On 10/08/2015 SHAHLA BROOMAND TEHRANI filed a Property - Other Real Property lawsuit against REZA POUR. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are YVETTE M. PALAZUELOS and SHIRLEY K. WATKINS. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Pending - Other Pending
Los Angeles County Superior Courts
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
Los Angeles, California
YVETTE M. PALAZUELOS
SHIRLEY K. WATKINS
TEHRANI SHAHLA BROOMAND
POUR REZA J
UYEDA JAMES S. LAW OFFICES OF
UYEDA JAMES SHINICHIRO
EZRA BRUTZKUS GUBNER LLP
8/16/2016: Notice of Stay of Proceedings (Bankruptcy)
8/24/2016: Minute Order
9/8/2016: Notice of Related Case
11/30/2016: Minute Order
12/21/2016: Notice of Ruling
4/24/2017: Minute Order
2/26/2018: Legacy Document
3/2/2018: Legacy Document
6/6/2018: Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
8/1/2018: Notice of Ruling
3/12/2019: Minute Order
3/12/2019: Certificate of Mailing for
10/8/2015: COMPLAINT FOR: 1. INDEPENDENT ACTION IN EQUITY TO SET ASIDE AND VACATE JUDGMENT FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION; ETC
10/27/2015: NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE
12/21/2015: NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEMURRER; DEMURRER OF DEFENDANT REZA POUR TO COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
7/22/2016: NOTICE OF RELATED CASE
at 08:30 AM in Department T, Shirley K. Watkins, Presiding; Status Conference Re: Bankruptcy - Held - ContinuedRead MoreRead Less
Minute Order ( (Status Conference Re: Bankruptcy)); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
Notice of Ruling; Filed by Ray Pour (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
Status Report; Filed by Reza Jalalipour (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
at 1:30 PM in Department T, Shirley K. Watkins, Presiding; Status Conference Re: Bankruptcy - Not Held - Advanced and Continued - by CourtRead MoreRead Less
Status Report; Filed by Reza J. Pour (Legacy Party)Read MoreRead Less
at 08:30 AM in Department T, Shirley K. Watkins, Presiding; Hearing on Motion - Other (lift the stay) - Held - Motion DeniedRead MoreRead Less
Order (Denying Motion to Lift Stay, Order Scheduling Bankruptcy Status Conference for 6-25-2019 at 8:30 A.M. in Dept. T); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
Certificate of Mailing for (Minute Order (Hearing on Motion - Other lift the stay) of 03/26/2019 and Order Denying Motion to Lift Stay, Order Scheduling Bankruptcy Status Conference for 6-25-2019 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. T filed 3-26-2019); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
Minute Order ( (Hearing on Motion - Other lift the stay)); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCERead MoreRead Less
Order on Court Fee Waiver (Superior Court); Filed by CourtRead MoreRead Less
Complaint; Filed by Shahla Broomand Tehrani (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
Complaint; Filed by Shahla Broomand Tehrani (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
Civil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by Shahla Broomand Tehrani (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
COMPLAINT FOR: 1. INDEPENDENT ACTION IN EQUITY TO SET ASIDE AND VACATE JUDGMENT FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION; ETCRead MoreRead Less
ORDER ON COURT FEE WAIVERRead MoreRead Less
ComplaintRead MoreRead Less
Request-Waive Court Fees; Filed by Attorney for Plaintiff/PetitionerRead MoreRead Less
SUMMONSRead MoreRead Less
Case Number: BC597220 Hearing Date: January 04, 2021 Dept: T
SHAHLA BROOMAND TEHRANI
REZA POUR; et. al.
CASE NO: BC597220
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:
DEMURRER AGAINST FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
January 4, 2021
[TENTATIVE] ORDER: The Demurrer by defendants Reza Pour and Schyna Pour against the First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.
Defendants Reza Pour and Schyna Pour (“Defendants”) demur against the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by Plaintiffs Shahla Tehrani Broomand and Reza Manesh (“Plaintiffs”). The demurrer places into issue the first cause of action (“COA”) for independent action in equity to set aside and vacate judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction and the second COA for independent action in equity to set aside and vacate judgment for extrinsic fraud or mistake.
Although Plaintiffs failed to serve their opposition to Defendants’ demurrer, the Court finds that Defendants were not prejudiced as a result of the delay. In fact, Defendants’ reply includes responses to all issues raised in the opposition. Accordingly, the Court exercises discretion to consider all submissions.
As to the first COA for independent action in equity to set aside and vacate judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from raising the same arguments they did in prior motions. Specifically, Defendant Pour commenced a resulting trust action (LASC Case No. LC102099) against Plaintiffs in 2014, seeking a decree that Broomand held title to a certain real property (“Property”) as a trustee of a resulting trust for the benefit of Defendants’ judgment lien. Due to Plaintiffs’ failure to answer the complaint, a default judgement was entered against them. (RJN, Exh. 2.) Plaintiffs made several attempts to vacate the judgment. On January 5, 2015, Plaintiff Manesh moved to set aside his default but this Court denied the motion. On April 29, 2015, Plaintiff Broomand filed a motion to set aside the resulting trust judgment, which this Court denied on May 22, 2015. On July 29, 2015, Plaintiff Manesh moved via ex parte application to set aside the resulting judgment, which the Court again denied. (RJN, Exhs. 3-6, 8-10.) Since all Plaintiffs’ motions were denied, the referenced case was never tried.
The Court is not convinced by Defendants’ argument. As Plaintiffs correctly indicate, Groves v. Peterson is instructive to the instant motion. “[W]here the issue is whether the prior denial of a motion in the underlying case to set aside a default and default judgment should be given collateral estoppel effect so as to bar a subsequent independent action in equity to set aside the prior judgment, a long line of cases has established a rule that such prior order does not collaterally estop the subsequent action.” (Groves, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th 659, 667 [citing Estudillo v. Security Loan etc. Co. (1906) 149 Cal. 556, 564, 565; Jeffords v. Young (1929) 98 Cal.App. 400, 406-407; Wilson v. Wilson (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 421, 426; Rose v. Fuqua (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 719, 724; Otani v. Kisling (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 438, 442; Huff v. Mendoza (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 677, 681; Rohrbasser v. Lederer (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 290, 297-300].) Since there was no trial or oral testimony taken in state court, prior motion denials cannot constitute collateral estoppel.
Defendants next argue that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should bar the issue of whether Plaintiffs were properly served because the issue had already been determined by the United States Bankruptcy Court (RJN, Exh. 14, Case No. 1:15-ap01237-VK). Plaintiffs argue that the bankruptcy court judgment is void because it relied on the default judgment referenced above under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Court does not read the ruling as Plaintiffs do. According to the bankruptcy court’s ruling dated January 11, 2017, the bankruptcy court had considered whether there was proper service in 2014. The ruling specifically considered Plaintiff Manesh’s in-court testimony that he was not personally served with the resulting trust complaint. (RJN, Exh. 14, p. 4.) Plaintiff Manesh also testified in court that he had received the complaint after it was mailed to the Property. (Ibid.) Then the bankruptcy court determined that Plaintiff Manesh had been served through his brother Hossein Fatehmanesh. (Ibid.) Accordingly, this Court finds that the issue of service had been heard and adjudicated before the bankruptcy court and will not be entertained here.
Defendants’ demurrer to the first COA is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
As to the second COA for independent action in equity to set aside and vacate judgment for extrinsic fraud or mistake, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs should be barred from further litigating this matter under the doctrine of res judicata because the bankruptcy court has conclusively determined all outstanding issues and claims. In opposition, Plaintiffs raise the same reasoning as discussed above.
The bankruptcy court found in its April 15, 2020 ruling to abandon claims that Plaintiff Manesh rely solely witness declarations, rather than documentary evidence. In ordering the trustee to abandon the claims, the bankruptcy court found that “Debtor [Manesh] and his witnesses will face serious credibility issues. As outlined above, Debtor has spent 25 years evading payment of Mr. Pour’s claims. During that time, Debtor, Ms. Broomand and/or Mr. Fatehmanesh:
Transferred the Delano Property multiple times among themselves;
Secretly executed the 2014 Quitclaim Deed transferring Ms. Broomand’s interest in the Delano Property just before Mr. Pour filed a complaint against Ms. Broomand and Debtor;
Filed three different motions before the state court to vacate the Resulting Trust Judgment, all of which were denied;
Recorded the 2014 Quitclaim Deed while their third request to vacate the Resulting Trust Judgment was pending;
Falsely represented to the state court that Debtor and Ms. Broomand were not married;
Filed multiple amended schedules and statements and repeatedly changing the sworn statements about Debtor’s interest in the Delano Property;
Refused to turn over the Delano Property and money generated therefrom to the estate, leading to the revocation of Debtor’s discharge;
Continued to assert that Debtor did not have an interest in the Delano Property during the Fatehmanesh Adversary, including by pursuing multiple appeals of the Turnover Judgment and increasing administrative costs of the estate;
Filing a state court complaint against Mr. Pour despite having no standing to pursue such an action, which the state court dismissed;
Filing a near identical complaint before this Court that was dismissed;
Opposing the Motion to Sell and requesting leave to file a quiet title complaint in state court to again dispute Debtor’s interest in the Delano Property; and
Filing two motions for relief from the automatic stay to continue asserting that Mr. Pour fraudulently obtained renewals of the 1995 Judgment.”
(RJN, Exh. 18, p. 10-11.) The bankruptcy court added that none of these attempts have been successful and that Plaintiff Manesh may have potentially exposed himself to sanctions and of malicious prosecution in state court. (Id. at 11-12.)
Based on the excerpts of this ruling, this Court is confident that the bankruptcy court provided every opportunity to Plaintiffs to litigate and present all relevant evidence in support of their position, including the alleged second COA. The Court also finds that the bankruptcy court’s findings are based on all the evidence it considered, not solely a product of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the second COA is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
IT IS SO ORDERED, CLERK TO GIVE NOTICE. DEFENDANTS TO SUBMIT PROPOSED JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL AFTER SUSTAINING OF DEMURRER WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.