [c]ommercial banks have no duty to police their fiduciary accounts and are “not liable for the misappropriation of trust funds by the trustee”

    Chazen v. Centennial Bank (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 532, 537 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

    Plaintiff has failed to state sufficient facts to demonstrate a duty of care owed to Plaintiff, a non-customer, by Defendant Chase, breach of that duty, as well as causation of damages.

    Therefore, the demurrer to the seventh cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

    Eighth Cause of Action for Violation of California Privacy Act

    Ninth Cause of Action for Unfairness -Unfair Information Practices

    Plaintiff makes reference to the “CCPA” in both the eighth and ninth causes of action. The Court notes that Plaintiff also references unspecified “federal law.”

    First, preliminary, of course, the CCPA refers to disclosure requirements as to sale of personal information involving a “consumer.” Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show that he is a consumer of demurring Defendant for the reasons already stated above.

    Civ. Code, 1798.100 states:

    “(a) A consumer shall have the right to request that a business that collects a consumer's personal information disclose to that consumer the categories and specific pieces of personal information the business has collected.

    (b) A business that collects a consumer's personal information shall, at or before the point of collection, inform consumers as to the categories of personal information to be collected and the purposes for which the categories of personal information shall be used. A business shall not collect additional categories of personal information or use personal information collected for additional purposes without providing the consumer with notice consistent with this section.

    (c) A business shall provide the information specified in subdivision (a) to a consumer only upon receipt of a verifiable consumer request.

    (d) A business that receives a verifiable consumer request from a consumer to access personal information shall promptly take steps to disclose and deliver, free of charge to the consumer, the personal information required by this section. The information may be delivered by mail or electronically, and if provided electronically, the information shall be in a portable and, to the extent technically feasible, readily useable format that allows the consumer to transmit this information to another entity without hindrance. A business may provide personal information to a consumer at any time, but shall not be required to provide personal information to a consumer more than twice in a 12-month period.

    (e) This section shall not require a business to retain any personal information collected for a single, one-time transaction, if such information is not sold or retained by the business or to reidentify or otherwise link information that is not maintained in a manner that would be considered personal information.”

    The statute regulates the collection of consumer information which appears to be a completely different theory of liability than the one presumed by Plaintiff – that Defendant was wrong in allowing access to an account belonging to a different entity than Plaintiff by a third party.

    Civ. Code, 1798.150 states:

    “(a)(1) Any consumer whose nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information, as defined in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 1798.81.5, is subject to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of the business's violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information to protect the personal information may institute a civil action for any of the following:

    (A) To recover damages in an amount not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not greater than seven hundred and fifty ($750) per consumer per incident or actual damages, whichever is greater.

    (B) Injunctive or declaratory relief.

    (C) Any other relief the court deems proper.

    (2) In assessing the amount of statutory damages, the court shall consider any one or more of the relevant circumstances presented by any of the parties to the case, including, but not limited to, the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the number of violations, the persistence of the misconduct, the length of time over which the misconduct occurred, the willfulness of the defendant's misconduct, and the defendant's assets, liabilities, and net worth.

    (b) Actions pursuant to this section may be brought by a consumer if, prior to initiating any action against a business for statutory damages on an individual or class-wide basis, a consumer provides a business 30 days' written notice identifying the specific provisions of this title the consumer alleges have been or are being violated. In the event a cure is possible, if within the 30 days the business actually cures the noticed violation and provides the consumer an express written statement that the violations have been cured and that no further violations shall occur, no action for individual statutory damages or class-wide statutory damages may be initiated against the business. No notice shall be required prior to an individual consumer initiating an action solely for actual pecuniary damages suffered as a result of the alleged violations of this title. If a business continues to violate this title in breach of the express written statement provided to the consumer under this section, the consumer may initiate an action against the business to enforce the written statement and may pursue statutory damages for each breach of the express written statement, as well as any other violation of the title that postdates the written statement.

    (c) The cause of action established by this section shall apply only to violations as defined in subdivision (a) and shall not be based on violations of any other section of this title. Nothing in this title shall be interpreted to serve as the basis for a private right of action under any other law. This shall not be construed to relieve any party from any duties or obligations imposed under other law or the United States or California Constitution.”

    Plaintiff has failed to allege pecuniary damages nor has Plaintiff alleged that he provided the opportunity to cure as outlined in the statute.

    Therefore, the demurrer to the eighth and ninth causes of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

    Motion to Strike

    The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. CCP 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. CCP 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. CCP 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. CCP 437.

    Defendants’ Motions to Strike are moot upon the sustaining of the demurrer.

    Defendant Belferoum is ordered to give notice of this ruling.



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