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This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 07/11/2021 at 16:29:32 (UTC).

YOUTH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ET AL VS CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Case Summary

On 11/06/2015 YOUTH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE filed a Civil Right - Other Civil Right lawsuit against CITY OF LOS ANGELES. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are EMILIE H. ELIAS, JAMES C. CHALFANT, KEVIN C. BRAZILE, MALCOLM MACKEY and TERRY GREEN. The case status is Disposed - Dismissed.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****0373

  • Filing Date:

    11/06/2015

  • Case Status:

    Disposed - Dismissed

  • Case Type:

    Civil Right - Other Civil Right

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

EMILIE H. ELIAS

JAMES C. CHALFANT

KEVIN C. BRAZILE

MALCOLM MACKEY

TERRY GREEN

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs, Petitioners and Cross Defendants

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY

SOUTH CENTRAL YOUTH LEADERSHIP COALITION

YOUTH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

DIVERSITY CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

COALITION SOUTH CENTRAL YOUTH LEADERSHIP

CITY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF CITY

LOGRANDE MICHAEL J.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Defendants, Respondents and Cross Defendants

CITY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF CITY

DOES 1 THROUGH 20

LOGRANDE MICHAEL J.

LOS ANGELES CITY OF

CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Intervenor

CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIAT

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

GUPTA WESSLER PLLC

COMMUNITIES FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT

PFEIFFER ROSCA WOLF ABDULLAH CARR & KANE

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY THE

GOLDEN-KRASNER MAYA

SIEGEL KASSIA R.

WOLF ADAM BRETT

Defendant and Respondent Attorneys

BROTHERS AMY DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY

TOBKIN JENNIFER KATHLEEN

Other Attorneys

DINTZER JEFFREY D.

DINTZER JEFFREY DAVID

 

Court Documents

Judgment - JUDGMENT (PROPOSED) JUDGMENT

3/23/2021: Judgment - JUDGMENT (PROPOSED) JUDGMENT

Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore

7/6/2021: Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore

CITY OF LOS ANGELES'S OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT IN INTERVENTION'S EX PARTE APPLICATION; DECLARATION OF JENNIFER K. TOBKIN IN SUPPORT OF CITY'S OPPOSITION

8/29/2016: CITY OF LOS ANGELES'S OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT IN INTERVENTION'S EX PARTE APPLICATION; DECLARATION OF JENNIFER K. TOBKIN IN SUPPORT OF CITY'S OPPOSITION

NOTICE RE: CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

9/14/2016: NOTICE RE: CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DISMISSAL AND PROOF OF SERVICE

9/29/2016: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DISMISSAL AND PROOF OF SERVICE

NOTICE TO STATE COURT AND ADVERSE PARTY OF REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT

10/3/2016: NOTICE TO STATE COURT AND ADVERSE PARTY OF REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION'S OBJECTION TO EXHIBITS H AND I OF DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT OF NON-PROFIT DEFENDANTS' ANTI-SLAPP MOTION TO STRIKE THE FIRST AMENDED VERIFI

4/3/2017: RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION'S OBJECTION TO EXHIBITS H AND I OF DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT OF NON-PROFIT DEFENDANTS' ANTI-SLAPP MOTION TO STRIKE THE FIRST AMENDED VERIFI

Proof of Service -

4/3/2017: Proof of Service -

OBJECTION BY CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION TO REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF CITY OF LOS ANGELES' REPLY TO CIPA'S OPPOSITION TO THE CITY'S DEMURRER AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STR

4/5/2017: OBJECTION BY CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION TO REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF CITY OF LOS ANGELES' REPLY TO CIPA'S OPPOSITION TO THE CITY'S DEMURRER AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STR

ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

5/24/2017: ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS BY CITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS TO RESPONDENT'S NOTICE ELECTING TO USE AN APPENDIX FILED BY CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION

6/22/2017: RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS BY CITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS TO RESPONDENT'S NOTICE ELECTING TO USE AN APPENDIX FILED BY CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION

Proof of Service -

8/28/2017: Proof of Service -

 

Docket Entries

  • 07/07/2021
  • DocketNotice (of Entry of Post Judgment Orders); Filed by City of Los Angeles (Defendant)

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  • 07/06/2021
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 55, Malcolm Mackey, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs - Held

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  • 07/06/2021
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 55, Malcolm Mackey, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees - Held

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  • 07/06/2021
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 55, Malcolm Mackey, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees - Held

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  • 07/06/2021
  • DocketOrder Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore

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  • 07/06/2021
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees; Hearing on Motion for At...)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/28/2021
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 55, Malcolm Mackey, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs - Not Held - Continued - Party's Motion

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  • 06/28/2021
  • DocketProof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Youth for Environmental Justice (Plaintiff); South Central Youth Leadership Coalition (Plaintiff); Center for Biological Diversity (Plaintiff)

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  • 06/28/2021
  • DocketDeclaration (DECLARATION OF MAYA GOLDEN-KRASNER IN SUPPORT OF NONPROFIT DEFENDANTS? REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS); Filed by Youth for Environmental Justice (Plaintiff); South Central Youth Leadership Coalition (Plaintiff); Center for Biological Diversity (Plaintiff)

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  • 06/28/2021
  • DocketDeclaration (DECLARATION OF ADAM B. WOLF IN SUPPORT OF NONPROFIT DEFENDANTS? REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS); Filed by Youth for Environmental Justice (Plaintiff); South Central Youth Leadership Coalition (Plaintiff); Center for Biological Diversity (Plaintiff)

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814 More Docket Entries
  • 11/18/2015
  • Docketat 00:00 AM in Department 324; (Order-Complex Determination; Case Determined to be non-Complex) -

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  • 11/18/2015
  • DocketMinute order entered: 2015-11-18 00:00:00; Filed by Clerk

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  • 11/12/2015
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Youth for Environmental Justice (Plaintiff); South Central Youth Leadership Coalition (Plaintiff); Center for Biological Diversity (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/12/2015
  • DocketProof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Maya Golden-Krasner (Attorney); Youth for Environmental Justice (Plaintiff); South Central Youth Leadership Coalition (Plaintiff) et al.

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  • 11/12/2015
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

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  • 11/12/2015
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Youth for Environmental Justice (Plaintiff); South Central Youth Leadership Coalition (Plaintiff); Center for Biological Diversity (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/10/2015
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Youth for Environmental Justice (Plaintiff); South Central Youth Leadership Coalition (Plaintiff); Center for Biological Diversity (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/06/2015
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 11/06/2015
  • DocketVERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

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  • 11/06/2015
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by null

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Tentative Rulings

b'

Case Number: BC600373 Hearing Date: July 6, 2021 Dept: 55

YOUTH\r\nFOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE v. CITY OF L. A. BC600373

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Hearing Date: 7/6/21, Dept. 55

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#10:

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MOTION\r\nFOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES [CCP §425.16(c)(1)].

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MOTION\r\nFOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES [CCP §425.16(c)(1)].

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MOTION TO TAX COSTS.

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Notice: Okay

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Opposition

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MP:\r\n

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Cross-Defendants YOUTH FOR\r\nENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE; SOUTH CENTRAL YOUTH LEADERSHIP COALITION; CENTER FOR\r\nBIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY.

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Cross-Defendants\r\nYOUTH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE; SOUTH CENTRAL YOUTH LEADERSHIP COALITION;\r\nCENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY.

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Cross-Complainant CALIFORNIA\r\nINDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION

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RP:\r\n Cross-Complainant\r\nCALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION

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Cross-Complainant CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM\r\nASSOCIATION

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Cross-Defendants\r\nYOUTH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE; SOUTH CENTRAL YOUTH LEADERSHIP COALITION;\r\nCENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY.

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Summary

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On 3/12/21, as directed\r\nby the Second District Court of Appeal, the Court entered an Order granting\r\ncross-defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions.

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The Court Of Appeal\r\nreversed Judge Green’s denial of SLAPP motions brought against\r\nCross-Complainant, CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION (CIPA), reasoning that the First Amended\r\nCross-Complaint challenged a protected settlement agreement (SLAPP step 1), and\r\nthat ZA Memo No. 133 did not infringe CIPA members’ legitimate, constitutional property\r\ninterests (SLAPP step 2).

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Judgment was entered on\r\nthe operative cross-complaint on 3/23/21.

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Upon remand to the trial\r\ncourt, Cross-Defendants YOUTH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE; SOUTH CENTRAL YOUTH\r\nLEADERSHIP COALITION; and CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, filed a peremptory\r\nchallenge to Judge Green, and then the case was reassigned to Department 55.

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Cross-Defendants’\r\nPositions

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Cross-Defendants request an\r\norder awarding attorneys’ fees and costs, and denying the motion to tax costs,\r\non grounds including the following:

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· \r\nUnder Code of Civil Procedure §\r\n425.16(c)(1), a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be\r\nentitled to recover its attorneys’ fees and costs.

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· \r\nCounsel’s time records and declarations\r\nare strong evidence that their hours are reasonable. (Horsford v. Bd. of\r\nTrustees of Cal. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 396.

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· \r\nThere was no unnecessary duplication of\r\neffort by counsel. The presence of multiple attorneys in complex litigation is\r\ncommon and often reasonable, and not duplication per se.

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· \r\nThe Nonprofit Defendants requested a fee\r\nenhancement of 1.5 times their lodestar (for their work until the issuance of\r\nthe remittitur, in May 2019). After\r\nobtaining full victory in this difficult and contentious case, counsel—who\r\nrepresented their clients on contingency over half-a-decade—are entitled to a\r\nfee enhancement of 1.5 times their lodestar.

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· \r\nCounsel for the City spent 1,346.5 hours\r\nsuccessfully defending itself against CIPA’s Cross-Complaint, both in the trial\r\ncourt and on appeal, dating back to fall 2016.

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· \r\nCIPA, a well-funded and litigious\r\nopponent, tried at every step of the way to keep its lawsuit going. The Petroleum Association can hardly complain\r\nabout the amount of time that the Nonprofit Defendants’ counsel devoted to this\r\ncase, caused by the Petroleum Association’s scorched-earth litigation tactics.

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· \r\nThe City’s attorneys sufficiently provided\r\ndeclarations in support of the hours worked on the case per month, with a\r\ndescription of the tasks completed that month, which correspond to the detailed\r\nprocedural history outlined.

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· \r\nThe City’s request is reasonable, based on\r\nthe time and expertise that was necessary to bring the anti-SLAPP Motion, which\r\nincluded researching and writing the Motion, attending eight hearings in the\r\ntrial court, and briefing two successful appeals.

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· \r\nBetween September 2016 and today, the\r\nCity’s counsel reviewed and/or drafted dozens of briefs and/or filings in the\r\ntrial and appellate courts, conducted legal research on novel issues, met and\r\nconferred with CIPA’s counsel multiple times, attended eight hearings in the\r\ntrial court, and prevailed in two appeals.

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· \r\nThe case involved protracted discovery\r\nbattles, numerous evidentiary motions, at least six hearings in this Court,\r\nmultiple ex parte requests, two appeals, and a petition for review in the\r\nCalifornia Supreme Court.

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· \r\nThe City seeks a blended market rate of\r\n$750 per hour for work completed by Deputy City Attorneys Amy Brothers (first\r\nlicensed in Massachusetts in 1991, and in California in 2000); Jennifer Tobkin\r\n(licensed in California since 2002); and Patrick Hagan (licensed in California\r\nsince 2009). This rate represents the reasonable market rate for attorneys\r\nlitigating a complex anti-SLAPP Motion, involving issues of constitutional law\r\nand land use law in Los Angeles.

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· \r\nNonprofit Defendants’ counsel do not claim\r\nhourly rates nearly as high as the market rate. For instance, the hourly rates\r\nfor their partner-level attorneys with twenty-plus years of experience are no\r\nmore than $845. Counsel are the\r\npreeminent lawyers in their field, with impressive backgrounds.

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· \r\nCross-Defendants (Nonprofit Defendants)\r\nseek only a relatively small sum of reasonable costs-- $8,642,46.

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· \r\nThe majority of these costs are for\r\nrequired filing and service fees through an Electronic Filing Service Provider,\r\nand the rest are necessary legal courier fees, reservation fees required by the\r\ncourt, reasonable travel costs only for appearing counsel, and minimal other\r\ncosts.

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· \r\nThe Petroleum Association’s assertions\r\nthat Nonprofit Defendants’ costs were for convenience, rather than reasonably\r\nnecessary to the litigation, do not provide evidence to rebut the Nonprofit\r\nDefendants’ prima facie showing that they are either entitled to their costs by\r\nright, or the costs were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.

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· \r\nMessenger fees are recoverable costs.

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· \r\nThe Los Angeles Superior Court has required\r\nelectronic filing of all documents (Exh.\r\nA; Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(14).)

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· \r\nCopying fees are recoverable as part of\r\ncourier charges. See Doe v. Los Angeles\r\nCty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 696\r\n[upholding award of courier fees, including postage, even though postage is not\r\nrecoverable under section 1033.5(b)].)

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· \r\nCourt reservations and charges are\r\nrequired for all courtrooms at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse.

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· \r\nTravel costs for one counsel attending\r\nhearings are sough, and are recoverable since “reasonably necessary to the\r\nconduct of the litigation.”

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· \r\nPrinting and shipping costs are\r\nrecoverable under the provision anti-SLAPP statute awarding prevailing\r\ndefendants “attorney’s fees and costs.”

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· \r\nAdditionally, the Nonprofit Defendants can\r\nrecover the costs via the fees and costs motions, under the SLAPP statute, but\r\ndo not seek any double recovery.

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Cross-Complainant’s\r\nPositions

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Cross-Complainant advocates\r\ndenying both motions for fees, and granting its motion to tax costs, for\r\nreasons including the following:

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· \r\nThe Environmental Groups, and the City,\r\ncollectively seek an inflated sum of $2,870,732.80 in attorney fees, for the\r\naligned pursuit of nearly identical anti-SLAPP motions.

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· \r\nBecause an “unreasonably inflated” fee\r\nrequest is a “special circumstance,” in the anti-SLAPP context, a trial court\r\nhas “broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee\r\naltogether.” Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1137-38 (2001).

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· \r\nEnvironmental Groups seek attorney fees\r\nfrom 10 lawyers employed by two law firms and two environmental organizations.\r\nThis overstaffing must have necessarily involved duplication of effort.

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· \r\nA substantial portion of the time claimed involves\r\ncommunications between or among the numerous co-counsel, fees which previously\r\nhave been held to be non-recoverable “padding.” See, e.g., 569 East County\r\nBoulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc., 6 Cal. App. 5th 426, 441\r\n(2016) (“the record contains sufficient support for the trial court\'s decision\r\nto adjust downward the hour component for the lodestar calculus. First, the\r\ncourt could conclude many of the hours represented work unrelated to either the\r\nmerits motion or the fees motion, such as work on discovery, ex parte\r\nappearances, work surrounding the case management conference, and conferring\r\nwith cocounsel.”).

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· \r\nRecovery of anti-SLAPP attorney fees is\r\nlimited to those incurred in connection with the merits and fee motions, e.g.,\r\nCity of Industry v. City of Fillmore, 198 Cal. App. 4th 191, 218 (2011). The Environmental Groups’ claim is laden with\r\nwork on the Groups’ unsuccessful demurrer, discovery-related motion practice, a\r\npost-appeal peremptory challenge of Judge Terry Green in the trial and\r\nappellate court, the Groups’ removal of the case to federal court and its\r\nsubsequent remand to this Court, and the Groups’ unsuccessful request for\r\npublication of the court of appeal opinion.

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· \r\nMeet-and-confer sessions before the\r\nanti-SLAPP motions were filed, CIPA and the Environmental Groups agreed the\r\nGroups’ participation in the case was unnecessary, but the City’s strategy\r\ncaused more participation of the Groups.

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· \r\nThe City’s $1,009,875 request is based on\r\nan hourly rate of $750 for each of its three attorneys, which is 50% higher\r\nthan the $500 hourly rate claimed by a more senior lawyer in the same division\r\nof the City Attorney’s office in a motion for attorney fees in another case, on\r\nMay 6, 2021. Ex. J. Applying instead the\r\nrate of $500 per hour would reduce the City’s request by $330,625, to $673,250.

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· \r\nThe City’s request is not supported by\r\ncontemporaneous time entries recorded by its counsel, but instead counsel\r\nprepared “summaries” five years after CIPA’s cross-complaint was filed.

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· \r\nCenter for Biological Diversity (CBD)\r\nshould be awarded no more than $3,166.95 in costs.

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· \r\nCIPA seeks to tax the entirety of CBD’s\r\nclaim for electronic filing and service fees (Item 14 on its Memorandum of\r\nCosts, totaling $4,197.75) and “other” fees (Item 16 on its Memorandum of\r\nCosts, totaling $1,277.76).

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· \r\nThere has been no Court order in this case\r\nrequiring the electronic filing or service of documents; hence, such costs are\r\nnot recoverable under CCP Section 1033.5(a)(14).

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· \r\nMany of the entries identify “photocopying”\r\nor “copy” charges”—costs which are barred under Section 1033.5(b)(3).

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· \r\nThe majority of entries pertain to filing\r\nservice fees paid by CBD to its vendor, including “urgent filing service” fees.\r\nSuch costs are not expressly allowable under Section 1033.5(a). Nor are such costs “reasonably necessary to\r\nthe conduct of the litigation.”

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· \r\nSection 1033.5(a) does not permit recovery\r\nof court reservation fees, which are “merely convenient or beneficial.” CBD\r\ntherefore should not be awarded any of the $180 for court reservation fees. See\r\nCiv. Proc. Code § 1033.5(c)(2).

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· \r\nCBD should not be awarded any of the\r\n$1,051.52 it seeks for costs for travel to court hearings.

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· \r\nIn Attachment 16c to its Memorandum of\r\nCosts, CBD seeks $38.74 to “print materials for discovery hearing,” and $7.50\r\nto “ship certified hearing transcripts to CBD.” “Postage” fees are specifically\r\nprohibited by Section 1033.5(b)(3). And there is no provision in Section 1033.5\r\nauthorizing counsel to recover costs to print materials for a hearing, which\r\ncosts are “merely convenient or beneficial” and thus non-recoverable. CBD\r\ntherefore should not be awarded any of the $46.24 it seeks for printing costs.

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Tentative\r\nRuling

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Both motions for\r\nattorneys’ fees are granted, as prayed.

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The Court awards to cross-defendants,\r\nCITY OF LOS ANGELES, THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING and\r\nMICHAEL J. LOGRANDE, attorneys\' fees in the sum of $1,002,816.00 ($1,009,875.00\r\n– 7,059) against Cross-Complainant\r\nCALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION.

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The Court awards to cross-defendants,\r\nYOUTH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, THE SOUTH CENTRAL YOUTH LEADERSHIP COALITION,\r\nand THE CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, attorneys\' fees in the sum of $1,224,603.60,\r\nagainst Cross-Complainant CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION.

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The motion to tax costs\r\nis denied.

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The Court allows to\r\ncross-defendants,YOUTH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, SOUTH CENTRAL YOUTH\r\nLEADERSHIP COALITION and CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, costs in the total amount\r\nof $8,642.46.

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Attorneys’ Fees

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As to both motions for\r\nattorneys’ fees, the Court finds that the sum of attorneys’ fees are\r\nrecoverable and reasonable, particularly considering that this case involves\r\ncomplex land-use and constitutional law, was vigorously litigated for about 5\r\nyears, and involved appellate and supreme court proceedings.

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While the attorneys’ fees\r\nrates are higher than the average case, the amounts above $700 are justified by\r\nmoving parties’ declarations, and are the market rate as to uniquely skilled attorneys\r\nwell experienced in the areas of land-use and constitutional law.

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A multiplier is justified,\r\nincluding because of litigation skill needed to address complexity and vigorous\r\nlitigation, while working at risk under a contingency agreement, and taking\r\ntime away from other potential legal work.

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While several attorneys\r\nworked on the case, the number was justified by the intense and complex nature,\r\nand unusually long duration of the case.

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Further, the opposing\r\nevidence does not meet the burden to disprove the above findings, it consisting\r\nmostly of a neutral procedural summary of this action, with a little of\r\naddressing attorneys’ fees rates, as to which flexible Court discretion is involved.

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In supporting\r\nattorneys’ fees motions, “ ‘there is no required level of detail that\r\ncounsel must achieve.’ ” Syers\r\nProperties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 699.

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“ ‘In challenging\r\nattorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is\r\nthe burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items\r\nchallenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General\r\narguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not\r\nsuffice.’ ” Lunada Biomedical v.\r\nNunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488. \r\nParties opposing motions for attorneys\' fees fail to show any abuse of\r\ndiscretion where they merely contend that amounts of attorneys\' fees are\r\nexcessive without providing a specific analysis or factual support. Mallard v. Progressive Choice Ins. Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 531, 545; Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1376 (an\r\n“‘assertion [that] is unaccompanied by any citation to the record or any\r\nexplanation of which fees were unreasonable or duplicative’ is insufficient to\r\ndisturb the trial court\'s discretionary award of attorney fees.”); Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc.\r\n(2006) 143 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1250; Avikian\r\nv. Wtc Fin. Corp. (2002) 98 Cal. App. 4th 1108, 1119; Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc.\r\nv. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550,\r\n560 (emphasizing that opposing parties\r\n“submitted no evidence that the hours claimed by counsel were excessive,” and\r\ndeclining to “declare as a matter of law that the hours were\r\nunreasonable”); Villanueva v. City of\r\nColton (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1204 (opposing party “offered no\r\nevidence of any kind which might have warranted a reduced fee award.”).

\r\n\r\n

As to a determination of\r\nthe amount of attorney fees, “an abuse of discretion transpires if ‘the\r\ntrial court exceeded the bounds of reason’ in making its award of attorney\r\nfees.” Maughan v. Google Technology,\r\nInc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1250 (involving attorney\r\nfee award as to anti-SLAPP matter). \r\nHowever, the requirement of substantial evidence is inapposite as\r\nto attorney fee awards. Id. at\r\n1249. A cited case in opposition repeatedly\r\nemphasized it was reviewing a court’s exercise of discretion, as distinguished\r\nfrom confining trial judges to one result. \r\nSee 569 East County\r\nBoulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426,\r\n441

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The attorneys’ fees\r\nand costs recoverable are only those incurred as to the special motion to\r\nstrike, and not as to other litigation events. \r\n569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.\r\n(4th Dist. 2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 433 (fees may not include matters unrelated to\r\nSLAPP motion, such as attacking service of process, answers, summary judgments,\r\nobtaining the docket and case-management conferences); Jackson v. Yarbray (2nd\r\nDist. 2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 92 \r\n(“only those attorney fees and costs related to the special motion to\r\nstrike, not the entire action, may be recovered under section 425.16,\r\nsubdivision (c).”); Chambers v.\r\nMiller (4th Dist. 2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 821, 826 (“the anti-SLAPP statute\'s attorney fee\r\nprovision is not designed to provide general monetary relief to SLAPP victims,\r\nbut only reimbursement for the fees and costs actually incurred in obtaining\r\nthe dismissal.”); Lafayette\r\nMorehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co. (1st Dist. 1995) 39\r\nCal.App.4th 1379, 1383. But\r\nsee Vargas v. City of Salinas\r\n(6th Dist. 2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1351 (distinguishing Lafayette because only one of several claims was subject to the\r\nsection 425.16 motion, whereas in Vargas\r\nall claims were dismissed, and thus all fees incurred post-judgment were\r\nincurred in connection with the section 425.16 motion.); Wilkerson v. Sullivan (4th\r\nDist. 2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 446 \r\n(“The statute is broadly construed so as to effectuate the legislative\r\npurpose of reimbursing the prevailing defendant for expenses incurred in\r\nextricating herself from a baseless lawsuit.”); \r\nDove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (2nd\r\nDist. 1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 785 (“section authorizes the court to make\r\nan award of reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing defendant, which will\r\nadequately compensate the defendant for the expense of responding to a baseless\r\nlawsuit.”); Robertson v. Rodriguez\r\n(2nd Dist. 1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 362 (“The right of prevailing defendants to\r\nrecover their reasonable attorney fees under section 425.16 adequately\r\ncompensates them for the expense of responding to a baseless lawsuit.”).

\r\n\r\n

Attorneys’ fees incurred\r\nin motions enforcing the right to mandatory fees under Code of Civil\r\nProcedure Section 425.16, are recoverable. \r\nKetchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1141.

\r\n\r\n

The provisions for\r\nawarding attorney fees and costs under Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16,\r\nsubdivision (c), include the authority to award fees incurred in responding to\r\nan appeal of an order on a special motion to strike. City of Alhambra v. D\'Ausilio (2011)\r\n193 Cal. App. 4th 1301, 1309-10.

\r\n\r\n

A court “ ‘indicated a\r\nfee reduction was warranted because it was unreasonable to have so many\r\nlawyers staffing a … case that did not present complex or unique issues,\r\ndid not involve discovery motions, and did not go to trial.’ ” Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC\r\n(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 253. [Emphases added.]

\r\n\r\n

Judges are not required\r\nto award the market rate of attorneys’ fees, and may have discretion to\r\ndetermine that the actual rate charged was reasonable. Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin\r\n(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 702. In\r\nsetting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to\r\nconsider the rate of “‘fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in\r\nthe community for similar work.’" Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems,\r\nInc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997 (affirming rate of $450 per hour), overruled on other grounds by Lakin\r\nv. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664.

\r\n\r\n

Support services costs\r\nare includable in an award for attorneys’ fees. \r\nCity of Oakland v. McCullough (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1,\r\n7. Counsel\'s disbursement costs, such as copying,\r\ntelephone, expert fees and travel, are recoverable costs as a part of attorney\r\nfees, “if they represent expenses ordinarily billed to a client and are not\r\nincluded in the overhead component of counsel\'s hourly rate.” Bussey v. Affleck (1st\r\nDist. 1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 1162, 1166-67. \r\nBut see, e.g., Benson v.\r\nKwikset Corp. (4th Dist. 2007) 152 Cal. App. 4th 1254, 1283\r\n(recognizing great weight of a split of authority disagreeing with Bussey,\r\nand holding that attorney fees awards do not include expenses); Fairchild v. Park (2d Dist.\r\n2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 919, 930 (disagreeing with Bussey and following\r\nview that attorney fees and expenses are distinctly different by statute).

\r\n\r\n

“Code of Civil Procedure\r\nsection 425.16, allows a court awarding attorney fees to include a fee\r\nenhancement for the purpose, e.g., of compensating the attorney who agreed\r\nto undertake such representation at the risk of nonpayment or delayed payment,\r\nin an amount approaching the market rate for comparable legal services.” Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24\r\nCal.4th 1122, 1136. “The award of a\r\nmultiplier is in the end a discretionary matter largely left to the trial\r\ncourt.” Hogar v. Community\r\nDevelopment Com\'n of City of Escondido (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1358,\r\n1371. “[T]he trial court is not required\r\nto include a fee enhancement for exceptional skill, novelty of the questions\r\ninvolved, or other factors. Rather, applying a multiplier is\r\ndiscretionary.” Rey v. Madera Unif.\r\nSch. Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1242.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Costs

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Costs authorized include\r\nthose under the SLAPP statute, CCP Section 425.16(c ), existing independently\r\nwithout limitations of other statutory bases, such as CCP Sections 1032 and\r\n1033.5 addressed below.

\r\n\r\n

Courts have discretion as\r\nto whether to disallow costs not reasonably incurred. Michell v.\r\nOlick (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1201; \r\nPerko\'s Ent., Inc. v. RRNS Ent. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238,\r\n245; El Dorado Meat Co. v. Yosemite\r\nMeat and Locker Service, Inc. (2007) \r\n150 Cal.App.4th 612, 616. \r\n“Whether a cost is ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the\r\nlitigation’ is a question of fact for the trial court, whose decision will be\r\nreviewed for abuse of discretion.” Gibson\r\nv. Bobroff (1996) 49 Cal. App. 4th 1202, 1209. Accord\r\nAdams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1487. “[T]he burden is on the party challenging\r\nthese costs to demonstrate that they were not reasonable or necessary.” Adams \r\nv. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199\r\nCal.App.4th 1475, 1486.

\r\n\r\n

Routine local travel\r\nexpenses, including parking fees, cab fares and mileage, unrelated to\r\nattending depositions are recoverable if evidenced to be reasonably necessary\r\nto the conduct of litigation, as opposed to being convenient. Ladas v. Cal. State Auto. Ass\'n (1993)\r\n19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 775-76. But see Gorman v. Tassajara Dev.\r\nCorp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 72 (expenses for travel unrelated to\r\ndepositions are not recoverable as costs).

\r\n\r\n

"Messenger fees\r\n… may be allowed in the discretion of the court." Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal. App.\r\n4th 111, 132. Accord Benach v. County\r\nof L.A. (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 836, 858. \r\nCosts for overnight messengers may be recoverable if reasonable and\r\nnecessary. Gorman v. Tassajara Dev.\r\nCorp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 75.

\r\n\r\n

"If a specific cost\r\nitem is not identified in either section 1033.5, subdivision (a), or\r\nsubdivision (b), it may be awarded in the trial court\'s discretion under\r\nsection 1033.5, subdivision (c)(4), provided it satisfies the further\r\nrequirement of section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(2), that it was reasonably\r\nnecessary to the conduct of the litigation." Seever v. Copley Press, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1558. Accord Gibson v. Bobroff (1996) 49 Cal. App.\r\n4th 1202, 1207; Michell v. Olick\r\n(1996) 49 Cal. App. 4th 1194, 1200.

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