On 06/13/2016 PRAXEDES E RUNNING filed a Personal Injury - Elder/Dependant Adult Abuse lawsuit against COVINA IRRIGATING COMPANY. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is TERESA A. BEAUDET. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Pending - Other Pending
Los Angeles County Superior Courts
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
Los Angeles, California
TERESA A. BEAUDET
RUNNING PRAXEDES E
PRAXEDES E. RUNNING TRUST
RUNNING PRAXEDES E.
AUZSA CITY OF. THE
MCINTYRE ANDREW M
CANYON WATER COMPANY
MCINTYRE WILLIAM L. JR
COVINA IRRIGATING COMPANY
ANDERSON CHET [DOE 2]
MORROW GEORGE [DOE 1]
MCINTYRE WILLIAM L. JR.
DOES 1 THROUGH 100
AZUSA VALLEY WATER COMPANY [DOE 5]
AZUSA VALLEY WATER COMPANY (5)
STOUGH DEBORAH L.
NATIONWIDE LEGAL LLC
LAW OFFICES OF MARLENE THOMASON
MARLENE THOMASON LAW OFFICES OF
MINNICK KRISTINE ELIZABETH
TANNER TIMOTHY CLARK
LAGERLOF SENECAL BRADLEY GOSNEY & KRUSE
PISANO CHRISTOPHER MARK ESQ.
STEVEN P. O'NEIL
MALONE PATRICK MOORE
BREMER WHYTE BROWN & O'MEARA LLP
LARSON O'BRIEN LLP
TYSON & MENDES LLP
PISANO CHRISTOPHER MARK
PISANO CHRISTOPHER M. ESQ.
BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP
1/18/2018: PLAINTIFFS'' OBJECTIONS AND PLAINTIFFS'' SEPARATE STATEMENT OF DISPUTED AND UNDISUPUTED MATERIAL FACTS SUBMITTED IN OPPOSITION TO FOUR MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ ADJUDICATION OF ALL DEFENDANTS AND;
1/18/2018: DECLARATION OF PATRICIA BEECHAM IN OPPOSITION TO FOUR MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ALTERNATIVE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES OF ALL DEFENDANTS
1/29/2018: PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION BY CITY TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RE THIRD PARTY SETLEMENT; IN LIMINE MOTION #6; ETC
3/13/2018: PLAINTIFFS' REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' FOUR MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ALTERNATIVE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES
5/7/2018: Proof of Service
5/7/2018: Proof of Service
6/26/2018: ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS CITY OF AZUSA, GEORGE MORROW, CHET ANDERSON, FRAN DELACH, AND AZUSA VALLEY WATER COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 128.7
8/27/2018: DEFENDANT SAN GABRIEL RIVER WATER COMMITTEE'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR A CORRECTION TO COURT'S JULY 27, 2018 ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS? MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTI ADJUDICATION; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
11/6/2018: Motion to Tax Costs
12/23/2016: SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF MARLENE THOMASON IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEMURRER OF THE CITY OF AZUSA
12/30/2016: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS
2/15/2017: DEFENDANTS CITY OF AZUSA, GEORGE MORROW, CHET ANDERSON, FRAN DELACH AND AZUSA VALLEY WATER COMPANY?S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
4/25/2017: OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER OF THE CITY OF AZUSA, AVWC, CHET ANDERSON, GEORGE MORROW, FRAN DELACH TO THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT; ETC
5/24/2017: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; AND ETC
11/17/2017: DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER M. PISANO TN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
11/17/2017: DEFENDANTS COVINA IRRIGATING COMPANY, WILLIAM L. MCINTYRE, JR., AND ANDREW M. MCINTYRE?S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ETC.
at 08:30 AM in Department 50, Teresa A. Beaudet, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs - Not Held - Advanced and VacatedRead MoreRead Less
Appeal - Notice Court Reporter to Correct/Augment Transcript (;SUPPLEMENTAL;); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
at 08:30 AM in Department 50, Teresa A. Beaudet, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs - Not Held - Advanced and VacatedRead MoreRead Less
Appeal - Supplemental Reporter Appeal Transcripts; Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
Notice of Ruling; Filed by Praxedes E. Running Trust (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
re Plaintiff's motion to stay; Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
at 08:30 AM in Department 50, Teresa A. Beaudet, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Stay of Proceedings (re Trial) - HeldRead MoreRead Less
Minute Order ( (Hearing on Motion for Stay of Proceedings re Trial)); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
Opposition ( to Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay); Filed by San Gabriel River Water Committee [DOE 4] (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
Notice of Joinder (Name Extension) (in Opposition); Filed by Covina Irrigating Company (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
Application ; Filed by Plaintiff/PetitionerRead MoreRead Less
NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCERead MoreRead Less
APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM-CIVILRead MoreRead Less
Notice-Case Management Conference; Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
SUMMONSRead MoreRead Less
Complaint; Filed by Praxedes E. Running Trust (Plaintiff); Praxedes E. Running (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
Complaint; Filed by Attorney for Plaintiff/PetitionerRead MoreRead Less
COMPLAINT FOR ABUSE OF ELDER PERSON; INJURY AND DESTRUCTION OF TIMBER INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS; NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS; INJUNCTIVE RELIEF; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; ETC.Read MoreRead Less
Miscellaneous-Other; Filed by Christopher Mark Pisano, Esq. (Attorney); City of Auzsa (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
Miscellaneous-Other (JOINT STATEMENT RE EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITIO TO MSF ); Filed by Attorney for Defendant/RespondentRead MoreRead Less
Case Number: BC623542 Hearing Date: March 18, 2021 Dept: 20
Judge Kevin C. Brazile
Hearing Date: Thursday, March 18, 2021
Case Name: Praxedes E. Running, et al. v. Covina Irrigating Co., et al.
Case No.: BC623542
Motion: Motion for Protective Order
Moving Party: Defendants Covina Irrigating Co., et al.
Responding Party: Plaintiffs Praxedes E. Running, et al.
Ruling: The Motion is DENIED.
Plaintiff to give notice.
If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LA Court Connect rather than in person in view of the COVID-19 pandemic.
On June 3, 2016, Plaintiffs Praxedes E. Running and the Praxedes E. Running Trust filed a Complaint against Covina Irrigating Company (“CICO”), City of Azusa (“City”), Azusa Valley Water Company (“AVWC”), San Gabriel River Water Committee (“SGRWC”), George Morrow, Fran Delach, Chet Anderson, William McIntyre, Andrew McIntyre, and Canyon Water Company, stating causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings, financial elder abuse, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of Defendants’ diversion of water from an open canal on Plaintiff’s property.
On July 27, 2018, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of several Defendants. The Court incorporates that ruling by reference.
On November 5, 2018, Plaintiff appealed the order granting summary judgment.
On February 8, 2019, the Court granted a Motion for Stay of Proceedings filed by Plaintiff, staying the action pending the outcome of the appeal, including as to the remaining claims against SGRWC and CICO.
On August 3, 2020, the Court of Appeal reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City and AVWC on Plaintiff’s claims for breach of written contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and financial elder abuse. The Court of Appeal directed this Court “to vacate its order granting summary judgment for the City and AVWC and entered a new and different order denying their motion.” The Court of Appeal also affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants “Morrow, Anderson, Delach, Canyon Water Company, William McIntyre and Andrew McIntyre.”
On October 29, 2020, the Court of Appeal issued the remittitur for the above appeal.
On February 22, 2021, Defendants CICO, the City, AVWC, and SGRWC (together “Defendants”) filed a Motion for Protective Order, seeking an order that discovery was not reopened after the recent reversal and remand.
On March 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion for Protective Order.
On March 11, 2021, Defendants filed a Reply in support of the protective order.
Defendants Covina Irrigating Company (“CICO”), City of Azusa, Azusa Valley Water Company (“AVWC”), and San Gabriel River Water Committee (“SGRWC”) (together “Defendants”) move for a protective order precluding further discovery after the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the grant of summary judgment for City of Azusa and AZWC, finding the City and AVWC “did not carry their initial burden” on summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith, and financial elder abuse, finding these claims were “revived” as to the City and AVWC. The Court of Appeal affirmed the “order sustaining the City defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend” as to certain tort claims against the City and AVWC on the ground that they were barred by the Government Claims Act, finding AVWC as the alter ego of the City for purposes of the demurrer. It also affirmed the grant of summary “judgment in favor of Morrow, Anderson, Delach, Canyon Water Company, William McIntyre and Andrew McIntyre.”
Defendants argue discovery should not be reopened for two principal reasons. First, Defendants contend there was no automatic reopening of discovery following the reversal and remand. Second, there was no reversal and remand as to certain Defendants—CICO and SGRWC—because the action was stayed as to the claims against CICO and SGRWC pending appeal. (Motion, p. 8 (“because neither CICO nor SGRWC were parties to the appeal, there would be absolutely no reason to reopen discovery against them.”))
Automatic Reopening of Discovery
The principal case on point is Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, holding that “in the case of a mistrial, order granting a new trial, or remand for a new trial after reversal of a judgment on appeal, the last date for completing discovery is 15 days before the date initially set for the new trial of the action.” (Id. at 247; see Beverly Hospital v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1289.) The Supreme Court found “no reason consistent with the legislative intent underlying the Discovery Act to require parties preparing for a new trial to draft and file discovery motions to show good cause before they can make discovery requests.” (Id. at 255.) Rather, “requiring the parties to seek leave for any additional discovery in the case of a new trial would run counter to the principal aims of the Discovery Act.” (Id. at 252.) The Court emphasized that the discovery cut-off date in former Section 2024.020 was based on the “initial” trial date, disregarding continuances, specifically to address litigants’ “intentional manipulation of the trial date by way of continuances and postponements in order to extend the time for discovery, [which] was apparently a frequent cause of inefficiency and unnecessary delays.” (Id.) “The same problem does not arise, however, in the relatively unusual situation when a new trial is ordered — i.e., following an order granting a new trial, a mistrial, or remand for a new trial after reversal of a judgment on appeal — for the simple reason that parties are unlikely to manipulate the discovery procedure by creating grounds for a new trial, mistrial, or appellate reversal merely in order to extend the time for discovery.” (Id.)
Defendants contend Fairmont is distinguishable “because unlike in Fairmont, this case has not yet gone to trial.” Rather, the Court merely granted summary judgment. Defendants argue “there has never been a trial held in the instant matter.” Hirano v. Hirano (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1 assists this Court’s resolution of this argument. In Hirano, the respondent argued Fairmont did not apply “because [a] remand for a trial after reversal of a judgment of dismissal, as occurred here, is not the same as the ‘remand for a new trial after reversal of a judgment on appeal’ discussed” in Fairmont. (Id. at 8.) The Hirano court understood the respondent to be arguing that “reversal on appeal automatically reopens discovery and resets the discovery time clock only to reversal of judgments entered after a trial on the merits because . . . where there has been no trial in the first instance, there can be no ‘new’ trial.” (Id.) This is essentially the same argument asserted by Defendants here. (Motion, p. 9 (“In this case, there has not yet been a trial, and thus the ‘initial trial date’ has never occurred.”))
The Court of Appeal rejected this as an “exceedingly narrow reading of Fairmont,” finding it inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s references to “a new trial following a dispositive judgment, e.g., on a demurrer or summary judgment.” (Id.) Rather, Fairmont “expressly contemplated that the rule reopening discovery following a reversal on appeal would apply to all judgments reversed on appeal, whether or not preceded by a trial on the merits.” (Id. at 9; Beverly Hospital, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at 1296 (finding “no rational distinction between a mistrial, order granting new trial and a reversal on appeal for purposes of restarting the discovery clock.”)) This is consistent with the Fairmont court’s conclusion that, “in any trial of the matter following reversal of a prior judgment, the parties are not limited to the evidence introduced at a prior trial, but are entitled to introduce additional evidence.” (Id.)
The Hirano court found the automatic reopening rule “is particularly applicable to expert witness discovery,” noting that parties may want or be “forced” to change expert witnesses, e.g., “because of the current unavailability of an expert selected perhaps years earlier” or because they now “elect to use an expert when they had not done so before.” (Id.) This is particularly relevant here where Defendants contend Plaintiff “wants a second bite at the apple . . . so that she can be bailed out of her decision not to depose any of Defendants’ experts.” (Motion, p. 9.) That is permissible following reversal of a prior judgment. Under Fairmont and Hirano, the Court concludes the reversal and remand following summary judgment automatically reopened discovery. (Hirano, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at 9 (holding the Fairmont rule “would apply to all judgments reversed on appeal, whether or not preceded by a trial on the merits.”))
Plaintiff relies alternatively on Roe v. Superior Court (1992) 224 Cal.App.3d 642 in arguing discovery automatically reopened, but Roe is distinguishable. The conclusion that discovery was automatically reopened after arbitration proceedings were “vacated” was explicitly based upon former Cal. Rules of Court 3.822, which then provided that in arbitration, “all discovery shall be completed not later than 15 days prior to the date set for the arbitration hearing unless the court, upon a showing of good cause, makes an order granting an extension of time within which discovery must be completed.” (Id. at 646 (emphasis added).) By contrast, former CCP sec. 2024.020 “impose[d] a 30–day discovery cut-off date applicable to cases going to trial,” and the cut-off date was “expressly governed by the initial trial date and is not affected by a continuance or postponement.” (Id. (emphasis added)) The Roe court zeroed in on the “omi[ssion of] any qualification that the controlling date is the ‘initial’ arbitration date.” (Id.) The Legislature had already amended parts of the Discovery Act (e.g. sections 2024 and 2034) “to specify that the ‘initial’ trial date controlled,” and the court took this as evidence “that the Legislature is aware of the practical distinction” as well as the Judicial Council. (Id.) The court inferred that the Judicial Council intentionally did not amend Rule 3.822 to reference the “initial” arbitration date. (Id.)
Without such a restriction, a continuance or extension of “the date set for the arbitration hearing” would extend the discovery cut-off date; statutes referencing the “initial” date would not have cut-off dates extended by continuances or extensions. (Id.) Based on the language of Rule 3.822 and the “vacating” of the arbitration proceedings, the court concluded that “discovery is permissible following the vacation and is then limited as to time only by any new dates set either for trial or arbitration.” (Id.) In effect, the Roe court construed the “canceling [of] the arbitration proceedings” as an indeterminate extension of the time for discovery, and therefore concluded discovery had been automatically reopened. (Id. at 647.)
The Roe court did not hold that the plaintiff “had an absolute right to conduct discovery after the case was returned to the civil active list and leave of court was not required.” (Opposition, p. 9.) The conclusion was restrained to the arbitration context based on differences between arbitration rules and discovery statutes; the Roe court referenced the “civil active list” only once in passing. The Roe court’s conclusion is plainly inapplicable here, as CCP sec. 2024.020 controls (not Rule 3.822) and provides that “a continuance or postponement of the trial date does not operate to reopen discovery.” The reversal and remand therefore did not automatically reopen discovery under Roe, though, as discussed above, it did under Fairmont and Hirano as to Defendants AZWC and City of Azusa after the reversal of summary judgment in their favor.
The Motion is DENIED AS STATED HEREIN as to Defendants CICO and SGRWC, parties uninvolved in the appeal. As discussed above, none of the authorities cited by Plaintiff—specifically, Roe and Fairmont-- indicate a remand automatically reopens discovery as to parties unaffected by the appeal and remand. The Court of Appeal did not order a new trial on Plaintiff’s claims against CICO and SGRWC. Therefore, as discovery was not automatically reopened, Plaintiff is required to bring a motion to reopen discovery under CCP sec. 2024.050 before attempting to compel discovery from CICO and SGRWC. (See Pelton-Shepherd Industries, Inc. v. Delta Packaging Products, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1586-88 (trial court lacks authority to hear discovery disputes after the discovery cut-off date in Section 2024.020 unless a party brings a noticed motion to reopen discovery)) The Court will consider the necessity of reopening discovery as a practical matter at that time if a motion is brought.
However, the Court will not impose a protective order at this time as Plaintiff has not filed a discovery motion in violation of CCP sec. 2024.020. Moreover, Plaintiff indicated acceptance of CICO’s objection to the sole discovery propounded, and the Court infers acceptance of the objection means no motion will be filed to compel responses from CICO. (Opposition, p. 8.) A protective order as to that discovery is unnecessary. (Fairmont, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 255 (“a party objecting to particular discovery requests, e.g., as unduly burdensome or oppressive, may seek a protective order.”)) A protective order stating that discovery is not automatically reopened as to CICO and SGRWC would be of little utility as Plaintiff would still be entitled to bring a motion under CCP sec. 2024.050 to reopen discovery, which CICO and SGRWC would still have to oppose. Grounds have not been given for the Court to conclude now that it would not reopen discovery as to CICO and SGRWC upon a properly supported request.
The Motion is DENIED.
Plaintiff to give notice.
If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LA Court Connect rather than in person in view of the COVID-19 pandemic
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