This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 11/10/2020 at 18:03:37 (UTC).

ALI MADDAH VS MARTHA BREWER KOO

Case Summary

On 01/12/2018 ALI MADDAH filed a Contract - Other Contract lawsuit against MARTHA BREWER KOO. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are PATRICIA D. NIETO and ROBERT L. HESS. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****9983

  • Filing Date:

    01/12/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Other Contract

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

PATRICIA D. NIETO

ROBERT L. HESS

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs, Petitioners and Cross Defendants

MADDAH ALI

SL CALIFORNIA HOLDINGS LLC

Defendants, Respondents and Cross Plaintiffs

DOES 1 TO 10

KOO MARTHA BREWER

CLARITY HOUSE INC.

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

ABB WAYNE M. ESQ.

ABB WAYNE MARK ESQ.

Defendant and Cross Plaintiff Attorney

STONE JASON MICHAEL

Plaintiff and Cross Defendant Attorney

ABB WAYNE MARK ESQ.

 

Court Documents

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES TO RE...)

10/2/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES TO RE...)

Opposition - OPPOSITION [DEFENDANT MARTHA BREWER KOOS] TO PLAINTIFF ALI MADDAHS MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF B

8/28/2020: Opposition - OPPOSITION [DEFENDANT MARTHA BREWER KOOS] TO PLAINTIFF ALI MADDAHS MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF B

Reply - REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT MARTHA BREWER KOO'S CROSS-COMPLAINT

6/26/2020: Reply - REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT MARTHA BREWER KOO'S CROSS-COMPLAINT

Notice of Ruling

7/7/2020: Notice of Ruling

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER) OF 05/19/2020

5/19/2020: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER) OF 05/19/2020

Cross-Complaint

3/12/2020: Cross-Complaint

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER)

3/19/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER)

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER) OF 03/19/2020

3/19/2020: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER) OF 03/19/2020

Notice of Intent to Appear by Telephone

1/27/2020: Notice of Intent to Appear by Telephone

Reply - REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT MARTHA BREWER KOO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

6/19/2019: Reply - REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT MARTHA BREWER KOO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Proof of Personal Service

6/10/2019: Proof of Personal Service

Opposition - OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT

6/10/2019: Opposition - OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case Management Order

1/28/2019: Case Management Order

Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

1/29/2019: Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

NOTICE RE; CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

9/25/2018: NOTICE RE; CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

Declaration - Declaration of Wayne M. Abb Re Pre -Demurrer Meet and Confer

11/6/2018: Declaration - Declaration of Wayne M. Abb Re Pre -Demurrer Meet and Confer

NOTICE OF CASE REASSIGNMENT AND OF ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE

6/21/2018: NOTICE OF CASE REASSIGNMENT AND OF ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE

SUMMONS (UNLAWFUL DETAINER -

1/12/2018: SUMMONS (UNLAWFUL DETAINER -

60 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 09/20/2021
  • Hearing09/20/2021 at 10:00 AM in Department 24 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Jury Trial

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  • 09/09/2021
  • Hearing09/09/2021 at 09:30 AM in Department 24 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Final Status Conference

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  • 07/07/2021
  • Hearing07/07/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 24 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Post-Mediation Status Conference

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  • 12/09/2020
  • Hearing12/09/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department 24 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses

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  • 12/09/2020
  • Hearing12/09/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department 24 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses

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  • 12/09/2020
  • Hearing12/09/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department 24 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 12/09/2020
  • Hearing12/09/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department 24 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery")

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 10/02/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 24; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses (to request for Admissions (filed 4/28/20)) - Held - Continued

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 10/02/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 24; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses (to Request for Production (filed 4/28/20)) - Held - Continued

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 10/02/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 24; Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") (to Request for Admissions (filed 4/29/20)) - Held - Continued

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110 More Docket Entries
  • 07/02/2018
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 24; Unknown Event Type

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  • 06/21/2018
  • DocketNotice of Case Reassignment and Order for Plaintiff to Give Notice; Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/21/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE REASSIGNMENT AND OF ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE

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  • 06/13/2018
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 24; Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Proceeding continued) -

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  • 06/13/2018
  • DocketMinute order entered: 2018-06-13 00:00:00; Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/23/2018
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/23/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

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  • 01/12/2018
  • DocketCOMPLAINT-CONTRACT

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  • 01/12/2018
  • DocketSUMMONS (UNLAWFUL DETAINER

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  • 01/12/2018
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Ali Maddah (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC689983    Hearing Date: August 19, 2020    Dept: 24

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Ali Maddah’s motion to strike is GRANTED without leave as the entire cross-complaint.

On January 12, 2018, Plaintiff Ali Maddah (“Maddah”) brought the instant breach of contract action against Defendant Martha Brewer Koo (“Koo”). The complaint alleges a breach of a lease agreement.

On October 15, 2018, Koo filed an answer and Cross-Complaint. However, on November 27, 2018, Koo filed a voluntary request for dismissal as to the cross-complaint, without prejudice. Again, on March 12, 2020, Koo filed a new cross-complaint, this time alleging intentional and negligent misrepresentation on the part of Maddah.

On March 30, 2020, Maddah filed the instant motion to strike the entirety of the cross-complaint for failure to seek leave, or alternatively, to strike punitive damages. On June 22, 2020, Koo filed an opposition. On June 26, 2020, Maddah filed a reply.

Legal Standard

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code Section 3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294 (a).) “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." (Coll. Hosp., Inc., supra, 8 Cal. 4th at 725 [examining Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1)].)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. [Citations.] In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. [Citations.] In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. [Citation.]” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.)

Meet and Confer

Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading. (CCP § 435.5.) Counsel’s declaration regarding a single email sent to opposing counsel does not satisfy CCP § 435.5(a)’s requirement that the parties meet and confer in person or by telephone. (Uss Decl. ¶ 10.) On this occasion, the Court will proceed to address the merits of the motion despite the insufficiency of the meet and confer. The Court cautions the parties that a code-compliant meet and confer effort is required for each demurrer or motion to strike on subsequent pleadings.

Discussion

Maddah moves to strike the newly filed cross-complaint on the grounds that it was not filed in conformity with the law. (CCP § 435(b).) The Court agrees.

Koo was required to file their cross-complaint against Maddah when they filed their initial answer. A party against whom a cause of action has been asserted in a complaint may file a cross-complaint setting forth either or both of the following:

(a) Any cause of action he has against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him. Nothing in this subdivision authorizes the filing of a cross-complaint against the plaintiff in an action commenced under Title 7 (commencing with Section 1230.010) of Part 3.

(b) Any cause of action he has against a person alleged to be liable thereon, whether or not such person is already a party to the action, if the cause of action asserted in his cross-complaint (1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the cause brought against him.

(CCP §428.10.)

Further, CCP section 428.50 provides in part:

(a) A party shall file a cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him or her before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint or cross-complaint.

[…]

(c) A party shall obtain leave of court to file any cross-complaint except one filed within the time specified in subdivision (a) or (b). Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.

(CCP § 428.50(a), (c).)

CCP section 426.30 states in relevant part:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, if a party against whom a complaint has been filed and served fails to allege in a cross complaint any related cause of action which (at the time of serving his answer to the complaint) he has against the plaintiff, such party may not thereafter in any other action assert against the plaintiff the related cause of action not pleaded.

(CCP § 426.30(a).)

Here, Koo filed their answer on October 15, 2018. Koo initially filed a cross-complaint then, but voluntarily dismissed it. Defendant’s First Amended Answer was thereafter filed on December 13, 2018. Koo was required to seek leave to file a new cross-complaint after dismissing the cross-complaint and having already answered. (CCP § 428.50(c).) Instead, Koo unilaterally filed a new cross-complaint on March 12, 2020, without the required leave of court.

Accordingly, Maddah's motion to strike is GRANTED without leave to amend. If Koo wishes to file a new cross-complaint, they must seek leave of court through a regularly noticed motion.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: BC689983    Hearing Date: July 06, 2020    Dept: 24

On January 12, 2018, Plaintiff Ali Maddah (“Maddah”) brought the instant breach of contract action against Defendant Martha Brewer Koo (“Koo”). The complaint alleges a breach of a lease agreement.

On October 15, 2018, Koo filed an answer and Cross-Complaint. However, on November 27, 2018, Koo filed a voluntary request for dismissal as to the cross-complaint, without prejudice. Again, on March 12, 2020, Koo filed a new cross-complaint, this time alleging intentional and negligent misrepresentation on the part of Maddah.

On March 30, 2020, Defendant filed the instant motion to strike the entirety of the cross-complaint for failure to seek leave, or alternatively, to strike punitive damages.

Legal Standard

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code Section 3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294 (a).) “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." (Coll. Hosp., Inc., supra, 8 Cal. 4th at 725 [examining Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1)].)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. [Citations.] In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. [Citations.] In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. [Citation.]” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.)

Meet and Confer

Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading. (CCP § 435.5.) Counsel’s declaration regarding a single email sent to opposing counsel does not satisfy CCP § 435.5(a)’s requirement that the parties meet and confer in person or by telephone. (Uss Decl. ¶ 10.) On this occasion, the Court will proceed to address the merits of the motion despite the insufficiency of the meet and confer. The Court cautions the parties that a code-compliant meet and confer effort is required for each demurrer or motion to strike on subsequent pleadings.

Discussion

Maddah moves to strike the newly filed cross-complaint on the grounds that it was not filed in conformity with the law. (CCP § 435(b).) The Court agrees that leave was required to file the instant cross-complaint. However, considering the lack of prejudice to Plaintiff, and that the Court would have granted leave to file a cross-complaint, the Court is not inclined to strike the pleading. In the interest of justice and judicial economy, the Court will deny the motion to strike.

The Court will therefore consider the alternative basis to strike the request for punitive damages.

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code Section 3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294 (a).) “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." (Coll. Hosp., Inc., supra, 8 Cal. 4th at 725 [examining Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1)].)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. [Citations.] In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. [Citations.] In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. [Citation.]” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.)

Fraud forms a basis for punitive damages. Civ. Code section 3294 defines fraud as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”

Here, the Cross-Complaint alleges two causes of action for fraud, an intentional misrepresentation claim and a negligent misrepresentation claim. These claim state that the parties were in negotiation for a lease regarding certain real property. (CC ¶¶ 8-9.) Cross-Complainant informed Nader Naderi (“Naderi”), Cross-Defendant's real estate agent, that the property was intended to be used for running a company titled Clarity House Inc., a residential sober facility where up tot twelve persons would be residing. (CC ¶ 10.) On July 26, 2015, Naderi informed Cross-Complainant that the lease would reflect that Cross-Defendant will not limit how many persons will occupy the subject property, and that she could use the property at her own discretion. (CC ¶¶ 11, 22.) In reliance on that promise, they entered into a lease agreement the next day. (CC ¶ 12.) Cross-Complainant used the property in accordance with that agreement for two years without issue. (CC ¶¶ 13-14.) On July 27, 2017, there was a move-out inspection, which failed to state any details in regards to alleged damage to the property. (CC ¶ 15.) On August 15, 2017, Cross-Defendant informed Cross-Complainant that the property contained approximately $46,998.00 in future repairs. (CC ¶ 16.) Cross-Defendant then filed the instant action, which alleges a breach of contract for failing to maintain the premises as provided in the rental agreement and causing severe damage to the property. (CC ¶¶ 17-18.) Cross-Defendant also claims, through discovery responses, that Cross-Complainant breached the agreement by failing: to get all occupants over 18 years of age to sign separate lease applications; to use the property for residential purposes only; subletting the property to a 3rd party; failure to maintain the property, damaging the flooring, bathroom vanities, and kitchen countertops; and failure to maintain and water the garden, landscaping, trees and shrubs. (CC ¶ 19.)

The Court does not find that this states acts of fraud per Civ. Code section 3294. The causes specifically cite the representation regarding permission to lease the subject property “at her own discretion” as the relevant misrepresentation, meaning her ability to use the rental property as a sober living facility. (CC ¶¶ 22-23.) Cross-Complainant states that she would not have entered into the lease agreement if she knew she would not be able to utilize the subject property for the operation of the sober living facility. (CC ¶¶ 24-26.) However, the underlying complaint--according to the cross-complaint--regards specific damages to the property, not the operation of the sober living facility per se. Cross-Complainant does not allege that she was prevented from operating the sober living facility. In fact, the sober living facility apparently operated without incident until the lease expired. (CC ¶ 15.) Thus, falsity is insufficiently alleged.

Cross-Complainant needs to clarify the basis of her fraudulent misrepresentations before punitive damages would be allowed. Accordingly, Cross-Defendant's motion to strike is GRANTED with leave.