This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 01/16/2019 at 13:53:26 (UTC).

NICK NICHOLS VS CITY OF BURBANK ET AL

Case Summary

On 10/30/2015 NICK NICHOLS filed a Civil Right - Other Civil Right lawsuit against CITY OF BURBANK. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are WILLIAM D. STEWART, RALPH C. HOFER, JAMES C. CHALFANT, LAURA A. MATZ and DONNA FIELDS GOLDSTEIN. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****4617

  • Filing Date:

    10/30/2015

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Civil Right - Other Civil Right

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

WILLIAM D. STEWART

RALPH C. HOFER

JAMES C. CHALFANT

LAURA A. MATZ

DONNA FIELDS GOLDSTEIN

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner

NICHOLS NICK

Defendants and Respondents

BURBANK POLICE DEPARTMENT

CITY OF BURBANK

LACHASSE SCOTT

SCOTT MARK

CITY OF BURBANK A MUNICIPAL ENTITY

BURBANK POLICE DEPARTMENT A PUBLIC ENTITY

DEPARTMENT BURBANK POLICE

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

GLAVE COREY W.

GLAVE COREY W. ESQ.

GLAVE COREY WILLIAM

COREY W. GLAVE

Defendant Attorneys

CITY ATTORNEY OF BURBANK

AMELIA ANN ALBANO CITY ATTORNEY

ALBANO AMELIA ANN

Respondent Attorney

ALBANO AMELIA

 

Court Documents

Minute Order

11/14/2018: Minute Order

Minute Order

11/20/2018: Minute Order

Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information

11/26/2018: Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information

Minute Order

11/26/2018: Minute Order

Notice of Ruling

11/27/2018: Notice of Ruling

Motion for Summary Judgment

11/30/2018: Motion for Summary Judgment

Motion for Summary Judgment

11/30/2018: Motion for Summary Judgment

Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

11/30/2018: Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

Memorandum of Points & Authorities

11/30/2018: Memorandum of Points & Authorities

Request for Judicial Notice

11/30/2018: Request for Judicial Notice

Other -

11/30/2018: Other -

Other -

11/30/2018: Other -

Other -

11/30/2018: Other -

Request for Judicial Notice

11/30/2018: Request for Judicial Notice

Other -

11/30/2018: Other -

NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE & ATTACHED ORDERS THEREON

5/17/2016: NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE & ATTACHED ORDERS THEREON

NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE

6/2/2016: NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE

Minute Order

6/13/2016: Minute Order

8 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 12/21/2018
  • at 09:00 AM in Department D; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses

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  • 11/30/2018
  • Separate Statement (of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Issues); Filed by City of Burbank, a municipal entity (Defendant); CITY OF BURBANK (Defendant)

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  • 11/30/2018
  • Request for Judicial Notice; Filed by City of Burbank, a municipal entity (Defendant); CITY OF BURBANK (Defendant)

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  • 11/30/2018
  • Motion for Summary Judgment (for Defendants' City of Burbank , Burbank Police Department, Mark Scott, Scott Lachasse); Filed by City of Burbank, a municipal entity (Defendant); CITY OF BURBANK (Defendant)

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  • 11/30/2018
  • Other - (name extension) (appendix of documentary evidence); Filed by NICK NICHOLS (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/30/2018
  • Separate Statement; Filed by NICK NICHOLS (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/30/2018
  • Motion for Summary Judgment; Filed by NICK NICHOLS (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/30/2018
  • Other - (name extension) (Defendants' Evidence in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment); Filed by City of Burbank, a municipal entity (Defendant); CITY OF BURBANK (Defendant)

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  • 11/30/2018
  • Other - (name extension) (appendix of documentary); Filed by NICK NICHOLS (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/30/2018
  • Other - (name extension) (plaintiff's appendix of documentary evidence); Filed by NICK NICHOLS (Plaintiff)

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253 More Docket Entries
  • 11/16/2015
  • Proof-Service/Summons; Filed by NICK NICHOLS (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/16/2015
  • Proof-Service/Summons; Filed by NICK NICHOLS (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/16/2015
  • Proof-Service/Summons; Filed by NICK NICHOLS (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/13/2015
  • Affidavit of Prejudice-Peremptory; Filed by Attorney for Defendant

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  • 11/13/2015
  • Challenge To Judicial Officer - Peremptory (170.6); Filed by CITY OF BURBANK (Defendant)

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  • 10/30/2015
  • Petition for Writ of Mandate; Filed by Plaintiff

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  • 10/30/2015
  • Complaint filed-Summons Issued; Filed by null

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  • 10/30/2015
  • Complaint filed-Summons Issued

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  • 10/30/2015
  • Summons Filed

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  • 10/30/2015
  • Summons; Filed by null

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: EC064617    Hearing Date: January 31, 2020    Dept: NCD

TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 21

Case Number: EC 064617

Date: 1/31/20 Trial date: March 9, 2020

Case Name: Nichols v. City of Burbank, et al.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

[CCP § 437c; CRC 3.1350 et seq.]

Moving Party: Plaintiff Nick Nichols

Responding Party: Defendants City of Burbank, Burbank Police Department, Mark Scott

and Scott Lachasse

Relief Requested:

Summary adjudication of issues in favor of plaintiff on the second cause of action and for violation of plaintiff’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983

Causes of Action from from Complaint

1) Petition for Writ of Mandate Pursuant to CCP § 1094.5

2) Relief for Violation of POBRA, Government Code § 3309.5

3) Violation of Civil Rights 42 USC § 1983

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT:

Plaintiff/Petitioner Nick Nichols alleges that he was terminated in June of 2010 from his position as a police officer with defendant the City of Burbank Police Department, based on an investigation of an incident occurring during a take-over robbery by MS 13 gang members of the Portos Bakery in Burbank, with respect to concerns that an unknown officer had assaulted a witness in a police department hallway and another officer had witnessed the incident and failed to report it. Plaintiff alleges that the investigation was improperly conducted, and that defendants and their witnesses caused undue delays in the administrative appeal process. Defendant Mark Scott is alleged to be the City Manager for the City of Burbank, and defendant Scott LaChasse is alleged to be the Chief of Police for the City of Burbank. The complaint alleges a cause of action for a writ of mandate, inquiring into the validity of the administrative order terminating Nichols, and causes of action for violations of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights (“POBRA”), and Violation of Civil Rights.

ANALYSIS:

Defendants argue in the opposition that the motion is denied on the ground it was not brought on sufficient notice. Defendants argues that the moving papers here were electronically served on November 18, 2019, only 74 days before the hearing, when due to the use of electronic service, defendants were entitled to two additional days.

CCP § 437c(a)(2) requires that a motion for summary judgment be brought on 75 days’ notice:

“Notice of the motion and supporting papers shall be served on all other parties to the action at least 75 days before the time appointed for the hearing.”

With respect to the 75 days’ notice requirement, the requirement is held mandatory in the absence of a stipulation between the parties. The Second District has considered whether trial courts may shorten this time

and concluded: “we hold that, in light of the express statutory language, trial courts do not have authority to shorten the minimum notice period for summary judgment hearings.” McMahon v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 112, 118; See also Urshan v. Musicians’ Credit Union (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 758, 764 (“the Legislature did not…authorize a trial court to shorten the minimum notice period for hearings on summary judgment motions. Such discretionary language is notably absent from the statute. Moreover, the statutory language regarding minimum notice is mandatory, not directive.”) See also Cuff v. Grossmont Union High School District (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 582, 595-596.

Here, the motion noticed a hearing date of January 31, 2020. Seventy-five days prior to this date was November 17, 2019, computing the time by counting backward from the hearing date, excluding the day of the hearing, as required under CCP § 12c (a) (“Where any law requires an act to be performed no later than a specified number of days before a hearing date, the last day to perform that act shall be determined by counting backward from the hearing date, excluding the date of the hearing as provided by Section 12.”) November 17, 2019 was a Sunday.

The reply argues that the summary judgment statute does not address service by electronic filing, which should be considered akin to personal service, so that the service on Monday, November 18, 2019 was appropriate.

The summary judgment statute provides at CCP § 437c(a):

(2) Notice of the motion and supporting papers shall be served on all other parties to the action at least 75 days before the time appointed for hearing. If the notice is served by mail, the required 75-day period of notice shall be increased by 5 days if the place of address is within the State of California, 10 days if the place of address is outside the State of California but within the United States, and 20 days if the place of address is outside the United States. If the notice is served by facsimile transmission, express mail, or another method of delivery providing for overnight delivery, the required 75-day period of notice shall be increased by two court days.

(Emphasis added).

The argument is that the statute does not mention service by e-filing, which should be considered personal service, not a method of delivery providing for overnight delivery, as it is instantaneous.

It is true that the statute does not mention service by e-filing. Under CCP § 437c(b)(6), the summary judgment statute:

“(6) Except for subdivision (c) of Section 1005 relating to the method of service of opposition and reply papers, Sections 1005 and 1013, extending the time within which a right may be exercised or an act may be done, do not apply to this section.”

However, the summary judgment statute above does not mention Section 1010.6, governing the electronic service of documents, which provides, in pertinent part:

“(4) Electronic service of a document is complete at the time of the electronic transmission of the document or at the time that the electronic notification of service of the document is sent. However, any period of notice, or any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days…”

CCP § 1010.6(a)(4).

The statute sets forth exceptions that do not apply here, and also states, “(C) This extension applies in the absence of a specific exception provided by any other statute or rule of court.” CCP § 1010.6 (a)(4)(C).

Accordingly, since the summary judgment statute does not provide a specific exception with respect to electronic filing, the time period is extended by two court days under CCP § 1010.6, so that defendants correctly argue here that the motion was required to have been filed by November 14, 2019, so was four days late.

The reply also argues that since the deadline was a Sunday, plaintiff was permitted until the following court day to file the moving papers.

As discussed above, the deadline was actually two court days prior to the Sunday, so this argument does not assist plaintiff.

In addition, although the summary judgment statute does not mention CCP § 12a, the California Supreme Court long ago held that CCP § 12a does not apply to statutes, such as the one at issue, in which an act is required to be done “not less” than or “not later” than a given number of days before a designated time. Steele v. Bartlett (1941) 18 Cal.2d 573, 574.

In Steele, the Court ordered a peremptory writ of mandamus to issue, compelling a city clerk to omit names from a special election ballot of persons who had not timely filed nominating papers. In Steele, the nominating papers were required by statute to be filed “not later than twelve o’clock noon on the thirty-first day before the election.” The thirty-first day before election day was a Sunday, and six of the eleven candidates filed their nominating papers on the following Monday, only thirty days before the election. The Court held that this was improper, and that CCP § 12a could not be relied upon to extend the statutory time:

Griffin v. Dingley, 114 Cal. 481, 483, 46 P. 457, and Hutchins v. County Clerk, 140 Cal.App. 348, 35 P.2d 563, are authority for the proposition that while sections 12, 12a, and 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Political Code serve to extend one day the time within which or upon which an act may be done when the last day therefor falls on a Sunday or holiday, said sections are without application and do not extend the time for an act that must be performed ‘not less' than or ‘not later’ than a given number of days before a designated time. In the latter situations it is held that to permit such an extension would be to nullify the legislative intent that the act must be performed more than a designated number of days before the event specified.

As stated in Griffin v. Dingley, supra, 114 Cal. at page 483, 46 P. at page 457, ‘the statute does not fix the day upon which or the time within which the certificate is to be filed, but declares that it shall be filed ‘not less' than 30 days before the day of election. To hold that it could be filed 28 days [two consecutive holidays were there involved] before the day of election would be in manifest disregard of the provisions of the statute.’”

Steele, at 574.

The Court accordingly held the nominating papers were untimely:

“It necessarily follows that the nominating papers of the six candidates whose names are here sought to be kept off the ballot were filed one day late and the fact that the thirty-first day before the election fell on a Sunday did not serve to extend the time for such filing to the following day.”

Steele, at 574.

Here, as set forth above, the statute requires the motion to be served “at least 75 days before the time appointed for the hearing,” which is akin to the “not less than” language in which the Court in Steele recognized a legislative intent that the filing and service must be performed more than the designated number of days so specified. The motion accordingly is not considered by the court, as not brought on sufficient notice.

The papers concede that there was no stipulation between the parties to shorten time, and the court has no authority to, for example, continue the hearing date to cure this defect. See Robinson v. Woods (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1268 (the Second District holding 76-day notice given on mailed motion was invalid, so that at the noticed motion hearing, “the trial court had no authority to continue the hearing a mere four days. At that point, the notice period had to begin anew…The four-day continuance was a violation of due process and an abuse of discretion.”).

The court declines to consider the motion as not brought on sufficient notice.

(Even if the court were to consider the substance of the motion, it would have to be denied. The motion is brought by plaintiff, seeking summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor, but does not address the issue of damages. It is held that he summary judgment procedures obligate a plaintiff to prove each element of plaintiff’s cause of action, including damages. In Department of Industrial Relations v. UI Video Stores, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1084, the court of appeal expressly held that where issues of the calculation of damages remain to be determined, it is not appropriate to grant summary judgment:

Although we have determined that Blockbuster is liable to appellant, Code of Civil Procedure section 437c makes no provision for a partial summary judgment as to liability. Even summary adjudication may be granted only in limited instances. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) Because issues of the calculation of damages apparently remain to be determined, it is not appropriate to grant summary judgment for appellant at this time. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 1996) ¶ 10:40.1, p. 10-17 [summary judgment or adjudication improper where amount of damages raises factual issue].) The correct procedure below would have been a motion to bifurcate the issue of liability, which the parties could have tried upon the undisputed facts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 598.) A decision on the issue of liability against the party on whom liability is sought to be imposed does not result in a judgment until the issue of damages is resolved.

Department of Industrial Relations, at 1097.

To the extent the motion purports to establish issues of “duty” owed to plaintiff, other than Issue No. 2, the motion is framed such that plaintiff is seeking both a determination that a duty was owed, and that it was violated. The “Issues” accordingly raised by the motion for summary adjudication are not addressed to, and do not appear to dispose of an entire cause of action, affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or issue of duty. See CCP § 437c(f)(1) (“A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”) Issue No. 2, concerning whether defendants owed plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to obtain representation prior to his interrogation, was addressed in defendant’s previous motion for summary judgement/adjudication, and requires a factual

determination and weighing of the evidence submitted by each side concerning whether plaintiff was at the time of the interrogation “under investigation,” giving rise to entitlement to POBRA rights, and triable issues of material fact are again raised. See Opposition, pp. 14-16; Puglisi Decl. ¶¶ 3-7; Misquez Decl. ¶¶ 5-12).

RULING:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is NOT CONSIDERED BY THE COURT.

The motion was not served on sufficient notice but was served only 74 days prior to the time appointed for the hearing. Under CCP § 437c(a)(2) “Notice of the motion and supporting papers shall be served on all other parties to the action at least 75 days before the time appointed for the hearing.” This requirement is mandatory in the absence of a stipulation between the parties, and trial courts do not have authority to shorten the minimum notice period for summary judgment hearings. McMahon v. Superior Court (2003, 2nd Dist.) 106 Cal.App.4th 112, 118; Urshan v. Musicians’ Credit Union (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 758, 764; Cuff v. Grossmont Union High School District (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 582, 595-596.

To the extent the reply argues that plaintiff was entitled to file his motion on the court day following the 75th day, a Sunday, plaintiff cites no legal authority under which the time would be extended, particularly in light of the clear statutory mandate that service be made “at least 75 days before” the hearing. To the extent the reply argues that plaintiff was not required to permit an additional two court days for service by electronic filing, the argument is irrelevant in light of the deadline discussed above, which was clearly not met, and the court would also find that CCP § 1010.6 (a)(4) applies to extend the service deadline by two court days, making the service another two court days late.

The court notes that it has reluctantly considered the opposition papers and reply papers, despite the failure of the parties to submit to the court timely courtesy copies. See General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil Filed by the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, filed November 5, 2018, requiring, that “Courtesy copies for filings with a hearing date of two days or less shall be delivered to the courtroom by 4:30 p.m. the same business day…,” and that “a printed courtesy copy…is required for the following documents: … C. Pleadings and motions that include points and authorities;…F. Motions for Summary Judgment/Adjudication.” See also Department D Policy, requesting courtesy paper copies lodged with Department D of “ALL REPLIES, OPPOSITIONS, AND OBJECTIONS, FOR THE MATTERS THE COURT HEARS ON FRIDAYS FOR ITS LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR.” The court may in the future refuse to consider papers efiled and submitted without the required printed courtesy copies.

The court also notes that the memorandum in support of the motion is 22 pages long, exceeding the 20-page limit, without plaintiff having obtained permission to file such a pleading. See CRC Rule 3.1113(d) (“In a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion, no opening or responding memorandum of points and authorities shall exceed 20 pages.”)

Case Number: EC064617    Hearing Date: January 17, 2020    Dept: NCD

TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 17

Date: 1/17/20

Case No: EC 064617 Trial Date: March 9, 2020

Case Name: Nichols v. City of Burbank, et al.

MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY (3)

Moving Party: Defendant City of Burbank

Responding Party: Plaintiff Nick Nichols

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Further Responses to Form Interrogatories—Employment, Set One

Further Responses to special Interrogatories, Set One

Further Responses to Requests for Admissions, Set One

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

Plaintiff/Petitioner Nick Nichols alleges that he was terminated in June of 2010 from his position as a police officer with defendant the City of Burbank Police Department, based on an investigation of an incident occurring during a take-over robbery by MS 13 gang members of the Portos Bakery in Burbank, with respect to concerns that an unknown officer had assaulted a witness in a police department hallway and another officer had witnessed the incident and failed to report it. Plaintiff alleges that the investigation was improperly conducted, and that defendants and their witnesses caused undue delays in the administrative appeal process. Defendant Mark Scott is alleged to be the City Manager for the City of Burbank, and defendant Scott LaChasse is alleged to be the Chief of Police for the City of Burbank. The complaint alleges a cause of action for a writ of mandate, inquiring into the validity of the administrative order terminating Nichols, and causes of action for violations of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights (“POBRA”), and Violation of Civil Rights.

The court on May 17, 2018, heard discovery motions brought concerning discovery propounded by plaintiff in this matter, and entered an order limiting discovery to the following subjects:

“Plaintiff is permitted to conduct discovery in this matter limited to the following matters: Plaintiff's allegations that defendants failed to inform plaintiff of the nature of the investigation prior to interrogation, failed to permit plaintiff access to the transcribed notes made by a stenographer and other required information, failed to permit plaintiff to bring his own recording device to record any aspect of the interrogation, failed to permit plaintiff to be represented by a representative of his choice during the interrogation, failed to complete the investigation within one year, improperly reopened the investigation, failed to provide plaintiff with an opportunity for administrative appeal, and entered comments adverse to plaintiff's interest in his personnel file without following the appropriate procedures, and as further limited in connection with the subject discovery, as set forth below.”

[RFJN, Ex. J].

RULING:

Defendant City of Burbank’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Defendant City of Burbank’s Form Interrogatories—Employment, Set One is GRANTED.

Plaintiff Nick Nichols concedes that he provided no timely response to Form Interrogatory No. 205.1. Plaintiff is ordered to serve a full and complete verified response to the subject interrogatory, with provides all information requested, and fully complies with the Discovery Act. Response is to be without objections, which have been waived.

Plaintiff Nick Nichols is ordered to serve further responses to Form Interrogatories Nos. 208.1, 209.1, 210.2, 210.3, 210.5, 210.6, 215.1, and 215.2 which respond to all subparts, and provide all information requested, and fully comply with the Discovery Act. The court has considered the asserted objections, and finds they are without merit, and plaintiff in opposition has failed to justify them, so further responses are to be served without objections. To the extent the opposition argues that the information is equally available to defendant, this objection was not asserted in the responses, and has according been waived, and, in any case, the court does not find this an acceptable response; propounding party is entitled to the information plaintiff has, and upon which he bases his action, and an equally available objection usually applies when a propounding party seeks to force another party to search public records equally available to both. Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218 (“’no rule or authority is cited which authorizes refusal to answer an interrogatory simply on the ground that the answer is known to the party seeking the information,’” quotation citation omitted); Alpine Mutual Water Co. v. Superior Court (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 45, 53. The court also does not find acceptable a response that plaintiff is looking for the requested information to respond, or that defendant is referred to the documents already produced in this case, which the opposition suggests plaintiff intends to do in further responses. See Coy, supra, at 217-219; see also Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978, 2nd Dist..) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783-784 (“it is not proper to answer [an interrogatory] by stating ‘See my deposition,’ ‘See my pleading,’ or ‘See the financial statement.’”).

Responses to Form Interrogatories Nos. 210.2 and 210.3 must provide the basis for each calculation, with respect to each category-- income, benefits, and earning capacity-- being claimed as lost to date, and in the future. The court does not find acceptable a response that the numbers do not take unidentified factors into consideration.

Further responses to be served within ten days.

Monetary sanctions requested by the moving party are DENIED. The Notice of Motion fails to identify every person, party and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, as required under CCP § 2023.040 (“A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought”). This is particularly appropriate here, as the memorandum of points and authorities suggests that sanctions are sought against plaintiff and counsel.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

Defendant City of Burbank’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Defendant City of Burbank’s Special Interrogatories, Set One is DENIED.

The discovery at issue appears to be directed at the writ of mandate cause of action, and not matters in connection with the issues raised by the second and third causes of action in this matter, or the issues encompassed by the court’s previous discovery orders in this matter.

Monetary sanctions requested by the moving party are DENIED.

Monetary sanctions requested by the responding party are GRANTED. Sanctions are awarded in the amount of $800.00 [$800 requested] in favor of plaintiff Nick Nichols, and against defendant the City of Burbank, and its counsel of record, jointly and severally, payable within 30 days. CCP sections 2030.300(d).

Defendant City of Burbank’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Defendant City of Burbank’s Requests for Admissions, Set One:

Motion is DENIED as to Requests Nos. 12 and 17, as the Requests appear to be directed at the allegations in connection with the writ of mandate cause of action, and not matters related to the issues raised by the second and third causes of action in this matter or encompassed by the court’s previous discovery orders in this matter.

Motion as Requests Nos. 3, 4, and 13 is GRANTED. The requests appear directed at plaintiff’s allegation in support of his second and third causes of action that there was a failure to complete the investigation within one year, and the City’s defense to that claim. Plaintiff Nick Nichols is ordered to provide further complete verified responses, which provide all information requested and which fully comply with the Code. See CCP § 2033.220(b):

(b) Each answer shall:  (1) Admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party. (2) Deny so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue.  (3) Specify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge.”

The court has considered the asserted objections and finds they are without merit, and plaintiff in opposition has failed to justify them. The court notes that it is held that it not proper ground for objection that a request for admission is vague or “ambiguous,” unless it is so ambiguous that the responding party cannot in good faith make an intelligent reply. See Cembrook v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 423, 428-430. The court therefore overrules all objections, so that further responses are to be served without objections.

Further responses to be served within ten days.

Monetary sanctions sought by the moving party are DENIED.

Monetary sanctions sought by the responding party are DENIED.