This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 07/02/2019 at 00:06:09 (UTC).

RYAN STANTON VS FRANCES FONTANE MARQUES ET AL

Case Summary

On 02/11/2015 RYAN STANTON filed an Other lawsuit against FRANCES FONTANE MARQUES. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are DEBRE K. WEINTRAUB and RANDOLPH M. HAMMOCK. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****2198

  • Filing Date:

    02/11/2015

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Other

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

DEBRE K. WEINTRAUB

RANDOLPH M. HAMMOCK

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner

STANTON RYAN

Defendants and Respondents

DOES 1 TO 9

MARQUES FRANCES FONTANE

MARQUES MANAGEMENT LLC

MARQUES PABLYNIE

MODERN MEDICAL MANAGEMENT LLC

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

TEITELBAUM MELVIN ESQ.

BONAVIDA ALAIN V. ESQ.

Defendant and Respondent Attorneys

REED MARTIN S. ESQ.

REED MARTIN S. REED & REED APC

 

Court Documents

DECLARATION OF LEONARD H. LYONS IN SUPPORT OF RYAN STANTON'S APPLICATION FOR RIGHT TO ATTACH ORDER AND ORDER FOR ISSUANCE OF WRITS OF ATTACHMENT

1/3/2018: DECLARATION OF LEONARD H. LYONS IN SUPPORT OF RYAN STANTON'S APPLICATION FOR RIGHT TO ATTACH ORDER AND ORDER FOR ISSUANCE OF WRITS OF ATTACHMENT

DEFENDANT'S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF DISCOVERY ISSUES IN DISPUTE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET TWO

1/8/2018: DEFENDANT'S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF DISCOVERY ISSUES IN DISPUTE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET TWO

DEFENDANT FRANCES MARQUES' MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO AS TO PLAINTIFF RYAN STANTON; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF DARREN G. REED IN S

1/8/2018: DEFENDANT FRANCES MARQUES' MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO AS TO PLAINTIFF RYAN STANTON; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF DARREN G. REED IN S

DEFENDANT FRANCES MARQUES' REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO AS TO PLAINTIFF RYAN STANTON

2/8/2018: DEFENDANT FRANCES MARQUES' REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO AS TO PLAINTIFF RYAN STANTON

JOINT STIPULATION TO CONTINUE FSC AND TRIAL DATHS

5/3/2018: JOINT STIPULATION TO CONTINUE FSC AND TRIAL DATHS

DEFENDANT?S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF DISCOVERY ISSUES IN DISPUTE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF?S RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO

7/18/2018: DEFENDANT?S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF DISCOVERY ISSUES IN DISPUTE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF?S RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO

DEFENDANT FRANCES MARQUES? MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO AS TO PLAINTIFF RYAN STANTON; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF DARREN G. REED IN S

7/18/2018: DEFENDANT FRANCES MARQUES? MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO AS TO PLAINTIFF RYAN STANTON; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF DARREN G. REED IN S

NOTICE OF TAKING DEFENDANT FRANCES MARQUES? MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO AS TO PLAINTIFF RYAN STANTON OFF CALENDAR

9/28/2018: NOTICE OF TAKING DEFENDANT FRANCES MARQUES? MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO AS TO PLAINTIFF RYAN STANTON OFF CALENDAR

Opposition

1/2/2019: Opposition

Request for Judicial Notice

1/2/2019: Request for Judicial Notice

Notice

6/4/2019: Notice

Reply

6/24/2019: Reply

Minute Order

6/29/2015: Minute Order

NOTICE OF RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICES OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) AND TO CLAIM ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS [CCP 405.30 ET SEQ.

8/27/2015: NOTICE OF RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICES OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) AND TO CLAIM ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS [CCP 405.30 ET SEQ.

NOTICE OF CASE REASSIGNMENT AND OF ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE

12/21/2016: NOTICE OF CASE REASSIGNMENT AND OF ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE

AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT

4/7/2017: AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT

WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION OF PABLYNIE MARQUES TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATES

4/7/2017: WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION OF PABLYNIE MARQUES TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATES

MODERN MEDICAL MANAGEMENT, LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER OVER DEPOSITION OF PMQ OF MODERN MEDICAL MANAGEMENT LLC

12/11/2017: MODERN MEDICAL MANAGEMENT, LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER OVER DEPOSITION OF PMQ OF MODERN MEDICAL MANAGEMENT LLC

142 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 07/01/2019
  • Minute Order ( (Defendant's Motion to Compel Testimony at Deposition and Prod...)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/24/2019
  • Reply ( In Support of Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff); Filed by Frances Fontane Marques (Defendant); Pablynie Marques (Defendant); Modern Medical Management, LLC (Defendant) et al.

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  • 06/20/2019
  • Response (TO DEFENDANTS SEPARATE STATEMENT); Filed by Ryan Stanton (Plaintiff)

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  • 06/20/2019
  • Opposition (TO MOTION TO COMPEL AND SANCTIONS); Filed by Ryan Stanton (Plaintiff)

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  • 06/19/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department 47, Randolph M. Hammock, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel (APPEARANCE AND DEPOSITION AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS) - Not Held - Rescheduled by Party

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  • 06/05/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department 47, Randolph M. Hammock, Presiding; Trial Setting Conference - Not Held - Continued - Stipulation

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  • 06/05/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department 47, Randolph M. Hammock, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel (Testimony at Deposition and Production of Documents and Monetary Sanctions) - Not Held - Rescheduled by Party

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  • 06/04/2019
  • Notice (1. Plaintiff's Notice of Ruling and New FSC, Trial Dates); Filed by Ryan Stanton (Plaintiff)

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  • 06/03/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department 47, Randolph M. Hammock, Presiding; Trial Setting Conference - Held

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  • 06/03/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department 47, Randolph M. Hammock, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Protective Order - Held

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323 More Docket Entries
  • 05/27/2015
  • Minute order entered: 2015-05-27 00:00:00; Filed by Clerk

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  • 03/17/2015
  • Notice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 03/17/2015
  • NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

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  • 03/05/2015
  • Summons; Filed by Ryan Stanton (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/05/2015
  • COMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

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  • 03/05/2015
  • Amended Complaint; Filed by Ryan Stanton (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/05/2015
  • SUMMONS

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  • 02/11/2015
  • Complaint; Filed by Ryan Stanton (Plaintiff)

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  • 02/11/2015
  • COMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

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  • 02/11/2015
  • SUMMONS

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC572198    Hearing Date: March 10, 2020    Dept: 47

Ryan Stanton v. Frances Fontane Marques, et al.

 

CASE NO.: BC572198

MOTION TO STRIKE AND TAX COSTS

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Frances Marques and Pablynie Jamison

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Ryan Stanton

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Defendants misappropriated monies from Plaintiff’s professional practice and business while managing and administering the business. Plaintiff prevailed at a jury trial, and has submitted a Memorandum of Costs, as the prevailing party.

Defendants move to tax costs.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Assuming that this motion does not become moot -- which depends on this Court’s ruling on the pending motions for new trial, etc, -- which this Court will hear and determine prior to this motion to tax costs:

Defendants Frances Marques and Pablynie Jamison’s motion to tax costs is GRANTED IN PART as to Item No. 1 in the amount of $116.20 and Item No. 16 in the amount of $9,431.35.

Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to Item Nos. 4, 5, 7, and 11.

ANALYSIS

Motion To Tax Costs

Item No. 1 (Filing and Motion Fees).

Defendants move to tax these costs in the amount of $744.60 of the $1,866.37 requested by Plaintiff – $506.75 for a motion that was withdrawn, $75 for a notice of small claims appeal, $121.65 for a writ application that was denied, and $41.20 for an abstract of judgment filing fee.

On a motion to tax costs, “the verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of their propriety, and the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show they were not reasonable or necessary.” (Ibid.) Here, Plaintiff listed the documents filed and their individual filing fees in his Memorandum of Costs. Given that these fees appear proper on their face, the burden is on Defendants to show that they were unreasonable or unnecessary. (Ladas v. California State Auto Ass’n (1993) 19 Cal.4th 761, 774-776.)

Defendants argue that the costs of the motion for summary judgment and the writ application should be taxed because the motion was withdrawn and the application was denied. The Court finds that the motion and application filed by Plaintiff, for which he actually paid filing fees, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (CCP § 1033.5(c)(2).) Costs may be permitted even as to those incurred for the unsuccessful aspects of the prevailing party’s case. (Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal. App. 4th 1194, 1199-1201.) In addition, the writ application was ultimately successful in a different form. (Plaintiff’s Oppo., at p. 3.)

The Court finds, however, that the notice of small claims appeal ($75) and the abstract of judgment filing fee ($41.20) were not necessary to the conduct of this litigation.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED IN PART as to Item No. 1 in the amount of $116.20.

Item No. 4 (Deposition Costs).

Defendants move to tax these costs in the amount of $2,257.70, on the ground that the costs related to Plaintiff’s deposition were not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation because the first two days were “filled with frivolous objections.” (Motion, at p. 5.)

The prevailing party is entitled to recover the costs of taking, video recording, and transcribing “necessary” depositions. (CCP § 1033.5(a)(3).) Defendants have not shown that these costs were not “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.” (CCP § 1033.5(c)(2).) Indeed, the fact that Defendants successfully sought to compel Plaintiff’s continued deposition demonstrates that the deposition itself was necessary. Nor does the Court find that Plaintiff bears responsibility for the number of days his deposition took.

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to Item No. 4.

Item No. 5 (Service of Process)

Defendants seek to tax these costs in the amount of $190.00 for service of process of a TRO on Defendant Frances Marques, arguing that this was not reasonably necessary because Defendant accepted service in court.

A prevailing party is entitled to recover service of process costs. (CCP § 1033.5(a)(4).)

Here, Defendants did not meet their burden of demonstrating that these costs, which were actually incurred, were unnecessary or unreasonable.

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to Item No. 5.

Item No. 7 (Surety Bond Premiums)

Defendants seek to tax these costs in the amount of $220.00 on the ground that the writ attachment bond premium was not reasonably necessary because the writ application was denied.

Necessary surety bond premiums are recoverable. (CCP § 1033.5(c)(1).) In addition, as discussed above, costs may be permitted even as to those incurred for the unsuccessful aspects of the prevailing party’s case. (Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal. App. 4th 1194, 1199-1201.) The writ application was also ultimately successful in a different form. (Plaintiff’s Oppo., at p. 3.)

The motion is DENIED as to Item No. 7.

Item No. 11 (Models, Enlargements, and Photocopies of Exhibits)

Defendants seek to tax these costs in the amount of $5,182.58 for exhibit binders because they were not used at trial. Defendants also seek to tax these costs in the amount of $106.75 representing 25% of Plaintiff’s costs for blow-ups, because one of Plaintiff’s blow-ups was necessary only to correct an error in an exhibit.

Expenses for models, enlargements, photocopies, and the electronic presentation of exhibits, including costs of rental equipment and electronic formatting, that are “reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact” are recoverable costs. (CCP § 1033.5(a)(13).) For this reason, exhibits that are not actually used at trial are generally not recoverable under CCP § 1033.5(a)(13), because they are not considered “reasonably helpful to the trier of fact.”

Here, however, as Plaintiff points out, the exhibit binders were prepared as required in this Department’s trial preparation order, and therefore they are necessarily considered “reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.” The Court would also have the discretion to allow these costs under CCP § 1033.5(c)(4). In this case, however, the Court finds that the exhibit binders were “reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.”

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to Item No. 11.

Item No. 16 (Other Costs).

Defendants seek to tax these costs in the amount of $432.40 for certified corporate documents, $67.00 for background reports on Defendants, $0.96 for postage costs, $1,028.00 for parking for depositions and hearings, $7,102.85 for trial transcripts not ordered by the court, and $1,300.50 for Realtime for counsel.

As to the background reports, postage, and trial transcript fees, Defendants argue only that these costs are not allowed under CCP § 1033.5. This is incorrect. Even items that are not mentioned specifically in CCP § 1033.5 “may be allowed or denied in the court’s discretion.” (CCP § 1033.5(c)(4).) The Court finds that the background reports and postage were reasonably necessary to the litigation and exercises its discretion to allow these fees. Defendants have offered no other basis on which to determine that these fees were unreasonable.

As to the trial transcripts, however, costs for transcripts not ordered by the court are allowable only when expressly authorized by law. (CCP § 1033.5(b)(5).) The transcripts here were not ordered by this Court, and their costs are not otherwise authorized by law. The Court also declines to award them under CCP § 1033.5(c)(4). These costs are taxed in the amount of $7,102.85.

As for obtaining certified corporate documents, the Court finds that these costs were reasonably necessary in connection with Plaintiff’s motions related to the defendant entities’ defaults and for use at trial.

Defendants are correct, however, that parking expenses are generally not recoverable, as “[r]outine expenses for local travel by attorneys or other firm employees are not reasonably necessary to the conduct of litigation.” (Ladas, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at 775–76.) These costs are taxed in the amount of $1028.00. Although Plaintiff indicates that “approximately $400” of these costs were parking fees for attending depositions, which are allowable, Plaintiff has provided no declaratory or other evidence to support the breakdown of this amount into parking fees related to depositions and other parking fees. Accordingly, these costs are taxed in their entirety.

Likewise, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel’s own use of Realtime transcription, as opposed to the costs for Court access that the parties split, was “merely convenient,” rather than reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (CCP § 1033.5(c)(2).) These costs are therefore taxed in the amount of $1,300.50.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED IN PART as to Item No. 16 in the amount of $9,431.35.

Moving party to give notice, unless waived.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2020 ___________________________________

Randolph M. Hammock

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org

Case Number: BC572198    Hearing Date: December 16, 2019    Dept: 47

Ryan Stanton v. Frances Fontane Marques, et al.

 

MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Modern Medical Management, LLC

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Ryan Stanton

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Defendants allegedly siphoned monies from Plaintiff’s professional practice and business while managing and administering the business.

Plaintiff moves to dismiss Defendants Modern Medical Management, LLC and Marques Management, LLC due to their lack of capacity to participate in litigation.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Modern Medical Management, LLC’s motion to set aside default is GRANTED. Defendant is to file a standalone copy of its answer to the second amended complaint on the date of this order.

Plaintiff is entitled to his reasonable fees and costs in connection with this motion. However, Plaintiff has not included any basis on which the Court may determine his reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Nor has he cited any authority for the proposition that it would be appropriate to allow him to file a separate motion for attorney’s fees related to this motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff is to file any declaration or other evidence supporting his reasonable attorney’s fees and costs before the hearing or be prepared to explain the legal basis for his contention that he should be allowed to file a separate motion for attorney’s fees.

ANALYSIS

Motion To Set Aside Default

Defendant Modern Medical Management, LLC seeks to have the default against it set aside based on CCP § 473(b). Under the mandatory provisions of that section, the Court “shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by the attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of default judgment . . . , unless the court finds that the default . . . was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (CCP § 473(b).)

Here, default was entered as to this Defendant on October 23, 2019, and this motion was filed on November 14, 2019. Thus, it is within the six-month time limit for the mandatory provisions to apply. Defendant’s attorney, Darren G. Reed, has also included a sworn affidavit attesting that it was due to his “mistake, inadvertence, . . . or neglect” that he had not revived the corporate status by the time of the hearing on October 23, because he “miscalendared” it. (Declaration of Darren G. Reed ¶ 3.) He had also not inquired as to the status of the company before that date because he “did not calendar the continuance properly.” (Id. ¶ 4.)

The purpose of this statutory provision is to “alleviate the hardship on parties who lose their day in court due solely to an inexcusable failure to act on the part of their attorneys.” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 257.) Based on Attorney Reed’s affidavit, it does not appear that the delay in reviving the corporation was due to Defendant’s neglect or that Defendant’s attorney is attempting to “cover” for it. (Behm v. Clear View Technologies (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1, 17.) Based on the affidavits of Attorney Reed and Tony Gales, the CPA who took the steps necessary to revive the corporation, the Court finds that the default was caused by Defendant’s attorney’s neglect.

In opposition, Plaintiff asks why Attorney Reed did not check on Defendant’s corporate status when he expected it to be revived, which was before the hearing date of October 23. (Oppo., at p. 3.) That is a good question. However, the answer to this question would only be relevant if Defendant’s attorney’s neglect had to be “excusable.” That is not a requirement for mandatory relief under § 473(b). (Martin Potts & Assocs., Inc. v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 438-441.)

Likewise, Plaintiff is conflating the requirements for discretionary and mandatory relief under CCP § 473(b) when he argues that this motion should be denied because Defendant did not attach its proposed answer to the second amended complaint. That is a requirement of the discretionary provisions of § 473(b), but the mandatory provisions apply “[n]otwithstanding any other requirements of this section.” (CCP § 473(b).) In any case, Defendant has now filed a proposed answer in reply. (Reply Declaration of Darren G. Reed, Exh. 2.)

Motions brought under § 473 do involve “an assessment of credibility by the trial court.” (Behm v. Clear View Techs. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1, 15.) In Behm, the court upheld the trial court’s determination that an attorney’s affidavit of fault lacked credibility based on “contradictions and discrepancies” between the attorney’s affidavit and his “earlier representations to the court.” (Ibid.) This included “different excuses” that had been provided earlier in the litigation for the same conduct. (Ibid.) The court concluded that the attorney had “forfeited his credibility when in his subsequent affidavit, he attempted ‘to change the facts and blame himself.’” (Id. at 16 [quoting Todd v. Thrifty Corp. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 986, 992].) Thus, the court had not erred in finding the affidavit “incredible” and therefore denying mandatory relief under § 473(b). (Ibid.) Here, however, the Court finds Attorney Reed’s declaration credible.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to set aside default is GRANTED. Defendant is to file a standalone copy of its answer to the second amended complaint on the date of this order.

Plaintiff is correct that he is entitled to his reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, which are mandatory when granting a motion for relief from default based on an attorney’s affidavit of fault. (CCP § 473(b) [“The court shall, whenever relief is granted based on an attorney’s affidavit of fault, direct the attorney to pay reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties.”].) However, Plaintiff has not included any basis on which the Court may determine his reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Nor has he cited any authority for the proposition that it would be appropriate to allow him to file a separate motion for attorney’s fees related to this motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff is to file any declaration or other evidence supporting his reasonable attorney’s fees and costs before the hearing or be prepared to explain the legal basis for his contention that he may file a separate motion for attorney’s fees related to this motion.

Moving party to give notice, unless waived.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 16, 2019 ___________________________________

Randolph M. Hammock

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org