ALTIMOND BRADBURY VS LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, ET AL.

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: *******2982    Hearing Date: March 15, 2021    Dept: 29

Altimond Bradbury v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, et al.

Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication, filed by Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority

TENTATIVE

Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority is GRANTED.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “The plaintiff or cross-complainant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.  (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c, subd. (c).)

Discussion

The Government Tort Claims Act

The intent behind the Tort Claims Act was “not to expand the rights of plaintiffs … against government entities, but to confine … government liability to rigidly delineated circumstances.” (Williams v. Hovarth (1975) 16 Cal.3d 834, 838.) As a result, a plaintiff must submit a claim to the public entity. In response to the plaintiff’s submission of the claim, the government entity must: (1) write to the plaintiff within 45 days of receipt of the claim for damages; (2) specify the date the claim was rejected; (3) warn of the six-month statute of limitations; and (4) serve the writing by personal service or by mail, to the address listed on the Claim for Damages. (Gov. Code, ;; 912.4, 912.6, 913, 945.4, and 945.6, subd. (a)(1).)

The statute of limitations period is triggered “from the date of the [Notice of Rejection] is deposited in the mail by the public entity, and not the date that it is received by the claimant or counsel.” (Edgington v. County of San Diego (1981) 225 Cal.App.3d 432, 440.)

Here, Moving Defendant asserts that Plaintiff timely submitted the Claim for Damages following the vehicle collision on January 31, 2018. (Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 3; Hampton Decl., ¶ 7, Exh. A.) Seven days following the receipt of Plaintiff’s Claim for Damages, on February 6, 2018, Defendant mailed the Notice of Reject to Plaintiff at his listed address at 14137 S. Vermont Ave. #523, Gardena, CA 90247. (UMF Nos. 4-5; Hampton Decl., ¶ 9-11, Exhs. A-B.) The Notice of Reject clearly indicates on its face and warns Plaintiff of his six-month time limit by which he must commenced this action. (Exh. B.) From the date of the rejection notice, Plaintiff had until August 6, 2018 to commence this action. (UMF No. 6.) This action, however, was not commenced until November 27, 2019. (Dykes Decl., ¶ 2, Exh. A.) Plaintiff failed to timely file his complaint in this action. (UMF No. 7.) Based on these undisputed material facts, Moving Defendant met its burden of showing that there is a complete defense to the only cause of action, i.e., statute of limitations under the Government Torts Claims Act. As a result, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

Since Plaintiff did not file his opposition to this motion, Plaintiff failed to meet his burden pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437, subdivision (p)(2). Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Conclusion

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

The action is DISMISSED in its entirety, without prejudice, as to Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and its named defendant employee Agop Marderos Shukri.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.