On 04/26/2017 BBR INVESTMENTS LLC filed a Contract - Debt Collection lawsuit against MAH ZAD CORPORATION. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is GREGORY KEOSIAN. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Pending - Other Pending
Los Angeles County Superior Courts
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
Los Angeles, California
BBR INVESTMENTS LLC
ROE CORPORATIONS XI TO XX
ESFAHANI SOLYMAN DAVID
MAH ZAD CORPORATION
DOES 1 TO X
SAYYAR ASSLY ATTORNEY AT LAW
RODRIGUEZ PATRICIA RENEE
5/29/2019: Stipulation - No Order
7/23/2018: Minute Order
7/24/2018: DECLARATION OF ASSLY SAYYAR, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.
7/24/2018: BRIEF RE EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY OF ONE DEFENDANT ON ACTION
2/26/2019: Writ of Execution
4/10/2019: Case Management Statement
4/25/2019: Case Management Order
1/22/2018: Minute Order
5/16/2017: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS
5/16/2017: Proof of Service by 1st Class Mail
5/16/2017: DECLARATION OF DUE DILIGENCE
6/19/2017: DECLARATION OF DILIGENCE
6/20/2017: Minute Order
6/21/2017: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS
6/21/2017: PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL
7/10/2017: CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT
7/20/2017: Minute Order
Hearingat 09:00 AM in Department 61 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Jury TrialRead MoreRead Less
Hearingat 09:00 AM in Department 61 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Final Status ConferenceRead MoreRead Less
Hearingat 09:00 AM in Department 61 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Post-Mediation Status ConferenceRead MoreRead Less
DocketStipulation - No Order (To Set Aside Defendant Mah Zad Corporation Answer, and Allow Plaintiffs' Default Judgment to Stand Aganist Mah-Zad Corporation Only); Filed by Mah Zad Corporation (Defendant); Shahriar Davidesfahani (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
DocketNotice of Posting of Jury Fees; Filed by Mah Zad Corporation (Defendant); Shahriar Davidesfahani (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
DocketNotice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information; Filed by Patricia Renee Rodriguez (Attorney)Read MoreRead Less
Docketat 09:00 AM in Department 61; Case Management Conference - HeldRead MoreRead Less
DocketMinute Order ( (Case Management Conference)); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
DocketCase Management Order; Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
DocketCase Management Statement; Filed by Mah Zad Corporation (Defendant); Shahriar Davidesfahani (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONSRead MoreRead Less
DocketNotice; Filed by Plaintiff/PetitionerRead MoreRead Less
DocketNON SERVICE REPORTRead MoreRead Less
DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
DocketOSC-Failure to File Proof of Serv; Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
DocketORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARINGRead MoreRead Less
DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCERead MoreRead Less
DocketCOMPLAINT FOR 1. BREACH OF CONTRACT; ETCRead MoreRead Less
DocketSUMMONSRead MoreRead Less
DocketComplaint; Filed by BBR Investments, LLC (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
Case Number: BC659218 Hearing Date: January 06, 2020 Dept: 61
Plaintiff BBR Investments, LLC’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED in the amount of $4,491.43 in attorney fees and $2,209.43 in costs.
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Parties to litigation must generally bear their own attorney’s fees, unless they otherwise agree. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.) However, Civil Code § 1717 provides for recovery of attorneys’ fees by a prevailing party in a dispute on a contract if the contract provides for recovery of fees. (Civ. Code § 1717, subd. (a).)
The business loan that BBR sued upon in this action contains a provision for attorney fees incurred in the enforcement of agreement. (Sayyar Decl. Exh. 3.) BBR asks for $4,491.43 in attorney fees and $2,209.43 in costs. (Motion at p. 4.)
“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.) In exercising its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in handling the matter, the attention given, the success or failure, and the resulting judgment. (See id.)
In determining the proper amount of fees to award, courts use the lodestar method. The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the total number of reasonable hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate. “Fundamental to its determination . . . [is] a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . in the presentation of the case.” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48 (Serrano III).) A reasonable hourly rate must reflect the skill and experience of the attorney. (Id. at p. 49.) “Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues. A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635 (Serrano IV).) The Court in Serrano IV also stated that fees associated with preparing the motion to recover attorneys’ fees are recoverable. (See id. at p. 624.)
BBR supports its request for fees and costs with attorney timekeeping entries. (Sayyar Decl. Exh. 2.) The court has reviewed the entries and they appear reasonable. Mah-Zad has filed no opposition to this motion.
BBR’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs is therefore GRANTED in the amount of $4,491.43 in attorney fees and $2,209.43 in costs.
Plaintiff to give notice.
Case Number: BC659218 Hearing Date: November 14, 2019 Dept: 61
Plaintiff BBR Investments, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment or Adjudication Against Defendant Shahriar Davidesfahani is GRANTED. BBR is entitled to principal in the amount of $223,623.50, interest of $27,162.09, and late fees of $929.60, as of February 22, 2017. (Harkless Decl. ¶ 19.) The court also awards pre-judgment interest at a rate of $38.82 per day (7.75% per annum under the contract) from February 23, 2017, to the entry of judgment. (See Civ. Code § 3289, subd. (a).) Plaintiff to submit Judgment within five days.
Plaintiff to give notice.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)
The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Plaintiffs moving for summary judgment may meet their initial burden by “prov[ing] each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).)
Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) The defendant may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
BREACH OF CONTRACT — ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
BBR argues that there are no triable issues of material fact as to its Breach of Contract claim against Shahriar. (Motion at pp. 3–9.)
“[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.)
BBR has made its prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to the existence of the contracts that it seeks to enforce. It has authenticated the Business Loan signed by Mah-Zad and Shahriar. (Harkless Decl. ¶ 5.) The lender performed its obligations under the agreement by loaning the money. (Harkless Decl. ¶ 12.) Shahriar defaulted on the payments after April 6, 2015. (Harkless Decl. ¶ 13.) BBR has incurred damages in the principal amount of $223,623.50 and interest of $27,162.09. (Harkless Decl. ¶ 19.)
Shahriar argues that the contract may be rescinded because of a mutual mistake of fact. (Opposition at pp. 3–4.) But he does not explain what the mistake was, and provides no evidence supporting the existence of this mistake.
Shahriar also argues that the agreement is rescindable under the federal Truth In Lending Act (“TILA”), which requires certain disclosures. (Opposition at pp. 4–5.) Specifically, Shahriar argues that the loan agreement did not disclose the borrower’s right to rescind the agreement under 15 U.S.C. § 1635, subd. (a). (Opposition at pp. 4–6.)
Shahriar’s argument is without merit. The TILA applies to “consumer credit transaction[s]” (15 U.S.C. § 1635, subd. (a)), and expressly exempts “[c]redit transactions involving extensions of credit primarily for business, commercial, or agricultural purposes.” (15 U.S.C. § 1603, subd. (1); see Toy Nat. Bank of Sioux city v. McGarr (1979) 286 N.W.2d 376, 378 [“Not every loan transaction which results in a security interest in the debtor's residence is subject to this statutory right of rescission. The transaction must be otherwise subject to the Act, i. e., it must be a consumer loan rather than a business or commercial one.”].) The adjective “consumer” is defined in relation to a credit transaction “as one in which the party to whom credit is offered or extended is a natural person, and the money, property, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” (15 U.S.C. § 1602, subd. (i).) Shahriar presents no argument or evidence as to why the loan at issue here, made to a corporation, and guaranteed by himself, was a “consumer” transaction covered by the TILA.
Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. BBR is entitled to principal in the amount of $223,623.50, interest of $27,162.09, and late fees of $929.60, as of February 22, 2017. (Harkless Decl. ¶ 19.) The court also awards pre-judgment interest at a rate of $38.82 per day (7.75% per annum under the contract) from February 23, 2017, to the entry of judgment. (See Civ. Code § 3289, subd. (a).)