Search

Attributes

This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 09/25/2019 at 06:57:31 (UTC).

5975-5999 TOPANGA CANYON BLVD., LLC VS. AHANG ZARIN KELK

Case Summary

On 02/03/2017 5975-5999 TOPANGA CANYON BLVD , LLC filed a Contract - Business lawsuit against AHANG ZARIN KELK. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Van Nuys Courthouse East located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are FRANK J. JOHNSON, ELIZABETH A. LIPPITT, HUEY P. COTTON, MELVIN D. SANDVIG and DEBRE K. WEINTRAUB. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****5208

  • Filing Date:

    02/03/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Business

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Van Nuys Courthouse East

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

FRANK J. JOHNSON

ELIZABETH A. LIPPITT

HUEY P. COTTON

MELVIN D. SANDVIG

DEBRE K. WEINTRAUB

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs

MIRSHOJAE HAMID REZA

5975-5999 TOPANGA CANYON BLVD. LLC

YEKTA LLC

1028 SAN FERNANOD ROAD LLC

Defendants

MIRSHOJAE AHANG

DOES 1-25

REGHABI ROSS

MIRSHOJAE AHANG Z.

KELK AHANG ZARIN

KELK AHANG ZARRIN

KELK AHANG Z.

YADEGAR ALLEN

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW GROUP

Others

RECIEVER KEVIN SINGER-SUPERIOR COURT

HAGEMANN MICHAEL K.

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorneys

GOLDMAN JAMES LEWIS

MILLER BARONDESS LLP

Defendant Attorneys

SALTZMAN MARK ELLIOTT

TAYLOR DANIEL J.

HAGEMANN MICHAEL K.

QUINTANA ANDRES FELIPE

 

Court Documents

Stipulation and Order - JOINT STIPULATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE AND (PROPOSED) ORDER

7/1/2019: Stipulation and Order - JOINT STIPULATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE AND (PROPOSED) ORDER

Civil Case Cover Sheet

2/3/2017: Civil Case Cover Sheet

Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: PROOF OF SERVICE

3/8/2017: Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: PROOF OF SERVICE

Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: DECLARATION

3/9/2017: Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: DECLARATION

Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: MISCELLANEOUS

3/20/2017: Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: MISCELLANEOUS

Answer

3/30/2017: Answer

Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: NOTICE OF LODGING

4/20/2017: Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: NOTICE OF LODGING

Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: DECLARATION

4/27/2017: Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: DECLARATION

Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: REPLY TO OPPOSITION

5/12/2017: Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: REPLY TO OPPOSITION

Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: OBJECTION

5/12/2017: Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: OBJECTION

Case Management Statement

6/15/2017: Case Management Statement

Request for Judicial Notice

6/23/2017: Request for Judicial Notice

Notice of Ruling

6/26/2017: Notice of Ruling

Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: Motion to Compel

7/26/2017: Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: Motion to Compel

Minute Order - Minute order entered: 2017-11-02 00:00:00

11/2/2017: Minute Order - Minute order entered: 2017-11-02 00:00:00

Minute Order - Minute order entered: 2017-12-13 00:00:00

12/13/2017: Minute Order - Minute order entered: 2017-12-13 00:00:00

Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: Notice

12/26/2017: Legacy Document - LEGACY DOCUMENT TYPE: Notice

Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

1/17/2019: Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

233 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 02/18/2020
  • Hearing02/18/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department F47 at 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311; Jury Trial

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/07/2020
  • Hearing02/07/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department F47 at 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311; Final Status Conference

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 07/15/2019
  • Docketat 08:35 AM in Department F47, Melvin D. Sandvig, Presiding; Jury Trial - Not Held - Continued - Stipulation

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 07/05/2019
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department F47, Melvin D. Sandvig, Presiding; Final Status Conference - Not Held - Continued - Stipulation

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 07/01/2019
  • DocketJoint Stipulation to Continue Trial Date and (Proposed) Order; Filed by Hamid Reza Mirshojae (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/06/2019
  • Docketat 08:35 AM in Department F47, Melvin D. Sandvig, Presiding; Jury Trial - Not Held - Continued - Stipulation

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/11/2019
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department F47, Melvin D. Sandvig, Presiding; Final Status Conference - Not Held - Continued - Stipulation

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/09/2019
  • DocketStipulation and Order (JOINT STIPULATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE AND [PROPOSED] ORDER); Filed by Hamid Reza Mirshojae (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/04/2019
  • Docketat 08:35 AM in Department F47, Melvin D. Sandvig, Presiding; Jury Trial - Not Held - Continued - Stipulation

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 01/25/2019
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department F47, Melvin D. Sandvig, Presiding; Final Status Conference - Not Held - Continued - Stipulation

    Read MoreRead Less
353 More Docket Entries
  • 02/03/2017
  • DocketSummons; Filed by null

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/03/2017
  • DocketNotice-Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/03/2017
  • DocketSummons Issued; Filed by Attorney-Plaintiff

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/03/2017
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/03/2017
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd., LLC (Plaintiff); YEKTA LLC (Plaintiff); Yekta, LLC (Plaintiff) et al.

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/03/2017
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd., LLC (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/03/2017
  • DocketComplaint filed-Summons Issued; Filed by null

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/03/2017
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Attorney-Plaintiff

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 03/08/2014
  • DocketProof of Service; Filed by Attorney-Plaintiff

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 03/08/2014
  • DocketProof of Service; Filed by 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd., LLC (Plaintiff); Yekta, LLC (Plaintiff); Hamid Reza Mirshojae (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: LC105208    Hearing Date: May 14, 2021    Dept: F47

Dept. F-47

Date: 5/14/21

Case #LC105208 (consolidated with LC106904)

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER

Motion filed on 2/25/21.

MOVING PARTY: Receiver Kevin Singer

RESPONDING PARTY # 1: Defendant Ahang Mirshojae aka Ahang Kelk

RESPONDING/JOINING PARTY # 2: Plaintiff Hamid Reza Mirshojae

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order: (1) providing instructions re: sale of real properties; and (2) authorizing issuance of Receiver’s Certificate.

RULING: The motion is placed off calendar.

This motion for an order: (1) providing instructions re: sale of real properties; and (2) authorizing issuance of Receiver’s Certificate filed by Receiver Kevin Singer was originally scheduled for hearing on 4/9/21. On 4/9/21, this Court continued the matter to 5/14/21 to allow the Receiver to provide more information as to the value of Ahang Zarin Kelk’s interests in the properties. (See 4/9/21 Minute Order, p.3). Additionally, the Court noted that the Receiver should provide authority and/or explanation as to why it is appropriate for this Court to provide him with instructions regarding the enforcement of a Charging Order in 17STPB07283. Id. Further, the Court ordered that the Receiver must also address why such relief would be appropriate since the Probate Court has seemingly not yet signed an order in relation to its granting of Nick’s Motion for Charging Order. Id. The Court ordered that the Receiver’s supplemental brief was due to be filed and served at least 16 court days before the continued hearing date and any supplemental oppositions were due to be filed and served at least 9 court days before the continued hearing date and any reply brief were due to be filed and served at least 5 court days before the continued hearing date. Id. at p.4.

No supplemental briefs have been filed in relation to this motion. Additionally, on 5/4/21, an Acknowledgment of Full Satisfaction of Judgment was filed by Hamid Mirshojae as to the assigned judgment he has against Ahang Mirshojae. The satisfaction of the judgment would seem to render the need to sell Ahang Mirshojae’s interests in the properties moot.

Case Number: LC105208    Hearing Date: May 12, 2021    Dept: F47

Dept. F-47

Date: 5/12/21

Case #LC105208 (consolidated with LC106094)

MOTION TO COMPEL

(Requests for Production of Documents, Set 1)

Motion filed on 4/16/21.

MOVING PARTY: Judgment Creditor Hamid Mirshojae

RESPONDING PARTY: Judgment Debtor Ross Reghabi dba Southern California Law Group aka Khosro Reghabi

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order requiring Judgment Debtor Ross Reghabi dba Southern California Law Group aka Khosro Reghabi to physically personally appear before this Court and show cause why he should not pay monetary sanction in the amount of $4,610 for abusing the discovery process in this action. Additionally, Judgment Creditor Hamid Mirshojae requests an order compelling Reghabi to provide responses to the Requests for Production propounded by Mirshojae, and produce all documents sought by the Requests.

RULING: The motion is granted as set forth below. Responses/further responses, without objections, are due within 20 days. Sanctions in the amount of $2,700.00 are payable within 20 days.

This matter consists of two consolidated cases, LASC LC105208 (“Mirshojae Case”) and LC106904 (“Reghabi Case”). At the trial of the consolidated cases, Hamid Mirshojae (“Mirshojae”) prevailed in both cases and obtained a $5,482,269.18 judgment against his former attorney, Khosro Reghabi, aka Ross K. Reghabi, dba Southern California Law Group (“Reghabi”).

On 8/3/20, Mirshojae obtained an Order to Appear for Examination (“ORAP”) from this Court, which ordered Reghabi to appear for a debtor’s examination on 8/26/20. (Do Decl., ¶ 4). Mirshojae also issued a subpoena for business records with the production deadline timed to coincide with the debtor’s examination (“Subpoena’’). Id. Despite many attempts by a process server, Mirshojae has been unable to serve Reghabi at his place of business with either the ORAP or the Subpoena. Id. As a resulted, the Court continued the debtor’s examination date from 8/26/20 to 10/21/20, then to 1/14/21 and now to 5/12/21.

On 9/11/20, Mirshojae served Reghabi with Requests for Production of Documents, Set 1, by email and overnight delivery. (Do Decl. ¶5, Ex.1). The requests seek documents to assist Mirshojae in collecting his judgment against Reghabi. Responses were due 10/14/20. CCP 1013(a); CCP 2031.260(a). Timely responses were not received. (Do Decl. ¶6). Therefore, on 4/16/21, Mirshojae filed and served the instant motion seeking an order requiring Reghabi to physically personally appear before this Court and show cause why he should not pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $4,610 for abusing the discovery process in this action. Additionally, Mirshojae requests an order compelling Reghabi to provide responses to the Requests for Production propounded by Mirshojae, and produce all documents sought by the Requests.

Reghabi has opposed the motion seeming to claim that the first time he became aware of the subject discovery was on 4/21/21 when he became aware that the motion had been served on his office address. (Reghabi Decl. ¶¶2-4; Nadim Decl. ¶¶2-3). Notably, Reghabi does not directly state that he never received the discovery requests served on 9/11/20 or that the discovery was not properly served. (Reghabi Decl.; Nadim Decl.). Reghabi contends that the motion is moot as he served responses to the subject discovery on 5/5/21. (Reghabi Decl. ¶5; Reghabi Decl. filed on 5/5/21).

A judgment creditor, such as Mirshojae, may demand that a judgment debtor produce, and permit a judgment creditor to inspect and to copy, documents in the judgment debtor’s possession, custody, or control in the same manner as provided in CCP 2031.010, et seq. regarding civil discovery. CCP 708.030(a). Such inspection demands may be enforced in the same manner as demands served in the course of civil discovery. CCP 708.030(c); CCP 2031.300.

Since Reghabi failed to serve timely responses to the discovery requests, the Court has authority to rule on the instant motion, despite Reghabi’s service of untimely responses. See CCP 2031.300(a), (b); Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. (2007) 148 CA4th 390, 408-409; CRC 3.1348(a). Due to Reghabi’s failure to serve timely responses to the subject documents requests, Reghabi waived any objections to the requests/demands. CCP 2031.300(a). Reghabi improperly included objections in his untimely responses. (See Reghabi Decl. filed 5/5/21, Ex.A Responses to Requests 42, 45, 46, 47, 48). Additionally, Reghabi’s untimely responses to other requests are deficient (i.e., Reghabi fails to adequately support claims of inability to comply with certain requests – i.e., why do no responsive documents exist). (See Reghabi Decl. filed 5/5/21, Ex.A Responses to Requests 1, 5, 6, 7, 12, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 32-40, 43, 46, 53); CCP 2031.230.

Mirshojae is entitled to an award of sanctions against Reghabi for Reghabi’s failure to comply with his discovery obligations. See CCP 2031.300(c); CCP 2023.010(d), (e), (f); CCP 2023.030(a). The Court finds that monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,700.00 are reasonable under the circumstances (2 hours to prepare the motion + 3 hours to review the opposition/responses, prepare/revise the reply and prepare for the hearing + 1 hour to appear at the hearing at the reasonable hourly rate of $450/hour). Since monetary sanctions are authorized by the preceding discovery statutes, the Court finds it unnecessary to require Reghabi to physically personally appear before this Court and show cause why he should not pay the monetary sanctions ordered. See CRC 3.670(f).

Case Number: LC105208    Hearing Date: April 9, 2021    Dept: F47

Dept. F-47

Date: 4/9/21

Case #LC105208 (consolidated with LC106904)

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER

Motion filed on 2/25/21.

MOVING PARTY: Receiver Kevin Singer

RESPONDING PARTY # 1: Defendant Ahang Mirshojae aka Ahang Kelk

RESPONDING/JOINING PARTY # 2: Plaintiff Hamid Reza Mirshojae

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order: (1) providing instructions re: sale of real properties; and (2) authorizing issuance of Receiver’s Certificate.

RULING: The hearing will be continued.

These are two consolidated actions, the “Mirshojae Case” (LC015208) and the “Reghabi Case” (LC106904). In the Mirshojae Case, Hamid Reza Mirshojae (Hamid) sued Khosro Reghabi aka Ross K. Reghabi dba Southern California Law Group (Reghabi) for malpractice, intentional misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. In the Reghabi Case, Reghabi sued Hamid and Ahang Zarin Kelk aka Ahang Mirshojae (Ahang) for allegedly unpaid legal fees.

In the Reghabi Case, the Court issued terminating sanctions against Ahang and judgment against Ahang and in favor of Reghabi was entered in the amount of $390,274.24. Hamid’s claims against Reghabi and Reghabi’s claims against Hamid went to trial in February 2020. Hamid obtained a judgment against Reghabi in the amount of $5,482,269.18 and prevailed against Reghabi’s fee claims (Reghabi Judgment).

On 8/18/20, Hamid obtained an order assigning Reghabi’s judgment against Ahang to Hamid (Assigned Judgment). On 9/22/20, this Court granted Hamid’s motion for charging order and appointment of receiver. On 10/14/20, this Court issued an order appointing Kevin Singer as the Receiver with regard to Ahang’s interests in California limited liability companies 1028 San Fernando Road LLC; 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd. LLC and Yekta LLC. Hamid has since been attempting to collect on his judgment against Reghabi and on Reghabi’s assigned judgment against Ahang.

On 8/11/17, Hamid and Ahang’s sons, Nick Mirshojae (Nick) and Jason Mirshojae initiated a lawsuit (Case No. 17STPB07283) via a petition against Ahang. In that lawsuit, Nick sought to recover over $400,000 which Ahang stole from his custodial UTMA account (UTMA Lawsuit). (Nick Decl. ¶2).

On 1/22/18, Nick participated in a mediation before Judge Fahey (Ret.) to resolve the issues in the Initial Petition. (Nick Decl. ¶3). Nick reached an agreement with Ahang and signed a short form settlement agreement (Short Form Settlement Agreement) which required Ahang to prepare and execute a long form settlement and to reimburse Nick for the money she took. Id. Ahang breached the Short Form Settlement Agreement by refusing to execute a long form settlement. Id. As a result, Nick initiated an arbitration proceeding against Ahang, as set forth in the dispute resolution section of the Short Form Settlement Agreement. Id. That arbitration hearing occurred before Judge Fahey (Ret.) on 6/19/19. Id. After the hearing had begun, Ahang agreed to execute a long-form settlement agreement (Settlement Agreement) and executed various operating agreements and irrevocable trusts, including confirming Nick’s interest in the Entities. As part of this settlement, the parties stipulated to an Arbitration Award, which Judge Fahey (Ret.) signed on 6/20/19 (Arbitration Award). Id.

After Ahang, again, failed to pay Nick, the Court in the UTMA Lawsuit confirmed the Arbitration Award in Nick’s favor on 3/23/20. (Id. ¶4). The Judgment awarded Nick the amount of $427,331.60 and $83,469.50 in attorneys’ fees (incurred through arbitration), totaling $510,801.10, as was set forth in the Final Arbitration Award, and accrues interest from the date of 12/22/16. Nick is now owed approximately $750,000. Id.

On 10/22/20, Nick filed a motion for a charging order against Ahang’s 51% interests in each of the Entities. (Id. ¶5). On 11/18/20, the Court in the UTMA Lawsuit granted Nick’s motion for a charging order. However, the Court has not yet signed the proposed order. Id.

By way of the instant motion, the Receiver seeks an order: (1) providing instructions re: sale of real properties; and (2) authorizing issuance of Receiver’s Certificate. Ahang has opposed the motion and Hamid has opposed the motion, in part, and joined the motion, in part.

The Receiver’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted.

In his supporting declaration, the Receiver states that counsel for Nick in the Probate Action, who is the same counsel for Hamid in this action, has requested that the Charging Order entered in the Probate Action be effectuated by the Receiver here. (See Singer Decl. ¶4). Without providing any authority or an adequate explanation, the Receiver says he believes that such action is appropriate, but he seeks instruction from the Court in that regard. (Id.; See also Reply p.2:23-p.3:7).

Both Ahang and Hamid (and Nick) oppose the selling of any of the properties owned by the LLCs now being managed by the Receiver. Hamid and Nick do not oppose the selling of only Ahang’s 51% interest in the LLCs to satisfy their respective judgments against Ahang. Ahang objects to any request to sell her 51% interest in the LLCs. Because such relief was not specifically addressed in the motion, Ahang argues that such an order would deprive her of her due process rights regarding such relief.

The Receiver has no objection to selling Ahang’s interests in the properties, rather than the properties themselves. In the reply, the Receiver explains that he sought to sell the entire properties so as to maximize the value of the interests for the best interest of all parties. The Receiver notes that selling only Ahang’s 51% interest might not generate significant interest among potential purchasers unrelated to the actions. Additionally, the Receiver argues that the motion appropriately sought instruction from the Court regarding how to proceed which would include selling only Ahang’s LLC interests.

Since the motion only addressed the selling of the properties and not Ahang’s interests therein, the hearing will be continued to allow the Receiver to provide more information as to the value of such interests as was done in the motion with regard to the properties. (See Singer Decl. ¶¶3-18; Motion p.10:13-25). Additionally, the Receiver should provide authority and/or explanation as to why it is appropriate for this Court to provide him with instructions regarding the enforcement of a Charging Order in 17STPB07283. Further, the Receiver must also address why such relief would be appropriate since the Probate Court has seemingly not yet signed an order in relation to its granting of Nick’s Motion for Charging Order. (Nick’s Decl. ¶5).

The Receiver’s supplemental brief is due to be filed and served at least 16 court days before the continued hearing date. Any supplemental oppositions are due to be filed and served at least 9 court days before the continued hearing date and any reply brief is due to be filed and served at least 5 court days before the continued hearing date. All briefs are limited to 10 pages.

Case Number: LC105208    Hearing Date: April 1, 2021    Dept: F47

Dept. F-47

Date: 4/1/21

Case #LC105208 (consolidated with LC106094)

MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ENTER

ACKNOWLEDGMENT & SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT

Motion filed on 3/4/21.

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Ahang Mirshojae

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Hamid Reza Mirshojae

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order directing the court clerk to enter the Acknowledgment of Satisfaction of Judgment filed on 8/14/20 with respect to the Judgment entered on 10/15/19 in case number LC106094 against Ahang and in favor of Reghabi.

RULING: The motion is denied.

These are two consolidated actions, the “Mirshojae Case” (LC015208) and the “Reghabi Case” (LC106904). In the Mirshojae Case, Hamid Reza Mirshojae (Hamid) sued Khosro Reghabi aka Ross K. Reghabi dba Southern California Law Group (Reghabi) for malpractice, intentional misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. In the Reghabi Case, Reghabi sued Hamid and Ahang Zarin Kelk (Ahang) for allegedly unpaid legal fees.

In the Reghabi Case, the Court issued terminating sanctions against Ahang and judgment against Ahang and in favor of Reghabi was entered in the amount of $390,274.24. Hamid’s claims against Reghabi and Reghabi’s claims against Hamid went to trial in February 2020. Hamid obtained a judgment against Reghabi in the amount of $5,482,269.18 and prevailed against Reghabi’s fee claims (Reghabi Judgment).

On 8/18/20, Hamid obtained an order assigning Reghabi’s judgment against Ahang to Hamid (Assigned Judgment). On 9/22/20, this Court granted Hamid’s motion for charging order and appointment of receiver. On 10/14/20, this Court issued an order appointing Kevin Singer as the Receiver with regard to Ahang’s interests in California limited liability companies 1028 San Fernando Road LLC; 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd. LLC and Yekta LLC. Hamid has since been attempting to collect on his judgment against Reghabi and on Reghabi’s assigned judgment against Ahang.

Ahang now seeks an order directing the court clerk to enter the Acknowledgment of Satisfaction of Judgment she attempted to file on 8/14/20 with respect to the Judgment entered on 10/15/19 in case number LC106094 against Ahang and in favor of Reghabi.

The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 attached to Ahang’s Requests for Judicial Notice (RJN) as records of this court. See Evidence Code 452(d). Ahang’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibit 6 is denied as the document is not in the court file/record.

Ahang’s evidentiary objection number 1 to the declaration of Estivi Ruiz is sustained. Ahang’s evidentiary objection number 2 to the declaration of Estivi Ruiz is overruled.

In support of and in opposition to this motion, the parties have submitted competing declarations regarding a settlement purportedly reached between Ahang and Reghabi days before this Court’s 8/18/20 order which assigned Reghabi’s judgment against Ahang to Hamid. (See Ahang Decl.; Nadim Decl.; Ruiz Decl.; Yadegar Decl.). The Court need not determine the veracity of the declarations regarding the settlement to deny the motion.

On 7/23/20, Hamid served Ahang with his motion for assignment order and related restraining order which was set for hearing on 8/18/20. (Beatty Decl., Ex.C). Ahang did not oppose the motion, but she did appear at the hearing. (Beatty Decl., Ex.D; 8/18/20 Minute Order). On 8/18/20, the Court granted the motion. (8/18/20 Minute Order). On 8/18/20, Hamid served Ahang with notice of the 8/18/20 ruling. (Beatty Decl., Ex.E). On 9/22/20, the Court granted Hamid’s unopposed motion for charging order and appointment of receiver. (9/22/20 Minute Orders). On 9/30/20, Hamid served Ahang with notice of the 9/22/20 ruling. (Beatty Decl., Ex.G).

The instant motion improperly seeks reconsideration of this Court’s 8/18/20 and 9/22/20 rulings.

CCP 1008(a) provides:

When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.

Additionally, a party seeking reconsideration must provide a satisfactory explanation as to why the new or different facts, circumstances or law were not previously presented. See Garcia (1997) 58 CA4th 674, 688-690; Gilberd (1995) 32 CA4th 1494, 1499; N.Y. Times Co. (2005) 135 CA4th 206, 212-213; Shiffer (2015) 240 CA4th 246, 255.

Ahang’s argument that she “is not asking this court to reconsider its order assigning the judgment, since no adverse ruling was ever made” makes no sense. Based on the ruling, Hamid was able to obtain a charging order and the appointment of a receiver over Ahang’s interest in several limited liability companies in order to collect on the assigned judgment.

If Ahang believed that Hamid was not entitled to the assignment of Reghabi’s $390,274.24 judgment against her because she had settled the judgment with Reghabi for $35,000.00, she was required to seek reconsideration of the Court’s order within 10 days of being served with notice of same on 8/18/20. Ahang failed to do so. Similarly, Ahang failed to seek reconsideration of this Court’s 9/22/20 ruling granting Hamid’s request for a charging order and appointment of a receiver. Rather, Ahang waited almost 7 months after receiving notice of the 8/18/20 order and approximately 5 months after receiving notice of the 9/22/20 order to make the instant motion which, if granted, would nullify the 8/18/20 and 9/22/20 rulings of this Court. (Note: The ruling on the instant motion makes no determination whether motions for reconsideration would have been granted, if timely made.)

Ahang also failed to appeal this Court’s rulings and the time to do so has expired. Post judgment orders are appealable when the order is entered after an appealable judgment is entered. CCP 904.1(a)(2); Solis (1999) 76 CA4th 710, 713. To be appealable, a post judgment order must involve issues different from those addressed in the underlying judgment; and must “affect” or “relate to” the underlying judgment by enforcing it or staying its execution. See Lakin (1993) 6 C4th 644, 651-652, n. 3; Redevelopment Agency (1975) 53 CA3d 424, 429; (any order relating to the enforcement of a judgment is appealable); See also SCC Acquisitions, Inc. (2015) 243

CA4th 741, 748; Bates (2009) 179 CA4th 1125, 1131.

Here, the underlying judgment was final and appealable. The assignment motion and motion for charging order and appointment of receiver both addressed issues different from those raised by the underlying judgment, and were brought to enforce the underlying judgment. Therefore, any orders resulting from those motions were appealable. Id.; See also Baum (1959) 51 C2d 610, 613–615 (an order granting a judgment creditor's motion for a charging order is appealable); Alioto Fish Co., Ltd. (1994) 27 CA4th 1669, 1679 (an order appointing a receiver is expressly made appealable by CCP 904.1(a)(7)).

As noted above, the Court granted the assignment motion 8/18/20. The 60 day deadline to appeal this order expired approximately five months ago. CRC 8.406(a). The Court granted the motion for charging order on 9/22/20 and signed the order appointing receiver on 10/14/20. Therefore, the deadlines to appeal those orders expired in November and December 2020, respectively. CRC 8.406(a). Ahang did not appeal any of the foregoing orders. Instead, she waited until 3/4/21 to file the instant motion.

Based on the foregoing, the motion is denied.

Case Number: LC105208    Hearing Date: March 26, 2021    Dept: F47

Dept. F-47

Date: 3/26/21

Case #LC105208 (consolidated with LC106094)

OSC RE SALE OF DWELLING

Application filed on 1/25/21.

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor Hamid Reza Mirshojae

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant/Judgment Debtor Ross Reghabi dba Southern California Law Group aka Khosro Reghabi and Non-Party Shirin Havaei

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order to sell all of Judgment Debtor Reghabi’s right, title and interest in the Property which is a single-family dwelling located in Los Angeles County and is commonly known as: 5169 Medina Road, Woodland Hills, CA 91364-1912; legally described as: the Northwest 45 feet measured on the Southwest line of lot 1931, of Tract 6170, as per map recorded in Book 76, Pages 57 to 62, inclusive of Maps, in the office of the county recorder of the County of Los Angeles; Assessor’s Parcel Number (APN): 2168-012-083.

RULING: The request for an order to sell dwelling is granted as set forth below.

These are two consolidated actions, the “Mirshojae Case” (LC015208) and the “Reghabi Case” (LC106904). In the Mirshojae Case, Hamid Reza Mirshojae (Mirshojae) sued Khosro Reghabi aka Ross K. Reghabi dba Southern California Law Group (Reghabi) for malpractice, intentional misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. In the Reghabi Case, Reghabi sued Mirshojae and Ahang Zarin Kelk (Kelk) for allegedly unpaid legal fees.

In the Reghabi Case, the Court issued terminating sanctions against Kelk and judgment against Kelk and in favor of Reghabi was entered in the amount of $390,274.24. Mirshojae’s claims against Reghabi and Reghabi’s claims against Mirshojae went to trial in February 2020. Mirshojae, hereinafter referred to as Judgment Creditor, obtained a judgment against Reghabi, hereinafter referred to as Judgment Debtor, in the amount of $5,482,269.18 with interest at 10% per annum and prevailed against Reghabi’s fee claims (Reghabi Judgment). (Beatty Decl., Ex.A). To date, Judgment Creditor has been unable to collect on the Judgment. (See Beatty Decl., Ex.B-D).

After levy on the Property, on 1/25/21, Judgment Creditor filed an Application for Sale of Legal and Equitable Interest in Dwelling Pursuant to CCP 704.750(a) and Setting of OSC Hearing Why an Order for Sale Should Not Be Made. (See Beatty Decl., Ex.F); CCP 704.750. On 1/26/21, this Court granted the application and set the OSC for 3/9/21. On 2/9/21, the Court continued the OSC to 3/15/21. (See 2/9/21 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing; 2/16/21 Judgment Creditor’s Notice of Continuance).

Judgment Debtor did not appear at the 3/15/21 hearing. Shirin Havaei appeared through counsel. (See 3/15/21 Minute Order). Based on Havaei’s counsel’s representations and request to file an opposition, the OSC hearing was continued to 3/26/21. Id. The Court ordered Havaei to serve and file an opposition by 12:00 p.m. on 3/19/21 and ordered a reply to be filed by 4:30 p.m. on 3/24/21. Id. Additionally, the Court ordered that the opposition “is to include information as requested by Moving Party [Judgment Creditor] regarding the fire and recent sale as to the property at issue. Id.

Havaei did not file an opposition as ordered. Rather, on 3/22/21, Havaei filed a Third Party Claim which was purportedly served on 3/23/21. The proof of service attached to the opposition indicates that it was executed on 3/23/21 which would have been impossible because the opposition was filed on 3/22/21. Regardless, it was received by Judgment Creditor and a reply was timely filed.

Judgment Creditor seeks an order to sell all of Judgment Debtor’s right, title and interest in the Property which is a single-family dwelling located in Los Angeles County and is commonly known as: 5169 Medina Road, Woodland Hills, CA 91364-1912; legally described as: the Northwest 45 feet measured on the Southwest line of lot 1931, of Tract 6170, as per map recorded in Book 76, Pages 57 to 62, inclusive of Maps, in the office of the county recorder of the County of Los Angeles; Assessor’s Parcel Number (APN): 2168-012-083.

Judgment Creditor has obtained a “Full Chain of Title Report,” dated 9/1/20, from U.S. Title Records. (Beatty Decl., Ex.G). Judgment Creditor has also obtained a “30 Year Search with Taxes and Copies,” dated 1/22/21, from ProTitleUSA. (Beatty Decl., Ex.H). Judgment Creditor has obtained an appraisal of the Property as of 1/24/21 which provides that the appraised fair market value of the Property is the sum of $1,150,000.00. (Beatty Decl., Ex.J).

The name and address of the party having an interest in the Property, per the U.S. Title Records report (Ex.G, pg. 37) and the ProTitleUSA report (Ex. H, pg. 46) is: Shirin Havaei, 5169 Medina Road Woodland Hills CA 91364-1912. Neither the U.S. Title Records report nor the ProTitleUSA report reflects any voluntary liens on the Property. The ProTitleUSA report reflects three notices of tax lien and a Notice of Levy (Enforcement of Judgment) recorded in connection with this Application. The only liens superior to Judgment Creditor, per the ProTitleUSA report, have been recorded by Mountains Recreation & Conservation Authority. (Beatty Decl., Ex.H, pp.62, 69, 76). Each of the foregoing is a “Notice of Special Tax Lien” recorded pursuant to California streets and Highways Code 3114.5 and California Government Code 53328.2. The Notices authorize Mountains Recreation and Conservation Authority to levy a special tax on all properties within the Community Facilities District. These liens are ongoing annual special tax liens; therefore, they cannot be paid off with finality upon the sale of the Property. (See Beatty Decl., Ex.H, pp.63, 70, 77 (“There is no provision for prepayment of the special tax obligation.”). As of 1/25/21, the Los Angeles County Treasurer and Tax Collector’s public website indicates that default Property taxes may be owed in the amount of $35,182.67. (Beatty Decl., Ex.K).

Shirin Havaei is Judgment Debtor’s ex-spouse and is the record owner and legal co-owner of the Property. Although Judgment Debtor is not a record owner of the property, pursuant to a divorce judgment entered in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. LD067433 on 2/7/19, Judgment Debtor owns 40% interest in the Property and Havaei owns a 60% interest in the Property. (See Beatty Decl., Ex.G, p.37; Ex.H, p.46, Ex.I). The Divorce Judgment between Judgment Debtor and Havaei, post-dates the Grant Deed and provides, in relevant part:

Husband will be awarded and assigned, as a portion of his share of the community property, the following assets and liabilities: … (b) Forty (40) percent ownership of Residential community property located at 5169 Medina Road, 23 Woodland Hills, California 91364;

. . .

Wife will be awarded and assigned, as a portion of her share of the community property, the following assets and liabilities: … (b) Sixty (60) percent ownership of residential community property located at 5169 Medina Road, Woodland Hills, California 91364.

(Beatty Decl., Ex.I, §III.3.04)

The Divorce Judgment further provides:

The parties will hold title to the family residence located at 5169 Medina Road, Woodland Hills, California 91364 as tenants in common. As soon as practicable after the effective date of this agreement the parties will dully execute, acknowledge, and record a deed, transferring title with respect to the residence to themselves as tenants in common. The change of title to tenancy in common, however, will not be dependent on execution or recordation of such a deed.

(Id. §V.4.01)

In the Third Party Claim filed by Havaei, she claims that she has not spoken to Judgment Debtor (her former spouse) for at least 10 years and that they were separated on 2/14/14. (Havaei Decl. ¶4). Havaei further claims that the Judgment in the dissolution proceeding indicating Judgment Debtor has a 40% interest in the property is a mistake which was rectified by Judgment Debtor executing a quit claim deed on 3/3/19 giving her 100% interest in the property and Judgment Debtor executing a Notice of Withdrawal of Pendency of Action on 2/28/19. (Havaei Decl. ¶5). The only information Havaei provides regarding the fire at the property is to claim that an “extensive fire” occurred in late 2020 which caused the value to be less than $700,000.00. (See Havaei Decl. ¶¶6, 8). Havaei provides no independent evidence regarding the fire or current value of the property. Havaei failed to provide any information regarding a recent sale of the property.

The Third Party Claim of Havaei is defective. There is no evidence that Havaei filed the claim with the levying officer as required. CCP 720.120. Nor did Havaei file a petition for hearing on the Third Party Claim as required. CCP 720.130. Havaei provides no authority for the proposition that the Third Party Claim may be filed, heard and/or decided in place of an opposition to the OSC as ordered by the Court.

Even if the Third Party Claim was properly before the Court, the evidence indicates that Quit Claim Deed on which Havaei relies for her 100% interest in the property amounts to a fraudulent transfer. Therefore, the Court may proceed to order the sale of Judgment Debtor’s interest in the property. See CC 3439, et seq.; CC 3439.07(c). A transfer made by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made, if the debtor made the transfer: (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor or (2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer, and (A) the debtor was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which his remaining assets were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or (b) the debtor intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due. CC 3439.04(a). Only one of the elements of CC 3439.04(a) needs to be present to establish a fraudulent transfer. See In re Ponce Nicasio Broadcasting, LP 2008 WL 361081 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2008).

The Court may consider the following factors, among others, to determine actual intent:

(1) Whether the transfer or obligation was to an insider; (2) Whether the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer; (3) Whether the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; (4) Whether before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; (5) Whether the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; (6) Whether the debtor absconded; (7) Whether the debtor removed or concealed assets; (8) Whether the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; (9) Whether the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; (10) Whether the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; (11) Whether the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor or that transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. See CC 3439.04(b).

Assuming the Quit Claim Deed was executed on 3/3/19 as indicated, the evidence still indicates that the transfer was fraudulent and, therefore, voidable. As set forth below, the CC 3439.04(b) factors indicate Judgment Debtor had an intent to defraud his creditors by making the transfer:

(1) The transfer was concealed. CC 3439.04(b)(3). Judgment Debtor and Havaei did not record the documentation reflecting Judgment Debtor’s 40% interest in the Property (despite the divorce judgment’s order to do so) or the Quit Claim Deed. Additionally, the Notice of Withdrawal of the Pendency of Action Havaei claims to have received from Judgment Debtor (see Third Party Claim, Ex. D) was neither filed with the family law division of this Court (see Docket for LASC Case No. LD067433), nor recorded with the County Recorder (see title reports filed with this Court in support of Application). The divorce case docket does not even reflect any notice of lis pendens.

(2) Judgment Debtor was sued in this matter on 2/3/17, before the 3/3/19 execution of the Quit Claim Deed. CC 3439.04(b)(4).

(3) The transfer appears to have constituted the substantial majority of Judgment Debtor’s assets. CC 3439.04(b)(5). Based on the divorce proceedings, Judgment Debtor does not own other real property or other substantial assets. Also, levies of Judgment Debtor’s bank accounts have been largely unsuccessful.

(4) Judgment Debtor has absconded. CC 3439.04(b)(6). Judgment Debtor has not appeared before this Court for hearing, has ignored discovery, and evaded service of this Court’s Orders to Appear for Examination.

(5) Judgment Debtor has removed and concealed his assets. CC 3439.04(b)(7). Judgment Debtor purports to have transferred his largest asset, the Property. Further, Judgment Creditor has been unsuccessful in attempting to levy Judgment Debtor’s known bank accounts.

(6) The transfer appears to have left Judgment Debtor insolvent. CC 3439.04(b)(9). Judgment Debtor has not made any payment on Judgment Creditor’s judgment. As noted above, Judgment Debtor does not appear to have any other substantial assets, and efforts to collect on the judgment against him have returned little.

(7) The Quit Claim Deed transfer appears to have occurred shortly before a substantial debt was incurred. CC 3439.04(b)(9). The 3/3/19 transfer happened just months before this case was supposed to go to trial in May 2019 (see Docket) and within less than a year of this Court entering a multimillion dollar judgment against Judgment Debtor, in favor of Judgment Creditor.

Further, Havaei’s claim that Judgment Debtor was merely rectifying a mistake in the divorce judgment by executing the Quit Claim Deed does not seem plausible. Havaei claims that she acquired the Property “with [her] own separate funds and Ross Reghabi had no interest whatsoever in said property.” (Havaei Decl. ¶4). However, the Grant Deed Havaei relies on to support her claim states no transfer tax is owed because Havaei obtained title to the Property as a “bona fide gift and the grantor received nothing in return, R&T 11911[.]” (Havaei Decl., Ex.C).

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that any transfer of Judgment Debtor’s 40% interest in the Property was fraudulent. Therefore, Judgment Creditor may still recover against such interest.

Havaei’s co-ownership of the Property does not prohibit the sale of Judgment Debtor’s interest therein. If a dwelling is owned by a judgment debtor as a joint tenant or a tenant in common, or if the judgment debtor’s interest is less than a fee interest, “[a]t an execution sale of a dwelling, the interest of the judgment debtor in the dwelling and not the dwelling shall be sold.” CCP 704.820(a). As such, Judgment Creditor is entitled to sell all right, title, and interest of Judgment Debtor and credit bid under CCP 701.590(b) or in the alternative, Judgment Creditor may obtain an order for a cash sale under CCP 704.780(b) and sell the Property for 90% of the appraised value under CCP 704.800(a).

There is no evidence that Judgment Debtor is entitled to a homestead exemption. See CCP 704.710, et seq.; (Beatty Decl. ¶5, Ex.G; Ex.H; Ex.I §V.4.02).

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds:

(1) Judgment Debtor is not entitled to a homestead right with regard to his interest in the Property;

(2) The property has a fair market value of $1,150,000.00; and

(3) The Property has equity in the amount of at least $1,114,817.33, which is the difference between the appraised value less the sum of the potential amount owed on the defaulted tax roll, 40% of which is $445,926.93.

Therefore, the Court orders the Los Angeles County Sheriff to sell Judgment Debtor’s interest in the Property either:

(a) pursuant to CCP 701.540 [with no exemption rights], to the highest bidder, and that Judgment Creditor is entitled to credit bid, together with cash payment of $35,182.67, if any, for the defaulted tax roll; or

(b) pursuant to CCP 704.800 (“insufficient sale bids”), for the minimum amount of $414,000.00 (i.e. 90% of $460,000.00)) and distribute the proceeds thereof as follows:

(i) To payment of unpaid property taxes, if any.

(ii) The balance of all other funds payable to the Judgment Creditor in partial satisfaction of the Judgment, which amount as of the date of this Application is $5,943,380.60.

Case Number: LC105208    Hearing Date: January 27, 2021    Dept: F47

Dept. F-47

Date: 1/27/21

Case #LC105208 (consolidated with LC106094)

OSC RE CONTEMPT

Ex Parte Application filed on 12/10/20.

MOVING PARTY: Receiver Kevin Singer

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Ahang Mirshojae

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: (1) An order holding Defendant Ahang Mirshojae in contempt for failure to obey this Court’s 10/14/20 Order Appointing Receiver Over Properties and (2) an order requiring Defendant Ahang Mirshojae to immediately turn over to Receiver rents in the amount of $93,221.67.

RULING:

The request for an order holding Defendant Ahang Mirshojae in contempt for failure to obey this Court’s 10/14/20 Order Appointing Receiver Over Properties is denied.

The request for an order requiring Defendant Ahang Mirshojae to immediately turn over to Receiver rents in the amount of $93,221.67 is denied.

The parties are reminded to review the 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil. When e-filing documents, parties must comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” which are set forth at page 4, line 4 through page 5, line 12 of the Court’s 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil. Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers being rejected, matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions. (See also 10/1/20 Notice to Attorneys).

These are two consolidated actions, the “Mirshojae Case” (LC015208) and the “Reghabi Case” (LC106904). In the Mirshojae Case, Hamid Reza Mirshojae sued Khosro Reghabi aka Ross K. Reghabi dba Southern California Law Group for malpractice, intentional misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. In the Reghabi Case, Khosro Reghabi sued Hamid Reza Mirshojae and Ahang Zarin Kelk (aka Ahang Mirshojae) for allegedly unpaid legal fees.

In the Reghabi Case, the Court issued terminating sanctions against Ahang Mirshojae and judgment against Ahang Mirshojae and in favor of Khosro Reghabi was entered in the amount of $390,274.24. Hamid Reza Mirshojae’s claims against Khosro Reghabi and Khosro Reghabi’s claims against Hamid Reza Mirshojae went to trial in February 2020. Hamid Reza Mirshojae obtained a judgment against Khosro Reghabi in the amount of $5,482,269.18 and prevailed against Khosro Reghabi’s fee claims (Reghabi Judgment).

On 8/18/20, Hamid Reza Mirshojae obtained an order assigning Khosro Reghabi’s judgment against Ahang Mirshojae to Hamid Reza Mirshojae (Assigned Judgment). Therefore, Hamid Reza Mirshojae, as the assignee of record, has the right to collect on the Assigned Judgment. On 10/14/20, this Court issued an order appointing Kevin Singer as the Receiver with regard to Ahang Mirshojae’s interests in California limited liability companies 1028 San Fernando Road LLC; 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd. LLC and Yekta LLC (the “Entities”). The 10/14/20 order authorized the Receiver to take immediate possession and control of: (a) the Entities’ real properties located at (1) 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd., Woodland Hills, CA 91367 (the “Topanga Property”), (2) 4942 Vineland Ave., North Hollywood, CA 91601 (the “Vineland Property”), and (3) 1028 San Fernando Blvd., Burbank, CA 91502 (the “Burbank Property”) (collectively, the “Properties”); (b) any rents generated by the Properties; and (c) any and all bank accounts in the name of the Entities. Additionally, the 10/14/20 order directs Ahang Mirshojae to turn over rents to the Receiver within three days, to turn over books and records to the Receiver within five days and to promptly provide the Receiver with insurance information.

The Receiver contends that Ahang Mirshojae has violated the 10/14/20 order by: (1) failing to provide requested documents (i.e., lease agreements, rent rolls, insurance policies, etc.); (2) failing to turn over rents for October and November 2020 and (3) instructing her agents not to cooperate with the Receiver. The reply clarifies that the Receiver contends that Ahang Mirshojae has violated the 10/14/20 order in at least four ways: (1) failure to turn over rents; (2) failure to turn over books and records, (3) failure to turn over insurance information and (4) interfering with the receivership.

The Receiver now seeks orders: (1) holding Defendant Ahang Mirshojae in contempt for failure to obey this Court’s 10/14/20 Order Appointing Receiver Over Properties and (2) requiring Defendant Ahang Mirshojae to immediately turn over to Receiver rents in the amount of $93,221.67.

Disobedience of a court order constitutes a contempt of court. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1209(a)(5). If the contempt is not committed in the immediate view of the court, then contempt proceedings commence with the filing of a declaration setting forth the following essential elements: (1) the court made a lawful/valid order; (2) the alleged contemnor had knowledge or notice of the order; (3) the alleged contemnor was able to comply with the order; and (4) the alleged contemnor willfully disobeyed the order. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1211(a); Application of Liu (1969) 273 CA2d 135, 140; Conn (1987) 196 CA3d 774, 784. As to element (3), the alleged contemnor’s ability to comply with the court order is a question of fact that the court has the right to determine. Ex Parte Cardella (1941) 47 CA2d 329, 330-31. Element (4) also presents a question of fact for the court to decide, and “willful” should be construed as “an indifferent disregard of the duty to obey [the court order] promptly.” Application of Burns (1958) 161 CA2d 137, 141-42.

While the Court found the declaration submitted with the application sufficient to set this Order to Show Cause hearing, in order to obtain an order holding Ahang Mirshojae in contempt, the Receiver must prove the contempt by competent evidence. See In re Cassil (1995) 37 CA4th 1081, 1088; In re Koehler (2010) 181 CA4th 1153, 1160. The Receiver has failed to meet this burden. The Receiver has not shown by competent evidence that Ahang Mirshojae is/was able to comply with the order and/or that she willfully disobeyed the order.

Ahang Mirshojae has submitted her own declaration wherein she states under penalty of perjury that: (1) the subject properties were managed by Irene Cameron who maintains an office at the Vineland Property and all books and records for the entities and the Properties are maintained at the Vineland Property; (2) she never instructed Irene Cameron not to cooperate with the Receiver; (3) she does not currently have access to the property management office or the records requested; (4) she has not received any rents from any of the tenants of the Properties since the Receiver was appointed; and (5) rent for the San Fernando/Burbank Property was deposited into the entity’s bank account from which the mortgage is automatically deducted. (See Mirshojae Declaration). The Receiver has submitted the declarations of his agent, Scott Scott Yahraus, to refute the foregoing. However, the Scott Yahraus declarations are based on inadmissible hearsay, misstate the evidence which supports the claims therein, and/or are not supported by any evidence.

Scott Yahraus offers no evidence to support his claim that Ahang Mirshojae collected November 2020 rents from tenants at the Vineland property and from Nova Vitae at the Topanga Property. (Yahraus Declaration ¶11). In the moving papers, Scott Yahraus contends that Ahang Mirshojae required the Receivership Estate to make the mortgage payments for the properties that were due on 11/1/20. (Yahraus Declaration ¶12). In the reply, Scott Yahraus fails to refute that the rent for the San Fernando property was deposited into the entities bank account, of which the Receiver now has control, and the mortgage payment was automatically deducted therefrom. (See Mirshojae Declaration ¶9). Additionally, Scott Yahraus’ claim that the property manager, Irene Cameron, told him Ahang Mirshojae instructed her to give Ahang Mirshojae the rents in violation of the 10/14/20 order is hearsay. (Yahraus Reply Declaration ¶7). The Receiver has not provided a declaration from Irene Cameron. Additionally, the Receiver has not provided any evidence to show that Ahang Mirshojae would have records in addition to those kept by the property manager, which the Receiver admits to now having access to. (Yahraus Reply Declaration ¶6; Mirshojae Declaration ¶¶5, 7). Further, Scott Yahraus contends that Allen Yadegar a tenant and owner of Nova Vitae informed him that he paid rent directly to Ahang Mirshojae is not supported by the attached email. (Yahraus Reply Declaration ¶8, Exhibit 1). The attached email merely states that Allen Yadegar “paid [rent] directly to the owner...please ask them for proof.” Id. There is no specific mention of Ahang Mirshojae in the emails and the owner of the property is an entity.

________________________________________________________________________________________

Dept. F-47

Date: 1/27/21

Case #LC105208 (consolidated with LC106094)

APPLICATION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

&

OSC RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

 Ex Parte Application filed on 12/11/20.

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Hamid Reza Mirshojae

JOINING PARTY: Receiver Kevin Singer

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Ahang Mirshojae

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: (1) An order that Defendant Ahang Mirshojae comply with the Settlement Agreement dated 10/13/17 and (2) a preliminary injunction enjoining Ahang Mirshojae’s COVID-19 testing operations at the Topanga Canyon property at which Hamid Reza Mirshojae’s urgent care medical clinic operates.

RULING: The joinder is granted. The request to enforce the settlement agreement as to the truck is moot. The request for a preliminary injunction is denied. The requests for additional relief in the joinder and reply are denied.

These are two consolidated actions, the “Mirshojae Case” (LC015208) and the “Reghabi Case” (LC106904). In the Mirshojae Case, Hamid Reza Mirshojae sued Khosro Reghabi aka Ross K. Reghabi dba Southern California Law Group for malpractice, intentional misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. In the Reghabi Case, Khosro Reghabi sued Hamid Reza Mirshojae and Ahang Zarin Kelk aka Ahang Mirshojae for allegedly unpaid legal fees.

In the Reghabi Case, the Court issued terminating sanctions against Ahang Zarin Kelk and judgment against Ahang Zarin Kelk and in favor of Khosro Reghabi was entered in the amount of $390,274.24. Hamid Reza Mirshojae’s claims against Khosro Reghabi and Khosro Reghabi’s claims against Hamid Reza Mirshojae went to trial in February 2020. Hamid Reza Mirshojae obtained a judgment against Khosro Reghabi in the amount of $5,482,269.18 and prevailed against Khosro Reghabi’s fee claims (Reghabi Judgment).

Additionally, the Receiver’s claim that the operation of COVID-19 testing tent by Ahang Zarin Kelk and Allen Yadegar is in violation of the 10/14/20 Order Appointing Receiver Over Properties was not the basis for the original application for preliminary injunction filed by Hamid Reza Mirshojae. Even if the 10/14/20 Order Appointing Receiver could be considered as a basis for the requested relief, the Receiver has failed to establish a violation of that order.

The Receiver claims that the 10/14/20 Order Appointing Receiver prohibits COVID-19 testing by Ahang Zarin Kelk and Allen Yadegar based on the following portions of the order:

   The Receiver shall have the power to take any and all lawful actions necessary to preserve, protect, maintain,  and operate the Properties…The power to possess, manage, and operate shall also include the right to exclude from the Properties anyone, including Ahang Zarin Kelk and persons claiming under or through   Ahang Zarin Kelk, who are not under valid lease or rental agreements. (p. 3:23 – p. 4:2)

Exclusion: The Receiver shall be empowered to exclude from the Properties, including, without limitation the Parties, or any person or other entity claiming under or through Parties, who is not under a valid lease or rental agreement. If the Parties have a valid lease and remain in compliance with their lease they shall remain on the Properties according to the terms of their lease. (p. 7:22-26)

(See Joinder p.2:14-22)

While the joinder indicates that “Defendants have not provided Receiver any valid lease agreements that suggest Defendants are authorized to administer COVID-19 tests in the parking lot of the Topanga Property, or that Defendants may conduct any business or activities in any part of the Properties that interfere with the business of the tentants [sic] at the Properties,” the Receiver has not provided evidence indicating that the Receiver has requested such documentation. The declaration of the agent for the Receiver states what was not provided, but never explicitly states that such documents were requested from Ahang Zarin Kelk. (See Joinder Yahraus Declaration ¶¶6-7; Reply Yahraus Declaration ¶¶2-3). Additionally, no admissible evidence has been provided to establish that the Receiver requested that these activities cease. (See Yahraus Declarations).

Case Number: LC105208    Hearing Date: August 18, 2020    Dept: F47

Motion filed on 7/23/20.

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor Hamid Reza Mirshojae

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant/Judgment Debtor Ross Reghabi dba Southern California Law Group and Ahang Zarin Kelk

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An assignment order and related restraining order. Specifically, Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor Hamid Reza Mirshojae (Hamid) requests that the Court assign to him any and all interest of Defendant/Judgment Debtor Ross Reghabi dba Southern California Law Group (Reghabi) in Reghabi’s judgment against Ahang Zarin Kelk in LASC Case No. LC016094 (Ahang Judgment) and all rights to payment thereunder, including accrued interest through the date of payment. Additionally, Hamid requests that the Court enter an order restraining Reghabi and any others from assigning, encumbering, or modifying Reghabi’s rights to payment under the Ahang Judgment.

RULING: The unopposed motion is granted.

These are two consolidated actions, the “Mirshojae Case” (LC015208) and the “Reghabi Case” (LC106904). In the Mirshojae Case, Hamid Reza Mirshojae (Hamid) sued Khosro Reghabi aka Ross K. Reghabi dba Southern California Law Group (Reghabi) for malpractice, intentional misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. In the Reghabi Case, Reghabi sued Hamid and Ahang Zarin Kelk (Ahang) for allegedly unpaid legal fees.

In the Reghabi Case, the Court issued terminating sanctions against Ahang and judgment against Ahang and in favor of Reghabi was entered in the amount of $390,274.24 (Ahang Judgment). (Beatty Decl. ¶3, Ex.A). Hamid’s claims against Reghabi and Reghabi’s claims against Hamid went to trial in February 2020. Hamid obtained a judgment against Reghabi in the amount of $5,482,269.18 and prevailed against Reghabi’s fee claims (Reghabi Judgment). (Beatty Decl. ¶¶4-5, Ex.B, C).

Hamid now seeks to have Reghabi’s judgment against Ahang (Ahang Judgment) assigned to him and for an order restraining Reghabi and any others from assigning, encumbering, or modifying Reghabi’s rights to payment under the Ahang Judgment.

“[U]pon application of the judgment creditor on noticed motion, the court may order the judgment debtor to assign to the judgment creditor…all or part of a right to payment due or to become due, whether or not the right is conditioned on future developments…” CCP 708.510(a). An assignment order can be used to reach assignable property that is subject to levy, including judgments. Casiopea Bovet, LLC (2017) 12 CA5th 656, 661.

When determining whether to order an assignment, the Court may take into consideration all relevant factors, such as: (1) the reasonable requirements of a judgment debtor who is a natural person and of persons supported in whole or in part by the judgment debtor; (2) payments the judgment debtor is required to make or that are deducted in satisfaction of other judgments and wage assignments, including earnings assignment orders for support; (3) the amount remaining due on the money judgment; and (4) the amount being or to be received in satisfaction of the right to payment that may be assigned. CCP 708.510(c). However, a right to payment may be assigned only to the extent necessary to satisfy the money judgment. CCP 708.510(d).

Here, there has been no stay of enforcement with regard to either the Ahang Judgment or the Reghabi Judgment. (Beatty Decl. ¶6). Nor has a payment plan been plan been implemented or sought on either judgment. (Beatty Decl. ¶8). Therefore, Reghabi and Hamid can immediately collect on their respective judgments. Since Reghabi has made no payments toward Hamid’s judgment against him, even if Hamid collects the full amount of the Ahang Judgment, there would be no danger of overpayment. (Beatty Decl. ¶7). The Court finds that assigning the Ahang Judgment to Hamid is more efficient than requiring Hamid to levy on the judgment.

Additionally, the Court finds that an order restraining Reghabi and any others from assigning, encumbering, or modifying Reghabi’s rights to payment under the Ahang Judgment is warranted. See CCP 708.520.

Case Number: LC105208    Hearing Date: June 24, 2020    Dept: F47

Dept. F-47

Date: 6/24/20

Case #LC105208

MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL

Motion filed on 3/9/20.

MOVING ATTORNEY: Gary N. Schwartz

CLIENT: Ahang Mirshojhae

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order relieving Gary N. Schwartz as counsel for Ahang Mirshojhae in this action.

TENTATIVE RULING: The hearing on the motion will be continued.

The proof of service for the motion contains an incorrect address for Ross K. Reghabi/Southern California Law Group. The proof of service indicates that the motion was mailed to Reghabi/Southern California Law Group at 5023 N. Parkway Calabasas, Calabasas, CA 91302-1412. However, eCourt and the last document filed by Reghabi/Southern California Law Group indicate their address is 24007 Ventura Blvd., Ste.205, Calabasas, CA 91302.

Additionally, a proposed order has not been submitted.

Based on the foregoing, the hearing on the motion will be continued so that motion can be properly served on Reghabi/Southern California Law Group and a proposed order can be submitted.

MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT & DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Motion filed on 3/18/20.

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Ahang Zarrin Kelk

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Khosro Reghabi

JOINING PARTY: Plaintiff/Defendant Hamid Mirshojae

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order vacating and setting aside the entry of Default and Default Judgment and Clerk’s entry of default obtained by Plaintiff Khosro Reghabi.

TENTATIVE RULING: The joinder in the opposition is denied. The motion is denied.

These actions arise out of an attorney fee dispute filed by Plaintiff against Defendant Hamidreza Mirshojae and Defendant Ahang Zarrin Kelk (LC106094) and a complaint filed by Defendant Hamidreza Mirshojae against Plaintiff and Defendant Ahang Zarrin Kelk (LC105208).

Due to Defendant Ahang Zarrin Kelk’s failure to comply with this Court’s 6/25/19 order compelling her to provide further responses to discovery requests, on 10/9/19 in LC106094, this court imposed terminating sanctions against Ahang Zarrin Kelk by striking her answer and entering default against her. Default judgment was entered against Ahang Zarrin Kelk on 10/15/19. The trial of this matter took place in February 2020. Ahang Zarrin Kelk filed this motion on 3/18/20 wherein she seeks an order vacating and setting aside the entry of Default and Default Judgment and Clerk’s entry of default obtained by Plaintiff Khosro Reghabi.

Plaintiff Khosro Reghabi has opposed the motion. Plaintiff/Defendant Hamid Mirshojae has filed a joinder in the opposition. Hamid Mirshojae fails to provide any authority which gives him standing to oppose the relief sought by Ahang Zarrin Kelk in this motion. As such, his joinder in the opposition is denied.

Although Ahang Zarrin Kelk cites the portion of Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(b) relating to mandatory relief in the motion, she states in the conclusion that she seeks relief under the discretionary provision of Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(b). (See Motion p.4:6-17, p.10:3). Ahang Zarrin Kelk would not be entitled to mandatory relief based on attorney fault because she was representing herself at the time the motion for terminating sanctions was granted and default judgment was entered against her. Ahang Zarrin Kelk has also failed to establish that discretionary relief is warranted.

Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(b) provides, in relevant part:

The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.

A proposed pleading (for instance, opposition to the motion for terminating sanctions) does not accompany the motion as is required. More importantly, Ahang Zarrin Kelk has not shown that the default and default judgment were the result of her mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. As a self-represented litigant, Ahang Zarrin Kelk is held to the same standard as a represented party. See Burnete (2007) 148 CA4th 1262, 1267, 1270. Ahang Zarrin Kelk admits to receiving the motion for sanctions, but Ahang Zarrin Kelk claims that she was confused by it because she had served discovery responses on 3/5/19 and, therefore, believed that she did not have to respond to the motion. (Kelk Declaration ¶¶4-5). However, the motion for sanctions addressed Ahang Zarrin Kelk’s failure to comply with this court’s 6/25/19 order requiring Ahang Zarrin Kelk to provide further responses to discovery. (See 10/9/19 Minute Order in LC106094). Ahang Zarrin Kelk never states that she provided the further responses ordered by the court. (See Kelk Declaration). Additionally, Ahang Zarrin Kelk did not oppose the motion requesting terminating sanctions for such failure and Kelk did not appear at the hearing on the motion for sanctions. (See 10/9/19 Minute Order in LC106094). As such, the court found terminating sanctions were warranted. (See 6/25/19 Minute Order in LC106094; 10/9/19 Minute Order in LC106094). The court now finds that Ahang Zarrin Kelk’s failures were the result of inexcusable neglect. 

Additionally, the court finds that Ahang Zarrin Kelk did not act diligently in seeking relief. A motion for relief under the discretionary provision of Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(b) must be made within a reasonable time after the judgment is entered with the court losing jurisdiction to grant relief after six months. On 10/28/19, Ahang Zarrin Kelk was served with notice of the entry of the default judgment against her. (See Notice of Entry of Judgment filed on 10/28/19 in LC106094). Ahang Zarrin Kelk did not file the instant motion until almost five months later on 3/18/20. Ahang Zarrin Kelk fails to explain the delay other than to vaguely state in her 3/2/20 declaration that “[i]t was not until I recently realized that a Judgment had been entered against me that I hired counsel to assist me with setting aside the Judgment.” (See Kelk Declaration ¶7). As such, Ahang Zarrin Kelk did not seek relief within a reasonable time after the entry of the judgment against her.

Ahang Zarrin Kelk has also failed to establish that the court should set aside the default and default judgment on equitable grounds. Ahang Zarrin Kelk has not established that the default or default judgment were the result of extrinsic fraud or mistake.

Ahang Zarrin Kelk’s argument that the judgment against her is voidable because the amount is in excess of that demanded in the complaint is improperly made for the first time in the reply. Therefore, Plaintiff did not have the opportunity to respond to this argument and it cannot be considered.

related-case-search

Dig Deeper

Get Deeper Insights on Court Cases


Latest cases where 5975-5999 TOPANGA CANYON BLVD LLC A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AD is a litigant

Latest cases where YEKTA LLC is a litigant

Latest cases where REGHABI LAW GROUP DBA SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW GROUP is a litigant

Latest cases represented by Lawyer GOLDMAN JAMES LEWIS