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This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 07/14/2021 at 00:22:36 (UTC).

PEYMAN BALAKHANE ET AL VS MORIS SAKHAI ET AL

Case Summary

On 12/20/2013 PEYMAN BALAKHANE filed a Contract - Other Contract lawsuit against MORIS SAKHAI. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are RICHARD E. RICO, MEL RED RECANA and JON R. TAKASUGI. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****1321

  • Filing Date:

    12/20/2013

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Other Contract

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

RICHARD E. RICO

MEL RED RECANA

JON R. TAKASUGI

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs, Petitioners and Respondents

BALAKHANE PEJMAN

BALAKHANE PEYMAN

L.A. FASHION HUB INC

AZADEGAN NAZIAR

CALIFORNIA CAPITAL VENTURE INC

DOES1-50

SAKHHAI MORIS

Defendants, Respondents and Appellants

AZADEGAN NAZIAR

SAKHHAI MORIS

CALIFORNIA CAPITAL VENTURE INC.

CALIFORNIA CAPITAL VENTURE INC

DOES1-50

MORIS SAKHAI

Other

RODRIGUEZ STEVEN L. ESQ.

Not Classified By Court

NORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY

NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

WILCOX WIL S.

TOMASSIAN MEEMO

SEBRING JENNIFER

SAKHAI MORIS

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

L.A. TRIAL LAWYERS INC

WOOD SMITH HENNING & BERMAN LLP

KITA MATTHEW JOSEPH

Defendant and Respondent Attorneys

ROSS JONATHAN A. ESQ.

FREEBURG STEVEN J. ESQ.

PARKER MILLS LLP

OMOKO GEORGE EMEKA

Not Classified By Court Attorney

TAMADDON RAY

Other Attorneys

LAW SAHAR MALEK

ESCANDARI ALEXANDER H.

SLAUGHTER YOLANDA ANNETTE

KITA MATTHEW J.

 

Court Documents

DECLARATION OF STEVEN J. FREEBURG IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLALNTIFFS/CROSS-DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE #7

1/4/2018: DECLARATION OF STEVEN J. FREEBURG IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLALNTIFFS/CROSS-DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE #7

DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE NO.19

1/10/2018: DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE NO.19

DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE NO.22

1/10/2018: DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE NO.22

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE NO.25 TO EXCLUDE NON-PARTY WITNESSES FROM THE COURTROOM WHILE NOT TESTIFYING

1/10/2018: REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE NO.25 TO EXCLUDE NON-PARTY WITNESSES FROM THE COURTROOM WHILE NOT TESTIFYING

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MORIS SAKHAI, NAZIAR AZADEGAN, AND CALIFORNIA CAPITAL VENTURE INC.'S MOTION IN LIMINE NO.7 TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE OF OR REFERENCE TO ALLEGED STATEMENTS BY MORIS

1/10/2018: REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MORIS SAKHAI, NAZIAR AZADEGAN, AND CALIFORNIA CAPITAL VENTURE INC.'S MOTION IN LIMINE NO.7 TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE OF OR REFERENCE TO ALLEGED STATEMENTS BY MORIS

Substitution of Attorney

2/27/2020: Substitution of Attorney

PLAINTIFF MORIS SAKHAI'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, SET FIVE, PROPOUNDED UPON DEFENDANT PEYMAN BALAKHANE

9/14/2016: PLAINTIFF MORIS SAKHAI'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, SET FIVE, PROPOUNDED UPON DEFENDANT PEYMAN BALAKHANE

NOTICE OF RULING ON MORIS SAKHAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, SET SIX, PROPOUNDED UPON DEFENDANT PEYMAN BALAKHANE

10/27/2016: NOTICE OF RULING ON MORIS SAKHAI'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, SET SIX, PROPOUNDED UPON DEFENDANT PEYMAN BALAKHANE

NOTICE OF RULING AT EX PARTE: PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO SHORTEN TIME TO HEAR MOTION TO COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF PATTY TAMYO [AKA PATTY TAMMYO] AT DEPOSITION AND FOR THE IMPOSITION OF MONETAR

8/2/2017: NOTICE OF RULING AT EX PARTE: PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO SHORTEN TIME TO HEAR MOTION TO COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF PATTY TAMYO [AKA PATTY TAMMYO] AT DEPOSITION AND FOR THE IMPOSITION OF MONETAR

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DECLARATION OF ROBERT A. CROOK IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM

9/13/2017: PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DECLARATION OF ROBERT A. CROOK IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM

 

Docket Entries

  • 06/17/2021
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 17, Jon R. Takasugi, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees - Held - Taken under Submission

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  • 06/17/2021
  • Docketat 2:58 PM in Department 17, Jon R. Takasugi, Presiding; Ruling on Submitted Matter

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  • 06/17/2021
  • DocketCertificate of Mailing for ((Ruling on Submitted Matter) of 06/17/2021); Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/17/2021
  • DocketOrder Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore; Filed by California Capital Venture, Inc. (Defendant); Moris Sakhhai (Defendant); MORIS SAKHAI (Defendant)

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  • 06/17/2021
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Ruling on Submitted Matter)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/17/2021
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/03/2021
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 17, Jon R. Takasugi, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees - Held - Continued

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  • 06/03/2021
  • DocketCertificate of Mailing for ([Minute Order (Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees)]); Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/03/2021
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/03/2021
  • DocketOrder Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore; Filed by California Capital Venture, Inc. (Defendant); Moris Sakhhai (Defendant); MORIS SAKHAI (Defendant)

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1,102 More Docket Entries
  • 01/14/2014
  • DocketDemurrer; Filed by Moris Sakhhai (Defendant)

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  • 01/14/2014
  • DocketNOTICE OF HEARING ON DEMURRER OF DEFENDANT NAZYAR AZADEGAN TO COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFFS

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  • 01/14/2014
  • DocketNOTICE OF HEARING ON DEMURRER OF DEFENDANT MORIS SAKHAI TO COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFFS

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  • 01/14/2014
  • DocketNOTICE OF HEARING ON DEMURRER OF DEFENDANT CALIFORNIA CAPITAL VENTURE INC. TO COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFFS

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  • 01/14/2014
  • DocketDemurrer; Filed by California Capital Venture, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 01/14/2014
  • DocketNotice of Hearing; Filed by Moris Sakhhai (Defendant)

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  • 01/14/2014
  • DocketDemurrer; Filed by Naziar Azadegan (Legacy Party)

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  • 12/20/2013
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by null

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  • 12/20/2013
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES: 1. BREACH OF ORAL CONTRACT; ETC

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  • 12/20/2013
  • DocketSUMMONS

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC531321    Hearing Date: June 3, 2021    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

PEYMAN BALAKHANE, et al.

vs.

MORIS SAKHAI, et al.

Case No.: BC531321

Hearing Date: June 3, 2021

Defendants are awarded $24,000 in attorneys fees.

On April 13, 2018, Plaintiffs Peyman and Pejman Balakhane Moris Sakhai, Nazyar Azadegan, and California Capital Ventures, Inc. (collectively, Defendants), alleging: 1-2) fraudulent transfer; 3-4) fraud; 5) conspiracy to commit fraud; and 6) declaratory relief. 

Now, Defendants move to recover attorneys fees and costs as the prevailing party.

The motion is unopposed.

Legal Standard

The party claiming attorneys’ fees must establish entitlement to such fees and the reasonableness of the fees claimed. (Civic Western Corporation v. Zila Industries, Inc. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 1, 16.) “Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties[.]” (CCP § 1021.)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.) In exercising its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in handling the matter, the attention given, the success or failure, and the resulting judgment. (Ibid.)

In determining what constitutes a reasonable compensation for an attorney who has rendered services in connection with a legal proceeding, the court may and should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorneys’ efforts, their learning, their age, and their experience in the particular type of work demanded the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed. (Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 657 (Stokus).)

In determining the proper amount of fees to award, courts use the lodestar method. The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the total number of reasonable hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate. “Fundamental to its determination … [is] a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney … in the presentation of the case.” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48 (Serrano III).) A reasonable hourly rate must reflect the skill and experience of the attorney. (Id. at 49.) “Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues. A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635 (Serrano IV); see also Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587 (“The trial court could make its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of the work done in light of the nature of the case, and of the credibility of counsel’s declaration unsubstantiated by time records and billing statements.”)

Reasonable attorney fees should be based on an objective standard of reasonableness, i.e., the market value of services rendered, not on some notion of cost incurred. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1090.) The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. (Id. at 1096.) The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony. (Ibid.) The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (Ibid.)

Procedural History

This action settled on February 2, 2018.

On February 7, 2018, Plaintiffs moved ex parte to enforce the settlement agreement and recover attorneys fees and costs under the agreement.

On March 5, 2018, retired Judge Rico ruled that Plaintiffs were not entitled to attorneys fees and costs because they were only entitled to such payments in the event of a breach of the settlement agreement, and there had been no breach.

On August 16, 2018, Plaintiffs again filed a motion for attorney fees and costs to enforce the settlement agreement.

On November 5, 2018, retired Judge Rico denied Plaintiffs motion, concluding that the motion was “not well taken for at least three reasons. First, it appears that Mr. Sakhai performed following the August 3 hearing. Second, Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees and costs is unsupported under the terms of the subject settlement agreement. Third, Plaintiff provides insufficient records to support attorney fees. Although detailed time records are not required, California Courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.Ap.4th 1363, 1375.)” (Motion, 7: 15-23.)

Plaintiffs appealed retired Judge Rico’s ruling. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys fees, and provided that Defendants were entitled to recover their costs on appeal.

Now, Defendants move to recover attorneys fees as the prevailing party on appeal pursuant to the settlement agreement. (See CRC rule 8.278, subd. (a)(2).)

Discussion

Generally, a prevailing party on appeal is only entitled to recover costs. (See CRC rule 8.278, subd. (d)(2), “Unless the court orders otherwise, an award of costs neither includes attorney's fees on appeal nor precludes a party from seeking them under rule 3.1702.”) Given that there has been no court order for fees here, and there is no other statutory basis for recovery of fees, the only basis under which Defendants could recover attorneys fees is contract.

Section 31 of the Parties’ settlement agreement provides:

31. ATTORNEY FEES: If either party or the broker named herein brings an action to enforce the terms hereof or declare rights hereunder, the prevailing party in such action, or trial or appeal, shall be entitled to his reasonable attorneys paid by the losing party as fixed by the court. The provisions of this paragraph shall inure to the benefit of the broker named herein who seeks to enforce a right hereunder.

Here, Plaintiffs appealed retired Judge Rico’s ruling denying them attorney fees and costs. Accordingly, their appeal was filed in an effort to enforce terms of the settlement agreement that they believed entitled them to an attorneys fees and cost award. Given that their appeal was denied, the settlement agreement provides that Defendants are entitled to have Plaintiffs, as the losing party, pay for Defendants’ attorneys fees incurred from the appeal.

Rates

Mr. George E. Omoko claims a $600/hr rate. Mr. Omoko joined the California Bar in 2000. Mr. Omoko specializes in civil litigation at both the trial and appellate levels. However, Mr. Omoko has not set forth any facts which would show that this appeal concerned especially difficult legal issues, or a high level of skill. Indeed, the question on appeal was very narrow in scope, and Mr. Omoko’s billing records indicate that the a large portion of the legal work performed consisted of review and correspondence. After a consideration of the relevant factors, including the duration of the litigation, the difficulty of the litigation, the skill required, and the contingency nature of the case, the Court finds that a $400 hourly rate is a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney with similar skill and experience (Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 657 (Stokus).)

Hours

Mr. Omoko claims 93.5 hours. The work concerned a standard appeal turning narrowly on the issue of whether or not an attorneys fees award had been properly denied. A careful review of Mr. Omoko’s claimed hours establish that while some of the hours billed for are reasonable, there is evidence of padding given the sheer number of hours claimed for certain rudimentary tasks. For example, Mr. Omoko claims 3.8 hours “researching the role of parties and retention of jurisdiction” and a “pause” to contact his client to “ask if he wanted me to research vacating the 3/14/10 Order of Judge Rico.” Mr. Omoko claims 4.5 hours for the vague tasks of “reviewing case summaries and scanned documents” and preparing a substitute of attorneys form.

Moreover, Mr. Omoko bills for services and correspondence related to the substitution of attorneys. For example, Mr. Omoko claims 2.5 hours spent, in part, “quibbling over my hourly rate”. (Omoko, Exh A.) These were not costs incurred to defend against the appeal, but were rather related to Defendants’ own decisions concerning his representation. Accordingly, those fees are not properly recoverable. The same goes for the hours billed for research about the memorandum of costs to be filed—this research was performed after the appeal ruling was issued and thus was not incurred to defend against the appeal.

Given the Court’s power to make “across-the-board percentage cuts either in the numbers of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure,” the Court finds only 60 hours reasonably spent and anticipated. (Gonzalez v. City of Maywood (9th Cir. 2013) 729 F.3d 1196, 1203 (Gonzalez). ($400 x 60 hrs = $24,000).

Lodestar

Defendants’ motion is uncertain in that, at times, it appears to request a 3.0 lodestar enhancement and in other places requests a 3.5 lodestar enhancement.

Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132. )

Here, the hourly rates set forth above capture the skill and the level of difficulty presented by this case. Thus, any multiplier would be duplicative of the calculations set forth above. Furthermore, an analysis of the relevant factors do not justify an enhancement award. The only ground advanced by Defendants in support of a lodestar enhancement is Plaintiffs’ “unreasonable failure to accept settlement demands lower than $56,100.00” (Motion, 4:1-2.) However, such a consideration is irrelevant to the lodestar enhancement analysis, and Defendants have not presented any case law that would suggest otherwise. There is nothing to suggest that the questions presented here were especially difficult, or that the ruling was attributable to Mr. Omoko’s skill alone.

After a consideration of the relevant factors, the Court finds that a lodestar enhancement is not justified. (Beaty v. BET Holdsings, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3d 607, 612.)

Defendants are awarded $24,000 in attorneys fees.

It is so ordered.

Dated: June , 2021

Hon. Jon R. Takasugi Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.

Due to Covid-19, the court is strongly discouraging in-person appearances. Parties, counsel, and court reporters present are subject to temperature checks and health inquiries, and will be denied entry if admission could create a public health risk. The court encourages the parties wishing to argue to appear via L.A. Court Connect. For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517. Your understanding during these difficult times is appreciated.

Case Number: BC531321    Hearing Date: June 26, 2020    Dept: 17

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

PEYMAN BALAKHANE, et al.

vs.

MORIS SAKHAI, et al.

Case No.: BC531321

Hearing Date: June 26, 2020

Defendants’ motion to set aside judgment is DENIED.

On April 13, 2018, Plaintiffs Peyman and Pejman Balakhane Moris Sakhai, Nazyar Azadegan, and California Capital Ventures, Inc. (collectively, Defendants), alleging: 1-2) fraudulent transfer; 3-4) fraud; 5) conspiracy to commit fraud; and 6) declaratory relief. 

On July 11, 2018, the Court ordered the instant action related with BC701875.

The instant action settled on February 2, 2018.

Defendants now move to vacate this Court’s orders of March 5, 2018, March 14, 2018, and March 29, 2018, releasing Nationwide Insurance Company and Northfield Insurance Company from the action.

Factual Background

This case arose out of a business dispute. Plaintiffs and Defendants settled the case in open court on February 2, 2018. Defendants agreed to pay a total settlement to the Plaintiffs in the amount of $750,000. The settlement agreement included a policy release, wherein Defendants’ insurers would fund a portion of the settlement after they obtained a full policy release from the Defendants.

Legal Standard

Defendants bring this motion pursuant to CCP section 473, subdivision (d) which provides:

The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.

Defendants also move pursuant to CCP section 664.6 Pursuant to CCP § 664.6, if parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.  If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.  The purpose of § 664.6 is to permit a court, via a summary proceeding, to finally dispose of an action when the existence of the agreement or the terms of the settlement are subject to reasonable dispute.  (Corkland Boscoe Skulnick

Discussion

Defendants argue, “Notwithstanding that Nationwide and Northfield were not parties to the consolidated action, and that no carrier was a party to the consolidated action, and that further notwithstanding that there was no record of any party agreeing for the Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, Hon. Richard E. Rico, concluded without jurisdiction that: “The court will enforce that part of the agreement granting the carrier a full policy release on the condition that it forward the agreed upon proceeds forthwith to Plaintiffs.” (Motion, 11: 6-16.) In other words, Defendants argue that this Court improperly retained jurisdiction over the settlement agreement in the instant action, and therefore improperly dismissed non-parties Nationwide and Northfield from the action without jurisdiction to do so.

In support of its argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, Defendants argue that “no attorney, nor party, nor carrier or insurer, or attorney for the carrier or insurer, ever gave on the record a stipulation for the Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement purportedly made pursuant to CCP section 6446.” (Motion, 23: 10-16.) Rather, Defendants argue that only the Honorable Richard E. Rico stipulated to such jurisdiction stating, “All right. The Court accepts the settlement agreement. The Court will retain jurisdiction under 664.6 to settle the matter.” (Motion, 23:21-23.)

However, “[w]here a settlement agreement provides the court may retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, but the dismissal fails to provide for retained jurisdiction, plaintiff’s remedy is to¿move to vacate or modify the dismissal¿under¿CCP § 473(b).” Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2017).) Here, however, Defendants have moved pursuant to CCP section 473, subdivision (d), which concerns clerical mistakes in entering a judgment. Defendants have presented no evidence that a clerical error was made in entering this judgment.

Based on the arguments advanced in their brief, it appears that Defendants may have intended to avail themselves of CCP section 473, subdivision b, which provides relief from judgments issued through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. However, CCP section 473, subdivision (b) provides:

(b) The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.

If such is the case, the orders here were issued on March 5, 2018, March 14, 2018, and March 29, 2018—over two years ago. Accordingly, the instant motion would appear to be untimely under CCP section 473, subdivision (b).

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to void this Court’s March 5, May 14, and March 29 orders is denied.

It is so ordered.

Dated: June 26, 2020

Hon. Jon R. Takasugi

Superior Court Judge

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.

Due to Covid-19, the court is strongly discouraging in-person appearances. Parties, counsel, and court reporters present are subject to temperature checks and health inquiries, and will be denied entry if admission could create a public health risk. The court encourages the parties wishing to argue to appear via CourtCall. For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517. Your understanding during these difficult times is appreciated.

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