On 07/20/2016 VICTORIA GRIFFITH filed a Personal Injury - Medical Malpractice lawsuit against NAVANJUN GREWAL, M D , . This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Santa Monica Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are LISA HART COLE and BOBBI TILLMON. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Pending - Other Pending
Los Angeles County Superior Courts
Santa Monica Courthouse
Los Angeles, California
LISA HART COLE
GREWAL NAVANJUN M.D.
ROXBURY CLINIC AND SURGERY CENTER INC.
ROXBURY SURGERY CENTER INC.
DOES 1 TO 200
ROXBURY SPECIALTY SURGERY CENTER LLC
GREWAL M.D. NAVANJUN
ROCKSTAR BEAUTY PC
WATKINS ASHTON R.
TOMLINSON RODNEY G. ESQ.
CINQUEMANI KIRSTEN K.
WOOD SMITH HENNING & BERMAN
JAMES ADAM R.
4/11/2017: Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
8/3/2017: Legacy Document
9/6/2017: Legacy Document
9/14/2017: Legacy Document
1/2/2018: Case Management Statement
1/9/2018: Legacy Document
1/10/2018: Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
2/23/2018: Notice of Ruling
4/19/2018: Legacy Document
8/30/2018: Notice of Case Management Conference
2/22/2019: Motion for Summary Judgment
5/8/2019: Minute Order
1/11/2017: REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT
Hearingat 08:30 AM in Department O at 1725 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90401; Hearing on Motion to Tax CostsRead MoreRead Less
Hearingat 09:15 AM in Department O at 1725 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90401; Jury TrialRead MoreRead Less
Hearingat 09:30 AM in Department O at 1725 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90401; Final Status ConferenceRead MoreRead Less
Hearingat 08:30 AM in Department O at 1725 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90401; Hearing on Motion for Summary JudgmentRead MoreRead Less
DocketNotice (NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF ACTION ); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
DocketMotion to Tax Costs; Filed by VICTORIA GRIFFITH (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
DocketMemorandum of Costs (Summary); Filed by Roxbury Specialty Surgery Center, LLC (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
DocketNotice (of Entry of Judgment); Filed by Roxbury Specialty Surgery Center, LLC (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
DocketJudgment (- Summary Judgment - Before Trial - 07/15/2019 entered for Defendant Roxbury Specialty Surgery Center, LLC against Plaintiff GRIFFITH, VICTORIA.); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
DocketJudgment (as Defendant Roxbury Specialty Surgery Center, LLC); Filed by Roxbury Specialty Surgery Center, LLC (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
DocketNOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANT, ROXBURY SURGERY CENTER, INC. TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT; ETCRead MoreRead Less
DocketSubstitution of Attorney; Filed by Plaintiff/PetitionerRead MoreRead Less
DocketSUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEYRead MoreRead Less
DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONSRead MoreRead Less
DocketProof-Service/SummonsRead MoreRead Less
DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONSRead MoreRead Less
DocketComplaint; Filed by VICTORIA GRIFFITH (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
DocketComplaint FiledRead MoreRead Less
DocketPLAINTIFF S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGESRead MoreRead Less
DocketSUMMONSRead MoreRead Less
Case Number: BC627780 Hearing Date: November 17, 2020 Dept: O
Case Name: Griffith v. Grewal, et al.
Case No.: BC627780
Calendar #: 8
Complaint Filed: 7-20-16
Motion C/O: 6-21-21
Discovery C/O: 7-6-21
Trial Date: 7-19-21
SUBJECT: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF JUNE 30, 2020 DECISION DENYING REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO CLAIM PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANTS
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Victoria Griffith
RESP. PARTY: Defendants Rockstar Beauty, PC and Navanjun S. Grewal, MD
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the June 30, 2020 Decision Denying Request for Leave to Claim Punitive Damages against Defendants is DENIED.
Timeliness—CCP §1008(a) requires that any motion for reconsideration must be brought “within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order…” Novak v. Fay (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 329, 335-336 (10-day limit did not apply where no notice of entry of order served). Plaintiff waived notice at the 6-30-20 hearing. Neither party offers any case law regarding the impact of waiver of notice on the 10-day requirement.
Under the prior version of CCP §1008(a), “knowledge of the order” triggered the 10-day requirement and where the moving party waived notice, the 10-day deadline was triggered the day the hearing was held. See In re Imperial Ins. Co. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 290, 293, 299-301 (“party has knowledge of court order for purpose of section 1008, subdivision (a) if he or his attorney is present in court when the decision is announced and waives notice”). Based on the Legislative Counsel’s Digest, “knowledge of the order” was replaced with “service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order” and carries the same meaning and purpose—to ensure knowledge of the order by the moving party seeking reconsideration. See 1992 Cal.Legis.Serv. Ch. 460 (B.B. 1805). “The wording of the statute suggests there is no time limit when notice is waived. But this seems contrary to the statutory purpose, and judges may therefore hold the 10-day period runs from the date of waiver. (In any case, the longer the delay, the less receptive the court may be to the motion.)” Edmon and Karnow, California Prac. Guide: CPBT, (Rutter Group June 2020), ¶9:326.
For this reason, the 10-day deadline was triggered on 6-30-20, when Plaintiff waived notice of the order. The motion for reconsideration was therefore due on 7-10-20. The motion was filed on 7-13-20 and is denied as untimely.
No new facts or circumstances—Plaintiff argues the continuance of the trial date is a new fact or circumstance justifying reconsideration of the Court’s 6-30-20 order on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to add punitive damages. Plaintiff argues the continuance of the trial date eliminates any prejudice if leave to amend were permitted.
The continuance of the trial date and absence of prejudice to the Defendants are not grounds for reconsideration of the 6-30-20 order for several reasons. First, neither “new” fact is material to the challenged rulings. A motion for reconsideration must be based on new or different facts, circumstances or law that are material to the underlying ruling challenged. See Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1499. Facts or circumstances which are wholly collateral to the merits of the initial motion are insufficient to warrant reconsideration. Id.
Based on the 9-21-18 Order, the continuance of the trial date and prejudice are immaterial and irrelevant to that ruling and the Court’s 6-30-18 ruling, which reaffirmed the reasoning of the 9-21-18 Order. The 9-21-18 Order found that (1) CCP §425.13 applies to Plaintiff’s fraud claim and (2) any request for leave to amend appeared untimely under CCP §425.13.
In order to avoid this time bar, Plaintiff was required to establish (1) the impossibility or impracticability of this time limitation; (2) he or she was unaware of facts or evidence necessary to make a proper motion under § 425.13 more than 9 months prior to the first assigned trial date; (2) he or she made reasonable, diligent and good faith efforts to discover the necessary facts or evidence to support such a motion prior to the first assigned trial date; (3) after assignment of the trial date, he or she made reasonable, diligent and good faith efforts to complete the necessary discovery; (4) he or she filed the § 425.13 motion to amend as soon as reasonably practicable after completing such discovery (but in no event more than 2 years after commencement of the action); and (5) defendant will suffer no surprise or prejudice by reason of any shortened time period and will be given reasonable opportunity to complete all necessary discovery to meet plaintiff's punitive damages allegations. See Goodstein v. Sup.Ct. (Pittman) (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1638 (trial set within 9 months although pleadings still at issue and discovery incomplete). Demonstrating grounds for relief from the deadline is a “heavy burden.” Id. (no reasonably possible for Plaintiff to comply with 9-month deadline under CCP §425.13 where initial trial date was set when pleadings were still at issue and discovery incomplete).
In its 9-21-18 Order, the Court expressly stated that any motion seeking leave under CCP §425.13 “must address the timeliness issue.” See 9-21-18 Order. Plaintiff did not address the timeliness issue in its 2-20-20 ex parte Motion for Leave under CCP §425.13 or this motion for reconsideration. Prejudice and the continuance of the trial date are therefore collateral to the 6-30-20 order.
Second, the 9-21-18 Order found that CCP §425.13 applied to Plaintiff’s fraud claim, despite it being an intentional tort. Although Plaintiff’s 2-20-20 ex parte application was framed as one for leave to add punitive damages under CCP §425.13, Plaintiff reargued the issue of whether CCP §425.13 even applied. The Court had already resolved that issue on the motion to strike and there was no basis to change its finding. Again, this reasoning was incorporated in to the 6-30-20 ruling on the ex parte motion for leave to add punitive damages under CCP §425.13 and the trial date and prejudice to the defendant were not part of the analysis.
Finally, in her reply memorandum, Plaintiff argues Plaintiff” “has a compelling fraud claim.” The Court Court did not address in its 6-30-20 the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s substantive evidentiary showing under CCP §425.13, because Plaintiff failed to address the timeliness issue in its 2-20-20 ex parte application, despite the Court’s express instruction to do so in the 9-21-18 Order. Without overcoming the procedural hurdle of timeliness under CCP §425.13, there was not need to address the substantive merits of Plaintiff’s evidentiary showing and in no way has the Court found, implicitly or otherwise , that Plaintiff has made a prima facia evidentiary showing for fraud. In that regard, in her reply memorandum Plaintiff mischaracterizes the Court’s 9-13-19 ruling on the motion for summary judgment. The Court never evaluated Plaintiff’s evidence to determine if she stated a prima facie case for fraud. In fact, the Court found that Defendant had not met its burden as moving party on the fraud cause of action and denied it on that ground. Because Defendant did not meet its initial burden as moving party, the burden on MSJ never shifted to Plaintiff and the Court did not discuss the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s case for fraud or whether Plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. See 9-13-19 Minute Order, pp. 2-3.
Case Number: BC627780 Hearing Date: June 30, 2020 Dept: O
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