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This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 02/05/2021 at 23:46:05 (UTC).

JOSE EDUARDO VAZQUEZ ET AL VS RUBEN ARMANDO CHAVEZ

Case Summary

On 02/06/2014 JOSE EDUARDO VAZQUEZ filed a Contract - Other Contract lawsuit against RUBEN ARMANDO CHAVEZ. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are ALLAN J. GOODMAN, JOSEPH R. KALIN, DANIEL S. MURPHY, MARC MARMARO and MARY H. STROBEL. The case status is Disposed - Judgment Entered.

Case Details Parties Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****5416

  • Filing Date:

    02/06/2014

  • Case Status:

    Disposed - Judgment Entered

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Other Contract

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

ALLAN J. GOODMAN

JOSEPH R. KALIN

DANIEL S. MURPHY

MARC MARMARO

MARY H. STROBEL

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs and Petitioners

VAZQUEZ JOSE EDUARDO

VAZQUEZ SELENE ROSALIA

Defendants and Respondents

CHAVEZ RUBEN ARMANDO

DOES 1 THROUGH 10

LILIANA NAVARRETE

CHAVEZ RUBEN ARMANDO (DEF. JUDGMENT)

CHAVEZ RUBEN ARMANDO DEF. JUDGMENT

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorney

CERON LAW OFFICE

Court Documents

Court documents are not available for this case.

 

Docket Entries

  • 02/03/2021
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 32, Daniel S. Murphy, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment (CCP 473) - Not Held - Taken Off Calendar by Court

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  • 02/03/2021
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment (CCP 473))); Filed by Clerk

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  • 11/20/2020
  • DocketMotion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment; Filed by Ruben Armando (DEF. JUDGMENT) Chavez (Defendant)

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  • 11/20/2020
  • DocketOrder on Court Fee Waiver (Superior Court); Filed by Clerk

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  • 02/20/2019
  • DocketWrit - Return

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  • 11/01/2017
  • DocketSUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

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  • 10/11/2017
  • DocketSUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

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  • 05/26/2017
  • Docketat 08:36 AM in Department 32; (Motion; Transferred to different departmnt) -

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  • 05/26/2017
  • DocketMinute order entered: 2017-05-26 00:00:00; Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/26/2017
  • DocketMinute Order

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115 More Docket Entries
  • 04/29/2014
  • DocketRequest for Entry of Default / Judgment; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

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  • 04/28/2014
  • DocketNOT FOUND/NO SERVICE/CANCELED

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  • 04/28/2014
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE

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  • 02/10/2014
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

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  • 02/10/2014
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

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  • 02/10/2014
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 02/06/2014
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Jose Eduardo Vazquez (Plaintiff); Selene Rosalia Vazquez (Plaintiff)

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  • 02/06/2014
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 02/06/2014
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

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  • 02/06/2014
  • DocketORDER ON COURT FEE WAIVER

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC535416    Hearing Date: February 03, 2021    Dept: 32

JOSE EDUARDO VAZQUEZ, et al.

Plaintiffs,

v.

RUBEN ARMANDO CHAVEZ,

Defendant.

Case No.: BC535416

Hearing Date: February 3, 2021

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

motion to set aside default and default judgment against ruben armando chavez

BACKGROUND

On February 6, 2014, Plaintiffs Jose Eduardo Vazquez and Selena Rosalia Vazquez filed a complaint against Defendant Ruben Armando Chavez for a single cause of action of breach of contract. Plaintiffs allege that the parties entered into several loan agreements beginning on June 23, 2004, in which the parties entered into an agreement for Plaintiffs to loan Defendant $60,000 to pay off the debts of Defendant’s business. Defendant had nine months or until May 23, 2005 to pay the loan back in full. Defendant also allegedly agreed to pay for the increased portion of Plaintiffs’ mortgage resulting from Plaintiffs having to refinance their home in order to loan Defendant the $60,000. Then, on June 28, 2004, Plaintiffs loaned Defendant $19,000 for Defendant to acquire an interest in a business, Spray Coast, Inc.. In 2004, Plaintiffs loaned Defendant $6,000 for Defendant to pay legal fees that he had incurred in a lawsuit that year. Then, in March 12, 2006, Defendant entered into a written agreement to pay Plaintiffs $20,000 as interest for the original $60,000 loan that Plaintiffs made to him in June 23, 2004. Defendant allegedly breached the agreements by failing to pay any of the terms of the agreements.

On October 31, 2014, a registered process server sub-served process on Defendant Ruben Armando Chavez (“Chavez”) by leaving the documents with Lilia Navarrete, a co-occupant of Chavez’s home.

On January 12, 2015, default was entered against Chavez. On January 13, 2016, default judgment was entered against Chavez in the amount of $163,095.74.

SERVICE ISSUE

The Court notes that Defendant has failed to attach or file proof of service of the motion to set aside default and default judgment filed on November 20, 2020.

DISCUSSION

Defendant Chavez, by and through his conservator, Miguel Chavez, moves to set aside the default judgment entered against him in this case pursuant to CCP section 473.5(a).

Defendant’s conservator, Miguel Chavez, is Defendant’s brother. Defendant’s conservator declares that Defendant is in a coma hospitalized at Providence Little Company of May Sub Acute Care Center. (Miguel Chavez Decl. ¶ 2.) Defendant’s conservator states that Defendant has been living in a comatose state since April 1, 2014. (Miguel Chavez Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant’s conservator argues that the Court should vacate the default and default judgment entered against Defendant pursuant to CCP section 473.5(a) because Defendant did not have actual notice of the action in time to defend.

CCP section 473.5 states in pertinent part that “[w]hen service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action.” “Actual notice” for purposes of this statue means “genuine knowledge.” (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 547.) A motion under this statute must “be accompanied by an affidavit showing under oath that the party’s lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect.” (CCP § 473.5(b).)

Chavez’s reliance on CCP section 473.5 is unavailing, however, because the motion is untimely. A notice of a motion to set aside default and for leave to defend an action under CCP section 473.5 “shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered.” (CCP § 473.5(a).) Default judgment was entered against Chavez on January 13, 2016. Thus, Defendant’s motion under CCP section 473.5(a), filed more than four years after the entry of default judgment is untimely.

Even if the Court were to interpret Defendant’s motion under CCP section 473(d), Defendant is without relief. CCP section 473(d) allows a court to “set aside any void judgment or order.” Under CCP section 473(d), a court may set aside a default judgment which is valid on its face but void as a matter of law due to improper service of process. (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544.) Chavez’s request for relief under this statute fails because he has not shown that service of process was improper. A process server filed a proof of service which is presumptively valid. “[A] registered process server’s declaration of service establishes a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence of the facts stated in the declaration.” (American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390 (citing Evid. Code § 647).) Defendant’s conservator confirms that service was effectuated at 524 N. Gulf Avenue, Wilmington, CA 90744, the address of real property which Chavez owns. Service was effectuated on October 31, 2014 via substituted service.

Finally, courts do have inherent equity authority to vacate a judgment on equitable grounds such as extrinsic fraud or mistake. (Bae v. T.D. Service Co. of Arizona (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 89, 97.) However, Chavez has not substantiated extrinsic fraud or mistake or articulated a theory as to why extrinsic fraud or mistake should be found.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment is DENIED.

Case Number: BC535416    Hearing Date: February 01, 2021    Dept: 32

JOSE EDUARDO VAZQUEZ, et al.

Plaintiffs,

v.

RUBEN ARMANDO CHAVEZ,

Defendant.

Case No.: BC535416

Hearing Date: February 3, 2021

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

motion to set aside default and default judgment against ruben armando chavez

BACKGROUND

On February 6, 2014, Plaintiffs Jose Eduardo Vazquez and Selena Rosalia Vazquez filed a complaint against Defendant Ruben Armando Chavez for a single cause of action of breach of contract. Plaintiffs allege that the parties entered into several loan agreements beginning on June 23, 2004, in which the parties entered into an agreement for Plaintiffs to loan Defendant $60,000 to pay off the debts of Defendant’s business. Defendant had nine months or until May 23, 2005 to pay the loan back in full. Defendant also allegedly agreed to pay for the increased portion of Plaintiffs’ mortgage resulting from Plaintiffs having to refinance their home in order to loan Defendant the $60,000. Then, on June 28, 2004, Plaintiffs loaned Defendant $19,000 for Defendant to acquire an interest in a business, Spray Coast, Inc.. In 2004, Plaintiffs loaned Defendant $6,000 for Defendant to pay legal fees that he had incurred in a lawsuit that year. Then, in March 12, 2006, Defendant entered into a written agreement to pay Plaintiffs $20,000 as interest for the original $60,000 loan that Plaintiffs made to him in June 23, 2004. Defendant allegedly breached the agreements by failing to pay any of the terms of the agreements.

On October 31, 2014, a registered process server sub-served process on Defendant Ruben Armando Chavez (“Chavez”) by leaving the documents with Lilia Navarrete, a co-occupant of Chavez’s home.

On January 12, 2015, default was entered against Chavez. On January 13, 2016, default judgment was entered against Chavez in the amount of $163,095.74.

SERVICE ISSUE

The Court notes that Defendant has failed to attach or file proof of service of the motion to set aside default and default judgment filed on November 20, 2020.

DISCUSSION

Defendant Chavez, by and through his conservator, Miguel Chavez, moves to set aside the default judgment entered against him in this case pursuant to CCP section 473.5(a).

Defendant’s conservator, Miguel Chavez, is Defendant’s brother. Defendant’s conservator declares that Defendant is in a coma hospitalized at Providence Little Company of May Sub Acute Care Center. (Miguel Chavez Decl. ¶ 2.) Defendant’s conservator states that Defendant has been living in a comatose state since April 1, 2014. (Miguel Chavez Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant’s conservator argues that the Court should vacate the default and default judgment entered against Defendant pursuant to CCP section 473.5(a) because Defendant did not have actual notice of the action in time to defend.

CCP section 473.5 states in pertinent part that “[w]hen service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action.” “Actual notice” for purposes of this statue means “genuine knowledge.” (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 547.) A motion under this statute must “be accompanied by an affidavit showing under oath that the party’s lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect.” (CCP § 473.5(b).)

Chavez’s reliance on CCP section 473.5 is unavailing, however, because the motion is untimely. A notice of a motion to set aside default and for leave to defend an action under CCP section 473.5 “shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered.” (CCP § 473.5(a).) Default judgment was entered against Chavez on January 13, 2016. Thus, Defendant’s motion under CCP section 473.5(a), filed more than four years after the entry of default judgment is untimely.

Even if the Court were to interpret Defendant’s motion under CCP section 473(d), Defendant is without relief. CCP section 473(d) allows a court to “set aside any void judgment or order.” Under CCP section 473(d), a court may set aside a default judgment which is valid on its face but void as a matter of law due to improper service of process. (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544.) Chavez’s request for relief under this statute fails because he has not shown that service of process was improper. A process server filed a proof of service which is presumptively valid. “[A] registered process server’s declaration of service establishes a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence of the facts stated in the declaration.” (American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390 (citing Evid. Code § 647).) Defendant’s conservator confirms that service was effectuated at 524 N. Gulf Avenue, Wilmington, CA 90744, the address of real property which Chavez owns. Service was effectuated on October 31, 2014 via substituted service.

Finally, courts do have inherent equity authority to vacate a judgment on equitable grounds such as extrinsic fraud or mistake. (Bae v. T.D. Service Co. of Arizona (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 89, 97.) However, Chavez has not substantiated extrinsic fraud or mistake or articulated a theory as to why extrinsic fraud or mistake should be found.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment is DENIED.