PAUL KRZEMUSKI VS GEORGE ZAKHARIA ET AL

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC597883    Hearing Date: March 06, 2020    Dept: 47

Paul Krzemuski, Trustee of the Violette Krzemuski aka Violette Adamian 2013 Family Trust v. George Zakharia,

et al.

MOTION TO TAX COSTS, INCLUDING POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST, COSTS AND ATTORNEY’S FEES, WITH A REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST GEORGE ZAKHARIA, HODA ZAKHARIA, AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, SELENA ROJHANI AND THE ROJHANI LAW GROUP

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Paul Krzemuski, Trustee of the Violet Krzemuski, aka Violette Adamian 2013 Family Trust; and Attorney Robert Scott Shtofman

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendants/Cross-Complainants George Zakharia and Hoda Zakharia

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is an action to quiet title by adverse possession.

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Paul Krzemuski and his attorney, Robert Scott Shtofman, move to tax costs, based upon a previous sanctions order, which apparently has been reduced to a judgment.

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion to tax costs is GRANTED as to Item No. 1 (a)(7). It is DENIED as to Item Nos. 1 (a)(1) and (2). Court will hear argument as to Item 1(a) (5), as well as to the claim for “accrued interest due.”

The Court will also hear argument as to the requests for monetary sanctions by the moving parties.

DISCUSSION:

The Court has read and considered the various pleadings filed in connection in this matter. Suffice it to state, this Court has never ever seen such a situation. This Court has grave concerns about the legality and/or appropriateness of claiming “costs” of $11,500 in attorney’s fees in a Memorandum of Costs, under the facts and circumstances of this case. An award of post-judgment attorney’s fees must first be reasonable, and moreover, they can only be awarded “if the underlying judgment includes an award of attorney’s fees to the judgment creditor pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of Section 1033.5.” CCP §685.040. Is this the case here? This Court thinks not.

The “judgment” at issue at this point is the previous award of monetary sanctions. Is that a judgment in which attorney’s fees were “included” under a “contract,” as opposed to by “statute” or “law?” This Court agrees with the moving parties’ arguments contained in pages 11-13 of its moving papers as to the issue of attorney’s fees.

Accordingly, the motion to tax costs is GRANTED as to Item No. 1 (a)(7).

Be that as it may, this Court recognizes that it may be proper for a judgment creditor to claim certain “reasonable and necessary costs” associated with post-judgment efforts to collect a judgment, when the judgment debtors continue to flatly refuse to simply satisfy the judgment, such as for some of the other costs claimed. However, the issue of the levying officer’s fees of $2,000 is subject to debate, as to whether they both properly authorized and were “reasonable and necessary,” in this case.

The costs claimed in Item Nos. 1 (a)(1) and (2) certainly appear “reasonable and necessary” to this Court. The moving parties have not demonstrated otherwise, and its their burden to do so. 612 South LLC v. Laconic Limited Partnership (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1285.) [On a motion to tax costs, “the verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of their propriety, and the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show they were not reasonable or necessary.”]

Accordingly, the motion to tax costs is DENIED as to Item Nos. 1 (a)(1) and (2).

This Court will hear argument as to Item 1(a) (5) as to whether that particular cost was “reasonable and necessarily” incurred or not.

This Court will also hear argument as to whether the claimed “accrued interest remaining due” [$835.00] is appropriate or not, or even subject to a motion to tax costs.

Last, the Court will hear argument as to the requests for monetary sanctions by the moving parties. Zealous representation is one thing. Extreme “hardball” tactics and frivolous misuse of the post-judgment remedies are another.

Moving party to give notice, unless waived.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 6, 2020 ___________________________________

Randolph M. Hammock

Judge of the Superior Court