This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/11/2019 at 00:44:07 (UTC).

LANDY MIS ET AL VS ARTURO DON DIEGO ET AL

Case Summary

On 05/18/2016 LANDY MIS filed a Personal Injury - Other Product Liability lawsuit against ARTURO DON DIEGO. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are MARGARET MILLER BERNAL and BENNY C. OSORIO. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****0931

  • Filing Date:

    05/18/2016

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Product Liability

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

MARGARET MILLER BERNAL

BENNY C. OSORIO

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs and Petitioners

MIS LANDY

AGUILAR GISSELLE

Defendants, Respondents and Cross Defendants

SMARK CHEMICALS

SMARK COMPANY

HERNANDEZ IGNACIO DON DIEGO

DON DIEGO ARTURO

DIAZ IGNACIO DON DIEGO

DON DIEGO CARLOS

DOES 1 TO 100

DON DIEGO DIAZ IGNACIO

HYSTER-YALE GROUP INC. ERRONEOUSLY SUED

UNIVAR USA INC.

DON DIEGO HERNANDEZ IGNACIO

HYSTER-YALE GROUP INC.

CHEMICALS SMARK

VANGUARD ENVIRONMENTAL INC.

HOOVER MATERIALS HANDLING GROUP INC.

HOOVER MATERIALS HANDLING GROUP INC. DBA

Defendant, Cross Plaintiff and Cross Defendant

UNIVAR USA INC.

Minors

AGUILAR JESSIE

AGUILLAR GISSELLE

16 More Parties Available

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Minor, Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

GREENBERG DAVID H.

HOMAMPOUR ARASH

PACHECO MARINA RENEE

TODD CHRISTOPHE CLYDE

RUBY EMILY A.

GREENBERG DAVID H

Defendant and Respondent Attorneys

BREDESON CHRISTIAN ETHAN

ACKER STEPHEN

BURNET LESLIE ANNE

GRAHAM NICHOLAS ROBERT

SWEDO JEFFREY ANDREW

LATHROP & GAGE LLP

WALLS-FOX TIFFINY MALIKA

GALLAGHER MICHAEL EDGAR

CHAVEZ ANTHONY STEVEN

Cross Plaintiff Attorneys

SAYRE ANGELA VANESSA

SAYRE MARK DAVID

Other Attorneys

WOLLMAN RUSSELL SCOTT

FLAGG DARIN WILLIAM

2 More Attorneys Available

 

Court Documents

Minute Order

10/24/2016: Minute Order

Unknown

1/27/2017: Unknown

Minute Order

6/21/2017: Minute Order

Unknown

12/4/2017: Unknown

Unknown

12/5/2017: Unknown

Unknown

3/22/2018: Unknown

Unknown

5/10/2018: Unknown

Substitution of Attorney

8/31/2018: Substitution of Attorney

Answer

12/28/2018: Answer

Motion for Summary Judgment

2/7/2019: Motion for Summary Judgment

Opposition

2/11/2019: Opposition

Reply

2/21/2019: Reply

Opposition

4/9/2019: Opposition

Motion for Leave to Amend

4/22/2019: Motion for Leave to Amend

Objection

4/23/2019: Objection

Request for Judicial Notice

5/2/2019: Request for Judicial Notice

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; DECLARATION OF DAVID H. GREENBERG

8/8/2016: REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; DECLARATION OF DAVID H. GREENBERG

DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

8/19/2016: DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

247 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 06/10/2019
  • Minute Order ( (Hearing on Motion - Other FOR AN ORDER TO CONTINUE UNIVAR USA...)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/10/2019
  • Order ([PROPOSED] ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS? UNOPPOSED EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER TO CONTINUE UNIVAR USA, INC.?S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT); Filed by LANDY MIS (Plaintiff)

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  • 06/07/2019
  • Ex Parte Application (PLAINTIFFS? UNOPPOSED EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER TO CONTINUE UNIVAR USA, INC.?S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT); Filed by JESSIE AGUILAR (Plaintiff); GISSELLE AGUILAR (Plaintiff); LANDY MIS (Plaintiff) et al.

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  • 06/07/2019
  • Order (ruling on matter submitted); Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/06/2019
  • at 4:15 PM in Department C; Ruling on Submitted Matter

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  • 06/06/2019
  • Minute Order ( (Ruling on Submitted Matter: Hearing date of 5/07/19;)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/29/2019
  • Memorandum of Points & Authorities; Filed by UNIVAR USA, INC. (Legacy Party)

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  • 05/29/2019
  • Declaration (of Angela V Sayre); Filed by UNIVAR USA, INC. (Legacy Party)

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  • 05/29/2019
  • Motion for Leave to Amend (Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint); Filed by UNIVAR USA, INC. (Legacy Party)

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  • 05/28/2019
  • at 09:30 AM in Department F, Margaret Miller Bernal, Presiding; Jury Trial - Not Held - Continued - Party's Motion

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378 More Docket Entries
  • 05/18/2016
  • Complaint; Filed by LANDY MIS (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/18/2016
  • Ord Apptng Guardian Ad Litem; Filed by LANDY MIS (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/18/2016
  • COMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

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  • 05/18/2016
  • Application-Miscellaneous (FOR GISSELLE AGUILAR GUARDIAN AD LITEM ); Filed by Attorney for Pltf/Petnr

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  • 05/18/2016
  • Receipt (CIVIL DEPOSIT ); Filed by Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner

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  • 05/18/2016
  • Complaint

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  • 05/18/2016
  • Application-Miscellaneous (FOR JESSIE AGUILAR GUARDIAN AD LITEM ); Filed by Attorney for Pltf/Petnr

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/18/2016
  • APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM CIVIL

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/18/2016
  • APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM CIVIL

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  • 05/18/2016
  • Complaint; Filed by LANDY MIS (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC620931    Hearing Date: July 21, 2020    Dept: SEC

CALENDAR #1LANDY MIS, et al. v. DON DIEGO, et al.

CASE NO.: BC620931

CALENDAR MATTER #1HEARING: 7/21/20[Remote appearances are encouraged and will be given priority.]

TENTATIVE ORDER

Defendant Univar USA Inc.’s unopposed motion for good faith settlement is GRANTED.

Moving Party to give NOTICE.

Defendant Univar USA Inc. move for good faith settlement determination.

If the nonsettling defendants do not oppose the motion on the good faith issue, a “barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case, is sufficient.” (City of Grand Terrace v. Sup.Ct. (Boyter) (1987) 192 CA3d 1251, 1261.)

The motion and Sayre’s declaration set forth grounds for good faith determination. Plaintiffs and Defendant has agreed to settle Plaintiff’s claim for $300,000.00. The court finds the settlement was made in good faith. There is no opposition. Motion is GRANTED.

Case Number: BC620931    Hearing Date: November 14, 2019    Dept: SEC

MIS v. DON DIEGO

CASE NO.: BC620931

HEARING: 11/14/19

JUDGE: MARGARET M. BERNAL

#4

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Order is DENIED.

Opposing Party to give Notice.

The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (CCP §2017.020(a).) The Court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person. (Id.) The court shall restrict the frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods listed in CCP §2019.010 if it determines either of the following: (1) The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (2) The selected method of discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. (CCP §2019.030.)

Plaintiffs seek a blanket protective order based on the volume of discovery requested—HOOVER propounded approximately 1,533 discovery requests. HOOVER’s counsel’s declaration under penalty of perjury states that additional discovery (in excess of 35/25) is needed to “establish facts and evidence in Plaintiff’s possession, custody, and control relating to the alleged claims against HMHG as well as plaintiffs wrongful death and loss of consortium damages.” (Opp., Walls-Fox Decl., Ex., 4.) Here, Plaintiffs are seeking $105,000,000.00 in damages each. (Opp., Ex. 1.) Given the nature and amount of damages sought by Plaintiffs, the Court finds that HOOVER satisfies its burden of justifying the number of discovery requests propounded. Plaintiffs’ objections to the number of requests is overruled.

The merits of the discovery requests at issue depend on an individualized examination of each interrogatory, request for admission, and request for production of documents. The proper procedure is for Plaintiffs to raise their objections in their responses to the interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents, and then to justify those objections if HOOVER brings Motions to Compel Further Responses. The Court notes that HOOVER’s Motions to Compel (not further) are set for hearing on January 14, 2020.

Further, even if Plaintiffs’ request for a blanket ruling was proper, Plaintiffs fail to make a sufficient showing of a “blanket justification” for the notion that they do not have to answer any of the discovery requests propounded. Plaintiffs also fail to justify good cause to warrant their alternative request for the ability to randomly select and only respond to any 35 special interrogatories, 35 requests for admissions, and 25 requests for production of documents that they see fit.

HOOVER is entitled to obtain written discovery from the Plaintiffs. The Motion for Protective Order is denied. This ruling is without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ ability to justify their objections to the specific interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production of documents if HOOVER brings timely Motions to Compel Further Responses.

Counsel are advised that their meet and confer efforts should go beyond merely sending letters stating their respective positions. (See Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1439.) Counsel are instructed to further meet and confer on the issues outlined in the instant Motion.

Case Number: BC620931    Hearing Date: November 07, 2019    Dept: SEC

LANDY MIS v. DON DIEGO

CASE NO.:  BC620931

HEARING:  11/07/19

JUDGE: RAUL A. SAHAGUN

#4

TENTATIVE ORDER

I. Defendant VANGUARD ENVIRONMENTAL, INC.’s unopposed Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement between Defendant VANGUARD ENVIRONMENTAL, INC. and Plaintiffs LANDY MIS; JESSE AGUILAR; and GISELLE AGUILAR is GRANTED. CCP §877.6

II. Defendant HOOVER MATERIALS HANDLING GROUP’s Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Costs are allowable to Defendants ARTURO DON DIEGO; CARLOS DON DIEGO; IGNACIO DON DIEGO DIAZ; IGNACIO DON DIEGO HRENANDEZ; SMARK COMPANY and SMARK CHEMICALS in the amount of $20,743.98.

Moving Party(s) to give Notice.

Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement

No Opposition filed as of November 5, 2019.

In determining the good faith of a settlement, the Court must balance the public policy favoring settlements with that favoring equitable sharing of costs among tortfeasors. To do so, the settlement must be within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor’s share of liability for the Plaintiff’s injuries, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the particular case. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) The Tech-Bilt court set forth the factors to be considered by the court in making the determination, such as: (1) the rough approximation of claimant’s total recovery and the settling parties’ proportional liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among claimants; (4) recognition that a settling party should pay less in settlement than he would if he were liable after trial; (5) the settling party’s financial condition; (6) insurance policy limits of settling respondents; and (7) existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interest of non-settling parties. Furthermore, the practical considerations require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of the settlement. (Id.) In sum, “a defendant’s settlement future must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability be.” (Id.) Thus, as long as settlement is not so far “out of the ballpark” in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of CCP §877.6, the settlement shall be determined as being made in good faith. (Id. 499-500.)

While a non-settling party bears the ultimate burden of showing that a settlement was not in good faith, the moving party must make a sufficient showing of all Tech-Bilt factors, either in the original moving papers, or in counter-declarations filed after opposition has been filed. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 92 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1262.)

The parties have been apprised of the settlement terms, and the amount to be paid in settlement ($2,000,000.00). As of November 5, 2019, no Opposition(s) to the instant motion have been filed. The unopposed motion for good faith determination of settlement is granted. The legal standards and requirements of CCP §877.6 and of Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488 are all met.

Motion to Strike/Tax Costs

Allowable costs under CCP §1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount. An item not specifically allowable § 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b), may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court under subdivision (c) if it meets the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount). If the items appearing in a cost tax costs costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred by the defendant [citations], and the burden of showing that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the [objecting party].” (Id., at 699.) The court's first determination, therefore, is whether the statute expressly allows the particular item and whether it appears proper on its face. If so, the burden is on the objecting party to show it to be unnecessary or unreasonable. (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.)

HOOVER MATERIALS HANDLING GROUP, INC. (“Hoover”) argues that Defendants ARTURO DON DIEGO; CARLOS DON DIEGO; IGNACIO DON DIEGO DIAZ; IGNACIO DON DIEGO HRENANDEZ; SMARK COMPANY and SMARK CHEMICALS’ (collectively “Smark”) claimed costs for the following items should be taxed as non-recoverable, unreasonable, unnecessary, or excessive: (1) Filing and Motion Fees; (2) Deposition Costs; and (3) Interpreter Costs (Other). As indicated in Reply, Hoover specifically seeks to tax Smark’s costs as follows:

Section

Cost Requested

Amount Requested

Amount Allowed

Amount to Be Taxed/Stricken

1

Filing and Motion Fees

$3,560.50

$199.62

$3,360.88

4

Deposition Costs

$16,858.48

$1,461.85

$15,396.63

16

Other

$1,525

$108.33

($325/3)

$1,416.67

TOTAL

$21,943.98

$1,769.80

$20,174.10

(Reply 3:8-15.)

Filing and Motion Fees

Filing and motion fees are expressly recoverable as costs pursuant to CCP §1033.5(a)(1). Smark does not dispute this. Rather, Hoover argues that Smark should not be able to claim costs against Hoover for claims not associated with Hoover’s Cross-Complaint. This argument lacks merit. “The right to recover costs under California law is governed by statute. [Cite.] Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b), provides that costs are to be awarded to a prevailing party as a matter of right. Apportionment of costs is authorized, at the court’s discretion, only under those comparatively unusual circumstances when the court must determine which party prevailed.” (Smock v. State of California (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 883, 888-889.) Here, on June 6, 2019, Smark prevailed on its Motions for Summary Judgment or alternatively Summary Adjudication. Apportionment would be improper. The Court finds that Smark has established an entitlement to all filing and motion fees sought. Hoover’s motion to tax filing and motion fees is denied.

Deposition Costs

Recovery of deposition costs, including taking, video recording, and transcribing depositions; interpreter fees; and travel expenses to attend depositions, are expressly allowed by statute. (CCP §1033.5(a)(3)(A-C).) Smark seeks deposition costs for costs incurred from seventeen depositions. Hoover argues that not all depositions were reasonably necessary for purposes of Smark prevailing on its Motions for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to CCP §1033.5(a)(3), Smark has the right to recover costs for depositions taken by Smark, or any other party in the instant action. Whether Smark utilized certain or all the deposition testimony it acquired is not determinative of whether certain witnesses’ testimonies were reasonable or necessary. Hoover’s motion to tax deposition costs is denied.

Interpreter Costs (Other)

Recovery of interpreter fees is not expressly authorized by §1033.5. “Items not mentioned in [CCP §1033.5] may be allowed or denied in the court’s discretion.” (CCP §1033.5(c)(4).) Hoover’s Motion to Tax is granted in part in the amount of $1,200.00 as to Smark’s claimed interpreter costs. The Court does not find that the interpreter fees incurred in preparing Plaintiffs/witnesses for deposition were reasonable and necessary.

The Motion is denied as to Smark’s claimed costs with respect to interpreter fees incurred to translate the declarations of Spanish-speaking declarants, which were necessary to support Smark’s Motions for Summary Judgment.