This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 10/02/2019 at 01:42:59 (UTC).

ALEXANDER NIKOLAYCHUK VS CAPITAL ONE N A ET AL

Case Summary

On 03/13/2018 a Property - Other Property Fraud case was filed by ALEXANDER NIKOLAYCHUK against CAPITAL ONE N A in the jurisdiction of Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****8251

  • Filing Date:

    03/13/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Property - Other Property Fraud

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

ELIZABETH ALLEN WHITE

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner

NIKOLYACHUK ALEXANDER

Defendants and Respondents

CAPITAL ONE N.A.

ECHOLS LORETTA

INTEGRATED LENDER SERVICES INC.

DOES 1 TO 100

 

Court Documents

Opposition - OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL; DECLARATION IN SUPPORT THEREOF

7/30/2019: Opposition - OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL; DECLARATION IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Separate Statement

8/23/2019: Separate Statement

Request for Judicial Notice

8/23/2019: Request for Judicial Notice

Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL, FINAL STATUS CONFERENCE, AND EXTEND TRIAL RELATED DEADLINES, DECLARATION OF LOREN COE IN SUPPORT THEREOF

8/28/2019: Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL, FINAL STATUS CONFERENCE, AND EXTEND TRIAL RELATED DEADLINES, DECLARATION OF LOREN COE IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Order - ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL AND TRIAL-RELATED DEADLINES

8/29/2019: Order - ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL AND TRIAL-RELATED DEADLINES

Opposition - OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FUTHER PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

5/8/2019: Opposition - OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FUTHER PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

Reply - REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL

5/13/2019: Reply - REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL

Order - ORDER - RULING: MOTION TO COMPEL "FURTHER PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS"

5/21/2019: Order - ORDER - RULING: MOTION TO COMPEL "FURTHER PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS"

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON PLAINTIFF ALEXANDER NIKOLAYCHUK'S MOTION TO COMPEL...)

5/21/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON PLAINTIFF ALEXANDER NIKOLAYCHUK'S MOTION TO COMPEL...)

Minute Order -

7/19/2018: Minute Order -

Separate Statement - Plaintiff 's Separate Statement in Support of Motion to Compel Further Production of Documents

12/7/2018: Separate Statement - Plaintiff 's Separate Statement in Support of Motion to Compel Further Production of Documents

NOTICE OF POSTING JURY FEES

8/30/2018: NOTICE OF POSTING JURY FEES

CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT -

8/7/2018: CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT -

Minute Order -

7/19/2018: Minute Order -

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT DECLARATION IN SUPPORT FHEREOF

7/6/2018: PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT DECLARATION IN SUPPORT FHEREOF

DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT; ETC

5/10/2018: DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT; ETC

COMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENT BREACH OF TRUSTEE'S DUTIES, NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, FRAUD AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

3/13/2018: COMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENT BREACH OF TRUSTEE'S DUTIES, NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, FRAUD AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

30 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 03/17/2020
  • Hearing03/17/2020 at 09:30 AM in Department 48 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Jury Trial

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  • 03/11/2020
  • Hearing03/11/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department 48 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Final Status Conference

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  • 11/18/2019
  • Hearing11/18/2019 at 08:30 AM in Department 48 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment

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  • 09/30/2019
  • Docketat 09:30 AM in Department 48, Elizabeth Allen White, Presiding; Jury Trial (- 5 Day Estimate) - Not Held - Continued - Party's Motion

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  • 09/26/2019
  • DocketNotice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order; Filed by Clerk

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  • 09/25/2019
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 48, Elizabeth Allen White, Presiding; Final Status Conference - Not Held - Continued - Party's Motion

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  • 09/05/2019
  • DocketNotice of Ruling; Filed by Capital One, N.A. (Defendant); Integrated Lender Services, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 08/29/2019
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 48, Elizabeth Allen White, Presiding; Hearing on Ex Parte Application (to Continue Trial, Final Status Conference, and Extend Trial Related Deadlines) - Held - Motion Granted

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  • 08/29/2019
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Defendants Capital One, N.A., and Integrated Lende...)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 08/29/2019
  • DocketOrder (Granting Defendants' Ex Parte Application to Continue Trial and Trial-Related Deadlines); Filed by Capital One, N.A. (Defendant); Integrated Lender Services, Inc. (Defendant)

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51 More Docket Entries
  • 05/10/2018
  • DocketDemurrer; Filed by Capital One, N.A. (Defendant); Integrated Lender Services, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 05/10/2018
  • DocketDECLARATION OF LOREN W. COE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO PLAITTIFF'S COMPLAINT

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  • 05/10/2018
  • DocketDEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT; ETC

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  • 05/08/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

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  • 05/08/2018
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Alexander Nikolyachuk (Plaintiff)

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  • 04/06/2018
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/06/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

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  • 03/13/2018
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Alexander Nikolyachuk (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/13/2018
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 03/13/2018
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENT BREACH OF TRUSTEE'S DUTIES, NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, FRAUD AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC698251    Hearing Date: November 18, 2019    Dept: 48

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Capital One, N.A. and Integrated Lender Service, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Alexander Nikolaychuk

PROOF OF SERVICE:

ANALYSIS

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the following: (1) IRS publication 4681 entitled Canceled Debts, Foreclosures, Repossessions, and Abandonments (for Individuals); (2) IRS publication entitled 2011 Instructions for Forms 1099-A and 1099-C; (3) Grant Deed dated August 12, 2011, and recorded in the Official Records of the Los Angeles County Recorder's Office on September 2, 2011, as Instrument Number 20111198958; (4) Excerpts, pages 3-5, from the California City Documentary and Property Transfer Tax Rates as pertaining to Los Angeles County, California; (5) Bankruptcy Court Docket as of August 22, 2019 filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Hawaii (Honolulu) Case No. 15-01460, entitled In re: Alexander Nikolaychuk;(6) Order of Discharge filed March 8, 2016, in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Hawaii (Honolulu) Case No. 15-01460, entitled In re: Alexander Nikolaychuk.

Requests Nos. 1 and 2 are GRANTED. Pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(c), the Court may take judicial notice of official acts of executive departments. Request No. 3 is GRANTED. The Court may take judicial notice of recorded documents (Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 549; Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 263, 274). Request No. 4 is DENIED. It is unclear whether this is a government publication. However, this will be considered as evidence, subject to evidentiary objections. Requests Nos. 5 and 6 are GRANTED per Evid. Code § 452(d)(court records).

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following: (1) Grant Deed recorded on September 2, 2011; (2) Deed of Trust recorded on November 7, 2007; (3) Defendant’s Response to Order to Show Cause filed May 18, 2011, in the United States District Court, Central District of California, Los Angeles Division, in ING Bank, fsb v. Alexander Nikolaychuk et al. (Case No. CV I0-01402-JST (PLA); (4) Reminder of Overdue Taxes for 2011 from IRS directed to Plaintiff dated October 5, 2015; (5) two Form 1099-Cs from IRS directed to Plaintiff dated October 14, 2015; (6) Email chain dated December 23, 2015 and December 28, 2015 between Plaintiff and Rick Abelmann; (7) Notice of Intent to Levy from IRS directed to Plaintiff dated May 2, 2016; (8) Certificate of Release of Federal Tax Lien from IRS directed to Plaintiff dated July 12, 2017; (9) Deposition Transcript excerpts of Craig Petroziello on April 7, 2017; (10) Pages from ING’s financial statement for the quarter ended December 31, 2011 from internet.

Requests Nos. 1 and 2 are GRANTED. The Court may take judicial notice of recorded documents. Request Nos. 3 is GRANTED per Evid. Code § 452(d)(court records). Requests Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are DENIED. These are not matters of which the Court may take judicial notice. However, these will be considered as evidence, subject to evidentiary objections.

Motion for Summary Judgment

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action:

¿ First cause of action (negligent breach of trustee’s duties): Plaintiff alleges that after the non-judicial foreclosure sale whereby Defendants ING acquired the property with a full credit bid, Plaintiff was no longer liable for the debt. Complaint, ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to calculate Plaintiff’s remaining debt and to take steps to cancel the note following the non-judicial foreclosure and provide Plaintiff with the cancelled promissory note. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 24, 25. Defendants also prepared a Form 1099-C which caused Plaintiff to believe he was facing income tax liability on $688,750.00 of cancelled debt income. Id. at ¶ 26.

¿ Second cause of action (negligent infliction of emotional distress): Plaintiff alleges that the above actions negligently caused him emotional distress. Complaint, ¶¶ 32 – 40. However, Defendant allegedly concealed the existence of the Form 1099-C from Plaintiff by mailing it to an incorrect address or not mailing it at all. ¶ 49. Thus, Plaintiff does not really complain about a misrepresentation to him, but rather to the IRS.

¿ Third cause of action (fraud): Plaintiff alleges that Defendant ING mad misrepresentations in the Form 1099-C. Complaint, ¶ 42.

¿ Fourth cause of action (intentional infliction of emotional distress): Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s conduct constitute extreme and outrageous behavior causing him severe emotional distress. Complaint, ¶¶ 55 – 57.

The Court has given due consideration to the issues presented and rules as follows:

The Court notes that Plaintiff only pled emotional distress damages and costs of addressing the cancelled debt through his CPA and attorney (¶ 38), but did not plead costs of moving to Peru to evade the IRS in the Complaint. As such, those costs-of-moving damages cannot be raised in the opposition to create a triable issue of material act.

Further, as for emotional distress damages, Plaintiff cannot recover such damages because there was no threat of physical injury to him:

[B]ecause the [*156]  only injury Wilson claimed in her lawsuit was emotional distress, she was required to show that Edison's breach threatened physical injury to her. (See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984–985 [25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 863 P.2d 795] (Potter) [“[T]here is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. [Citation.] The tort is negligence, a cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff is an essential element. [Citations.] That duty may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.”].)  “[U]nless the defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the emotional condition of the plaintiff is an object[1], recovery is available only if the emotional distress arises out of the defendant's breach of some other legal duty and the emotional distress is proximately caused by that breach of duty. Even then, with rare exceptions, a breach of the duty must threaten physical injury, not simply damage to property or financial interests.” (Potter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 985.) Thus, at the very least, there could not have been a breach of duty during the period when no shocks were felt on the property.

Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 15-156 (bold emphasis and underlining added).

Finally, Plaintiff apparently seeks to recover out-of-pocket costs of hiring tax professionals to clarify his tax liability. For the reasons discussed below, there is no triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for such out-of-pocket costs.

1. For purposes of the 1099-C Form, the loan should have been characterized as nonrecourse because it was satisfied by way of non-judicial foreclosure upon the real property security.

On May 17, 2011, the property was sold at a trustee’s sale to the highest bidder, Defendant ING. Sep. State. UF No. 4; Meis Decl., ¶ 13. ING purchased the property at the foreclosure sale via credit bid amount in the amount of $1,060,642.44, which was an amount equal to the total unpaid debt at the time of the sale; the unpaid principal balance at the time of the sale was $880,000.00. UF No. 5; Meis Decl., ¶¶ 13, 16. In January 2012, ING issued an IRS Form 1099-C to the IRS and to Plaintiff that reflected that ING cancelled debt in the amount of $688,750.00 UF No. 6; Meis Decl., ¶ 14; Exh. 3.

Because the property was sold pursuant to a trustee’s sale (non-judicial foreclosure), it is a nonrecourse debt. “After the nonjudicial foreclosure, [CCP] Section 580d renders nonrecourse any debt evidenced by the Note — for both Simpson and his wife.” Simpson v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. (In re Simpson) (Bankr.9th Cir. May 29, 2013, No. CC-12-1445-MkTaJu) 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4643, at *21.

This nonjudicial foreclosure pursuant to the power of sale in a deed of trust constitutes an “identifiable event,” which triggered Defendant ING Bank, FSB’s obligation to file a Form 1099-C reporting a cancelled debt. The IRS Publication, “2011 Instructions For Forms 1099-A and 1099-C,” attached as Exh. 2 to Def’s RJN state as flows in pertinent part at Pages 2, 3 and 4:

Who Must File

File Form 1099-C if you are:

1. A financial institution described in section 581 or 591(a) (such as a domestic bank, trust company, building and loan or savings and loan association).

. . .

6. Any organization whose significant trade or business is the

lending of money, such as a finance company or credit card

company (whether or not affiliated with a financial institution). The

lending of money is a significant trade or business if money is lent

on a regular and continuing basis. Regulations section

1.6050P-2(b) lists three safe harbors under which reporting may not

be required for the current year. See Safe harbor rules below.

. . .

When Is a Debt Canceled

A debt is deemed canceled on the date an identifiable event occurs

or, if earlier, the date of the actual discharge if you choose to file

Form 1099-C for the year of cancellation. An identifiable event is:

. . .

2. A cancellation or extinguishment making the debt

unenforceable in a receivership, foreclosure, or similar federal or

state court proceeding.

. . .

4. A cancellation or extinguishment when the creditor elects

foreclosure remedies that by law end or bar the creditor's right to

collect the debt. This event applies to a mortgage lender or holder

who is barred by local law from pursuing debt collection after a

"power of sale" in the mortgage or deed of trust is exercised.

Debt Defined

A debt is any amount owed to you, including stated principal, stated

interest, fees, penalties, administrative costs, and fines. The

amount of debt canceled may be all or only part of the total amount

owed. However, for a lending transaction, you are required to report

only the stated principal. See Exceptions on this page.

When To File

Generally, file Form 1099-C for the year in which an identifiable

event occurs. See Exceptions on this page. If you cancel a debt

before an identifiable event occurs, you may choose to file Form

1099-C for the year of cancellation. No further reporting is required

even if a later identifiable event occurs with respect to an amount

previously reported. Also, you are not required to file an additional

or corrected Form 1099-C if you receive payment on a prior year

debt.

When Is a Debt Canceled

A debt is deemed canceled on the date an identifiable event occurs

or, if earlier, the date of the actual discharge if you choose to file

Form 1099-C for the year of cancellation. An identifiable event is:

. . .

2. A cancellation or extinguishment making the debt

unenforceable in a receivership, foreclosure, or similar federal or

state court proceeding.

. . .

4. A cancellation or extinguishment when the creditor elects

foreclosure remedies that by law end or bar the creditor's right to

collect the debt. This event applies to a mortgage lender or holder

who is barred by local law from pursuing debt collection after a

"power of sale" in the mortgage or deed of trust is exercised.

. . .

(Bold emphasis and underlining added.)

2. Only the unpaid principal balance at the time of the foreclosure sale should have been reported as cancelled debt. For a nonrecourse debt, fair market value (“FMV”) is not relevant to the calculation of income realized.

According to the U.S. Supreme Court:

When a taxpayer sells or disposes of property encumbered by a nonrecourse obligation, the Commissioner properly requires him to include among the assets realized the outstanding amount of the obligation. The fair market value of the property is irrelevant to this calculation. We find this interpretation to be consistent with Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), and to implement the statutory mandate in a reasonable manner. National Muffler Dealers Assn. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476 (1979).

Comm'r v. Tufts (1983) 461 U.S. 300, 317 (bold emphasis and underlining added).

It appears that Defendant’s argument as to the formula for calculating the amount of debt cancellation—unpaid principal balance (“UPB”) less fair market value (“FMV”) = cancelled debt (Def’s Ps & As, Page 13)—pertains to recourse loans. By that same token, Plaintiff’s argument that the correct formula is $640,000 principal debt less $340,000 FMV = $300,000 cancelled debt is also inapposite to a nonrecourse debt. See Comm’r v. Tufts, supra, 461 U.S. at 317 (“The fair market value of the property is irrelevant to this calculation”)

3. In this regard, however, the information Defendant provided on the 1099-C was more favorable to Plaintiff than that to which Plaintiff was entitled.

The Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale recorded on May 26, 2011 is attached to the Complaint as Exh. 2. It reflects that the Grantee was the foreclosing beneficiary, the amount of the unpaid debt was $1,060,642.44 and the amount paid by the Grantee was $1,060,642.44.

The below IRS Wage and Income Transcript reflecting the Form 1099-C sent by ING Direct as Creditor is attached to the Complaint as Exh. 3.

It appears that the information that Defendant provided on the 1099-C—that the amount of debt cancelled was $688,750.00 and that the borrower was personally liable for repayment of the debt was not correct. As noted, the debt should have been characterized as nonrecourse, and amount of debt cancelled was $1,060,642.44. In this regard, however, Defendant underreported the amount of debt cancelled (as $688,750.00), which was more favorable to Plaintiff.

As such, Defendant’s apparent error on the Form 1099-C submitted to the IRS did not cause Plaintiff damage because it was more favorable to Plaintiff’s financial interests than it should have been.

It is important to remember that, even if Defendant did not prepare a 1099-C form, Plaintiff had an independent obligation to report whether he realized a gain or loss out of the foreclosure sale. Of significance, the “amount realized” is only one part of the equation. The second part of the equation is the “adjusted basis” of the property. The gain or loss on the disposition of the property is measured by the difference between the “amount realized” and the “adjusted basis” of the property.

IRS Publication 4681, “Canceled Debts, Foreclosures, Repossessions, and Abandonments” (Defs’ RJN, Exh. 1) Page 3 states next to a Caution! symbol: “Even if you did not receive a Form 1099-C, you must report canceled debt as gross income on your tax return unless one of the exceptions or exclusions described later applies.” (Italics omitted, bold emphasis and underlining added.)

This means, Plaintiff had an independent obligation to ascertain (presumably with the assistance of a tax professional) the information reflected on the 1099-C. Also, Plaintiff was required as the taxpayer to take the information reflected on the 1099-C and compare it to his adjusted basis in the property to calculate his gain or loss for tax reporting purposes. 1441. The adverse impact upon Plaintiff arising from his failure to do so—and instead moving to Lima, Peru to avoid the reach of the IRS—falls upon him, not Defendants. See UF No. 17 (in 2016, Plaintiff moves to Lima, Peru to evade the IRS without first consulting a CPA regarding his potential tax liability—Nikolaychuk Depo. 79:6 – 80:15 (Coe Decl., Exh. D)). Indeed, Plaintiff did not conduct any independent research into the propriety of the 1099-C or its potential taxable consequences or lack thereof). UF No. 18; Nikolaychuk Depo. at 72:23-73:5, 110:3-111:5. Nor did he speak with a CPA or an attorney about the propriety of the 1099-C. UF No. 19; Nikolaychuk Depo. 72:3-73:5. Under the present circumstances, “ignorance of the law is no ground for recovery[2]” against Defendants. In March 2017, Plaintiff gave the 1099-C and related IRS correspondence to a CPA, who prepared Plaintiff’s 2011 tax return and informed Plaintiff on march 22, 2017 that no taxes were owed as a result of the 1099-C; Plaintiff has never and will pay any taxes arising from the 1099-C. UF Nos. 20 and 21; Nikolaychuk Depo. at 88:15-92:7; Coe Decl., Exh. A; Response to SPROG Nos. 24 and 30.

The adjusted basis is a calculation which requires a close analysis that need not be performed here, as addressed in 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a) – (c); § 1012(a); § 1016. The Court only mentions it to note that it was Plaintiff’s independent responsibility as a taxpayer to calculate the tax liability resulting from the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of his property. Indeed, had Plaintiff complied with this obligation to file a 2011 tax return he would have learned—as he admits he did—that as a result of an exemption, he had no tax liability for 2011. Opposition, Page 10:6-10. Needless to say, the damages Plaintiff suffered were self-inflicted as a result of his failure to comply with his obligations as a U.S. taxpayer.

Moreover, had Plaintiff been provided with a cancelled promissory note—one of Defendants’ failures of which Plaintiff complaints—representing that the indebtedness had been discharged, this is consistent with reporting the 1099-C cancellation of debt in the full amount of the remaining debt (or portion thereof, as Defendant reported) as discussed above.

The Court notes that Defendant intentionally mailing the 1099-C to the wrong address did not cause Plaintiff’s damages. As noted above, Plaintiff had an independent obligation to ascertain the information reflected on the 1099-C, even if he did not receive a 1099-C from Defendants.

The Court also finds that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims for fraud generally committed by Defendant against the IRS in connection with taking excess deductions for charging off bad debt.

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.


[1] Here, Defendants did not assume a duty in which the emotional condition of Plaintiff was an object. Rather, they were reporting financial information for tax purposes in connection with the non-judicial foreclosure of Plaintiff’s property.

[2] Stanley v. Westover (1928) 93 Cal.App. 97, 112.