AMERICAN CONTRACTORS INDEMNITY COMPANY VS MEIR LEVI ET AL

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC671306    Hearing Date: November 20, 2019    Dept: 20

Tentative Ruling

Judge Dalila C. Lyons

Department 20

Hearing Date: Wednesday, November 20, 2019

Case Name: American Contractors Indemnity Company v. Meir Levi, et al.

Case No.: BC671306

Motion: Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

Moving Party: Plaintiff American Contractors Indemnity Company

Responding Party: *UNOPPOSED*

Notice: OK

Ruling: Plaintiff American Contractors Indemnity Company’s motion for 40,013.32 in attorney fees and $1,413.34 in costs against defendant Meir Levi is GRANTED.

Moving party to give notice.

On August 26, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for summary adjudication of the Frist Cause of Action against defendant Meir Levi (Levi). On August 26, 2019, Plaintiff dismissed Western and the Doe Defendants. On October 15, 2019, the Court entered judgment for Plaintiff and against Levi and ordered that attorney's fees and costs should be determined by noticed motion and memorandum of costs as provided by law. Subsequently this motion was filed and on October 23, 2019 plaintiff filed its memorandum of costs requesting $1,413.34 in costs.

Plaintiff moves to recover $40,013.32 in attorney fees and $1,413.34 in costs from Levi pursuant to the contractual provisions of the GIA. Plaintiff was the prevailing party and judgment was entered for Plaintiff.

No opposition to this motion was filed.

ANALYSIS

“Except as attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but parties to actions or proceedings are entitled to their costs, as hereinafter provided.” CCP § 1021. Attorneys’ fees are allowable costs when authorized by contract, statute, or the law. CCP § 1033.5(a)(10).

“[T]he starting point of every fee award…must be a calculation of the attorney's services in terms of the time he has expended on the case. Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.” In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal. App. 4th 1041, 1058 (quoting Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 322). “[T]he primary method for establishing the amount of ‘reasonable’ attorney fees is the lodestar method. The lodestar (or touchstone) is produced by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate.” Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal. App.4th 819, 833. Under this approach, a base amount is calculated from a compilation of time reasonably spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48; Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639. While “a fee request ordinarily should be documented in great detail.,” the absence of time records and billing statements did not deprive the court of “substantial evidence” to support an award when the attorney provided a declaration under the penalty of perjury which described the work and permitted the trial court to make its own evaluation of the reasonableness of the work done in light of the nature of the case and on the credibility of counsel’s declaration. Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587; Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559 (while not required for an award of attorneys’ fees, the failure to keep books of account and other records has been found to be the basis for disciplinary action). The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts. PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134.

Levi failed to oppose this motion. Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 560 (emphasizing that opposing parties “submitted no evidence that the hours claimed by counsel were excessive,” and declining to “declare as a matter of law that the hours were unreasonable”); Villanueva v. City of Colton (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1204 (opposing party “offered no evidence of any kind which might have warranted a reduced fee award.”).

Here, ACIC is the prevailing party and is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§1032 and 1033.5 and Civil Code 18 § 1717. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s time records and affidavits filed in support of this motion and finds the hourly rate of counsel to be reasonable and the time expended on the matter and the billing to be reasonable. Stevenson Decl., Exh. B; Laverty Decl., Exh. B. Plaintiff has met its burden to provide substantial evidence of the attorney fees reasonably incurred by providing not only affidavits of counsel but also time records for the two years of this litigation. In contrast, Levi has failed to provide any evidence or argument that Plaintiff’s counsel’s fees are not unreasonable. Plaintiff’s unopposed request for $40,013.32 in attorney fees and $1,413.34 in costs is reasonable.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for $40,013.32 in attorney fees and $1,413.34 in costs is GRANTED.