This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 01/24/2022 at 11:24:30 (UTC).

ADAM HARARI VS MICHAEL RAY NGUYEN-STEVENSON ET AL

Case Summary

On 02/07/2017 ADAM HARARI filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against MICHAEL RAY NGUYEN-STEVENSON. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Spring Street Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are MARC D. GROSS, MICHELLE WILLIAMS COURT, RICHARD J. BURDGE JR., JON R. TAKASUGI, THOMAS D. LONG, CHARLES C. LEE, HOLLY E. KENDIG and AUDRA MORI. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****9756

  • Filing Date:

    02/07/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

MARC D. GROSS

MICHELLE WILLIAMS COURT

RICHARD J. BURDGE JR.

JON R. TAKASUGI

THOMAS D. LONG

CHARLES C. LEE

HOLLY E. KENDIG

AUDRA MORI

 

Party Details

Petitioner and Plaintiff

HARARI ADAM

Not Classified By Court, Respondents and Defendants

STEVENSON MICHAEL RAY

DOES 1-20

TYGA

NGUYEN-STEVENSON MICHAEL RAY

THE PENTHOUSE NIGHTCLUB

ATF PRIVATE SECURITY INC.

SKWS ENTERPRISES INC.

F&S INVESTMENT PROPERTIES GP

Respondents, Cross Defendants, Cross Plaintiffs and Defendants

NGUYEN-STEVENSON MICHAEL RAY

ATF PRIVATE SECURITY INC.

SKWS ENTERPRISES INC.

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Petitioner and Plaintiff Attorneys

O'NEIL & MATUSEK LLP

MATUSEK HENRY JOHN II

Respondent and Defendant Attorneys

KOSSOFF ALAN ESQ.

SINGH DALJINDER ESQ.

PARIKH SAGAR

DORENFELD DAVID K

PARTOS MICHAEL J

Defendant and Cross Plaintiff Attorneys

PARTOS MICHAEL J

SINGH DALJINDER

Defendant and Cross Defendant Attorneys

SINGH DALJINDER ESQ.

PARIKH SAGAR

Not Classified By Court Attorney

ABA ISAAC

 

Court Documents

Notice - NOTICE DEFENDANT ATF PRIVATE SECURITY, INC.'S NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF ADAM HARARI

1/19/2022: Notice - NOTICE DEFENDANT ATF PRIVATE SECURITY, INC.'S NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF ADAM HARARI

Memorandum of Costs (Summary)

1/19/2022: Memorandum of Costs (Summary)

Notice - NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

1/13/2022: Notice - NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Opposition - OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE APPLICATION

1/13/2022: Opposition - OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE APPLICATION

Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO SCHEDULE AND TAKE A COVID EXAMINATION BEFORE THE INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION

1/13/2022: Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO SCHEDULE AND TAKE A COVID EXAMINATION BEFORE THE INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO SCHEDU...)

1/14/2022: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO SCHEDU...)

Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF RULING

12/23/2021: Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF RULING

Judgment

1/6/2022: Judgment

Judgment

1/6/2022: Judgment

Opposition - OPPOSITION OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RELIEF FOR AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAM

12/20/2021: Opposition - OPPOSITION OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RELIEF FOR AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAM

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION - OTHER FOR RELIEF FOR AN INDEPENDENT MEDIC...)

12/21/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION - OTHER FOR RELIEF FOR AN INDEPENDENT MEDIC...)

Notice of Ruling

12/21/2021: Notice of Ruling

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (FINAL STATUS CONFERENCE)

12/23/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (FINAL STATUS CONFERENCE)

Notice of Ruling

12/10/2021: Notice of Ruling

Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR RELIEF FOR AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION

12/13/2021: Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR RELIEF FOR AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION

Response - RESPONSE DEFENDANT SKWS ENTERPRISES, INC.S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO SKWS EX PARTE MOTION FOR RELIEF FOR AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINTION

12/13/2021: Response - RESPONSE DEFENDANT SKWS ENTERPRISES, INC.S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO SKWS EX PARTE MOTION FOR RELIEF FOR AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINTION

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR RELIEF FOR AN INDEPENDENT...)

12/14/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR RELIEF FOR AN INDEPENDENT...)

Opposition - OPPOSITION OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE APPLICATION

12/14/2021: Opposition - OPPOSITION OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE APPLICATION

159 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 03/01/2022
  • Hearing03/01/2022 at 08:30 AM in Department 31 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Jury Trial

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/15/2022
  • Hearing02/15/2022 at 10:00 AM in Department 31 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Final Status Conference

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 01/19/2022
  • DocketNotice (DEFENDANT ATF PRIVATE SECURITY, INC.'S NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF ADAM HARARI); Filed by ATF PRIVATE SECURITY, INC. (Defendant)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 01/19/2022
  • DocketMemorandum of Costs (Summary); Filed by Michael Ray Nguyen-Stevenson (Defendant)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 01/14/2022
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 31, Audra Mori, Presiding; Hearing on Ex Parte Application (to Compel Plaintiff to Schedule and Take a Covid Examination before the Independent Medical Examination) - Held - Motion Denied

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 01/14/2022
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Ex Parte Application to Compel Plaintiff to Schedu...)); Filed by Clerk

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 01/13/2022
  • DocketNotice (of Entry of Judgment); Filed by Michael Ray Nguyen-Stevenson (Defendant)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 01/13/2022
  • DocketEx Parte Application (to Compel Plaintiff to Schedule and Take a Covid Examination before the Independent Medical Examination); Filed by SKWS ENTERPRISES, INC. (Defendant)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 01/13/2022
  • DocketOpposition (TO EX PARTE APPLICATION); Filed by Adam Harari (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 01/07/2022
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 31, Audra Mori, Presiding; Jury Trial - Not Held - Continued - Stipulation

    Read MoreRead Less
235 More Docket Entries
  • 05/24/2017
  • DocketREPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT; DECLARATIONS OF MICHAEL RAY NGUYEN-STEVENSON AND AMBER H. MELIUS IN SUPPORT

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/16/2017
  • DocketOpposition Document; Filed by Adam Harari (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/16/2017
  • DocketPLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO QUASH; REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS UNDER C.C.P. 128.5 FOR FRIVOLOUS ACTIONS INTENDED TO INCREASE EXPENSE AND/OR CAUSE DELAY; ETC.

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/26/2017
  • DocketNOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, ETC

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/26/2017
  • DocketMotion to Quash; Filed by Michael Ray Nguyen-Stevenson (Defendant); Michael Ray Stevenson (Legacy Party)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/07/2017
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Adam Harari (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/07/2017
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/07/2017
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES NEGLIGENCE AND INTENTIONAL TORT

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/07/2017
  • DocketSUMMONS

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/07/2017
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Adam Harari (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less

Tentative Rulings

b'

Case Number: BC649756 Hearing Date: December 21, 2021 Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

ADAM HARARI,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

MICHAEL RAY NGUYEN-STEVENSON, aka MICHAEL RAY STEVENSON, aka TYGA, ET AL.,

Defendant(s).

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: BC649756

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REOPEN DISCOVERY

Dept. 31

1:30 p.m.

December 21, 2021

1. Background Facts

On February 7, 2017, Plaintiff, Adam Harari filed this action against Defendant, Michael Ray Nguyen-Stevenson, aka Michael Ray Stevenson, aka Tyga (“Stevenson”), and Does 1-20 for negligence and intentional tort. Plaintiff alleges that while attempting to serve Defendant with legal documents at a night club, Plaintiff was grabbed, yanked, pulled and choked by other persons. On February 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint naming SKWS Enterprises, Inc. (“SKWS”) as Doe 2.

Trial in this matter is currently set for January 7, 2022, with discovery being cut-off on December 8, 2021. On December 13, 2021, SKWS filed an Ex Parte Application for Relief for an Independent Medical Examination (“IME”).

On or about November 4, 2021, SKWS, together with then co-defendants Stevenson and ATF, served a Notice of IME on Plaintiff setting Plaintiff’s IME for December 7, 2021, at 4:30 p.m., with Dr. Kvitne at 2275 Huntington Drive #124, San Marino, California 91108. SKWS provides that Stevenson’s counsel took the lead in scheduling the IME and sending out the notice. However, SKWS provides that Stevenson’s counsel, unbeknownst to SKWS, noticed the exam at Dr. Kvitne’s mailing address, instead of Dr. Kvitne’s physical address of 2401 Huntington Drive, San Marino, CA. On December 7, 2021, Plaintiff appeared for the IME at the address on the notice, which was the mailing address, and the exam did not go forward. SKWS, therefore, requested it be allowed to conduct an IME of Plaintiff.

The court heard the application on December 14, 2021, and issued the following order:

The Court sets the Ex Parte Application for Relief for an Independent Medical Examination as a noticed motion.

Moving papers are to be filed and served no later than 12/16/2021.

Opposition is to be filed and served no later than 12/20/2021.

Hearing on Motion - Other for Relief for an Independent Medical Examination is scheduled for 12/21/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 31 at Spring Street Courthouse.

(Min. Order, Dec. 14, 2021.)

SKWS argues the IME did not proceed on December 7, 2021, due to a clerical mistake, and contends discovery should be reopened to allow the IME to proceed.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues SKWS failed to cite any authority showing it is entitled to relief under CCP 473(b) and asserts the case will be five years old in February 2022. Plaintiff contends he appeared for the IME on December 7, 2021, but Dr. Kvitne did not appear. Plaintiff avers SKWS fails to make any showing that the court should exercise its discretion to reopen discovery to permit an IME closer to trial. Plaintiff further argues SKW fails to carry its burden to show discovery should be reopened, and thus, granting the motion would be an abuse of discretion.

2. Request to Reopen Discovery

CCP 2024.050 states:

(a) On motion of any party, the court may grant leave to complete discovery proceedings, or to have a motion concerning discovery heard, closer to the initial trial date, or to reopen discovery after a new trial date has been set. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

(b) In exercising its discretion to grant or deny this motion, the court shall take into consideration any matter relevant to the leave requested, including, but not limited to, the following:

(1) The necessity and the reasons for the discovery.

(2) The diligence or lack of diligence of the party seeking the discovery or the hearing of a discovery motion, and the reasons that the discovery was not completed or that the discovery motion was not heard earlier.

(3) Any likelihood that permitting the discovery or hearing the discovery motion will prevent the case from going to trial on the date set, or otherwise interfere with the trial calendar, or result in prejudice to any other party.

(4) The length of time that has elapsed between any date previously set, and the date presently set, for the trial of the action.

Here, unless discovery is ordered reopen first, the motion to allow SKWS to conduct Plaintiff’s IME must be denied. (See Pelton-Shepherd Industries, Inc. v. Delta Packaging Products, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1568.)

In Pelton-Shepherd Industries, Inc. v. Delta Packaging Products, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1588, the court held that, “[b]y simply hearing the motion to compel without first deciding whether discovery should be reopened for that purpose under all of the relevant circumstances, the trial court ‘transgresse[d] the confines of the applicable principles of law’ . . . and thereby abused its discretion.” (citing, in part, City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297.)

First, as to the necessity and reasons for the discovery, SKWS asserts that additional discovery is required to obtain information regarding Plaintiff’s condition because Plaintiff is asserting claims for physical injuries on which his case hinges. While Plaintiff argues the IME is not necessary to this action, Plaintiff does not deny he is claiming damages for physical injuries allegedly caused by SKWS. CCP 2032.220 states in relevant part, “(a) In any case in which a plaintiff is seeking recovery for personal injuries, any defendant may demand one physical examination of the plaintiff…” To the extent Plaintiff argues this would be Plaintiff’s second IME, Plaintiff cites no authority holding that merely appearing for an IME, without being examined, is sufficient to constitute a physical examination under the Code.

Second, SKWS avers it was diligent in timely setting the IME but due to a clerical mistake the incorrect address for the IME was provided to Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not otherwise dispute that no examination of Plaintiff has been completed.

Third, trial is set for January 7, 2022, and Defendants assert that reopening discovery for the IME will not delay the trial date because the IME can go forward within a week. Moreover, SKWS contends it will be prejudiced if it is forced to go to trial without a medical expert. Finally, although the case will be five years old in February 2022, SKWS contends a trial continuance will not be necessary to have the IME go forward. Plaintiff does not argue that he will not have sufficient time to prepare for trial if required to appear for an IME prior to trial. Moreover, there is no evidence SKWS delayed in seeking to reopen discovery after learning of the error with Plaintiff’s noticed IME.

Based on the foregoing, SKWS has demonstrated Plaintiff’s IME is necessary to fully prepare for trial and ascertain the extent of Plaintiff’s medical damages. Plaintiff does not identify any apparent prejudice to Plaintiff is discovery is reopened for the limited purpose of allowing Plaintiff’s IME to go forward. Nonetheless, if requested by Plaintiff, the court will be inclined to grant a very short trial continuance to alleviate any prejudice to Plaintiff.

Defendant’s request to reopen discovery is granted for the limited purpose of allowing Plaintiff’s IME to go forward prior to trial. Given the proximity to the trial date, the court shortens the required notice for a demand for physical examination of Plaintiff to three (3) days- that is, the exam must be scheduled for a date at least three days after service of the demand, unless the parties agree to an alternative date.

Defendants are ordered to give notice.

C61906

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:

Dated this 21st day of December, 2021

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court

'b"

Case Number: BC649756 Hearing Date: December 6, 2021 Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

ADAM HARARI,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

MICHAEL RAY NGUYEN-STEVENSON, aka MICHAEL RAY STEVENSON, aka TYGA, ET AL.,

Defendant(s).

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CASE NO: BC649756

[TENTATIVE] ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’ STEVENSON’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; (2) GRANTING ATF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; (3) DENYING SKWS’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dept. 31

1:30 p.m.

December 6, 2021

1. Background

On February 7, 2017, Plaintiff, Adam Harari filed this action against Defendant, Michael Ray Nguyen-Stevenson, aka Michael Ray Stevenson, aka Tyga (“Stevenson”), and Does 1-20 for negligence and intentional tort. Plaintiff alleges that while attempting to serve Defendant with legal documents at a night club, Plaintiff was grabbed, yanked, pulled and choked by other persons. On February 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint naming SKWS Enterprises, Inc. (“SKWS”) as Doe 2. On July 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint naming ATF Private Security, Inc. (“ATF”) as Doe 3.

At this time, Stevenson, ATF and SKWS each move for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes all three motions, and Stevenson, ATF and SKWS each filed replies.

2. Stevenson’s Motion for Summary Judgment

a. Moving Argument

Stevenson argues he is entitled to summary judgment because there is no evidence suggesting Stevenson is liable for the incident, as Plaintiff concedes Stevenson was not the individual who allegedly assaulted or battered Plaintiff, nor was the unidentified individual allegedly responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries in any way affiliated with Stevenson. Stevenson contends he owed no general duty to protect or safeguard Plaintiff at the night club, which was owned and operated by Defendant SKWS Enterprises, Inc. (“SKWS”), and that Plaintiff cannot establish that Stevenson’s acts or omissions were a substantial factor in causing his purported injuries.

b. Opposing Argument

Plaintiff argues that on the night of the incident, all the arrangements, including security, were handled by Stevenson’s personal assistant, Luke. Plaintiff contends Stevenson does not meet his moving burden to show there is no triable issue of fact because Stevenson’s evidence is inadmissible. Further, Plaintiff argues there are triable issues concerning agency, as there is video evidence of three people offensively touching Plaintiff, one of which is Dre Williams (“Williams”), who is Stevenson’s employee, the second was SKWS employee Korey Byrd (“Byrd”), and a third unidentified person. Plaintiff contends the agency of the people that assaulted Plaintiff was such that each was representing Stevenson. Additionally, Plaintiff argues Stevenson owed Plaintiff a nondelegable duty to not cause Plaintiff harm, and that Defendants have suppressed the identity of the third security guard that choked Plaintiff.

c. Evidentiary Objections

In the reply, Stevenson submits 28 objections to Plaintiff’s separate statement and evidence. Objections 1-26 are made to Plaintiff’s separate statement. Objections to a separate statement are improper. (Cal. Rules of Code, rule 3.1354(b).) The court, therefore, declines to rule on the purported objections to Plaintiff’s separate statement. Nonetheless, to the extent Plaintiff disputes or asserts facts without evidentiary or legal support, such responses will be disregarded.

Objections 27-28 are overruled.

d. Burdens on Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(c).) Where a defendant seeks summary judgment or adjudication, he must show that either “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.” (Id. at §437c(o)(2).) A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some essential element of the claim. (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574, 590.) Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A defendant moving for summary judgment must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Id. at §437c(p).) A defendant may discharge this burden by furnishing either (1) affirmative evidence of the required facts or (2) discovery responses conceding that the plaintiff lacks evidence to establish an essential element of the plaintiff's case. If a defendant chooses the latter option he or she must present evidence “and not simply point out that plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence….” Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 865-66.

[A] defendant may simply show the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action “by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.) Thus, rather than affirmatively disproving or negating an element (e.g., causation), a defendant moving for summary judgment has the option of presenting evidence reflecting the plaintiff does not possess evidence to prove that element. “The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing” to support an essential element of his case. (Aguilar, supra, at p. 855.) Under the latter approach, a defendant's initial evidentiary showing may “consist of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses, or admissions by the plaintiff in deposition or in response to requests for admission that he or she has not discovered anything that supports an essential element of the cause of action.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 110.) In other words, a defendant may show the plaintiff does not possess evidence to support an element of the cause of action by means of presenting the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence may be reasonably inferred. (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)

Thus, a moving defendant has two means by which to shift the burden of proof under the summary judgment statute: “The defendant may rely upon factually insufficient discovery responses by the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action sued upon. [Citation.] [Or a]lternatively, the defendant may utilize the tried and true technique of negating (‘disproving’) an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action.” (Brantly v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1598.)

(Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103.)

Until the moving defendant has discharged its burden of proof, the opposing plaintiff has no burden to come forward with any evidence. Once the moving defendant has discharged its burden as to a particular cause of action, however, the plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence showing that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action. (Id. at §437c(p)(2).) On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party's supporting documents are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21.)

e. Analysis

“The elements of negligence are (1) a legal duty to use due care, (2) the breach of such legal duty, and (3) the breach was the proximate or legal cause of injury.” (Orey v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1255.) As in any negligence action, whether a duty was owed under the facts is a question of law for the court. (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213.) To determine the existence and scope of duty, courts consider the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, and the extent of the burden to the defendant of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach. (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.) Additionally, “In California, the causation element of negligence is satisfied when the plaintiff establishes (1) that the defendant's breach of duty (his negligent act or omission) was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm and (2) that there is no rule of law relieving the defendant of liability.” (Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 481.)

“The elements of a cause of action for assault are: (1) the defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch the plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) the plaintiff reasonably believed he was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to the plaintiff that the defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the defendant's conduct; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm.” (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 890; see also Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. Cal. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 232 [“The tort of assault is complete when the anticipation of harm occurs.”].)

“The elements of a cause of action for battery are: (1) the defendant touched the plaintiff, or caused the plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff did not consent to the touching; (3) the plaintiff was harmed or offended by the defendant's conduct; and (4) a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have been offended by the touching.” (Carlsen, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at 890; see also Piedra v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495 [contact is unlawful if unconsented to].)

Concerning holding an employer liable for an employee’s actions, “[t]he respondeat superior doctrine is to be given a broad application…” (Jeewarat v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 427, 434.) “Before liability attaches, there must be a nexus between the employment and the activity which results in an injury that is foreseeable. [Citation.] The test is not whether it is foreseeable that employees might act in such a way as to give rise to civil liability but rather, whether the employee's act is foreseeable in light of the duties the employee is hired to perform.” (Martinez v. Hagopian (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1229.) In addition, “As an alternate theory to respondeat superior, an employer may be liable for an employee's act where the employer either authorized the tortious act or subsequently ratified an originally unauthorized tort. [Citations.] The failure to discharge an employee who has committed misconduct may be evidence of ratification. [Citations.] The theory of ratification is generally applied where an employer fails to investigate or respond to charges that an employee committed an intentional tort, such as assault or battery. [Citations.] Whether an employer has ratified an employee's conduct is generally a factual question. [Citation.]” (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1110.)

Here, it is undisputed that SKWS is the exclusive tenant and manager of the night club where the incident occurred, and Stevenson maintains no ownership, financial or managerial interest or oversight in the night club or SKWS. (UMF 4-5.) ATF is a private security company that was retained by SKWS to provide private security for the night club on the date of the incident, and SKWS did not hire or retain any employees, agents or representatives to provide security for Stevenson. (UMF 6-7.) Stevenson did not hire ATF security and did not retain nor request the security services of SKWS or ATF in connection with his personal appearance. (UMF 11-12.) Other than Stevenson’s paid personal appearance at the night club, Stevenson has never had nor does he connection or affiliation with SKWS or ATF. (UMF 14.) Stevenson did not expect that either SKWS or ATF would provide Stevenson with any special security in connection with his appearance at the night club. (UMF 20.) Stevenson retained only the security services of Williams, who was already present at the night club when Stevenson arrived. (UMF 27, 31.)

Stevenson has never given his security personnel any special instructions on how they should treat or handle individuals attempting to serve Stevenson with legal papers, and Stevenson did not give Williams any such instructions in connection with his appearance at the night club. (UMF 32.) Other than Williams and Luke, Stevenson was not accompanied by any other representative, employee or agent. (UMF 33.) Further, Stevenson attests that he has no personal knowledge of the identity of the individual who purportedly assaulted or battered Plaintiff, and Plaintiff admits he does not know the identity of the person that purportedly assaulted or battered him. (UMF 38, 42-44.) Stevenson attests that he never touched Plaintiff in any manner, and that Stevenson never instructed, authorized, ratified, or condoned anyone to touch Plaintiff in any respect or capacity. (UMF 45-50.)

This evidence is sufficient to meet Stevenson’s moving burden. The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiff, in opposition, primarily contends there are triable issues of fact concerning the issue of agency. Plaintiff contends stills from a video of the incident show three people “offensively touching [P]laintiff at the same time to protect Stevenson,” (Opp. at p. 8:25-26), and one of these people was Williams. Plaintiff contends Stevenson as an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of his employee, and that SKWS’s employees were borrowed by Stevenson during the incident.

However, concerning SKWS’s and ATF’s employees, Plaintiff provides no evidence showing Stevenson borrowed their employees such that Stevenson is liable for SKWS’s or ATF’s employees’ actions. Similarly, Plaintiff does not submit any evidence showing SKWS’s or ATF’s employees were ostensible agents of Stevenson at the time of the incident.

In addition, to the extent Plaintiff cites to California Civil Jury Instructions (“CACI”) Nos. 3706 and 3707 in arguing Stevenson is responsible for the acts of all security guards under the doctrine of joint responsibility for a special employee, Plaintiff does not submit any evidence showing a special employment relationship existed to find Stevenson liable for any acts by SKWS’s or ATF’s employees. For example, Plaintiff does not submit any evidence showing Stevenson controlled or directed any of SKWS’s or ATF’s employees’ activities. While Plaintiff argues the security guards all believed it was within their authority to keep Stevenson safe from harm when they battered Plaintiff, Plaintiff fails to cite any authority showing Stevenson can be held liable absent any other conduct by Stevenson. The evidence shows that Stevenson did not retain or request security services from SKWS or ATF in connection with his personal appearance, and Stevenson retained the security services of Williams only. (UMF 19, 27.) Stevenson did not any time touch Plaintiff in any respect or capacity on the night of the incident, nor did Stevenson instruct or authorize anyone to touch Plaintiff at any time. (UMF 45, 47-48.)

Consequently, Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence showing that Stevenson owed Plaintiff any duty for the actions of SKWS’s or ATF’s employees.

Nonetheless, Plaintiff avers that Stevenson admitted that his employee, Williams, touched Plaintiff. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of the employment.” (Lisa M v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296.) The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the employee's tortious act was committed within the scope of his employment. (Mary M v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 209.)

Battery requires the touching with the intent to cause harm or offense. (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-69.) Assault requires the defendant act intending to cause harmful or offensive conduct, meaning that it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity. (Id.; see Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2005) CACI No. 1301 [defines an offensive touching as: “A touching is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.”]; see also Rest.2d Torts, § 19.)

In this case, Plaintiff asserts that during the incident, Williams held Plaintiff’s left side. In making this argument, Plaintiff relies on Stevenson’s response to Plaintiff’s request for admissions (“RFA”), set two, No. 24, which requests Stevenson admit Williams “touched Plaintiff on November 24, 2016.” (Opp. Exh. 3.) In response to this RFA, Stevenson stated:

Admitted in part. From an examination of the TMZ video, although not clear or definitive in any manner, Plaintiff’s clothing may have slightly grazed Dre Williams’ hand. Specifically, from an examination of the TMZ video, it appears that Plaintiff Harari may have moved towards Dre Williams’ hand and Plaintiff Harari may have brushed the back of Harari’s clothing near Harari’s waist against Dre Williams’ hand. It is unequivocally clear and undisputed that Dre Williams did not touch Plaintiff anywhere near his head, neck, throat or chest…

(Opp. Exh. 4, RFA No.24.)

Accordingly, Stevenson admitted only that Plaintiff’s clothing may have grazed Williams’s hand. The photograph attached to Plaintiff’s RFAs shows only a hand, which is seemingly identified as Williams’s hand, near the right side of Plaintiff’s body. (Opp. Exh. 3 [p. 83 of electronic pdf].) However, it does not show Williams holding Plaintiff’s left side as Plaintiff describes. The photo does not show Williams restraining or grabbing Plaintiff; it does not even appear that Williams is actually touching Plaintiff. The additional still photos taken from the video of the incident submitted with the opposition likewise fail to show Williams holding Plaintiff’s left side in the manner asserted by Plaintiff. (Opp. Exh. 7.)

Moreover, even assuming the photos show Williams reaching his hand out towards Plaintiff, Plaintiff does not submit any evidence suggesting Williams intended to cause harmful or offensive contact, or that Plaintiff found Williams’s purported touching offensive. There is no evidence that any purported touching by Williams would offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity.

Therefore, Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue of material fact concerning the negligence and battery claims against Stevenson for the incident.

Defendant Stevenson’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

3. ATF’s Motion for Summary Judgment

a. Moving Argument

ATF argues it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff does not have any evidence that any ATF security guards grabbed, yanked, pulled, and choked Plaintiff by the neck. ATF asserts that Alvin Oldham, (“Oldham”), who works as a manager for ATF was present at the time of the incident, and Oldham was the only employee present outside the night club at the time of the incident. ATF avers that Plaintiff’s claims against it fail because Plaintiff cannot establish causation against ATF.

b. Opposing Argument

Plaintiff contends the issue in this matter is duty, not causation. Plaintiff argues that the individuals who touched Plaintiff are liable for negligence and battery, and that ATF is liable for the actions of the three people that touched Plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff argues that ATF had a duty to keep the night club premises safe, and ATF is responsible for the acts of its joint employee security guards.

c. Request for Judicial Notice

ATF requests the court take judicial notice of the Plaintiff’s complaint filed February 7, 2017, and Plaintiff’s Doe Amendment filed July 12, 2019. The requests are granted pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(d).

c. Evidentiary Objections

In the reply, Stevenson submits 10 objections to Plaintiff’s response to ATF’s separate statement. Objections to a separate statement are improper. (Cal. Rules of Code, rule 3.1354(b).) The court, therefore, declines to rule on the purported objections to Plaintiff’s separate statement. Nonetheless, to the extent Plaintiff disputes or asserts facts without evidentiary or legal support, such responses will be disregarded.

d. Analysis

In this case, upon Stevenson’s arrival at the night club, Plaintiff approached Stevenson, announced his purpose, handed Stevenson the legal process, and was immediately thereafter grabbed, yanked, pulled, and choked by the neck from behind by an unidentified assailant. (UMF 2-3.) Oldham, who works as an operation manager for ATF, was present on the night of the incident, and 19 ATF guards, including Oldham, were hired to provide security services for the night club. (UMF 5-6, 10.) ATF attests that the duties of the 19 ATF security guards were to provide security services solely to the interior of the night club. (UMF 7.) Oldham as the operation manager for ATF assigned the location of each ATF guard inside the night club. (UMF 8.) Furthermore, Joe Villa (“Villa”), the financial manager, controller and bookkeeper of SKWS, testified that ATF was hired to maintain security inside the club. (UMF 9-10.)

Shortly before Stevenson arrived at the night club, Oldham received a call through his earpiece from the club’s in-house security that a VIP was going to be coming to the club, and when Oldham received the call, Oldham exited the club and walked to the exterior area to the side of the club. (UMF 11-12.) Oldham was at the bottom of the staircase when the Plaintiff came to attempt to serve legal documents on Stevenson, and Plaintiff testified that he had no recollection of being touched on the night of the incident by Oldham. (UMF 13-16.) Oldham was the only ATF employee outside the club at the time of the incident, and Plaintiff has testified he has no personal knowledge that any ATF employee touched him the night of the incident or were present. (UMF 17-19.)

ATF’s evidence is sufficient to meet ATF’s moving burden. The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

In opposition, Plaintiff primarily argues ATF owed Plaintiff a duty not to cause Plaintiff harm, and to protect him from the harm he suffered. Further, Plaintiff contends that as the contractor for supervision of security, ATF is responsible for all actions of the security that night, including Williams, Byrd, and the unidentified third assailant. Plaintiff contends ATF is variously liable for the actions of the guards, and that ATF, Stevenson, and SKWS are responsible for the guards under the doctrine of joint responsibility for a special employee.

However, Plaintiff provides no evidence showing that ATF was in fact responsible for Stevenson’s employee or SKWS’s employees, nor does Plaintiff present any evidence showing Stevenson’s employee or SKWS’s employees were actual or ostensible agents of ATF.

Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff relies on CACI Nos. 3706 and 3707 in arguing ATF is responsible for the acts of all security guards under the doctrine of joint responsibility for a special employee, Plaintiff does not submit any evidence showing a special employment relationship existed to find ATF liable for any acts by SKWS’s or Stevenson’s employees. Plaintiff does not submit any evidence showing ATF controlled or directed any of Stevenson’s or SKWS’s employees’ activities. The evidence shows that ATF was hired to provide security for the interior of the night club, that Plaintiff attempted to serve Stevenson with legal papers outside the club, Oldham was the only ATF employee present at the time, and Oldham did not touch Plaintiff. Although ATF might have had a duty not to cause Plaintiff harm, Plaintiff does not submit any evidence showing ATF’s employees caused Plaintiff any harm.

Further, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence or authority showing ATF was responsible for preventing Plaintiff from being harmed outside of the night club by other people as Plaintiff attempted to serve legal papers. ATF’s evidence shows that SKWS’s financial manager, bookkeeper, and controller explicitly testified:

Q.· What job is it that you hired them to do on your behalf, sir?

A.· Maintain security inside the club. Maintain -- we have -- I would say, crowd control. Keep any fight or anything of that nature under control, to respond to altercations or disruptions of any kind.

Q. And that would include altercations or disruptions at the arrival of invited talent to your nightclub; is that correct, sir?

A. If it happened inside of our property, I would think so, yes.

(Mot. Table of Evidence Exh. 3 at p. 19:9-19.) Plaintiff does not otherwise submit any evidence showing that ATF had a duty to protect Plaintiff, who was not a patron or inside the Club at the time, from third party conduct outside of the club in a parking lot when Plaintiff was serving Stevenson with legal documents.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to show that ATF is liable for the actions of Stevenson’s or SKWS’s employees outside of the night club. Furthermore, there is no evidence that any ATF employee touched Plaintiff at the time of the incident such as to find ATF liable for assault or battery.

Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue of material fact concerning the negligence and intentional tort claims against ATF for the incident. ATF’s motion is granted.

4. SKWS’s Motion for Summary Judgment

a. Moving Argument

SKWS argues it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot prove liability against SKWS, because SKWS owed no duty to Plaintiff since the incident was not foreseeable, and because even if SKWS had a duty, it did not breach any duty. SKWS argues there is no evidence it was involved in the alleged assault or could have prevented the assault, and that the parking lot where the incident occurred is operated by King Valet Parking (“King Valet”). SKWS provides it had one person in the parking lot at the time of the incident, Byrd, but Byrd was not the person that grabbed or assaulted Plaintiff.

b. Opposing Arguments

Plaintiff argues all Defendants were working in concert to provide security for Stevenson, and the assailants were part of the security detail protecting Stevenson. Plaintiff argues SKWS fails to meet its moving burden, and that the moving papers offer no affirmative evidence that the people assaulting Plaintiff were not SKWS’s agents. In addition, Plaintiff argues there are triable issues concerning agency, as there is video evidence of three people offensively touching Plaintiff, Williams, SKWS employee Byrd, and a third unidentified person. Plaintiff contends SKWS is vicariously liable for the incident, and that SKWS owed a nondelegable duty to Plaintiff to keep the nightclub premises in a safe condition.

c. Evidentiary Objections

In its reply, SKWS asserts 11 objections to Plaintiff’s evidence. The objections are not numbered. Nevertheless, in the order presented, Objection 1 is made to John Matusak’s declaration and the remaining objections are made to Plaintiff’s responses to SKWS’s separate statement of material facts.

Objection 1 is overruled. Objections to a separate statement are improper. (Cal. Rules of Code, rule 3.1354(b).) The court, therefore, declines to rule on the purported objections to Plaintiff’s separate statement. Nonetheless, to the extent Plaintiff disputes or asserts facts without evidentiary or legal support, such responses will be disregarded.

d. Analysis re: Moving Burden

SKWS argues it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no evidence establishing any liability on the part of SKWS. SKWS contends that Plaintiff cannot present any evidence concerning who assaulted him, and that Plaintiff has no knowledge of who assaulted him or who the unidentified assailant was associated with. (Mot. UMF 20-22, 24.) SKWS argues that Plaintiff lacks evidence showing SKWS is responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries, SKWS is entitled to summary judgment.

A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must introduce admissible evidence in order to shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff. There are two ways for the moving party to make out the necessary prima facie case. A defendant may present evidence that – if uncontradicted – constitutes a preponderance of evidence that plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of its case. This approach, which requires offering evidence that negates a key element of the plaintiff’s cause of action, is known as the “tried and true” approach. (See e.g., Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 879.)

Alternatively, a defendant may present circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff does not now possess and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence needed to establish one or more elements of a claim. This is known as the “no evidence” approach and is described in Aguilar v, Atlantic Richfield Company (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, at 854. A defendant making a “no evidence” motion must introduce admissible evidence (by declaration or otherwise) that, in response to the full panoply of discovery devices (request for production, interrogatories, depositions etc.), the plaintiff has produced factually devoid responses sufficient to support an inference that the plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case on an element of its case. In addition, a defendant making a “no evidence” motion must also establish that, by the time the case comes up for trial, the plaintiff “cannot reasonably expect to obtain” the evidence necessary to raise a triable issue of fact on the issue. (Schieding v. Dinwiddie Construction Company (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)

Here, in arguing it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, SKWS primarily relies on its contention that Plaintiff does not have any evidence showing SKWS is responsible for the incident, including that Plaintiff has no evidence the alleged unidentified third assailant is associated with SKWS. However, in arguing that Plaintiff has no evidence to support his claims against SKWS, SKWS does not establish it has propounded the “full panoply of discovery available” on Plaintiff, but the responses remained deficient. (Id.) What is more, information concerning whether the unidentified third assailant was SKWS’s employee or not is more within the knowledge of SKWS, such that SKWS cannot merely claim Plaintiff has no information concerning the assailant. Moreover, SKWS does not establish that Plaintiff cannot obtain the evidence necessary to raise a triable issue of fact on the issue of SKWS’s liability for the incident by the time the matter comes up for trial. (Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 854 [noting that a defendant seeking summary judgment “must show that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence . . . the defendant must also show that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence . . .”].)

Additionally, in asserting that SKWS had one person, Byrd, in the parking lot at the time of the incident, SKWS relies solely on the declaration of Villa, the financial manager, controller and bookkeeper of SKWS, who provides: “After my deposition, I reviewed SKWS Enterprises, Inc.’s earlier discovery responses as well as the TMZ tape again and the Facebook page and photos of Korey Byrd and determined, Korey Byrd was in seen in the TMZ video.” (Mot. Villa Decl. ¶ 6.) Thus, Villa merely confirms Byrd is seen in the video of the incident, but Villa does not otherwise state he was present at the time of the incident or that no other SKWS employees were in the parking lot or involved in the incident. The video itself shows only an arm in what appears to be a black sleeve come from off screen and pull Plaintiff away around his neck area. SKWS does not offer any affirmative evidence to support is contention that Byrd was the only SKWS employee there at the time the incident occurred.

Therefore, SKWS fails to meet its moving burden in showing it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because SKWS’s arguments concerning duty and breach rely on SKWS’s assertion that the unidentified third assailant was not its employee or associated with it, which SKWS has not established at this time, the court does not reach these issues.

Based on the foregoing, SKWS’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

5. Conclusion

Defendant Stevenson’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Defendant ATF’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Defendant SKWS’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Moving Defendants are each ordered to give notice.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:

Dated this 6th day of December, 2021

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court

"b"

Case Number: BC649756 Hearing Date: September 20, 2021 Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

ADAM HARARI,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

MICHAEL RAY NGUYEN-STEVENSON, aka MICHAEL RAY STEVENSON, aka TYGA, ET AL.,

Defendant(s).

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CASE NO: BC649756

[TENTATIVE] ORDER FINDING MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION MOOT

Dept. 31

1:30 p.m.

September 20, 2021

Plaintiff, Adam Harari filed this action against Defendant, Michael Ray Nguyen-Stevenson, aka Michael Ray Stevenson, aka Tyga (“Defendant”), et al. for negligence and intentional tort. Plaintiff alleges that while attempting to serve Defendant with service, Plaintiff was grabbed, yanked, pulled, and choked by others.

On June 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel Defendant’s deposition. Defendant opposed the motion, and Plaintiff filed a reply.

CCP § 2025.450(a) provides, “If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.” CCP § 2025.450 requires the Court to compel the deposition unless it finds a valid objection was served under §2025.410.

Here, Plaintiff asserts he has noticed Defendant’s deposition multiple times only to have Defendant refuse to appear. Most recently, Plaintiff asserts Defendant’s deposition was noticed for May 18, 2021, but Defendant again refused to appear and gave no alternative dates.

In opposition, Defendant asserts that before this motion was filed, Defendant provided Plaintiff with 10 dates Defendant was available for his deposition, but Plaintiff disregarded the offered dates. Further, Defendant asserts he sat for his deposition on July 20 and 22, 2021, but Plaintiff refuses to withdraw this motion.

In reply, Plaintiff asserts the motion remains on calendar for the sole purpose of seeking monetary sanctions.

Given Defendant’s deposition has now been completed, the motion is moot as to compelling the deposition.

CCP § 2025.450(g)(1) requires the Court to impose sanctions unless it finds the deponent acted with substantial justification or there are circumstances that render imposition of sanctions unjust. Because Defendant’s evidence shows Defendant attempted to meet and confer regarding available dates for deposition prior to the motion being filed, the court finds sanctions unwarranted against Defendant. Additionally, because the deposition was not completed until after the motion was filed, the court does not find sanctions against Plaintiff warranted.

No sanctions are awarded.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at sscdept31@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

Dated this 20th day of September, 2021

Hon. Audra Mori

Judge of the Superior Court

"b'

Case Number: BC649756 Hearing Date: August 13, 2021 Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

ADAM HARARI,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

MICHAEL RAY NGUYEN-STEVENSON, aka MICHAEL RAY STEVENSON, aka TYGA, ET AL.,

Defendant(s).

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CASE NO: BC649756

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Dept. 31

8:30 a.m.

August 13, 2021

1. Background

Plaintiff, Adam Harari filed this action against Defendant, Michael Ray Nguyen-Stevenson, aka Michael Ray Stevenson, aka Tyga (“Defendant”), et al. for negligence and intentional tort. Plaintiff alleges that while attempting to serve Defendant with service, Plaintiff was grabbed, yanked, pulled and choked by others.

On July 26, 2021, the court heard Defendant’s Ex Parte Application for Order Designating Defendant’s Deposition as Confidential and set the instant hearing on Defendant’s motion for protective order for August 13, 2021. The motion was to be filed by August 2, 2021, opposition by August 6, 2021, and any reply by August 11, 2021.

The parties timely filed the moving papers, an opposition, and reply.

2. Motion for Protective Order

CCP § 2025.420 states in part:

(a) Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

(b) The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense…

The issuance and formulation of protective orders are to a large extent discretionary. (See Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 584, 588.)

Here, Defendant asserts Plaintiff took Defendant’s deposition on July 20, 2021, and asked about private matters, including Defendant’s financial matters, familial relations, private residential address and other sensitive information. Defendant asserts he is a public figure and requests the court enter a general protective order regarding the designation of material as confidential.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends Defendant is attempting to obtain the arbitrary authority to declare anything confidential without putting any testimony or legal authority to support such. Plaintiff argues Defendant simply demands the entire transcript be deemed confidential and ordered sealed without any evidence to support the request. Plaintiff argues there is no good cause for a protective order to seal testimony.

In reply, Defendant contends he seeks only a standard protective order in this matter, specifically the Lo Angeles Model Stipulated Confidentiality Order Form. Defendant argues Plaintiff addresses a request to seal documents, which Defendant asserts he is not making.

Given the parties agree Defendant testified to at least some sensitive information, including Defendant’s address and potential information concerning his son, the court finds a protective order appropriate. The court has reviewed Defendant’s proposed protective order and finds the proposed protective order adequately address concerns relating to confidential information that may be produced by third parties. (Mot. Richards Decl. Exh. E.) The proposed protective order properly governs the use of confidential information by the parties. Although Plaintiff contends Defendant do not establish good cause to seal Defendant’s testimony, Defendant is not moving for a sealing order.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for protective order is granted.

Moving Defendant is ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at sscdept31@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

Dated this 13th day of August, 2021

Hon. Teresa Sanchez-Gordon

Judge of the Superior Court

'
related-case-search

Dig Deeper

Get Deeper Insights on Court Cases


Latest cases where SKWS ENTERPRISES INC. is a litigant

Latest cases where TYGA is a litigant

Latest cases where ATF PRIVATE SECURITY INC is a litigant