This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 05/28/2019 at 01:48:04 (UTC).

ANTONIO CUTTS VS MORLEY BUILDERS INC ET AL

Case Summary

On 12/28/2017 ANTONIO CUTTS filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against MORLEY BUILDERS INC. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is TERESA A. BEAUDET. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****8363

  • Filing Date:

    12/28/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

TERESA A. BEAUDET

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

CUTTS ANTONIO

Defendants

HELIX ELECTRIC INC

BLVD 6200 OWNER SOUTH LLC

BENCHMARK CONTRACTORS INC.

MORLEY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorney

RAMEY JOHN F. ESQ.

Defendant Attorneys

AINSLIE ADAM ANTHONY

STELLWAGEN ROBERT H. JR

 

Court Documents

NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS OR OTHER CONTACT INFORMATION

1/25/2018: NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS OR OTHER CONTACT INFORMATION

RESERVATION ID: 180213289463 DLJ RESERVATION ID 180213289470 CLARETT RESERVATION ID 180213289485 HELIX RESERVATION ID: 180213289479 MORLEY

2/13/2018: RESERVATION ID: 180213289463 DLJ RESERVATION ID 180213289470 CLARETT RESERVATION ID 180213289485 HELIX RESERVATION ID: 180213289479 MORLEY

DEFENDANT HELIX ELECTRIC INC.'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF 'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

2/13/2018: DEFENDANT HELIX ELECTRIC INC.'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF 'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

DEFENDANT MORLEY BUILDERS INC 'S MOTION TO STRIKE

2/13/2018: DEFENDANT MORLEY BUILDERS INC 'S MOTION TO STRIKE

DELCARATION OF ADAM A AINSLIE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS DLJ REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS L P AND

2/13/2018: DELCARATION OF ADAM A AINSLIE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS DLJ REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS L P AND

DEFENDANT MORLEY BUILDERS INC'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF 'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

2/13/2018: DEFENDANT MORLEY BUILDERS INC'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF 'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

DEFENDANTS DLJ REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS, L P AND CLARETT WEST DEVELOPMENT LLC 'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF 'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

2/13/2018: DEFENDANTS DLJ REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS, L P AND CLARETT WEST DEVELOPMENT LLC 'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF 'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

DEFENDANT HELIX ELECTRIC INC'S MOTION TO STRIKE

2/13/2018: DEFENDANT HELIX ELECTRIC INC'S MOTION TO STRIKE

RESERVATION ID 180213289463 DLJ RESERVATION ID 180213289470 CLARETT

2/13/2018: RESERVATION ID 180213289463 DLJ RESERVATION ID 180213289470 CLARETT

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS CLARETT WEST DEVELOPMENT, LLC AND DLJ REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS, LP.'S DEMURRER

3/1/2018: PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS CLARETT WEST DEVELOPMENT, LLC AND DLJ REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS, LP.'S DEMURRER

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HELIX ELECTRIC, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE

3/1/2018: PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HELIX ELECTRIC, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT MORLEY BUILDERS, INC.'S DEMURRER TO THE COMPLAINT

3/1/2018: PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT MORLEY BUILDERS, INC.'S DEMURRER TO THE COMPLAINT

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT CLARETT WEST DEVELOPMENT, LLC AND DLJ REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS, L.P.'S MOTION TO STRIKE

3/1/2018: PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT CLARETT WEST DEVELOPMENT, LLC AND DLJ REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS, L.P.'S MOTION TO STRIKE

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HELIX ELECTRIC, INC.'S DEMURRER TO THE COMPLAINT

3/1/2018: PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HELIX ELECTRIC, INC.'S DEMURRER TO THE COMPLAINT

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT MORLEY BUILDERS, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE

3/1/2018: PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT MORLEY BUILDERS, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE

DEFENDANTS DLJ REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS, L.P. AND CLARETT WEST DEVELOPMENT, LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

3/7/2018: DEFENDANTS DLJ REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS, L.P. AND CLARETT WEST DEVELOPMENT, LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

DEFENDANT MORLEY BUILDERS, INC.'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

3/7/2018: DEFENDANT MORLEY BUILDERS, INC.'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

DEFENDANT HELIX ELECTRIC, INC.'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

3/7/2018: DEFENDANT HELIX ELECTRIC, INC.'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

47 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 05/23/2019
  • DocketDeclaration (of Adam Ainslie ISO MSJ); Filed by Morley Construction Company (Defendant)

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  • 05/23/2019
  • DocketSeparate Statement; Filed by Morley Construction Company (Defendant)

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  • 05/23/2019
  • DocketRequest for Judicial Notice; Filed by Morley Construction Company (Defendant)

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  • 05/23/2019
  • DocketExhibit List; Filed by Morley Construction Company (Defendant)

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  • 05/23/2019
  • DocketMotion for Summary Judgment; Filed by Morley Construction Company (Defendant)

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  • 05/23/2019
  • DocketDeclaration (of Mike Hetman ISO MSJ); Filed by Morley Construction Company (Defendant)

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  • 03/21/2019
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 50, Teresa A. Beaudet, Presiding; Hearing on Ex Parte Application (to Continue Trial and Continue the hearing on MSJ) - Held

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  • 03/21/2019
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 50, Teresa A. Beaudet, Presiding; Status Conference - Held

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  • 03/21/2019
  • DocketOrder (granting defendants' ex parte application); Filed by Benchmark Contractors, Inc. (Defendant); Blvd 6200 Owner South, LLC (Defendant); Helix Electric Inc (Defendant) et al.

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  • 03/21/2019
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Status Conference; Hearing on Ex Parte Application to Continu...)); Filed by Clerk

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91 More Docket Entries
  • 01/10/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Antonio Cutts (Plaintiff)

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  • 01/09/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons

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  • 01/09/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

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  • 01/08/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 01/08/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons

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  • 01/08/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

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  • 01/08/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons

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  • 12/28/2017
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 12/28/2017
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Antonio Cutts (Plaintiff)

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  • 12/28/2017
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 1. NEGLIGENCE AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS 2. NEGLIGENCE PER SE AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS 3. PREMISES LIABILITY AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: ****8363 Hearing Date: January 27, 2022 Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

antonio cutts,

Plaintiff,

vs.

morley construction company, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.:

BC 688363

Hearing Date:

January 27, 2022

Hearing Time:

10:00 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

DEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Background

On December 28, 2017, Plaintiff Antonio Cutts (“Cutts”) filed this action against Defendants Morley Construction Company (“Morley”), Benchmark Contractors, Inc. (“Benchmark”), Helix Electric, Inc. (“Helix”), and Blvd 6200 Owner South, LLC (“Blvd 6200”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was filed on August 7, 2018, and asserts causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) negligence per se, and (3) premises liability stemming from injuries sustained by Cutts while working on a construction project located at 6200 Hollywood Blvd., Hollywood, California 90028 (the “Property”).

On May 23, 2019, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, which was opposed by Cutts. On January 16, 2020, the Court issued an order denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication in its entirety. Thereafter, Defendants’ moved for leave to file another motion for summary judgment based on newly discovered facts and circumstances. On August 20, 2020, the Court issued an order granting Defendants’ motion for leave to file a second motion for summary judgment.

Defendants now move for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of the first, second, and third causes of action. Cutts opposes.

Evidence

The Court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice as to Items 1 and 2.

The Court rules on Cutts’s evidentiary objections to the evidence presented by Defendants as follows:

Objections 1-12: overruled

The Court rules on Defendants’ evidentiary objections as follows:

Objections 1-5, 13: sustained

Objection 6-12: overruled

Legal Standard

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Proc., 437c (c)","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":[],"IconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":0,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":8,"IsEnabled":false,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":0,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":true,"ShowPinPointPage":false,"SuggestionVisibility":false,"SuggestedDocUri":"[A]%20motion%20for%20summary%20judgment%20shall%20be%20granted%20if%20all%20the%20papers%20submitted%20show%20that%20there%20is%20no%20triable%20issue%20as%20to%20any%20material%20fact%20and%20that%20the%20moving%20party%20is%20entitled%20to%20a%20judgment%20as%20a%20matter%20of%20law."}}}' docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” ( Full.StateStatuteCite Cal. 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The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If the moving party carries this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Ibid. ) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)"},"foundBy":"","pattern":"Full.StateStatuteCite","tabName":"Cal. Civ. Proc. 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Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850Full.CaseCitationciteReporter.NameCal. 4thReporter.Volume25Reporter.FirstPage826Reporter. PinPages.First850","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_3","Original_string":"Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Full.CaseCitation","PinPage":"850","ReadOrderIndex":2452,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"25 Cal. 4th 826","Start":2411,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If the moving party carries this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. ( Id.CaseUId 36 Cal. App. 4th 1032 ","ParentCiteID":null,"Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Ibid.","original_string":"Ibid.","error":null,"fullText":"Ibid. ","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"36 Cal. App. 4th 1032","isParallel":false,"parallel":"","legistlativeHistory":null,"isLegislativeHistory":false,"start":2632,"end":2638,"pattern":"Id.CaseUId","readOrderIndex":2632,"index":601,"citeType":1,"CiteShepSignal":2,"CiteShepSignalLink":"https: advance.lexis.com/api/shepards?context=1000516&id=urn:contentItem:7XWR-K2V1-2NSD-N0ND-00000-00","story":"wdMainTextStory","PinPage":"1036","name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK70","foundBy":"","FullTextParen":null,"ParentheticalType":null,"IntermediateCite":false,"TOAHeading":null,"ts":{"$ref":"1"},"master":" RESULTS_9","kernel_data":"Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.Id.CaseUIdciteCaseNameXYZZY v. 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PinPages1036Reporter. PinPages._PatternPinPagesFirst.PinPagesFirstReporter. PinPages.First1036Reporter. PinPages.First. PageNumber1036Reporter. PinPages.First._PatternFirstPageInRangeSupp.FirstPageInRangeSuppReporter._PatternIdAtReporter.IdAtReporterReporter.atatReporter.FirstPage1032Reporter.NameCal. App. 4thReporter.pagepageReporter.Reporter.pagepageReporter.RequiredComma, Reporter.RequiredComma._PatternRequiredComma.RequiredCommaReporter.RequiredComma.Comma,Reporter.Volume36RequiredComma, RequiredComma._PatternRequiredComma.RequiredCommaSecondPartyFalcon Cable TV suprasupra, supra.,, supra._PatternShortCaseSupra.ShortCaseSuprasupra.suprasupra"},"IconIndicator":{"Id":4,"Title":"Text is not recognized as a valid cite. It will be included in the Other section of TOA, and long/short forms will not be updated automatically. 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Ibid.

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.IdciteReporter.Namecal4thReporter.Volume25Reporter.FirstPage826Reporter. PinPages.First850","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_2","Original_string":"Ibid.","Page":null,"Parallel":null,"Pattern":"Id","PinPage":"850","ReadOrderIndex":2631,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"25 Cal. 4th 826","Start":2632,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Ibid.

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Ibid.) Courts “Correct quotation (No suggestions)","CitationText":"Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389","ModifiedCitationText":"Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":[],"IconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":0,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":8,"IsEnabled":false,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":0,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":true,"ShowPinPointPage":false,"SuggestionVisibility":false,"SuggestedDocUri":"liberally%20construe%20the%20evidence%20in%20support%20of%20the%20party%20opposing%20summary%20judgment%20and%20resolve%20doubts%20concerning%20the%20evidence%20in%20favor%20of%20that%20party."}}}' docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” ( Full.CaseCitation 39 Cal. 4th 384 ","ParentCiteID":null,"Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Dore v. 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Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389Full.CaseCitationciteReporter.NameCal. 4thReporter.Volume39Reporter.FirstPage384Reporter. PinPages.First389","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_4","Original_string":"Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Full.CaseCitation","PinPage":"389","ReadOrderIndex":2837,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"39 Cal. 4th 384","Start":2799,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

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Code Civ. Proc., 437c(p)(2)

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Code Civ. Proc., 437c(p)(2)Code Civ. Proc., 437c(p)(2)Code Civ. Proc., 437c(p)(2)Full.StateStatuteCiteciteReporter.Name","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_5","Original_string":"Code Civ. Proc., 437c(p)(2)","Page":null,"Parallel":null,"Pattern":"Full.StateStatuteCite","PinPage":null,"ReadOrderIndex":3066,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 437c","Start":3066,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Code Civ. Proc., 437c(p)(2)

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Code Civ. Proc., 437c(p)(2).)

Discussion

Defendants contend that Cutts’s action against them is barred by the Privette doctrine. In Full.CaseCitation 5 Cal. 4th 689 ","ParentCiteID":null,"Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689","original_string":"Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689","error":null,"fullText":"Privette v. 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Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, the California Supreme Court held that an employee of an independent contractor performing inherently dangerous work may not seek recovery of tort damages from the person who hired the contractor but did not cause the injuries. (Id. at p. 702.) This is so because workers’ compensation “is the exclusive remedy against an employer for injury or death of an employee” and because the hirer of the contractor “generally has no right of control as to the mode of doing the work contracted for.” (Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted].) "},"foundBy":"","pattern":"Full.CaseCitation","tabName":"5 Cal. 4th 689"},{"$id":"18","Name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK63","Range":{"$id":"19","ts":{"$ref":"15"},"_Start":370,"_End":383,"_Text":"Defendants contend that Cutts’s action against them is barred by the Privette doctrine. In Privette v. 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Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, the California Supreme Court held that an employee of an independent contractor performing inherently dangerous work may not seek recovery of tort damages from the person who hired the contractor but did not cause the injuries. (Id. at p. 702.) This is so because workers’ compensation “is the exclusive remedy against an employer for injury or death of an employee” and because the hirer of the contractor “generally has no right of control as to the mode of doing the work contracted for.” (Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted].) "},"foundBy":"","pattern":"Full.CaseCitation","tabName":"13 Cal. App. 5th 635"}],"Range":{"$id":"22","ts":{"$ref":"15"},"_Start":0,"_End":746,"_Text":"Defendants contend that Cutts’s action against them is barred by the Privette doctrine. In Privette v. 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Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689Full.CaseCitationciteReporter.NameCal. 4thReporter.Volume5Reporter.FirstPage689","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_7","Original_string":"Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Full.CaseCitation","PinPage":null,"ReadOrderIndex":3235,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"5 Cal. 4th 689","Start":3201,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, the California Supreme Court held that an employee of an independent contractor performing inherently dangerous work may not seek recovery of tort damages from the person who hired the contractor but did not cause the injuries. ( 5 Cal. 4th 689 ","ParentCiteID":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK64","Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Id. at p. 702","original_string":"Id. at p. 702","error":null,"fullText":"Id. at p. 702","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"5 Cal. 4th 689","isParallel":false,"parallel":"","legistlativeHistory":null,"isLegislativeHistory":false,"start":3480,"end":3493,"pattern":"","readOrderIndex":3480,"index":370,"citeType":1,"CiteShepSignal":2,"CiteShepSignalLink":"https: advance.lexis.com/api/shepards?context=1000516&id=urn:contentItem:7XWN-03D1-2NSF-C2D3-00000-00","story":"wdMainTextStory","PinPage":"702","name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK63","foundBy":"","FullTextParen":null,"ParentheticalType":null,"IntermediateCite":false,"TOAHeading":null,"ts":{"$ref":"15"},"master":" RESULTS_5","kernel_data":"Id. at p. 702Id. at p. 702Id. at p. 702citeCaseNameXYZZY v. KamalaCaseName.FirstPartyPrivetteCaseName.FirstParty._PatternParty.PartyCaseName.FirstParty.PartyPrivetteCaseName.SecondPartySuperior CourtCaseName.SecondParty._PatternParty.PartyCaseName.SecondParty.PartySuperior CourtCaseName.vv.CourtParenthetical (1993) CourtParenthetical._PatternCourtParenthetical.CourtParentheticalCourtParenthetical.Date1993 CourtParenthetical.Date._PatternCourtParenthetical.Date.DateCourtParenthetical.Date.Year1993CourtParenthetical.Date.Year._PatternCourtParenthetical.Date.Year.YearCourtParenthetical.Date.Year.Year1993CourtParenthetical.ForbiddenComma._PatternForbiddenComma.ForbiddenCommaCourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L (CourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L.((CourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L._PatternSwitch ( [ L.Switch ( [ LCourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R) CourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R.))CourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R._PatternSwitch ) ] R.Switch ) ] RFirstPartyPrivette HAS_AUTHORITATIVE_DATAYESIdIbid.Id._PatternIbidGraph.IbidGraphId.ForbiddenComma._PatternForbiddenComma.ForbiddenCommaId.IdIbid.master_name RESULTS_5NY L Paren(NY R Paren)pagepageReporterat p. 702Reporter.[[Reporter.]]Reporter. PinPages702Reporter. PinPages._PatternPinPagesFirst.PinPagesFirstReporter. PinPages.First702Reporter. PinPages.First. PageNumber702Reporter. PinPages.First._PatternFirstPageInRangeSupp.FirstPageInRangeSuppReporter._PatternIdAtReporter.IdAtReporterReporter.atatReporter.FirstPage689Reporter.NameCal. 4thReporter.pagepageReporter.Reporter.pagepageReporter.Volume5RequiredComma, RequiredComma._PatternRequiredComma.RequiredCommaSecondPartySuperior Court suprasupra, supra.,, supra._PatternShortCaseSupra.ShortCaseSuprasupra.suprasupra"},"IconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"Display":"Id. at p. 702","CitationRichText":"Id. at p. 702","IconShepardSignal":{"Id":2,"Title":"Possible negative treatment - cases","IconType":0,"ImagePath":"/Content/Images/IconSignalPossibleNegative.gif","Description":null},"ShepardSignalLink":"https: advance.lexis.com/api/shepards?context=1000516&id=urn:contentItem:7XWN-03D1-2NSF-C2D3-00000-00","ShowShepardSignal":true,"ShowParentLink":true,"ParentCitation":null,"SuggestionsForCitation":[],"SuggestionsForCite":[],"SelectedSuggestion":null,"IsSuggestionEnabled":false,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"OriginalUseCurrentIconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"CitationMarkupText":"Id. at p. 702","ShortText":"5 Cal. 4th 689","IsParentCorrect":true,"IsParentCorrectableConfirmed":false,"IsParentUnknownConfirmed":false,"IsParentCorrectable":false,"IsParentUnknown":false,"CitationOriginalText":"Id. at p. 702","ModifiedCiteText":null,"MarkUp":null,"IsCheckCurrent":false,"PreviousCitationRetain":null},"CQ":"","TOA":"","html":"

Id. at p. 702

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Id. at p. 702Id. at p. 702Id. at p. 702IdciteReporter.Namecal4thReporter.Volume5Reporter.FirstPage689","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_6","Original_string":"Id. at p. 702","Page":null,"Parallel":null,"Pattern":"Id","PinPage":"702","ReadOrderIndex":3479,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"5 Cal. 4th 689","Start":3480,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Id. at p. 702

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Id. at p. 702.) This is so because workers’ compensation “Correct quotation (No suggestions)","CitationText":"Id. at p. 702","ModifiedCitationText":"Id. at p. 702","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":["Id. at p. 697"],"IconIndicator":9,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":9,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":9,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":9,"IsEnabled":false,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":1,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":false,"ShowPinPointPage":true,"SuggestionVisibility":false,"SuggestedDocUri":"is%20the%20exclusive%20remedy%20against%20an%20employer%20for%20injury%20or%20death%20of%20an%20employee"}}}' docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">is the exclusive remedy against an employer for injury or death of an employee” and because the hirer of the contractor “has . . . no right of control as to the mode of doing the work contracted for .","SuggestionForQuote":"generally has “‘“‘no right of control as to the mode of doing the work contracted for","CCSuggestionForQuote":" generally has no right of control as to the mode of doing the work contracted for","CitationText":"Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted]","ModifiedCitationText":"Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted]","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":[],"IconIndicator":9,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":10,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":8,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":8,"IsEnabled":true,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":0,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":false,"ShowPinPointPage":false,"SuggestionVisibility":true,"SuggestedDocUri":"generally%20has%20no%20right%20of%20control%20as%20to%20the%20mode%20of%20doing%20the%20work%20contracted%20for."}}}' docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">generally has no right of control as to the mode of doing the work contracted for.” ( Full.CaseCitation 13 Cal. App. 5th 635 ","ParentCiteID":null,"Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted]","original_string":"Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted]","error":null,"fullText":"Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted]","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"13 Cal. 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Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted]

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted]Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted]Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted]Full.CaseCitationciteReporter.NameCal. App. 5thReporter.Volume13Reporter.FirstPage635Reporter. PinPages.First640","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_8","Original_string":"Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted]","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Full.CaseCitation","PinPage":"640","ReadOrderIndex":3798,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"13 Cal. App. 5th 635","Start":3744,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted]

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted].)

Nevertheless, certain exceptions to the Privette doctrine exist. First, “Correct quotation (No suggestions)","CitationText":"Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]","ModifiedCitationText":"Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":[],"IconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":0,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":8,"IsEnabled":false,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":0,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":true,"ShowPinPointPage":false,"SuggestionVisibility":false,"SuggestedDocUri":"when%20the%20hirer%20retains%20control%20over%20safety%20conditions%20at%20the%20worksite"}}}' docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">when the hirer retains control over safety conditions at the worksite” and “that . . . affirmatively contribute[s] . . . to the employee’s workplace injury ,","SuggestionForQuote":"exercised that control in a way that ‘affirmatively contribute[d]’ to the employee's workplace injury","CCSuggestionForQuote":" exercised that control in a way that affirmatively contribute[d] to the employee's workplace injury","CitationText":"Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]","ModifiedCitationText":"Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":[],"IconIndicator":9,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":10,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":8,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":8,"IsEnabled":true,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":0,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":false,"ShowPinPointPage":false,"SuggestionVisibility":true,"SuggestedDocUri":"exercise[s]%20that%20control%20in%20a%20way%20that%20affirmatively%20contribute[s]%20to%20the%20employee%e2%80%99s%20workplace%20injury,"}}}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">exercise[s] that control in a way that affirmatively contribute[s] to the employee’s workplace injury,” the hirer may be liable. ( 13 Cal. App. 5th 635 ","ParentCiteID":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK65","Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]","original_string":"Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]","error":null,"fullText":"Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"13 Cal. 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First, “when the hirer retains control over safety conditions at the worksite” and “exercise[s] that control in a way that affirmatively contribute[s] to the employee’s workplace injury,” the hirer may be liable. (Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]); (see also Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 213 [“if a hirer does retain control over safety conditions at a worksite and negligently exercises that control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to an employee’s injuries, it is only fair to impose liability on the hirer”].) The affirmative contribution “can take the form of actively directing a contractor or contractor’s employee, but can also take the form of a hirer’s omission, such as failing to undertake a particular safety measure after promising to do so.” (Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker].) "},"foundBy":"","pattern":"Id.CaseId","tabName":"13 Cal. 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The affirmative contribution “can take the form of actively directing a contractor or contractor’s employee, but can also take the form of a hirer’s omission, such as failing to undertake a particular safety measure after promising to do so.” (Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker].) "},"foundBy":"","pattern":"Full.CaseCitation","tabName":"27 Cal. 4th 198"},{"$id":"28","Name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK68","Range":{"$id":"29","ts":{"$ref":"23"},"_Start":877,"_End":964,"_Text":"Nevertheless, certain exceptions to the Privette doctrine exist. First, “when the hirer retains control over safety conditions at the worksite” and “exercise[s] that control in a way that affirmatively contribute[s] to the employee’s workplace injury,” the hirer may be liable. (Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]); (see also Hooker v. 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First, “when the hirer retains control over safety conditions at the worksite” and “exercise[s] that control in a way that affirmatively contribute[s] to the employee’s workplace injury,” the hirer may be liable. (Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]); (see also Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 213 [“if a hirer does retain control over safety conditions at a worksite and negligently exercises that control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to an employee’s injuries, it is only fair to impose liability on the hirer”].) The affirmative contribution “can take the form of actively directing a contractor or contractor’s employee, but can also take the form of a hirer’s omission, such as failing to undertake a particular safety measure after promising to do so.” (Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker].) 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Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]

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Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]

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see also Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 213 [“if a hirer does retain control over safety conditions at a worksite and negligently exercises that control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to an employee’s injuries, it is only fair to impose liability on the hirer”]

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">see also Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198Full.CaseCitationciteReporter.NameCal. 4thReporter.Volume27Reporter.FirstPage198","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_25","Original_string":"Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Full.CaseCitation","PinPage":null,"ReadOrderIndex":10185,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"27 Cal. 4th 198","Start":10139,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 213 [“if a hirer does retain control over safety conditions at a worksite and negligently exercises that control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to an employee’s injuries, it is only fair to impose liability on the hirer”]
.) The affirmative contribution “Correct quotation (No suggestions)","CitationText":"Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker]","ModifiedCitationText":"Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker]","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":[],"IconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":0,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":8,"IsEnabled":false,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":0,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":true,"ShowPinPointPage":false,"SuggestionVisibility":false,"SuggestedDocUri":"can%20take%20the%20form%20of%20actively%20directing%20a%20contractor%20or%20contractor%e2%80%99s%20employee,%20but%20can%20also%20take%20the%20form%20of%20a%20hirer%e2%80%99s%20omission,%20such%20as%20failing%20to%20undertake%20a%20particular%20safety%20measure%20after%20promising%20to%20do%20so."}}}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">can take the form of actively directing a contractor or contractor’s employee, but can also take the form of a hirer’s omission, such as failing to undertake a particular safety measure after promising to do so.” ( Full.CaseCitation 153 Cal. App. 4th 137 ","ParentCiteID":null,"Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker]","original_string":"Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker]","error":null,"fullText":"Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker]","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"153 Cal. 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KamalaCaseName.FirstPartyEvardCaseName.FirstParty._PatternParty.PartyCaseName.FirstParty.PartyEvardCaseName.SecondPartySouthern California EdisonCaseName.SecondParty._PatternParty.PartyCaseName.SecondParty.PartySouthern California EdisonCaseName.vv.CourtParenthetical (2007) CourtParenthetical._PatternCourtParenthetical.CourtParentheticalCourtParenthetical.Date2007 CourtParenthetical.Date._PatternCourtParenthetical.Date.DateCourtParenthetical.Date.Year2007CourtParenthetical.Date.Year._PatternCourtParenthetical.Date.Year.YearCourtParenthetical.Date.Year.Year2007CourtParenthetical.ForbiddenComma._PatternForbiddenComma.ForbiddenCommaCourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L (CourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L.((CourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L._PatternSwitch ( [ L.Switch ( [ LCourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R) CourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R.))CourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R._PatternSwitch ) ] R.Switch ) ] RFirstPartyEvard HAS_AUTHORITATIVE_DATAYESNY L Paren(NY R Paren)Parenthetical [discussing Hooker] Parenthetical.([ (Parenthetical.([.[[Parenthetical.([._Pattern([.([Parenthetical.])) Parenthetical.]).]]Parenthetical.])._Pattern]).])Parenthetical. 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Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker]

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker]Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker]Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker]Full.CaseCitationciteReporter.NameCal. App. 4thReporter.Volume153Reporter.FirstPage137Reporter. PinPages.First145","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_11","Original_string":"Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker]","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Full.CaseCitation","PinPage":"145","ReadOrderIndex":4776,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"153 Cal. App. 4th 137","Start":4733,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker]

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker].)

Second, Privette does not apply when nondelegable duties are involved. ( Full.CaseCitation 36 Cal. App. 4th 1032 ","ParentCiteID":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK70","Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038","original_string":"Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038","error":null,"fullText":"Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"36 Cal. 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One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor.” (Id. at p. 1036.) “Nondelegable duties may arise when a statute provides specific safeguards or precautions to insure the safety of others.” (Ibid.); see also Rest. 2d Torts, 424 [“One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specific safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.”]. Thus, a failure to comply with a specific statute or regulation may constitute an omission that “creates a triable issue of fact as to whether [a] defendant[] breached [his or her] nondelegable duty in a manner that affirmatively contributed to [the contractor’s employee’s] injury.” (Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148.) "},"foundBy":"","pattern":"Full.CaseCitation","tabName":"36 Cal. App. 4th 1032"},{"$id":"34","Name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK69","Range":{"$id":"35","ts":{"$ref":"31"},"_Start":336,"_End":350,"_Text":"Second, Privette does not apply when nondelegable duties are involved. (Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038.) “A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others. One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor.” (Id. at p. 1036.) “Nondelegable duties may arise when a statute provides specific safeguards or precautions to insure the safety of others.” (Ibid.); see also Rest. 2d Torts, 424 [“One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specific safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.”]. Thus, a failure to comply with a specific statute or regulation may constitute an omission that “creates a triable issue of fact as to whether [a] defendant[] breached [his or her] nondelegable duty in a manner that affirmatively contributed to [the contractor’s employee’s] injury.” (Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148.) "},"foundBy":"","pattern":"Id.CaseId","tabName":"36 Cal. App. 4th 1032"},{"$id":"36","Name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK62","Range":{"$id":"37","ts":{"$ref":"31"},"_Start":478,"_End":482,"_Text":"Second, Privette does not apply when nondelegable duties are involved. (Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038.) “A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others. One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor.” (Id. at p. 1036.) “Nondelegable duties may arise when a statute provides specific safeguards or precautions to insure the safety of others.” (Ibid.); see also Rest. 2d Torts, 424 [“One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specific safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.”]. Thus, a failure to comply with a specific statute or regulation may constitute an omission that “creates a triable issue of fact as to whether [a] defendant[] breached [his or her] nondelegable duty in a manner that affirmatively contributed to [the contractor’s employee’s] injury.” (Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148.) "},"foundBy":"","pattern":"Id.CaseUId","tabName":"25 Cal. 4th 826"},{"$id":"38","Name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK70","Range":{"$id":"39","ts":{"$ref":"31"},"_Start":478,"_End":483,"_Text":"Second, Privette does not apply when nondelegable duties are involved. (Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038.) “A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others. One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor.” (Id. at p. 1036.) “Nondelegable duties may arise when a statute provides specific safeguards or precautions to insure the safety of others.” (Ibid.); see also Rest. 2d Torts, 424 [“One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specific safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.”]. Thus, a failure to comply with a specific statute or regulation may constitute an omission that “creates a triable issue of fact as to whether [a] defendant[] breached [his or her] nondelegable duty in a manner that affirmatively contributed to [the contractor’s employee’s] injury.” (Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148.) "},"foundBy":"","pattern":"Id.CaseUId","tabName":"36 Cal. App. 4th 1032"},{"$id":"40","Name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK72","Range":{"$id":"41","ts":{"$ref":"31"},"_Start":1130,"_End":1199,"_Text":"Second, Privette does not apply when nondelegable duties are involved. (Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038.) “A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others. One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor.” (Id. at p. 1036.) “Nondelegable duties may arise when a statute provides specific safeguards or precautions to insure the safety of others.” (Ibid.); see also Rest. 2d Torts, 424 [“One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specific safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.”]. Thus, a failure to comply with a specific statute or regulation may constitute an omission that “creates a triable issue of fact as to whether [a] defendant[] breached [his or her] nondelegable duty in a manner that affirmatively contributed to [the contractor’s employee’s] injury.” (Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148.) "},"foundBy":"","pattern":"Short.ShortCaseCite","tabName":"153 Cal. App. 4th 137"},{"$id":"42","Name":"Psych_Cite_96","Range":{"$id":"43","ts":{"$id":"44","End":5206,"Offset":4829,"Start":0,"nref":0,"nind":0,"story":"wdMainTextStory","namedRanges":[{"$ref":"32"},{"$ref":"34"},{"$ref":"36"},{"$ref":"38"},{"$ref":"40"},{"$ref":"42"}],"Range":{"$id":"45","ts":{"$ref":"44"},"_Start":0,"_End":5206,"_Text":"Second, Privette does not apply when nondelegable duties are involved. (Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038.) “A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others. One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor.” (Id. at p. 1036.) “Nondelegable duties may arise when a statute provides specific safeguards or precautions to insure the safety of others.” (Ibid.); see also Rest. 2d Torts, 424 [“One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specific safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.”]. Thus, a failure to comply with a specific statute or regulation may constitute an omission that “creates a triable issue of fact as to whether [a] defendant[] breached [his or her] nondelegable duty in a manner that affirmatively contributed to [the contractor’s employee’s] injury.” (Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148.) Third, a “hirer as landowner may be independently liable to the contractor’s employee, even if it does not retain control over the work, if (1) it knows or reasonably should know of a concealed, pre-existing hazardous condition on its premises; (2) the contractor does not know and could not reasonably ascertain the condition; and (3) the landowner fails to warn the contractor.” (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675.) “The Privette line of decisions establishes a presumption that an independent contractor’s hirer ‘delegates to that contractor its tort law duty to provide a safe workplace for the contractor’s employees.’” (Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642.) This presumption is one that affects the burden of producing evidence, meaning that “the trier of fact [is required] to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence . . . .” (Id. at pp. 643-644.) In order to benefit from the Privette presumption, certain “foundational facts” must be established. In Alvarez, the evidence cited by the Court of Appeal establishing the “foundational facts” was (1) as to the defendant owner, evidence that the plaintiff’s employer was hired to perform work on a specific project by the owner, (2) as to the other defendants who were the owner’s contractors, evidence that the contractors were also hired by the owner to perform work on the same project, and (3) evidence that the plaintiff was injured while working on the project. (Id. at p. 644.) It is undisputed that Blvd 6200 is the owner of the Property. (Defendants’ Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) 1; FAC, 5.) It is further undisputed that Benchmark was hired by Blvd 6200 to be the general contractor on the project, that Benchmark hired Morley to be the concrete construction subcontractor, that Benchmark hired Helix to be the electrical subcontractor, and that Morley hired Traxx Construction Inc. (“Traxx”) as one of the excavation subcontractors. (UMF 2-4.) Cutts was the co-owner of Traxx, with the title of President of Construction. (UMF 5.) Cutts was injured while working on the project. (UMF 28; FAC, 8.) Based on these facts, Defendants contend that they are entitled to the Privette presumption, thus shifting the burden to Cutts to raise a triable issue of fact. Specifically, as to Helix, Defendants argue that even though Helix did not hire Traxx, the Privette doctrine is equally applicable to Helix. Although not discussed explicitly by the Court of Appeal, based on judicially noticeable facts, the Court finds that the Privette doctrine applies to an allegedly negligent contractor who is not within the direct contractual hiring chain. (Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]); Ainslie Decl., 20, Ex. 19, 7-12 [complaint in Alvarez, in which the plaintiff alleges direct negligence theory against the contractor defendants].) As the moving party, Defendants bear the burden of establishing the “foundational facts” for the application of the Privette doctrine, which includes the fact that Cutts was an employee of Traxx. Defendants point to Labor Code section 3351, which defines an “employee” to include “[a]ll officers and members of boards of directors of quasi-public or private corporations while rendering actual service for the corporations for pay.” (Lab. Code, 3351, subd. (c).) Cutts himself confirms that he was the president and owner of Traxx (Cutts’s Additional Material Fact (“AMF”) 22), and Defendants provide evidence that Cutts was paid for the work he performed on the Boulevard 6200 project. (Ainslie Decl., 22, Ex. 21, Rezner Depo. at 138:6-8.) The Court finds that Defendants have provided the requisite factual foundation for the Privette presumption to apply. The burden thus shifts to Cutts to raise a triable issue of fact. "}},"_Start":486,"_End":843,"_Text":"Second, Privette does not apply when nondelegable duties are involved. (Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038.) “A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others. One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor.” (Id. at p. 1036.) “Nondelegable duties may arise when a statute provides specific safeguards or precautions to insure the safety of others.” (Ibid.); see also Rest. 2d Torts, 424 [“One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specific safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.”]. Thus, a failure to comply with a specific statute or regulation may constitute an omission that “creates a triable issue of fact as to whether [a] defendant[] breached [his or her] nondelegable duty in a manner that affirmatively contributed to [the contractor’s employee’s] injury.” (Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148.) Third, a “hirer as landowner may be independently liable to the contractor’s employee, even if it does not retain control over the work, if (1) it knows or reasonably should know of a concealed, pre-existing hazardous condition on its premises; (2) the contractor does not know and could not reasonably ascertain the condition; and (3) the landowner fails to warn the contractor.” (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675.) “The Privette line of decisions establishes a presumption that an independent contractor’s hirer ‘delegates to that contractor its tort law duty to provide a safe workplace for the contractor’s employees.’” (Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642.) This presumption is one that affects the burden of producing evidence, meaning that “the trier of fact [is required] to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence . . . .” (Id. at pp. 643-644.) In order to benefit from the Privette presumption, certain “foundational facts” must be established. In Alvarez, the evidence cited by the Court of Appeal establishing the “foundational facts” was (1) as to the defendant owner, evidence that the plaintiff’s employer was hired to perform work on a specific project by the owner, (2) as to the other defendants who were the owner’s contractors, evidence that the contractors were also hired by the owner to perform work on the same project, and (3) evidence that the plaintiff was injured while working on the project. (Id. at p. 644.) It is undisputed that Blvd 6200 is the owner of the Property. (Defendants’ Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) 1; FAC, 5.) It is further undisputed that Benchmark was hired by Blvd 6200 to be the general contractor on the project, that Benchmark hired Morley to be the concrete construction subcontractor, that Benchmark hired Helix to be the electrical subcontractor, and that Morley hired Traxx Construction Inc. (“Traxx”) as one of the excavation subcontractors. (UMF 2-4.) Cutts was the co-owner of Traxx, with the title of President of Construction. (UMF 5.) Cutts was injured while working on the project. (UMF 28; FAC, 8.) Based on these facts, Defendants contend that they are entitled to the Privette presumption, thus shifting the burden to Cutts to raise a triable issue of fact. Specifically, as to Helix, Defendants argue that even though Helix did not hire Traxx, the Privette doctrine is equally applicable to Helix. Although not discussed explicitly by the Court of Appeal, based on judicially noticeable facts, the Court finds that the Privette doctrine applies to an allegedly negligent contractor who is not within the direct contractual hiring chain. (Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]); Ainslie Decl., 20, Ex. 19, 7-12 [complaint in Alvarez, in which the plaintiff alleges direct negligence theory against the contractor defendants].) As the moving party, Defendants bear the burden of establishing the “foundational facts” for the application of the Privette doctrine, which includes the fact that Cutts was an employee of Traxx. Defendants point to Labor Code section 3351, which defines an “employee” to include “[a]ll officers and members of boards of directors of quasi-public or private corporations while rendering actual service for the corporations for pay.” (Lab. Code, 3351, subd. (c).) Cutts himself confirms that he was the president and owner of Traxx (Cutts’s Additional Material Fact (“AMF”) 22), and Defendants provide evidence that Cutts was paid for the work he performed on the Boulevard 6200 project. (Ainslie Decl., 22, Ex. 21, Rezner Depo. at 138:6-8.) The Court finds that Defendants have provided the requisite factual foundation for the Privette presumption to apply. The burden thus shifts to Cutts to raise a triable issue of fact. "},"foundBy":null,"pattern":null,"tabName":null}],"Range":{"$id":"46","ts":{"$ref":"31"},"_Start":0,"_End":1204,"_Text":"Second, Privette does not apply when nondelegable duties are involved. (Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038.) “A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others. One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor.” (Id. at p. 1036.) “Nondelegable duties may arise when a statute provides specific safeguards or precautions to insure the safety of others.” (Ibid.); see also Rest. 2d Torts, 424 [“One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specific safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.”]. Thus, a failure to comply with a specific statute or regulation may constitute an omission that “creates a triable issue of fact as to whether [a] defendant[] breached [his or her] nondelegable duty in a manner that affirmatively contributed to [the contractor’s employee’s] injury.” (Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148.) "}},"master":" RESULTS_9","kernel_data":"Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038Full.CaseCitationciteCaseNameXYZZY v. 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Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038Full.CaseCitationciteReporter.NameCal. App. 4thReporter.Volume36Reporter.FirstPage1032Reporter. PinPages.First1038","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_14","Original_string":"Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Full.CaseCitation","PinPage":"1038","ReadOrderIndex":4935,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"36 Cal. App. 4th 1032","Start":4901,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038.) “contractor . ","QuotationType":"SentenceQuote","EditedQuotationText":"A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others. One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor.”","MarkedQuotationText":"A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others. One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor [.] . . . ’","CCMarkedQuotationText":" A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others . One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor [.] . . . ","SuggestionForQuote":"A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others. One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor. (","CCSuggestionForQuote":" A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others . One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor .","CitationText":"Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038","ModifiedCitationText":"Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":["Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1036"],"IconIndicator":9,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":9,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":9,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":9,"IsEnabled":true,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":1,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":false,"ShowPinPointPage":true,"SuggestionVisibility":true,"SuggestedDocUri":"A%20nondelegable%20duty%20is%20a%20definite%20affirmative%20duty%20the%20law%20imposes%20on%20one%20by%20reason%20of%20his%20or%20her%20relationship%20with%20others.%20One%20cannot%20escape%20this%20duty%20by%20entrusting%20it%20to%20an%20independent%20contractor.%e2%80%9d"}}}' docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others. One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor.” ( 36 Cal. App. 4th 1032 ","ParentCiteID":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK70","Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Id. at p. 1036","original_string":"Id. at p. 1036","error":null,"fullText":"Id. at p. 1036","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"36 Cal. App. 4th 1032","isParallel":false,"parallel":"","legistlativeHistory":null,"isLegislativeHistory":false,"start":5165,"end":5179,"pattern":"","readOrderIndex":5165,"index":336,"citeType":1,"CiteShepSignal":2,"CiteShepSignalLink":"https: advance.lexis.com/api/shepards?context=1000516&id=urn:contentItem:7XWR-K2V1-2NSD-N0ND-00000-00","story":"wdMainTextStory","PinPage":"1036","name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK69","foundBy":"","FullTextParen":null,"ParentheticalType":null,"IntermediateCite":false,"TOAHeading":null,"ts":{"$ref":"31"},"master":" RESULTS_9","kernel_data":"Id. at p. 1036Id. at p. 1036Id. at p. 1036citeCaseNameXYZZY v. 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Id. at p. 1036

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Id. at p. 1036Id. at p. 1036Id. at p. 1036IdciteReporter.Namecalapp4thReporter.Volume36Reporter.FirstPage1032Reporter. PinPages.First1038","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_12","Original_string":"Id. at p. 1036","Page":null,"Parallel":null,"Pattern":"Id","PinPage":"1036","ReadOrderIndex":5164,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"36 Cal. App. 4th 1032","Start":5165,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Id. at p. 1036

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Id. at p. 1036.) “Correct quotation (No suggestions)","CitationText":"Ibid.","ModifiedCitationText":"Ibid.","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":[],"IconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":0,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":8,"IsEnabled":false,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":0,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":true,"ShowPinPointPage":false,"SuggestionVisibility":false,"SuggestedDocUri":"Nondelegable%20duties%20may%20arise%20when%20a%20statute%20provides%20specific%20safeguards%20or%20precautions%20to%20insure%20the%20safety%20of%20others."}}}' docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Nondelegable duties may arise when a statute provides specific safeguards or precautions to insure the safety of others.” (Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.IdciteReporter.Namecalapp4thReporter.Volume36Reporter.FirstPage1032Reporter. PinPages.First1038","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_13","Original_string":"Ibid.","Page":null,"Parallel":null,"Pattern":"Id","PinPage":"1036","ReadOrderIndex":5306,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"36 Cal. App. 4th 1032","Start":5307,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Ibid.

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Ibid.; see also Rest., 2d, Torts, 424 [“specific safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions .","QuotationType":"SentenceQuote","EditedQuotationText":"One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specific safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.","MarkedQuotationText":"One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specifi[c] safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.","CCMarkedQuotationText":" One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specifi[c] safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions .","SuggestionForQuote":"One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.","CCSuggestionForQuote":" One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions .","CitationText":"Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148","ModifiedCitationText":"Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":["Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 146"],"IconIndicator":9,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":9,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":9,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":9,"IsEnabled":true,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":1,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":false,"ShowPinPointPage":true,"SuggestionVisibility":true,"SuggestedDocUri":"One%20who%20by%20statute%20or%20by%20administrative%20regulation%20is%20under%20a%20duty%20to%20provide%20specific%20safeguards%20or%20precautions%20for%20the%20safety%20of%20others%20is%20subject%20to%20liability%20to%20the%20others%20for%20whose%20protection%20the%20duty%20is%20imposed%20for%20harm%20caused%20by%20the%20failure%20of%20a%20contractor%20employed%20by%20him%20to%20provide%20such%20safeguards%20or%20precautions."}}}' docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specific safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.”]). Thus, a failure to comply with a specific statute or regulation may constitute an omission that “[a] defendant[] breached [his or her] nondelegable duty in a manner that affirmatively contributed to [the contractor’s employee’s] injury .","QuotationType":"PhraseQuote","EditedQuotationText":"creates a triable issue of fact as to whether [a] defendant[] breached [his or her] nondelegable duty in a manner that affirmatively contributed to [the contractor’s employee’s] injury.","MarkedQuotationText":"creates a triable issue of fact as to whether [a] defendant[] breached [his or her] nondelegable duty in a manner that affirmatively contributed to [the contractor’s employee’s] injury.","CCMarkedQuotationText":" creates a triable issue of fact as to whether [a] defendant[] breached [his or her] nondelegable duty in a manner that affirmatively contributed to [the contractor’s employee’s] injury .","SuggestionForQuote":"Correct quotation (No suggestions)","CCSuggestionForQuote":"Correct quotation (No suggestions)","CitationText":"Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148","ModifiedCitationText":"Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":[],"IconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":0,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":8,"IsEnabled":false,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":0,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":true,"ShowPinPointPage":false,"SuggestionVisibility":false,"SuggestedDocUri":"creates%20a%20triable%20issue%20of%20fact%20as%20to%20whether%20[a]%20defendant[]%20breached%20[his%20or%20her]%20nondelegable%20duty%20in%20a%20manner%20that%20affirmatively%20contributed%20to%20[the%20contractor%e2%80%99s%20employee%e2%80%99s]%20injury."}}}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">creates a triable issue of fact as to whether [a] defendant[] breached [his or her] nondelegable duty in a manner that affirmatively contributed to [the contractor’s employee’s] injury.” ( Short.ShortCaseCite 153 Cal. App. 4th 137 ","ParentCiteID":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK68","Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148","original_string":"Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148","error":null,"fullText":"Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"153 Cal. App. 4th 137","isParallel":false,"parallel":"","legistlativeHistory":null,"isLegislativeHistory":false,"start":5959,"end":6028,"pattern":"Short.ShortCaseCite","readOrderIndex":5959,"index":1130,"citeType":1,"CiteShepSignal":2,"CiteShepSignalLink":"https: advance.lexis.com/api/shepards?context=1000516&id=urn:contentItem:7XWW-5WD1-2NSD-N3D9-00000-00","story":"wdMainTextStory","PinPage":"148","name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK72","foundBy":"","FullTextParen":null,"ParentheticalType":null,"IntermediateCite":false,"TOAHeading":null,"ts":{"$ref":"31"},"master":" RESULTS_8","kernel_data":"Evard v. 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KamalaCaseName.FirstPartyEvardCaseName.FirstParty._PatternParty.PartyCaseName.FirstParty.PartyEvardCaseName.SecondPartySouthern California EdisonCaseName.SecondParty._PatternParty.PartyCaseName.SecondParty.PartySouthern California EdisonCaseName.vv.CourtParenthetical (2007) CourtParenthetical._PatternCourtParenthetical.CourtParentheticalCourtParenthetical.Date2007 CourtParenthetical.Date._PatternCourtParenthetical.Date.DateCourtParenthetical.Date.Year2007CourtParenthetical.Date.Year._PatternCourtParenthetical.Date.Year.YearCourtParenthetical.Date.Year.Year2007CourtParenthetical.ForbiddenComma._PatternForbiddenComma.ForbiddenCommaCourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L (CourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L.((CourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L._PatternSwitch ( [ L.Switch ( [ LCourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R) CourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R.))CourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R._PatternSwitch ) ] R.Switch ) ] RFirstPartyEvard HAS_AUTHORITATIVE_DATAYESNY L Paren(NY R Paren)ParentheticalParenthetical.([ (Parenthetical.([.[[Parenthetical.([._Pattern([.([Parenthetical.])) Parenthetical.]).]]Parenthetical.])._Pattern]).])Parenthetical._PatternParenthetical.ParentheticalReporter153 Cal.App.4th 137, 148Reporter.[[Reporter.]]Reporter. 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Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148Short.ShortCaseCiteciteReporter.NameCal. App. 4thReporter.Volume153Reporter.FirstPage137Reporter. PinPages.First148","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_15","Original_string":"Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Short.ShortCaseCite","PinPage":"148","ReadOrderIndex":5996,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"153 Cal. App. 4th 137","Start":5961,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148.)

Third, a “Correct quotation (No suggestions)","CitationText":"Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675","ModifiedCitationText":"Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":[],"IconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":0,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":8,"IsEnabled":false,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":0,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":true,"ShowPinPointPage":false,"SuggestionVisibility":false,"SuggestedDocUri":"hirer%20as%20landowner%20may%20be%20independently%20liable%20to%20the%20contractor%e2%80%99s%20employee,%20even%20if%20it%20does%20not%20retain%20control%20over%20the%20work,%20if%20(1)%20it%20knows%20or%20reasonably%20should%20know%20of%20a%20concealed,%20pre-existing%20hazardous%20condition%20on%20its%20premises;%20(2)%20the%20contractor%20does%20not%20know%20and%20could%20not%20reasonably%20ascertain%20the%20condition;%20and%20(3)%20the%20landowner%20fails%20to%20warn%20the%20contractor."}}}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">hirer as landowner may be independently liable to the contractor’s employee, even if it does not retain control over the work, if (1) it knows or reasonably should know of a concealed, pre-existing hazardous condition on its premises; (2) the contractor does not know and could not reasonably ascertain the condition; and (3) the landowner fails to warn the contractor.” ( Full.CaseCitation 37 Cal. 4th 659 ","ParentCiteID":null,"Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Kinsman v. 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Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675Full.CaseCitationciteReporter.NameCal. 4thReporter.Volume37Reporter.FirstPage659Reporter. PinPages.First675","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_17","Original_string":"Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Full.CaseCitation","PinPage":"675","ReadOrderIndex":6448,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"37 Cal. 4th 659","Start":6417,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675.)

“Correct quotation (No suggestions)","CitationText":"Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642","ModifiedCitationText":"Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":[],"IconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":0,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":8,"IsEnabled":false,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":0,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":true,"ShowPinPointPage":false,"SuggestionVisibility":false,"SuggestedDocUri":"The%20Privette%20line%20of%20decisions%20establishes%20a%20presumption%20that%20an%20independent%20contractor%e2%80%99s%20hirer%20%e2%80%98delegates%20to%20that%20contractor%20its%20tort%20law%20duty%20to%20provide%20a%20safe%20workplace%20for%20the%20contractor%e2%80%99s%20employees.%e2%80%99"}}}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">The Privette line of decisions establishes a presumption that an independent contractor’s hirer ‘delegates to that contractor its tort law duty to provide a safe workplace for the contractor’s employees.’” ( Short.ShortCaseCite 13 Cal. App. 5th 635 ","ParentCiteID":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK66","Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642","original_string":"Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642","error":null,"fullText":"Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"13 Cal. 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Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642.) This presumption is one that affects the burden of producing evidence, meaning that “the trier of fact [is required] to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence . . . .” (Id. at pp. 643-644.) In order to benefit from the Privette presumption, certain “foundational facts” must be established. In Alvarez, the evidence cited by the Court of Appeal establishing the “foundational facts” was (1) as to the defendant owner, evidence that the plaintiff’s employer was hired to perform work on a specific project by the owner, (2) as to the other defendants who were the owner’s contractors, evidence that the contractors were also hired by the owner to perform work on the same project, and (3) evidence that the plaintiff was injured while working on the project. (Id. at p. 644.) 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In Alvarez, the evidence cited by the Court of Appeal establishing the “foundational facts” was (1) as to the defendant owner, evidence that the plaintiff’s employer was hired to perform work on a specific project by the owner, (2) as to the other defendants who were the owner’s contractors, evidence that the contractors were also hired by the owner to perform work on the same project, and (3) evidence that the plaintiff was injured while working on the project. (Id. at p. 644.) "},"foundBy":"","pattern":"Id.CaseId","tabName":"13 Cal. App. 5th 635"},{"$id":"56","Name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK76","Range":{"$id":"57","ts":{"$ref":"51"},"_Start":1143,"_End":1156,"_Text":"“The Privette line of decisions establishes a presumption that an independent contractor’s hirer ‘delegates to that contractor its tort law duty to provide a safe workplace for the contractor’s employees.’” (Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642.) This presumption is one that affects the burden of producing evidence, meaning that “the trier of fact [is required] to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence . . . .” (Id. at pp. 643-644.) In order to benefit from the Privette presumption, certain “foundational facts” must be established. In Alvarez, the evidence cited by the Court of Appeal establishing the “foundational facts” was (1) as to the defendant owner, evidence that the plaintiff’s employer was hired to perform work on a specific project by the owner, (2) as to the other defendants who were the owner’s contractors, evidence that the contractors were also hired by the owner to perform work on the same project, and (3) evidence that the plaintiff was injured while working on the project. (Id. at p. 644.) "},"foundBy":"","pattern":"Id.CaseId","tabName":"13 Cal. App. 5th 635"}],"Range":{"$id":"58","ts":{"$ref":"51"},"_Start":0,"_End":1161,"_Text":"“The Privette line of decisions establishes a presumption that an independent contractor’s hirer ‘delegates to that contractor its tort law duty to provide a safe workplace for the contractor’s employees.’” (Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642.) This presumption is one that affects the burden of producing evidence, meaning that “the trier of fact [is required] to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence . . . .” (Id. at pp. 643-644.) In order to benefit from the Privette presumption, certain “foundational facts” must be established. In Alvarez, the evidence cited by the Court of Appeal establishing the “foundational facts” was (1) as to the defendant owner, evidence that the plaintiff’s employer was hired to perform work on a specific project by the owner, (2) as to the other defendants who were the owner’s contractors, evidence that the contractors were also hired by the owner to perform work on the same project, and (3) evidence that the plaintiff was injured while working on the project. (Id. at p. 644.) "}},"master":" RESULTS_6","kernel_data":"Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642Short.ShortCaseCiteciteCaseNameXYZZY v. 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Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642Short.ShortCaseCiteciteReporter.NameCal. App. 5thReporter.Volume13Reporter.FirstPage635Reporter. PinPages.First642","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_20","Original_string":"Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Short.ShortCaseCite","PinPage":"642","ReadOrderIndex":6726,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"13 Cal. App. 5th 635","Start":6680,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642.) This presumption is one that affects the burden of producing evidence, meaning that “[is required] to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence . . . .","QuotationType":"PhraseQuote","EditedQuotationText":"the trier of fact [is required] to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence . . . .","MarkedQuotationText":"the trier of fact [is required] to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence.","CCMarkedQuotationText":" the trier of fact [ is required ] to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence .","SuggestionForQuote":"the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence","CCSuggestionForQuote":" the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence .","CitationText":"Id. at pp. 643-644","ModifiedCitationText":"Id. at pp. 643-644","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":[],"IconIndicator":9,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":10,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":8,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":8,"IsEnabled":true,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":0,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":false,"ShowPinPointPage":false,"SuggestionVisibility":true,"SuggestedDocUri":"the%20trier%20of%20fact%20[is%20required]%20to%20assume%20the%20existence%20of%20the%20presumed%20fact%20unless%20and%20until%20evidence%20is%20introduced%20which%20would%20support%20a%20finding%20of%20its%20nonexistence%20.%20.%20.%20."}}}' docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">the trier of fact [is required] to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence . . . . ( 13 Cal. App. 5th 635 ","ParentCiteID":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK77","Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Id. at pp. 643-644","original_string":"Id. at pp. 643-644","error":null,"fullText":"Id. at pp. 643-644","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"13 Cal. App. 5th 635","isParallel":false,"parallel":"","legistlativeHistory":null,"isLegislativeHistory":false,"start":7023,"end":7041,"pattern":"","readOrderIndex":7023,"index":553,"citeType":1,"CiteShepSignal":1,"CiteShepSignalLink":"https: advance.lexis.com/api/shepards?context=1000516&id=urn:contentItem:5P2F-Y0R1-J9X6-H3SC-00000-00","story":"wdMainTextStory","PinPage":"643","name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK75","foundBy":"","FullTextParen":null,"ParentheticalType":null,"IntermediateCite":false,"TOAHeading":null,"ts":{"$ref":"51"},"master":" RESULTS_6","kernel_data":"Id. at pp. 643-644Id. at pp. 643-644Id. at pp. 643-644citeCaseNameXYZZY v. 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Id. at pp. 643-644

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Id. at pp. 643-644Id. at pp. 643-644Id. at pp. 643-644IdciteReporter.Namecalapp5thReporter.Volume13Reporter.FirstPage635Reporter. PinPages.First640","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_18","Original_string":"Id. at pp. 643-644","Page":null,"Parallel":null,"Pattern":"Id","PinPage":"643","ReadOrderIndex":7024,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"13 Cal. App. 5th 635","Start":7025,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Id. at pp. 643-644

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Id. at pp. 643-644.) In order to benefit from the Privette presumption, certain “foundational facts” must be established. In Alvarez, the evidence cited by the Court of Appeal establishing the “foundational facts” was (1) as to the defendant owner, evidence that the plaintiff’s employer was hired to perform work on a specific project by the owner, (2) as to the other defendants who were the owner’s contractors, evidence that the contractors were also hired by the owner to perform work on the same project, and (3) evidence that the plaintiff was injured while working on the project. ( 13 Cal. App. 5th 635 ","ParentCiteID":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK75","Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Id. at p. 644","original_string":"Id. at p. 644","error":null,"fullText":"Id. at p. 644","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"13 Cal. 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KamalaCaseName.FirstPartyAlvarezCaseName.FirstParty._PatternParty.PartyCaseName.FirstParty.PartyAlvarezCaseName.SecondPartySeaside Transportation Services LLCCaseName.SecondParty._PatternParty.PartyCaseName.SecondParty.PartySeaside Transportation Services LLCCaseName.vv.CourtParenthetical (2017) CourtParenthetical._PatternCourtParenthetical.CourtParentheticalCourtParenthetical.Date2017 CourtParenthetical.Date._PatternCourtParenthetical.Date.DateCourtParenthetical.Date.Year2017CourtParenthetical.Date.Year._PatternCourtParenthetical.Date.Year.YearCourtParenthetical.Date.Year.Year2017CourtParenthetical.ForbiddenComma._PatternForbiddenComma.ForbiddenCommaCourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L (CourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L.((CourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L._PatternSwitch ( [ L.Switch ( [ LCourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R) CourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R.))CourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R._PatternSwitch ) ] R.Switch ) ] RFirstPartyAlvarez HAS_AUTHORITATIVE_DATAYESIdIbid.Id._PatternIbidGraph.IbidGraphId.ForbiddenComma._PatternForbiddenComma.ForbiddenCommaId.IdIbid.master_name RESULTS_6NY L Paren(NY R Paren)pagepageParentheticalParenthetical.([ (Parenthetical.([.[[Parenthetical.([._Pattern([.([Parenthetical.])) Parenthetical.]).]]Parenthetical.])._Pattern]).])Parenthetical._PatternParenthetical.ParentheticalReporterat p. 644Reporter.[[Reporter.]]Reporter. 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Id. at p. 644

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Id. at p. 644Id. at p. 644Id. at p. 644IdciteReporter.Namecalapp5thReporter.Volume13Reporter.FirstPage635Reporter. PinPages.First640","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_19","Original_string":"Id. at p. 644","Page":null,"Parallel":null,"Pattern":"Id","PinPage":"644","ReadOrderIndex":7614,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"13 Cal. App. 5th 635","Start":7615,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Id. at p. 644

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Id. at p. 644.)

It is undisputed that Blvd 6200 is the owner of the Property. (Defendants’ Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) 1; FAC, 5.) It is further undisputed that Benchmark was hired by Blvd 6200 to be the general contractor on the project, that Benchmark hired Morley to be the concrete construction subcontractor, that Benchmark hired Helix to be the electrical subcontractor, and that Morley hired Traxx Construction Inc. (“Traxx”) as one of the excavation subcontractors. (UMF 2-4.) Cutts was the co-owner of Traxx, with the title of President of Construction. (UMF 5.) Cutts was injured while working on the project. (UMF 28; FAC, 8.)

Based on these facts, Defendants contend that they are entitled to the Privette presumption, thus shifting the burden to Cutts to raise a triable issue of fact. Specifically, as to Helix, Defendants argue that even though Helix did not hire Traxx, the Privette doctrine is equally applicable to Helix. Although not discussed explicitly by the Court of Appeal, based on judicially noticeable facts, the Court finds that the Privette doctrine applies to an allegedly negligent contractor who is not within the direct contractual hiring chain. ( Id.CaseUId 13 Cal. App. 5th 635 ","ParentCiteID":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK76","Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]","original_string":"Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]","error":null,"fullText":"Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"13 Cal. 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Specifically, as to Helix, Defendants argue that even though Helix did not hire Traxx, the Privette doctrine is equally applicable to Helix. Although not discussed explicitly by the Court of Appeal, based on judicially noticeable facts, the Court finds that the Privette doctrine applies to an allegedly negligent contractor who is not within the direct contractual hiring chain. (Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]); Ainslie Decl., 20, Ex. 19, 7-12 [complaint in Alvarez, in which the plaintiff alleges direct negligence theory against the contractor defendants].) "},"foundBy":"","pattern":"Id.CaseUId","tabName":"13 Cal. App. 5th 635"}],"Range":{"$id":"62","ts":{"$ref":"59"},"_Start":0,"_End":837,"_Text":"Based on these facts, Defendants contend that they are entitled to the Privette presumption, thus shifting the burden to Cutts to raise a triable issue of fact. Specifically, as to Helix, Defendants argue that even though Helix did not hire Traxx, the Privette doctrine is equally applicable to Helix. Although not discussed explicitly by the Court of Appeal, based on judicially noticeable facts, the Court finds that the Privette doctrine applies to an allegedly negligent contractor who is not within the direct contractual hiring chain. (Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]); Ainslie Decl., 20, Ex. 19, 7-12 [complaint in Alvarez, in which the plaintiff alleges direct negligence theory against the contractor defendants].) "}},"master":" RESULTS_6","kernel_data":"Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]Id.CaseUIdciteCaseNameXYZZY v. KamalaCaseName.FirstPartyAlvarezCaseName.FirstParty._PatternParty.PartyCaseName.FirstParty.PartyAlvarezCaseName.SecondPartySeaside Transportation Services LLCCaseName.SecondParty._PatternParty.PartyCaseName.SecondParty.PartySeaside Transportation Services LLCCaseName.vv.CourtParenthetical (2017) CourtParenthetical._PatternCourtParenthetical.CourtParentheticalCourtParenthetical.Date2017 CourtParenthetical.Date._PatternCourtParenthetical.Date.DateCourtParenthetical.Date.Year2017CourtParenthetical.Date.Year._PatternCourtParenthetical.Date.Year.YearCourtParenthetical.Date.Year.Year2017CourtParenthetical.ForbiddenComma._PatternForbiddenComma.ForbiddenCommaCourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L (CourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L.((CourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L._PatternSwitch ( [ L.Switch ( [ LCourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R) CourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R.))CourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R._PatternSwitch ) ] R.Switch ) ] RFirstPartyAlvarez HAS_AUTHORITATIVE_DATAYESIdIbid.Id._PatternIbidGraph.IbidGraphId.ForbiddenComma._PatternForbiddenComma.ForbiddenCommaId.IdIbid.master_name RESULTS_6NY L Paren(NY R Paren)pagepageParenthetical [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”] Parenthetical.([([Parenthetical.([.[[Parenthetical.([._Pattern([.([Parenthetical.])])Parenthetical.]).]]Parenthetical.])._Pattern]).])Parenthetical. 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Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]IdciteReporter.Namecalapp5thReporter.Volume13Reporter.FirstPage635Reporter. PinPages.First640","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_21","Original_string":"Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]","Page":null,"Parallel":null,"Pattern":"Id","PinPage":null,"ReadOrderIndex":8808,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"Ibid.","Start":8809,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]); Ainslie Decl., 20, Ex. 19, 7-12 [complaint in Alvarez, in which the plaintiff alleges direct negligence theory against the contractor defendants].)

As the moving party, Defendants bear the burden of establishing the “foundational facts” for the application of the Privette doctrine, which includes the fact that Cutts was an employee of Traxx. Defendants point to Full.StateStatuteCite Cal. Lab. Code section 3351 ","ParentCiteID":null,"Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Labor Code section 3351","original_string":"Labor Code section 3351","error":null,"fullText":"Labor Code section 3351","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"Cal. Lab. 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Defendants point to Labor Code section 3351, which defines an “employee” to include “[a]ll officers and members of boards of directors of quasi-public or private corporations while rendering actual service for the corporations for pay.” (Lab. Code, 3351, subd. (c).) "},"foundBy":"","pattern":"Full.StateStatuteCite","tabName":"Cal. Lab. Code section 3351"},{"$id":"66","Name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK92","Range":{"$id":"67","ts":{"$ref":"63"},"_Start":435,"_End":463,"_Text":" As the moving party, Defendants bear the burden of establishing the “foundational facts” for the application of the Privette doctrine, which includes the fact that Cutts was an employee of Traxx. Defendants point to Labor Code section 3351, which defines an “employee” to include “[a]ll officers and members of boards of directors of quasi-public or private corporations while rendering actual service for the corporations for pay.” (Lab. Code, 3351, subd. (c).) "},"foundBy":"PsychStateSubjectCode","pattern":"Full.StateStatuteCite","tabName":"Cal. Lab. Code 3351"}],"Range":{"$id":"68","ts":{"$ref":"63"},"_Start":0,"_End":467,"_Text":" As the moving party, Defendants bear the burden of establishing the “foundational facts” for the application of the Privette doctrine, which includes the fact that Cutts was an employee of Traxx. Defendants point to Labor Code section 3351, which defines an “employee” to include “[a]ll officers and members of boards of directors of quasi-public or private corporations while rendering actual service for the corporations for pay.” (Lab. Code, 3351, subd. (c).) "}},"master":" RESULTS_13","kernel_data":"Labor Code section 3351Labor Code section 3351Labor Code section 3351Full.StateStatuteCitecite AfterStatutoryCite AfterStatutoryCite._PatternAfterStatutoryCite.AfterStatutoryCite AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite() AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.(( AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.)) 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Labor Code section 3351

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Labor Code section 3351Labor Code section 3351Labor Code section 3351Full.StateStatuteCiteciteReporter.Name","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_22","Original_string":"Labor Code section 3351","Page":null,"Parallel":null,"Pattern":"Full.StateStatuteCite","PinPage":null,"ReadOrderIndex":9321,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"Cal. Lab. Code 3351","Start":9321,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Labor Code section 3351

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Labor Code section 3351, which defines an “employee” to include “Correct quotation (No suggestions)","CitationText":"Lab. Code, 3351, subd. (c)","ModifiedCitationText":"Lab. Code, 3351, subd. (c)","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":[],"IconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":0,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":8,"IsEnabled":false,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":0,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":true,"ShowPinPointPage":false,"SuggestionVisibility":false,"SuggestedDocUri":"[a]ll%20officers%20and%20members%20of%20boards%20of%20directors%20of%20quasi-public%20or%20private%20corporations%20while%20rendering%20actual%20service%20for%20the%20corporations%20for%20pay."}}}' docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">[a]ll officers and members of boards of directors of quasi-public or private corporations while rendering actual service for the corporations for pay.” ( PsychStateSubjectCode Full.StateStatuteCite Cal. Lab. Code 3351 ","ParentCiteID":null,"Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Lab. 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Lab. Code, 3351, subd. (c)

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Lab. Code, 3351, subd. (c)Lab. Code, 3351, subd. (c)Lab. Code, 3351, subd. (c)Full.StateStatuteCiteciteReporter.Name","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_23","Original_string":"Lab. Code, 3351, subd. (c)","Page":null,"Parallel":null,"Pattern":"Full.StateStatuteCite","PinPage":null,"ReadOrderIndex":9539,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"Cal. Lab. Code 3351","Start":9539,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Lab. Code, 3351, subd. (c)

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Lab. Code, 3351, subd. (c).)

Cutts himself confirms that he was the president and owner of Traxx (Cutts’s Additional Material Fact (“AMF”) 22), and Defendants provide evidence that Cutts was paid for the work he performed on the Boulevard 6200 project. (Ainslie Decl., 22, Ex. 21, Rezner Depo. at 138:6-8.) The Court finds that Defendants have provided the requisite factual foundation for the Privette presumption to apply. The burden thus shifts to Cutts to raise a triable issue of fact.

Cutts argues that exceptions to the Privette doctrine exist here, including the exception set forth in Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198. As set forth above, “when the hirer retains control over safety conditions at the worksite” and “exercise[s] that control in a way that affirmatively contribute[s] to the employee’s workplace injury,” the hirer may be liable. ( Id 27 Cal. 4th 198 ","ParentCiteID":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK98","Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]","original_string":"Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]","error":null,"fullText":"Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"27 Cal. 4th 198","isParallel":false,"parallel":null,"legistlativeHistory":null,"isLegislativeHistory":false,"start":10425,"end":10468,"pattern":"Id","readOrderIndex":10424,"index":10425,"citeType":1,"CiteShepSignal":-3,"CiteShepSignalLink":"https: advance.lexis.com/api/shepards/citation?context=1000516&cite=27%20Cal.%204th%20198,%20213","story":"wdMainTextStory","PinPage":"641","name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK97","foundBy":"","FullTextParen":"Id. at p. 641","ParentheticalType":null,"IntermediateCite":false,"TOAHeading":null,"ts":{"$ref":"69"},"master":" RESULTS_21","kernel_data":"Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]Id.CaseIdciteCaseNameHooker v. 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Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]IdciteReporter.Namecal4thReporter.Volume27Reporter.FirstPage198Reporter. PinPages.First213","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_24","Original_string":"Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]","Page":null,"Parallel":null,"Pattern":"Id","PinPage":"641","ReadOrderIndex":10426,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"27 Cal. 4th 198","Start":10427,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642Short.ShortCaseCiteciteReporter.NameCal. App. 5thReporter.Volume13Reporter.FirstPage635Reporter. PinPages.First642","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_20","Original_string":"Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Short.ShortCaseCite","PinPage":"642","ReadOrderIndex":6726,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"13 Cal. App. 5th 635","Start":6680,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642

"}" docpart="24D11DA97C2C4B3EB7A58C6F47B823AB">Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]); ( PsychCase Full.CaseCitation 27 Cal. 4th 198 ","ParentCiteID":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK97","Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"see also Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 213 [“if a hirer does retain control over safety conditions at a worksite and negligently exercises that control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to an employee’s injuries, it is only fair to impose liability on the hirer”]","original_string":"see also Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 213 [“if a hirer does retain control over safety conditions at a worksite and negligently exercises that control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to an employee’s injuries, it is only fair to impose liability on the hirer”]","error":null,"fullText":"see also Hooker v. 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see also Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 213 [“if a hirer does retain control over safety conditions at a worksite and negligently exercises that control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to an employee’s injuries, it is only fair to impose liability on the hirer”]

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">see also Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 213 [“if a hirer does retain control over safety conditions at a worksite and negligently exercises that control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to an employee’s injuries, it is only fair to impose liability on the hirer”].) The affirmative contribution “Correct quotation (No suggestions)","CitationText":"Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, at p. 145 [discussing Hooker]","ModifiedCitationText":"Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, at p. 145 [discussing Hooker]","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":[],"IconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":0,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":8,"IsEnabled":false,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":0,"IsManagedCite":false,"PinpointPageText":"View suggested pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":true,"IsCorrect":true,"ShowPinPointPage":false,"SuggestionVisibility":false,"SuggestedDocUri":"can%20take%20the%20form%20of%20actively%20directing%20a%20contractor%20or%20contractor%e2%80%99s%20employee,%20but%20can%20also%20take%20the%20form%20of%20a%20hirer%e2%80%99s%20omission,%20such%20as%20failing%20to%20undertake%20a%20particular%20safety%20measure%20after%20promising%20to%20do%20so."}}}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">can take the form of actively directing a contractor or contractor’s employee, but can also take the form of a hirer’s omission, such as failing to undertake a particular safety measure after promising to do so.” ( PsychCase Short.ShortCaseCite 153 Cal. App. 4th 137 ","ParentCiteID":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK72","Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, at p. 145 [discussing Hooker]","original_string":"Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, at p. 145 [discussing Hooker]","error":null,"fullText":"Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, at p. 145 [discussing Hooker]","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"153 Cal. 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Southern California Edison CaseName._PatternCaseName.CaseNameCaseName.FirstPartyEvard CaseName.FirstParty._PatternParty.PartyCaseName.FirstParty.PartyEvardCaseName.SecondPartySouthern California Edison CaseName.SecondParty._PatternParty.PartyCaseName.SecondParty.PartySouthern California EdisonCaseName.vv.CourtParenthetical (2007) CourtParenthetical._PatternCourtParenthetical.CourtParentheticalCourtParenthetical.Date2007 CourtParenthetical.Date._PatternDate.DateCourtParenthetical.Date.Year2007 CourtParenthetical.Date.Year._PatternYear.YearCourtParenthetical.Date.Year.Year2007CourtParenthetical.ForbiddenComma._PatternForbiddenComma.ForbiddenCommaCourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L (CourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L.((CourtParenthetical.Switch ( [ L._PatternSwitch ( [ L.Switch ( [ LCourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R) CourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R.))CourtParenthetical.Switch ) ] R._PatternSwitch ) ] R.Switch ) ] RFirstPartyEvard HAS_AUTHORITATIVE_DATAYESmaster_name RESULTS_8NY L Paren(NY R Paren)Parenthetical [discussing Hooker] Parenthetical.([ [Parenthetical.([.[[Parenthetical.([._Pattern([.([Parenthetical.])] Parenthetical.]).]]Parenthetical.])._Pattern]).])Parenthetical. 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Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, at p. 145 [discussing Hooker]

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, at p. 145 [discussing Hooker]Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, at p. 145 [discussing Hooker]Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, at p. 145 [discussing Hooker]Short.ShortCaseCiteciteReporter.NameCal. App. 4thReporter.Volume153Reporter.FirstPage137Reporter. PinPages.First145","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_27","Original_string":"Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, at p. 145 [discussing Hooker]","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Short.ShortCaseCite","PinPage":"145","ReadOrderIndex":11060,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"153 Cal. App. 4th 137","Start":11025,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, at p. 145 [discussing Hooker]

"}" docpart="80C561D38B7544EEB79FE01993DA7C0A">Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, at p. 145 [discussing Hooker].)

Cutts offers evidence (in the form of his own testimony) that he was informed by Mr. Hetman and Mr. Lumpkin that the buried power lines would not run in the path of the digging. (AMF 44.) It is undisputed that Mr. Hetman was the superintendent for Benchmark and Mr. Lumpkin was the superintendent for Morley on the project. (AMF 4, 6.) Cutts also testified that he was informed by Mr. Hetman and Morley that the lines were encased in concrete, so he would be “okay” if he hit the lines. (AMF 45, 60-61.) When he hit the lines on June 15, 2016, the electrical wires were exposed and only half were contained in concrete. (AMF 63.) Cutts offers evidence that the lines were not properly located because they were not underneath the bottom of the footings where they were supposed to be, according to the footing drawings given to Helix by Morley. (AMF 64, 82.) Cutts offers evidence that Helix never provided Mr. Tran, its foreman for the project, with any safety training regarding the installation of temporary underground power lines. (AMF 10, 17.) Cutts also testified that on June 16, 2016, he asked Morley if he could attach a ground wire to his excavator to minimize the effect of an electrical shock. (AMF 70.) This request was refused. (AMF 72.) When the incident happened, Cutts was digging “several feet” from the area where he hit the line on June 15, 2016. (AMF 76.) Cutts also provides evidence that in periodic meetings with the project representative for Blvd 6200, the topic of construction site safety never arose. (AMF 2, 3.) Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that Cutts has raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the Hooker exception to the Privette doctrine exists here except as to Blvd 6200.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, is denied except as to Blvd 6200. Blvd 6200 is ordered to file and serve a proposed judgment within 10 days of the date of this Order.

Cutts is ordered to provide notice of this Order.

DATED: January 27, 2022

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court



b"

Case Number: ****8363 Hearing Date: August 17, 2021 Dept: 50

The Court has read the Trial Setting Conference Statement filed by Plaintiff's counsel. The Court is very sorry to learn that the Plaintiff passed away on June 22, 2021. Because of this situation, the Court orders as follows: The Court will not hear the motion for summary judgment/adjudication on August 17, 2021 nor will it conduct the Trial Setting Conference. The Court sets a status conference regarding the status of pending matters on November 9, 2021 at 10 a.m. in Dept. 50. The Court continues the hearing on the MSJ/MSA and the trial setting conference to that same date and time but only for rescheduling purposes, as needed. Defendants are ordered to give notice of this order.

Dated: August 12,2021

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, LA Superior Court

"


Case Number: ****8363    Hearing Date: May 27, 2021    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Antonio cutts,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MORLEY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.:

****8363

Scheduled Hearing Date:

May 27, 2021

Hearing Time:

10:00 a.m.

ORDER RE:

DEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

In light of the Defendants’ Statutory Offer to Compromise Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 998 dated May 13, 2021, the Court hereby continues the hearing on the above motion to June 21, 2021 at 2 P.M. in DEPT. 50. Defendants are ordered to give notice of this Order. No appearance is necessary at the hearing scheduled for tomorrow.

DATED: May 26, 2021

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court



Case Number: ****8363    Hearing Date: May 6, 2021    Dept: 50

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Antonio cutts,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MORLEY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.:

****8363

Hearing Date:

May 6, 2021

Hearing Time:

11:00 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

DEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Background

On December 28, 2017, Plaintiff Antonio Cutts (“Cutts”) filed this action against Defendants Morley Construction Company (“Morley”), Benchmark Contractors, Inc., Helix Electric, Inc., and Blvd 6200 Owner South, LLC (“Blvd 6200”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was filed on August 7, 2018 and asserts causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) negligence per se, and (3) premises liability stemming from injuries sustained by Cutts while working on a construction project located at 6200 Hollywood Blvd., Hollywood, California 90028 (the “Project”).

Defendants move for a second time for summary judgment by arguing that the first, second, and third causes of action are barred by the Privette doctrine. Cutts opposes, and Defendants have filed a reply.

Evidence

The Court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice as to items 1 and 2.

The Court rules on Cutts’ evidentiary objections to the evidence presented by Defendants as follows: Objections 1-12 overruled.

The Court rules on Defendants’ evidentiary objections as follows:

Objections 4 and 13: sustained

Objections 1-3, 5-12: overruled

Legal Standard

“[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., ; 473c(c).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If the moving party carries this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Id.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

When a defendant seeks summary judgment, he must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established; or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c(p)(2).)

Discussion

  1. Whether Defendants Have Improperly Brought This Second Motion for Summary Judgment.

Code of Civil Procedure ;437c(f)(2) provides that “a party may not move for summary judgment based on issues asserted in a prior motion for summary adjudication and denied by the court, unless that party establishes to the satisfaction of the court, newly discovered facts or circumstances or a change of law supporting the issues reasserted in the summary judgment motion.”

When the Defendants initially sought leave of court to bring this second motion, they asserted that they had “newly discovered” evidence that was sourced from the deposition testimony of Charles Rezner. Specifically, this “newly discovered” evidence stated that Cutts was being paid as President of Traxx and was specifically paid for his work on the Project. Cutts asserts that the second motion does not cite to this “newly discovered,” and for this reason, Cutts claims that the motion is improperly brought. However, the second motion and the arguments in it are derived from this new information, and Mr. Rezner’s deposition testimony is included as Exhibit 21 of Defendants’ compendium of evidence. Therefore, the Court finds that the second motion is properly brought.

  1. Whether the Privette Doctrine Barrs Cutts Action Against the Defendants.

Defendants contend that Cutts’ action against them is barred by the Privette doctrine. In Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, the California Supreme Court held that an employee of an independent contractor performing inherently dangerous work may not seek recovery of tort damages from the person who hired the contractor but did not cause the injuries. (Id. at 702.) This is so because workers’ compensation “is the exclusive remedy against an employer for injury or death of an employee,” and because “the hirer of the independent contractor generally has no right of control as to the mode of doing the work contracted for.” (Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted].)

To establish this doctrine and shift the burden, a defendant must show the following foundational facts: (1) as to the defendant owner, evidence that the plaintiff’s employer was hired to perform work on a specific project by the owner, (2) as to the other defendants who were the owner’s contractors, evidence that the contractors were also hired by the owner to perform work on the same project, and (3) evidence that the plaintiff was injured while working on the project (Id. at 644.)

    1. Whether Cutts was an employee of Traxx.

Previously, this Court held that of the three foundational facts, the Defendants failed to show any evidence that Cutts was an employee who rendered services to Traxx for pay as an employee pursuant to Labor Code ; 3351.

In this instance, Defendants rely on Cutts’ own admission that he was working on behalf of Traxx as well as Mr. Rezner’s deposition testimony that Cutts was paid for services performed during the Project that he provided to Traxx (UMF 5; UMF 28; Ex. 21.) In opposition, Cutts asserts that he falls under an exception to section 3351 considering that he waived his rights to workers’ compensation and other protections under the Labor Code. (Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc. (2010) Cal.4th 518; Labor Code ;; 3351(c), 3352(a)(18)-(19); Plaintiff’s Additional Material Facts (“PAMF”) No. 103.) As previously set forth in the prior summary judgment order, the Court is not persuaded by Cutts’ argument. Thus, because Cutts would be considered an employee and the other two requirements of the Privette doctrine have been established, the burden shifts to Cutts.

    1. Whether any of the exceptions to the Privette Doctrine apply.

Even if a defendant has established the foundational facts of the Privette doctrine, there are exceptions that prevent its application. First, “when the hirer retains control over safety conditions at the worksite” and “exercise[s] that control in a way that affirmatively contribute[s] to the employee’s workplace injury,” the hirer may be liable. (Alvarez, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at 641 [internal quotations omitted]; see also Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 213 [“if a hirer does retain control over safety conditions at a worksite and negligently exercises that control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to an employee’s injuries, it is only fair to impose liability on the hirer.”]) The affirmative contribution “can take the form of actively directing a contractor or contractor’s employee, but it can also take the form of a hirer’s omission, such as failing to undertake a particular safety measure after promising to do so.” (Evard Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker].)

Second, Privette does not apply when nondelegable duties are involved (Felmlee v. Falcon Cable Tv (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038.)

Third, a “hirer as a landowner may be independently liable to the contractor’s employee even if it does not retain control over the work, if (1) it knows or reasonably should know of a concealed, pre-existing hazardous condition on its premises; (2) the contractor does not know and could not reasonably ascertain the condition; and (3) the landowners fails to warn the contractor.” (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal4th 659, 675.)

Here, Cutts argues that there are applicable exceptions in this case for the following reasons: (1) Defendants were negligent and created the dangerous condition which caused his injuries, (2) they maintained control over all aspects of his work, and (3) the dangerous condition was concealed from him. (Opposition at pp. 14-17.) In terms of Cutts’ concealed dangerous condition exception argument, this exception applies to landowners; it would only be applicable to Blvd. 6200. Here, the facts do not support this exception as to the owner. (Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal4th at 675.) Second, Cutts had a statutory and contractual duty to inspect and determine the exact location of the underground utilities, which he did not do. (8 C.C.R. ; 1541(b); UMF Nos. 11, 45-47.) Regardless of these duties, there are several undisputed facts to suggest that Cutts had reason to know that a dangerous condition existed near the area that he was excavating. (UMF Nos. 23, 35, 40.) Thus, the exception would not apply because Cutts failed to inspect the area. (Gravelin v. Satterfield (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1218.)

In terms of the other exceptions raised, Defendants contend that Cutts does not specify “which defendants retained control, which defendants negligently exercised that control, or how such exercise of control affirmatively contributed to his injury.” (Reply at pg. 8.) Moreover, it is undisputed that Traxx had considerable responsibility for its own workplace safety (UMF No. 7, 10-13.) However, the determination that needs to be made is whether the Defendants retained control of the safety conditions and whether this retention affirmatively contributed to Cutts’ injuries. (Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 213.) Even though Traxx had latitude in ensuring its own workplace safety, Cutts has presented evidence to show that, with the exception of Blvd 6200, the Defendants’ retention over some aspects of the safety conditions contributed to his injuries. Specifically, Cutts was not responsible for installing the power lines in the wrong place without proper protection, was instructed on where to dig, was not permitted to ground his equipment, was reassured that the lines were covered in concrete, and received specific instructions from Mr. Lumpkin, who is the superintendent from Morley on the Project. (PAMF Nos. 39-49, 61, 63-65, 70-72, 74, 80, 104-105). At this stage, it is not dispositive that Cutts does not single out which of those Defendants retained this control because the evidence provides the inference that they were involved to one degree or another in their collective negligence.

Thus, because it is disputed as to whether Traxx was solely responsible for completely maintaining its own workplace safety, this creates an inference that raises a triable issue of material fact as to whether the Defendants, other than Blvd 6200, retained control of the safety conditions and, if so, whether their actions affirmatively attributed to Cutts’ injuries. Accordingly, even though the Defendants have established the foundational facts for the Privette doctrine, the Defendants’ motion is denied, except as to Blvd 6200 because Cutts has raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether an exception to the Privette doctrine applies in this action. With regard to Blvd 6200, Cutts has not raised a triable issue of material fact, and for that reason summary judgment must be granted as to Blvd. 6200.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication is denied except as to Blvd. 6200. Blvd 6200 is ordered to file and serve a proposed judgment within 10 days of the date of this Order.

Cutts is ordered to provide notice of this ruling.

DATED: May 6, 2021

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court



Case Number: ****8363    Hearing Date: April 20, 2021    Dept: 50

THE COURT REQUIRES ADDITIONAL TIME TO REVIEW THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PAPERS.  THE HEARING WILL NOT GO FORWARD TOMORROW.  THE JA WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES TO SCHEDULE A NEW HEARING DATE. DEFENDANTS ARE TO GIVE NOTICE TO THE PLAINTIFF.


Case Number: ****8363    Hearing Date: August 20, 2020    Dept: 50

 

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

antonio cutts,

Plaintiff,

vs.

morley construction company, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.:

BC 688363

Hearing Date:

August 20, 2020

Hearing Time:

10:00 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES

Background

On December 28, 2017, Plaintiff Antonio Cutts (“Cutts”) filed this action against Defendants Morley Construction Company (“Morley”), Benchmark Contractors, Inc. (“Benchmark”), Helix Electric, Inc. (“Helix”), and Blvd 6200 Owner South, LLC (“Blvd 6200”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Cutts alleges damages, in particular, nerve damage that has caused numbness and pain in his left side, as a result of injuries sustained while working on a construction project located at 6200 Hollywood Blvd., Hollywood, California 90028 (the “Property”).

On January 16, 2020, the Court issued an order denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication in its entirety.

Defendants now move, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(2), for leave to file another motion for summary judgment. Cutts opposes.

Discussion

Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(2) provides in pertinent part that “[a] party shall not move for summary judgment based on issues asserted in a prior motion for summary adjudication and denied by the court unless that party establishes, to the satisfaction of the court, newly discovered facts or circumstances or a change of law supporting the issues reasserted in the summary judgment motion.”

Defendants contend that they have obtained newly discovered facts to support a new motion for summary judgment. Defendants’ first motion for summary judgment was denied, among other reasons, because Defendants had failed to establish the foundational facts for the application of the Privette doctrine, which would have barred Cutts’s action against Defendants in its entirety. The particular foundational fact that Defendants had failed to demonstrate was whether Cutts was an “employee” as defined by Labor Code section 3351, in other words, whether Cutts rendered actual services for his company (Traxx) for pay when he was working on the subject construction project. After the ruling denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, on March 4, 2020, Defendants deposed Charles Rezner, the co-owner of Traxx in his individual capacity and as Traxx’s person most knowledgeable. (Ainslie Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. 1.) Mr. Rezner testified at this deposition that Cutts was working for Traxx when he was working on the subject construction project. (Ainslie Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. 1, p. 137:18-21.) Mr. Rezner also testified that Cutts “took draws” and that Cutts was “paid for the work that he performed on the Boulevard 6200 project.” (Ainslie Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. 1, p. 138:2-8.)

Cutts argues that this does not constitute newly discovered evidence. First, Cutts points to a different portion of Mr. Rezner’s deposition testimony, where he was unable to answer the question whether “[a]nyone working on behalf of Traxx on the project, was a Traxx employee.” (Ramey Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A, p. 82:10-19.) Second, Cutts argues that Mr. Rezner’s testimony is not “new” evidence but evidence from a different source that they could have reached prior to filing the original motion for summary judgment. But the Court notes that Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(2) does not require the presentation of “new” evidence, only that facts or circumstances are “newly discovered.” The Court finds that Defendants have established that the fact of Mr. Rezner’s testimony about whether Cutts was paid for his services on the subject construction project is newly discovered. Lastly, Cutts argues that even if this is “newly discovered” evidence, the outcome of the summary judgment motion would be unchanged because the Court separately found that Cutts had raised a triable issue on the elements of breach and causation in support of the negligence cause of action. But as noted by Defendants, the question of whether Defendants may bring another motion for summary judgment is separate from whether Defendants will prevail on a second motion for summary judgment.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted.

Defendants are ordered to provide notice of this ruling.

DATED: August 20, 2020 ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court



Case Number: ****8363    Hearing Date: June 22, 2020    Dept: 50

 

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

antonio cutts,

Plaintiff,

vs.

morley construction company, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.:

BC 688363

Hearing Date:

June 22, 2020

Hearing Time:

8:30 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE FOR (1) ADDITIONAL MEDICAL EXAMINATION OF PLAINTIFF WITH MARK J. SPOONAMORE, M.D.; (2) THE EXAMINATION TO OCCUR AFTER THE PERCIPIENT DISCOVERY CUT-OFF; (3) THE EXAMINATION TO OCCUR ON SHORTEN NOTICE

Background

On December 28, 2017, Plaintiff Antonio Cutts (“Cutts”) filed this action against Defendants Morley Construction Company (“Morley”), Benchmark Contractors, Inc. (“Benchmark”), Helix Electric, Inc. (“Helix”), and Blvd 6200 Owner South, LLC (“Blvd 6200”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Cutts alleges damages, in particular, nerve damage that has caused numbness and pain in his left side, as a result of injuries sustained while working on a construction project located at 6200 Hollywood Blvd., Hollywood, California 90028 (the “Property”). Trial is currently scheduled for September 21, 2020.

On January 8, 2020, Cutts underwent a mental examination by Defendants’ retained neuro-psychologist, Dr. Dylan Harwood. (Ainslie Decl., ¶ 5.) On January 21, 2020, Cutts underwent a physical examination by Defendants’ retained neurologist, Dr. Jeffrey Bounds. (Ainslie Decl., ¶ 5.)

Defendants have moved for leave to conduct an additional physical examination of Cutts. The date originally requested was March 30, 2020. At the time of filing the motion, the trial date had not been moved to September, and the Defendants also moved for leave to conduct the additional physical examination after the discovery cut-off date and on shortened notice. Recently, the parties stipulated that the discovery cut-off date is tied to the new trial date. Additionally, there now should be adequate time to give regular notice. Cutts opposes the motion.

Discussion

Defendants contend that good cause exists for an additional physical examination of Cutts, specifically an orthopedic examination. This contention is based on Dr. Bounds’s opinion that Cutts’s injury was not neurological but orthopedic in origin. (Ainslie Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendants further contend that Cutts’s own medical records, which include an orthopedic consultation and opinion, support a finding of good cause to conduct an orthopedic exam of Cutts. (Ainslie Decl., ¶ 11.)

“In any case in which a plaintiff is seeking recovery for personal injuries, any defendant may demand one physical examination of the plaintiff,” on the conditions that the “examination does not include any diagnostic test or procedure that is painful, protracted, or intrusive” and that “[t]he examination is conducted at a location within 75 miles of the residence of the examinee.”  (Code Civ. Proc., ; 2032.220 subd. (a).) If “any party desires to obtain discovery by a physical examination other than that described in Article 2 (commencing with Section 2032.210) . . . the party shall obtain leave of court.” ((Code Civ. Proc., ; 2032.310, subd. (a).) Such a motion may be granted “only for good cause shown.” (Code Civ. Proc., ;2032.320, subd. (a); (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 840 [finding that a showing of “good cause” requires “the party [to] produce specific facts justifying discovery and that the inquiry be relevant to the subject matter of the action or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”].) Physical examinations must be scheduled for a date that is at least 30 days after the service of the demand, but “[o]n motion of the party demanding the examination, the court may shorten this time.” ((Code Civ. Proc., ; 2032.220, subd. (d).)

Cutts opposes on the ground that an orthopedic examination is unnecessary and intrusive because his injuries are not orthopedic in nature and so, he is not seeking damages for orthopedic injuries. (Ramey Decl., ¶ 9.) Cutts argues that he has only seen an orthopedic doctor once on a referral from his primary care provider, and that the orthopedic doctor then referred Cutts to a neurologist for nerve testing. (Ramey Decl., ¶ 9.) Moreover, to the extent that Defendants are relying on the opinion of Dr. Bounds, Cutts argues that Defendants will suffer no prejudice if no orthopedic exam is taken because Defendants can meet their burden of proof (that Cutts did not suffer an injury of the chronic regional pain system) with Dr. Bounds’s testimony.

Here, the Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated good cause for the conducting of the additional physical examination. Defendants have set forth the specific facts justifying the discovery and the Court finds that the orthopedic exam is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

June 22, 2020 ________________________________



Case Number: ****8363    Hearing Date: January 16, 2020    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

antonio cutts,

Plaintiff,

vs.

morley construction company, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.:

BC 688363

Hearing Date:

January 16, 2020

Hearing Time:

8:30 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Background

On December 28, 2017, Plaintiff Antonio Cutts (“Cutts”) filed this action against Defendants Morley Construction Company (“Morley”), Benchmark Contractors, Inc. (“Benchmark”), Helix Electric, Inc. (“Helix”), and Blvd 6200 Owner South, LLC (“Blvd 6200”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was filed on August 7, 2018, and asserts causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) negligence per se, and (3) premises liability stemming from injuries sustained by Cutts while working on a construction project located at 6200 Hollywood Blvd., Hollywood, California 90028 (the “Property”).

Defendants now move for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of the first and second causes of action. Cutts opposes.

Evidence

The Court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice as to Items 1 and 2.

The Court rules on Cutts’s evidentiary objections to the evidence presented by Defendants as follows:

Objections 1-12: overruled

The Court rules on Defendants’ evidentiary objections as follows:

Objections 1-5: sustained

Objection 6: overruled

Objection 7: overruled

Legal Standard

“[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” ((Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c (c).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. ((Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If the moving party carries this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. ((Ibid. .) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” ((Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

When a defendant seeks summary judgment, he/she must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established; or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. ((Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c(p)(2).)

Discussion

Defendants contend that Cutts’s action against them is barred by the Privette doctrine. In Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, the California Supreme Court held that an employee of an independent contractor performing inherently dangerous work may not seek recovery of tort damages from the person who hired the contractor but did not cause the injuries. ((Id. at p. 702.) This is so because workers’ compensation “is the exclusive remedy against an employer for injury or death of an employee” and because the hirer of the contractor “generally has no right of control as to the mode of doing the work contracted for.” ((Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 640 [internal quotations omitted].)

Nevertheless, certain exceptions to the Privette doctrine exist. First, “when the hirer retains control over safety conditions at the worksite” and “exercise[s] that control in a way that affirmatively contribute[s] to the employee’s workplace injury,” the hirer may be liable. ((Id. at p. 641 [internal quotations omitted]); (see also Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 213 [“if a hirer does retain control over safety conditions at a worksite and negligently exercises that control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to an employee’s injuries, it is only fair to impose liability on the hirer”].) The affirmative contribution “can take the form of actively directing a contractor or contractor’s employee, but can also take the form of a hirer’s omission, such as failing to undertake a particular safety measure after promising to do so.” ((Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 145 [discussing Hooker].)

Second, Privette does not apply when nondelegable duties are involved. ((Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038.) “A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others. One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor.” ((Id. at p. 1036.) “Nondelegable duties may arise when a statute provides specific safeguards or precautions to insure the safety of others.” ((Ibid. ); see also Rest. 2d Torts, ; 424 [“One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specific safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.”].) Thus, a failure to comply with a specific statute or regulation may constitute an omission that “creates a triable issue of fact as to whether [a] defendant[] breached [his or her] nondelegable duty in a manner that affirmatively contributed to [the contractor’s employee’s] injury.” ((Evard v. Southern California Edison, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 148.)

Third, a “hirer as landowner may be independently liable to the contractor’s employee, even if it does not retain control over the work, if (1) it knows or reasonably should know of a concealed, pre-existing hazardous condition on its premises; (2) the contractor does not know and could not reasonably ascertain the condition; and (3) the landowner fails to warn the contractor.” ((Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675.)

“The Privette line of decisions establishes a presumption that an independent contractor’s hirer ‘delegates to that contractor its tort law duty to provide a safe workplace for the contractor’s employees.’” ((Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 642.) This presumption is one that affects the burden of producing evidence, meaning that “the trier of fact [is required] to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence . . . .” ((Id. at pp. 643-644.) In order to benefit from the Privette presumption, certain “foundational facts” must be established. In Alvarez, the evidence cited by the Court of Appeal establishing the “foundational facts” was (1) as to the defendant owner, evidence that the plaintiff’s employer was hired to perform work on a specific project by the owner, (2) as to the other defendants who were the owner’s contractors, evidence that the contractors were also hired by the owner to perform work on the same project, and (3) evidence that the plaintiff was injured while working on the project. ((Id. at p. 644.)

It is undisputed that Blvd 6200 is the owner of the Property. (Defendants’ Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) 1; FAC, ¶ 5.) It is further undisputed that Benchmark was hired by Blvd 6200 to be the general contractor on the project, that Benchmark hired Morley to be the concrete construction subcontractor, that Benchmark hired Helix to be the electrical subcontractor, and that Morley hired Traxx Construction Inc. (“Traxx”) as one of the excavation subcontractors. (UMF 2-4.) Cutts was the co-owner of Traxx, with the title of President of Construction. (UMF 5.) Cutts was injured while working on the project. (UMF 28; FAC, ¶ 8.)

Based on these facts, Defendants contend that they are entitled to the Privette presumption, thus shifting the burden to Cutts to raise a triable issue of fact. Specifically as to Helix, Defendants argue that even though Helix did not hire Traxx, the Privette doctrine is equally applicable to Helix. Although not discussed explicitly by the Court of Appeal, based on judicially noticeable facts, the Court finds that the Privette doctrine applies to an allegedly negligent contractor who is not within the direct contractual hiring chain. ((Ibid. [finding that the fact that the other contractor defendants were also hired by the owner to perform work was a “foundational fact”]); Ainslie Decl., ¶ 20, Ex. 19, ¶¶ 7-12 [complaint in Alvarez, in which the plaintiff alleges direct negligence theory against the contractor defendants].)

Cutts counters that Privette does not apply as to any of the Defendants because he was not an employee of Traxx. Rather, Cutts contends that, as an owner of Traxx, he was not covered by workers’ compensation insurance, and Privette precludes recovery only when workers’ compensation insurance is available and mandatory. Cutts and Defendants both cite to Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 518, in support of their respective positions. In Tverberg, an independent contractor who was hired by a subcontractor sued the general contractor seeking damages for workplace injuries. ((Id. at p. 526.) The Court of Appeal found in favor of the plaintiff by reasoning that “Privette did not control because unlike the independent contractor’s employee injured at the jobsite, as occurred in Privette, the injured independent contractor [in Tverberg] was not subject to mandatory coverage for workplace injuries under California’s workers’ compensation system.” (Ibid. [emphasis in original].) The Supreme Court of California reversed, finding that “an injured independent contractor hired by a subcontractor cannot hold the general contractor vicariously liable for those jobsite injuries on a theory of peculiar risk.” (Id. at p. 527 [emphasis added].) This conclusion was based on the fact that “the doctrine of peculiar risk was developed by the courts as an exception to the common law rule of hirer nonliability ‘to ensure that innocent third parties injured by the negligence of an independent contractor hired by a landowner to do inherently dangerous work . . . would not have to depend on the contractor’s solvency in order to receive compensation for the injuries.” (Ibid. [emphasis in original].) “Privette held that an independent contractor’s injured employee, although qualifying as a ‘third party’ with respect to the contract between the hirer and the independent contractor, cannot use the doctrine of peculiar risk to recover damages from the hirer of the independent contractor for injuries compensable under workers’ compensation insurance, the cost of which is generally included in the contract price for the hired work.” (Ibid.) Nevertheless, “[w]hen an independent contractor is hired to perform inherently dangerous construction work, that contractor, unlike a mere employee, receives authority to determine how the work is to be performed and assumes a corresponding responsibility to see that the work is performed safely.” (Id. at p. 528.) Thus, “the existence of workers’ compensation coverage is not relevant to deciding whether a hirer should incur vicarious liability for workplace injury to an independent contractor who was hired by a subcontractor to do inherently dangerous work.” (Id. at p. 527 [emphasis added].) Because the independent contractor has been “delegated control over the performance of the work,” the independent contractor is no longer within the category of “innocent third parties deserving of financial protection under the doctrine of peculiar risk.” (Id. at p. 528 [internal quotations omitted].)

Stated otherwise, while the rule is that an independent contractor is barred from attempting to hold an owner or general contractor vicariously liable for work-related injuries, this is not because the Privette doctrine applies. Rather, it is because the peculiar risk doctrine does not apply. As set forth in Tverberg, the Privette doctrine is merely an exception to the peculiar risk doctrine, which itself is an exception to the common law rule that owners are not liable to innocent third parties for the negligence of hired contractors. ((Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 518, 524-525.) Accordingly, the California Supreme Court held that “the doctrine of peculiar risk does not apply when . . . an on-the-job-injured independent contractor hired by a subcontractor seeks to hold the general contractor vicariously liable for injuries arising from risks inherent in the nature or the location of the hired work over which the independent contractor has, through the chain of delegation, been granted control.” ((Id. at pp. 528-529.) Based on this, the Court finds that neither Defendants nor Cutts have correctly applied Tverberg to the facts of this case. Defendants misconstrue Tverberg in concluding that “regardless of whether Plaintiff Cutts was an ’employee’ of Traxx Construction, which he disputes as he was an ‘owner,’ and regardless of whether he is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits through Traxx’s policy it purchased, the Privette reasoning and holding is still applicable.” (Reply, p. 4: 14-17.) Cutts cites to Tverberg in his opposition (p. 12: 13-14) but overlooks the fact that Tverberg would bar Cutts’s claims to the extent they are based on vicarious liability.

In any event, Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because of the Privette doctrine. As the moving party, Defendants bear the burden of establishing the “foundational facts” for the application of the Privette doctrine, which includes the fact that Cutts was an employee of Traxx. Defendants point to Labor Code section 3351, which defines an “employee” to include “[a]ll officers and members of boards of directors of quasi-public or private corporations while rendering actual service for the corporations for pay.” (Lab. Code

; 3351, subd. (c).) Although Cutts himself confirms that he was the president of Traxx (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Material Facts in Dispute, Fact 22), Defendants offer no evidence that Cutts rendered actual service for Traxx “for pay.” Therefore, because Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing that Cutts was an employee of Traxx pursuant to Labor Code section 3351, Defendants have failed to establish a “foundational fact” for the application of the Privette doctrine. Thus, the burden does not shift to Cutts to raise a triable issue of fact.

Separately, Defendants move for summary adjudication of the first and second causes of action (negligence and negligence per se) on the grounds that Cutts cannot prove breach or causation.

The following facts are undisputed. On June 15, 2016, Cutts was excavating foundation footing pads when he struck the power lines; he was uninjured. (UMF 28, 36-37.) On June 16, 2016, Cutts resumed digging the foundation pad with the assistance of a Helix employee hand digging to completely expose the power lines. (UMF 39.) The Helix employee was also spraying the conduits with orange/red spray paint to highlight their location and to signify that they were energized. (UMF 40.) A Morley laborer was also measuring elevations of the footing and cleaning out loose dirt. (UMF 41.) After the Helix employee left for lunch and while the Morley employee was faced the other direction, Cutts used his excavator to dig on top of the power lines to take dirt off the top in a location “several feet further up from the line that was struck the day before.” (UMF 43; Lopez Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. 8 (Vo Depo.), pp. 87:22 – 89:14.) At the time of the incident, approximately five feet of the power lines were exposed. (Ainslie Decl.,

¶ 13, Ex. 12 (Cahill Depo.) pp. 48:20 – 50:4; Ainslie Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. 11 (King Depo.) pp. 199:18 – 201:13.)

On the negligence per se claim, Cutts alleges that “Defendants violated laws and/or regulations that require making electrical line safe for others to work around.” (FAC, ¶ 19.) Cutts also alleges that the “California Public Utilities Commission requires that buried electrical lines be covered by not less than 3 inches of concrete.” (FAC, ¶ 7.) Defendants contend that Cutts cannot establish that any laws or regulations were violated. Although Cutts does not identify the specific law or regulation that is the basis for his negligence per se claim, Defendants point to Rule 43.4A of the Public Utilities Commission Rules for Construction of Underground Electric Supply and Communication Systems, General Order No. 128. That rule provides as follows: “Buried communication cables and conductors, when independently installed, shall be separated where practicable from supply system ducts and buried cables or conductors by not less than 3 inches of concrete, 4 inches of brick masonry, or 12 inches of earth.” (Cal. P.U.C., General Order No. 128, Rule 43.4A (Jan. 2006).)

It is undisputed that in May 2016, Helix installed temporary electrical power lines for the project. (UMF 29.) Defendants submit evidence that the temporary power lines were encased in plastic conduits and buried under several feet of dirt. (Hetman Decl., ¶ 10.) Cutts disputes this fact but cites only to inadmissible evidence from his expert. (See Response to UMF 30.) Importantly, Cutts offers no evidence or argument that the power lines were not buried under several feet of dirt. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the Public Utilities Commission rule cited by Defendants actually applies. The rule seems to dictate the distance between buried cables and not to the distance between a buried cable and the surface of the ground. Therefore, it is unclear whether burying an electrical supply line under “several feet of dirt” is sufficient to establish that Defendants did not violate any applicable Public Utilities Commission rules. Because the burden is on Defendants, as the moving parties, to show that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing that the negligence per se cause of action has no merit.

Next, Defendants argue that the negligence cause of action has no merit because Cutts cannot prove breach of a legal duty or causation.

Defendants present evidence that there was no requirement within the Benchmark-Helix contract that required Helix to have the temporary power lines encased in concrete. (Hetman Decl., ¶ 10.) Although Cutts purports to dispute this fact, no evidence is cited that actually creates a dispute. (See Response to UMF 31.) Defendants also present evidence that on June 13, 2016, Cutts attended a safety meeting where trenching and excavations were discussed. (UMF 32.) Although Cutts also disputes this fact, no evidence is cited that creates a dispute. (See Response to UMF 32.) At this meeting, the topics included calling an underground service alert prior to any trenching or excavations, hand digging being required within 24 inches on both sides of the marked utility, not using machines to scrape off dirt to expose a utility, and changes in underground utility elevation. (UMF 33.) On the same day, the superintendent for Benchmark, the superintendent for Morley, and the assistant superintendent for Morley made the decision to use Helix employees to hand dig each side within two feet of the buried conduits to address Cutts’s concerns about encountering temporary power lines during excavations. (UMF 34.) Again, Cutts purports to dispute this fact, but the argument and cited evidence does not reveal a material dispute. (See Response to UMF 34.) Cutts contends that he was never going to be providing employees to hand dig, but Cutts does not suggest that Defendants either failed to respond to his concerns about encountering power lines or that Defendants did not provide Helix employees to do the digging. It is undisputed that Cutts was told not to dig within two feet of either side of the “conduits hanging from the shoring wall at N line.” (UMF 35.)

Defendants argue that based on their safety policies, standard industry practices, contractual obligations of the excavator, and legal obligations of the excavator under Cal OHSA, they had no reason to suspect that the location of the lines was in dangerous proximity to the excavation of foundation footing pads to be performed by Cutts. (UMF 15-27.) Defendants argue that they reasonably believed and expected Cutts to locate subsurface utilities, expose them by hand digging, and stay clear of exposed power lines. Defendants also argue that Cutts’s injuries were not the result of any of Defendants’ acts or omissions but of Cutts’s own failure to provide protective equipment and devices, failure to locate existing subsurface utilities prior to opening an excavation, and failure to allow digging by hand to expose the utility.

Cutts counters that he could not have known that he was digging in a dangerous location because “the danger was buried.” (Opp’n, p. 17: 15-16.) Cutts offers evidence (in the form of his own testimony) that he was informed that the buried power lines would not run in the path of the digging. (Cutts’s Additional Material Fact (“AMF”) 44.) Cutts also testified that he was informed that the lines were encased in concrete, so he would be “okay” if he hit the lines. (AMF 45, 60-61.) When he hit the lines on June 15, 2016, the electrical wires were exposed and only half were contained in concrete. (AMF 63.) Cutts offers evidence that the lines were not properly located because they were not underneath the bottom of the footings. (AMF 64, 82.) Cutts also testified that on June 16, 2016, he requested to attach a ground wire to his excavator to minimize the effect of an electrical shock. (AMF 70.) This request was refused. (AMF 72.) When the incident happened, Cutts was digging “several feet” from the area where he hit the line on June 15, 2016. (AMF 76.)

Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that Cutts has raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the elements of breach and causation can be established in support of the negligence cause of action.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication is denied in its entirety.

Cutts is ordered to provide notice of this ruling.

DATED: January 16, 2020 ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court



Case Number: ****8363    Hearing Date: October 24, 2019    Dept: 50

THE COURT NEEDS ADDITIONAL TIME TO COMPLETE ITS REVIEW OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PAPERS.  CONSEQUENTLY, THE HEARING WILL NOT GO FORWARD TOMORROW.  THE CLERK WILL CONTACT THE PARTIES TO DETERMINE A NEW DATE FOR THE HEARING.  DEFENDANTS ARE ORDERED TO GIVE NOTICE.



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