This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 08/14/2019 at 10:00:11 (UTC).

TAELENUU LUIGI TUAAU VS ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV WORLDWIDE INC E

Case Summary

On 10/19/2016 TAELENUU LUIGI TUAAU filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV WORLDWIDE INC E. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is CHRISTOPHER K. LUI. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****7698

  • Filing Date:

    10/19/2016

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

CHRISTOPHER K. LUI

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner

TUAAU TAELENUU LUIGI

Claimant

DELTA AIR LINES INC.

Defendants and Respondents

DOES 1 THROUGH 20

LOS ANGELES CITY OF

ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV WORLDWIDE INC.

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

INHOUSE ATTORNEYS PC

LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES D. NAYLOR A.P.C.

LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES D. NAYLOR

NGO UYEN-MINH

NAYLOR CHARLES DOUGLAS

Defendant Attorneys

HAIGHT BROWN & BONESTEEL LLP

KANG MIN KYONG

ROZANSKI KEITH MITCHELL

SALDANA MANUEL

Other Attorneys

VASQUEZ DAVIL ROBERT

 

Court Documents

Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

8/2/2019: Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

Motion for Summary Judgment

8/2/2019: Motion for Summary Judgment

Separate Statement

8/2/2019: Separate Statement

Notice

12/18/2018: Notice

Notice

1/7/2019: Notice

Notice of Settlement

1/18/2019: Notice of Settlement

Notice

1/25/2019: Notice

Minute Order

5/22/2019: Minute Order

NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL

4/9/2018: NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL

ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES

6/5/2018: ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES

NOTICE OF RULING RE (1) MOTION TO COMPELL DEFENDANT ANHEUSER BUSCH

6/13/2018: NOTICE OF RULING RE (1) MOTION TO COMPELL DEFENDANT ANHEUSER BUSCH

Minute Order

6/28/2018: Minute Order

REQUEST FOR REFUND

7/12/2018: REQUEST FOR REFUND

Declaration

10/17/2018: Declaration

Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

10/17/2018: Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

10/19/2016: COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

SUMMONS

10/19/2016: SUMMONS

CITY OF LOS ANGELES' ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DAMAGES

12/8/2016: CITY OF LOS ANGELES' ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DAMAGES

36 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 11/19/2019
  • Hearingat 08:30 AM in Department 4A at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Jury Trial

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  • 11/05/2019
  • Hearingat 10:00 AM in Department 4A at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Final Status Conference

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  • 10/21/2019
  • Hearingat 08:30 AM in Department 4A at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal

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  • 10/04/2019
  • Hearingat 13:30 PM in Department 4A at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment

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  • 08/02/2019
  • DocketMotion for Summary Judgment; Filed by Anheuser-Busch LLC Erroneously Sued As Anheuser-Busch Inbev Worldwide, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 08/02/2019
  • DocketDeclaration (Declaration of CW); Filed by Anheuser-Busch LLC Erroneously Sued As Anheuser-Busch Inbev Worldwide, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 08/02/2019
  • DocketProof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Anheuser-Busch LLC Erroneously Sued As Anheuser-Busch Inbev Worldwide, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 08/02/2019
  • DocketSeparate Statement; Filed by Anheuser-Busch LLC Erroneously Sued As Anheuser-Busch Inbev Worldwide, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 07/03/2019
  • DocketSubstitution of Attorney; Filed by Anheuser-Busch LLC Erroneously Sued As Anheuser-Busch Inbev Worldwide, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 06/24/2019
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 4A, Christopher K. Lui, Presiding; Jury Trial - Not Held - Advanced and Continued - by Court

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69 More Docket Entries
  • 12/08/2016
  • DocketAnswer; Filed by Los Angeles, City of (Defendant)

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  • 11/08/2016
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 11/08/2016
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

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  • 11/08/2016
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

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  • 11/08/2016
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 11/03/2016
  • DocketMiscellaneous-Other; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

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  • 11/03/2016
  • DocketCIVIL DEPOSIT

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  • 10/19/2016
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 10/19/2016
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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  • 10/19/2016
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Taelenuu Luigi Tuaau (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC637698    Hearing Date: November 22, 2019    Dept: 4A

Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.  

BACKGROUND

On October 19, 2016, Plaintiff Taelenuu Luigi Tuaau (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Anheuser-Busch Inbev Worldwide, Inc. and City of Los Angeles alleging negligence and a dangerous condition of public property in relation to an automobile collision that occurred on June 16, 2015.

On May 6, 2019, the Court dismissed Defendant City of Los Angeles with prejudice.

On August 2, 2019, Defendant Anheuser-Busch Inbev Worldwide, Inc. filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 437c.

On October 4, 2019, the Court continued Defendant Anheuser-Busch Inbev Worldwide, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment.

On October 9, 2019, the Court continued Defendant Anheuser-Busch Inbev Worldwide, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment.

Trial is set for February 10, 2020.

PARTY’S REQUEST

Defendant Anheuser-Busch Inbev Worldwide, Inc. (“Moving Defendant”) asks the Court to enter summary judgment against Plaintiff and in favor of Moving Defendant on the grounds that it did not owe a duty to Plaintiff or cause Plaintiff’s injuries.

OBJECTIONS

Moving Defendant objects to the evidence underlying Plaintiff’s undisputed material fact number 4 as lacking foundation, being speculative, consisting of an incomplete hypothetical, and reflecting a lay witness opinion.  This evidence consists of the testimony of Delta Airlines Operations Service Manager, Joseph George, who stated that the location where Moving Defendant’s truck was parked created a visual obstruction.  Mr. George has foundation to make this testimony by virtue of his position at Delta Airlines.  This is not speculative, but rather his lay witness opinion.  There is no hypothetical stated here, but rather a question of whether Mr. George saw any problems with the parking of Moving Defendant’s truck where it obstructed Plaintiff’s view prior to the collision.  Lastly, Moving Defendant is not testifying as an expert but as a lay witness.  It does not take an expert to testify as to whether the presence of an object obstructs one’s view.  The objections to Plaintiff’s undisputed material fact number 4 are OVERRULED.

Moving Defendant objects to the evidence underlying Plaintiff’s undisputed material facts numbers 6, 13, and 16 as lacking foundation and being irrelevant.

The evidence pertaining to Plaintiff’s undisputed material fact number 6 is testimony of Los Angeles World Airports’ airport manager, Paul Eduardo Herrera, who testified that the period from 1:00 pm to 4:00 pm was the preferred time to deliver goods.  The Court finds Mr. Herrera had foundation to make this testimony by virtue of his position.  The Court finds this evidence has a tendency to prove that parking the delivery truck outside this time frame was negligent.  The objections to Plaintiff’s undisputed material fact number 6 are OVERRULED.

The evidence pertaining to Plaintiff’s undisputed material facts numbers 13 and 16 come from the declaration of commercial motor vehicle safety compliance expert, V. Paul Herbert.  The Court finds Mr. Herbert laid sufficient foundation to declare to these facts by virtue of his considerable experience in commercial trucking, as stated in paragraph 2 of his declaration.  The Court finds this evidence is relevant because it has a tendency to prove that Moving Defendant did not train and instruct its trucker about the line of sight hazard in parking the truck where it would obstruct Plaintiff’s view.  The objections to Plaintiff’s undisputed material facts numbers 13 and 16 are, thus, OVERRULED.

Moving Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s undisputed material facts numbers 9, 10, and 12 on the grounds that they are irrelevant.  The evidence underlying Plaintiff’s undisputed material facts numbers 9, 10, and 12 are derived from the declaration of commercial motor vehicle safety compliance expert, V. Paul Herbert.  The Court finds this evidence is relevant because it has a tendency to prove that Moving Defendant’s truck could have blocked Plaintiff’s line of sight and caused the collision and that Moving Defendant’s failure to adequately train its trucker and tell the trucker of preferred parking times caused the collision by leading to the situation where the truck blocked Plaintiff’s line of sight.  Accordingly, the objections to Plaintiff’s undisputed material facts numbers 9, 10, and 12 are OVERRULED.

Moving Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s undisputed material fact number 15 as lacking foundation, being irrelevant, and being speculative.  The evidence pertaining to Plaintiff’s undisputed material facts number 15 comes from the declaration of commercial motor vehicle safety compliance expert, V. Paul Herbert.  As noted above, the Court finds that Mr. Herbert laid a foundation to declare to these facts by virtue of his immense experience in commercial trucking, as stated in paragraph 2 of his declaration.  This evidence is relevant because it has a tendency to prove that Moving Defendant caused Plaintiff’s harm.  The Court finds this evidence is not speculative because Mr. Herbert was opining as an expert and based on facts presented to him.  The objections to Plaintiff’s undisputed material fact number 15 are OVERRULED.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Ibid.)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

DISCUSSION

The elements for negligence are: (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damage to the plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)¿

California Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) states, in part: [e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care . . . . “As a general rule, each person has a duty to use ordinary care and is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances.” Romero v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1080 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted).)

The element of duty “may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 985.“The issue of whether a duty exists is a question of law to be determined by the court . . . . (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1620.)

In Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, the Supreme Court summarized the so-called Rowland factors for determining whether a duty of care exists: “In the Rowland decision, this court identified several considerations that, when balanced together, may justify a departure from the fundamental principle embodied in Civil Code section 1714:  ‘the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.’”  (Id. at p. 771 (citing Rowland, supra, 69 Cal. 2d 108).)  Although foreseeability and the extent of the burden to the defendant are ordinarily the crucial considerations, one or more of the Rowland factors may be determinative of the duty analysis in a given case.  (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213; Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 237, fn. 15.)

Moving Defendant’s undisputed material facts establish the following.  On June 16, 2015, Plaintiff was employed as a ramp agent for Delta at LAX.  (UMF No. 1, p. 2:6-2:13.)  At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was operating a baggage tug attempting to travel from a break area between gates 54A and 54B to a baggage room area at or near gate 52 at Terminal 5 of LAX.  (UMF No. 3, pp. 2:21-3:2.)  Plaintiff was exiting the gate, or ramp area, in front of gate 54B attempting to turn left (north) onto the taxiway to get to the baggage room.  (UMF No. 5, p. 3:9-3:17.)  Plaintiff’s baggage tug collided into Rodney Lear baggage tug as Mr. Lear was traveling southbound along the taxiway.  (UMF No. 6, p. 3:17-3:22.)  As Plaintiff exited the aircraft ramp area towards the taxiway, Moving Defendant’s delivery truck was parked to Plaintiff’s left.  (UMF No. 13, p. 5:4-5:22.)  Plaintiff alleges Moving Defendant’s truck created a blind spot for Plaintiff.  (UMF Nos. 14, 18, pp. 5:22-6:7, 7:6-7:18.)  

Defendant’s undisputed material facts also establish the following facts.  Airport rules permit vendors to part outside gate envelopes or wing envelopes when making deliveries at the terminals and delivery drivers could park inside a gate envelope with permission of the Delta Operations center.  (UMF No. 21, p. 8:9-8:18.)  The owner and operator of LAX, Los Angeles World Airports, did not have parking rules, regulations, or recommendations in place to address blind-spots or line-of-sight issues on or near the ramp because it was not believed to be an issue or a safety consideration.  (UMF No. 22, pp. 8:18-9:3.)  Delta did not promulgate any of their own policies for delivery trucks at Terminal 5 other than providing a designated area for deliveries.  (UMF No. 23, p. 9:3-9:11.)  Moving Defendants’ truck was parked at the correct location.  (Ibid.)

The Court finds that Moving Defendant has made a preliminary showing that it did not owe a duty to Plaintiff.  It was unforeseeable that Moving Defendant’s properly parked truck would cause a blind spot for Plaintiff.  Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s undisputed material facts establish the following.  Moving Defendant’s truck was not parked in an acceptable location because it could impede ramp operations.  (PUMF No. 4, p. 11:11-11:17.)  Moving Defendant’s truck was also not parked in an acceptable location because it would obstruct the view of people operating vehicles in the alleyway and people operating vehicles approaching the alleyway.  (Ibid.)  Los Angeles World Airports’ guidelines recommend that vendors make deliveries to Terminal 5 between 1:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. because the likelihood of congestion on the ramp is lower during that time.  (PUMF No. 6, pp. 11:21-12:1.)  The collision occurred at 8:50 a.m.  (PUMF No. 5, p. 11:18-11:21.)  The trucker who parked Moving Defendant’s vehicle was not instructed by Moving Defendant that the preferred delivery hours at Terminal 5 were from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.  (PUMF No. 13, p. 14:2-14:8.)  It is likely the incident would not have occurred if Moving Defendant had told the trucker who parked Moving Defendant’s vehicle about the 1:00 p.m. to 4:00p.m. preferred delivery hours.  (PUMF No. 16, pp. 14:23-15:8.)

Plaintiff’s undisputed material facts also establish the following.  The type of tractor and trailer that Moving Defendant owned which obstructed Plaintiff’s view has long been associated with causing line of sight obstructions for vehicles being operated adjacent to or nearby them.  (PUMF Nos. 8-9, p. 12:8-12:21.)  The industry standard is to train and instruct drivers regarding line of sight obstructions and to take them into account when parking.  (PUMF No. 10, pp. 12:21-13:9.)  The trucker who parked Moving Defendant’s vehicle was not provided any training or instruction by Moving Defendant concerning hazards associated with line of sight obstructions.  (PUMF No. 12, pp. 13:21-14:1.)  It is likely the incident would not have occurred if Moving Defendant had adequately and effectively trained the trucker who parked Moving Defendant’s vehicle on the safety impact of line of sight obstructions and to take them into consideration when parking.  (PUMF No. 15, p. 14:12-14:22.)

The Court finds Plaintiff has met Plaintiff’s burden.  Plaintiff’s evidence shows that Moving Defendant’s truck was parked in an area where it created a line of sight issue and during a time of day that was not the preferred period for making deliveries.  Further, Plaintiff’s evidence shows that Moving Defendant did not instruct its trucker to make deliveries during the preferred hours nor did it adequately train its trucker to his vehicle in a way that it would not obstruct the view of tug baggage drivers, such as Plaintiff.  In light of the context where this accident occurred on a busy taxiway at LAX and the evidence of Moving Defendant’s failure to provide specific direction to its trucker about how to park safety to make deliveries, the Court finds that there is a sufficient showing to demonstrate the foreseeability of the harm that resulted here.  Accordingly, summary judgment is not proper.

The motion is DENIED.

Moving Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: BC637698    Hearing Date: October 29, 2019    Dept: 4A

Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving papers and opposition papers, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On October 19, 2016, Plaintiff Taelenuu Luigi Tuaau (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Anheuser-Busch Inbev Worldwide, Inc. and City of Los Angeles, alleging negligence and a dangerous condition of public property in relation to an automobile collision that occurred on June 16, 2015.

On May 6, 2019, the Court dismissed Defendant City of Los Angeles with prejudice.

On August 2, 2019, Defendant Anheuser-Busch Inbev Worldwide, Inc. filed this motion for summary judgment.

Trial is set for February 19, 2020.

PARTY’S REQUEST

Defendant Anheuser-Busch Inbev Worldwide, Inc. (“Defendant”) requests that this Court enter summary judgment against Plaintiff on grounds that Defendant did not owe a duty to Plaintiff nor cause Plaintiff’s injuries.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).)  “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).)

DISCUSSION

On October 4, 2019, the Court continued the hearing on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment to October 29, 2019 after finding that notice was ineffective due to an incorrect hearing date listed on the moving papers.  Specifically, the Court noted that the moving papers show the hearing on the motion was to take place on October 17, 2019, but the Reservation ID set forth in the moving papers corresponded with a scheduled hearing date of October 4, 2019.

On October 9, 2019, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment to November 22, 2019 because the department was closed on October 17, 2019 for motions.  Defendant was ordered to give notice of this continuance. On October 9, 2019, Defendant filed a notice of continuance of the hearing on its motion for summary judgment, indicating that it was continued to November 22, 2019.

The Court finds that, because of the previous discrepancy with the hearing date and Reservation ID set forth in Defendant’s moving papers, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is currently set for hearing on both October 29, 2019 and November 22, 2019.

Accordingly, the hearing on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment set for October 29, 2019 is VACATED.