This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 05/26/2019 at 15:26:17 (UTC).

JIANG QI VS BLUESTAR EXPRESS GROUP INC.

Case Summary

On 06/29/2016 JIANG QI filed a Labor - Other Labor lawsuit against BLUESTAR EXPRESS GROUP INC. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Pomona Courthouse South located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are OKI, DAN THOMAS and GLORIA WHITE-BROWN. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****8561

  • Filing Date:

    06/29/2016

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Labor - Other Labor

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Pomona Courthouse South

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

OKI, DAN THOMAS

GLORIA WHITE-BROWN

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Cross Defendant

QI JIANG

Defendants and Cross Plaintiffs

ZHANG YIDAN

BLUESTAR EXPRESS GROUP INC.

BLUESTAR EXPRESS GROUP INC. A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION

DIAMOND TRUCKING

ZHANG QINGYU

YUE KETIAN

GAO SHUQIN

ZHAO YANG

ZHANG TAO

ZHANG TOM

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorney

CHU ANTHONY K. ESQ

Defendant and Cross Plaintiff Attorneys

LIU ESQ. TONY T.

LIU LONG Z

 

Court Documents

Complaint

6/29/2016: Complaint

Notice of Case Management Conference

7/6/2016: Notice of Case Management Conference

Unknown

7/13/2016: Unknown

Unknown

7/10/2017: Unknown

Unknown

7/12/2017: Unknown

Other -

9/11/2017: Other -

Minute Order

9/20/2017: Minute Order

Unknown

9/22/2017: Unknown

Answer

12/4/2017: Answer

Unknown

3/26/2018: Unknown

Unknown

6/18/2018: Unknown

Memorandum of Points & Authorities

12/4/2018: Memorandum of Points & Authorities

Request for Judicial Notice

12/4/2018: Request for Judicial Notice

Motion for Summary Judgment

12/27/2018: Motion for Summary Judgment

Order

2/7/2019: Order

Declaration

2/13/2019: Declaration

Order

4/29/2019: Order

Minute Order

4/29/2019: Minute Order

145 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 05/09/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department J, Gloria White-Brown, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel (Ex-Parte Application to Shorten Time for(1) Motion to Compel Deposition Attendance of Pliantiff Jiang Qi; (2) Request to Continue the Discovery Cut-Off Date to Take Deposition of Plaintiff; Declaration of Long Z. Liu; [Proposed] Order) - Not Held - Advanced and Continued - by Court

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  • 04/29/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department J, Gloria White-Brown, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel (Ex-Parte Application to Shorten Time for(1) Motion to Compel Deposition Attendance of Pliantiff Jiang Qi; (2) Request to Continue the Discovery Cut-Off Date to Take Deposition of Plaintiff; Declaration of Long Z. Liu; [Proposed] Order) - Not Held - Taken Off Calendar by Court

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  • 04/29/2019
  • Minute Order ( (Hearing on Motion to Compel Ex-Parte Application to Shorten T...)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/29/2019
  • Order (Tentative Ruling); Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/29/2019
  • Certificate of Mailing for (Minute Order (Hearing on Motion to Compel Ex-Parte Application to Shorten T...) of 04/29/2019); Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/23/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department J, Gloria White-Brown, Presiding; Jury Trial - Not Held - Advanced and Continued - by Court

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  • 04/18/2019
  • Declaration (Of Anthony K. Chu re Non-filing and Serving of Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff Jiang Qi); Filed by Jiang Qi (Plaintiff)

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  • 04/15/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department J, Gloria White-Brown, Presiding; Final Status Conference - Not Held - Advanced and Continued - by Court

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  • 04/15/2019
  • Declaration (Declaration of Long Z. Liu in Support of New Diamond Trucking, Inc.'s Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff Jiang Qi); Filed by DIAMOND TRUCKING (Defendant)

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  • 04/05/2019
  • at 09:00 AM in Department J, Gloria White-Brown, Presiding; Hearing on Ex Parte Application (to Shorten Time for (1) Motion to Compel Deposition Attendance of Jiang Qi; (2) Request to Continue the Discovery Cut-Off Date to Take Deposition of Plaintiff) - Held - Motion Granted

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182 More Docket Entries
  • 11/01/2016
  • Case Management Statement; Filed by Jiang Qi (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/08/2016
  • Answer to Cross-Complaint; Filed by Jiang Qi (Plaintiff)

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  • 08/19/2016
  • Cross-Complaint; Filed by Bluestar Express Group, Inc., a California corporation (Cross-Complainant)

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  • 08/19/2016
  • Answer; Filed by Bluestar Express Group, Inc., a California corporation (Defendant); Yidan Zhang (Defendant)

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  • 07/13/2016
  • Rtn of Service of Summons & Compl; Filed by Jiang Qi (Plaintiff)

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  • 07/13/2016
  • Rtn of Service of Summons & Compl; Filed by Jiang Qi (Plaintiff)

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  • 07/06/2016
  • Notice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/29/2016
  • Civil Case Cover Sheet

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  • 06/29/2016
  • Summons (on Complaint)

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  • 06/29/2016
  • Complaint; Filed by Jiang Qi (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: KC068561    Hearing Date: July 10, 2020    Dept: J

HEARING DATE: Friday, July 10, 2020

NOTICE: See below[1]

RE: Qi v. Bluestar Express Group, Inc. (KC068561)

______________________________________________________________________________

 

Plaintiff Jiang Qi’s MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT TO ADD QINGYU ZHANG

AND SHUQIN GAO AS JUDGMENT DEBTORS UNDER CCP SECTION 187

Responding Party: None (unopposed, as of 6/30/20, 10:24 a.m.; due 6/26/20)

Tentative Ruling

See below.

Background

Wage/hour violations lawsuit. On June 29, 2016, Plaintiff Jiang Qi (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against Defendants Bluestar Express Group Inc. (“Bluestar”), Yidan Zhang (“Yidan”) and Does 1-20 for:

1. Failure to Pay Minimum Hourly Wages and Overtime Wages [Cal. Labor Code §§ 510, 1194]

2. Failure to Provide Meal and Rest Periods [Cal. Labor Code § 226.7]

3. Knowing and Intentional Failure to Comply with Accurate Itemized Employee Wage Statement Provisions [Cal. Labor Code § 226]

4. Waiting Time Penalties [Cal. Labor Code §§ 201, 203]

5. Unfair Competition [Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.]

6. Civil Penalties for Labor Code Violations [Cal. Labor Code § 558]

On August 19, 2016, Bluestar filed a cross-complaint, asserting a cause of action against Plaintiff and Does 1-20 for:

1. Breach of Contract

On September 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed six “Amendment[s] to Complaint,” wherein Tom Zhang was named in lieu of Doe 1, Tao Zhang was named in lieu of Doe 2, Qingyu Zhang (“Qingyu”) was named in lieu of Doe 3, Shuqin Gao (“Gao”) was named in lieu of Doe 4, Yang Zhao (“Zhao”) was named in lieu of Doe 5, and Ketian Yue was named in lieu of Doe 6.

On January 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed another “Amendment to Complaint,” wherein New Diamond Trucking, Inc. was named in lieu of Doe 7. On January 22, 2018, Plaintiff dismissed Qingyu and Gao without prejudice. On November 19, 2018, Plaintiff dismissed Zhao, without prejudice.

This case proceeded to trial on August 13, 2019. On October 2, 2019, an “Order of Judgment” was filed. On October 30, 2019, Judgment was filed. On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed and mail-served a Notice of Entry of Judgment. On March 10, 2020 an “Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Prejudgment Interest” was filed; that day, an Amended Judgment was filed. On March 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed and mail-served a Notice of Entry of Amended Judgment.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 187 states: “When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this code.”

“Section 187 of the Code of Civil Procedure grants to every court the power to use all means to carry its jurisdiction into effect, even if those means are not set out in the Code. Under section 187, the court has the authority to amend a judgment to add additional judgment debtors.” (NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 772, 778 [citations omitted].)

“Judgments are often amended to add additional judgment debtors on the grounds that a person or entity is the alter ego of the original judgment debtor. (Id.) “The rationale is that the new defendant is really one and the same as the original defendant and, as such, was represented by the original defendant's participation in the trial leading to the judgment.” (Oyakawa v. Gillett (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 628, 631.)

“[A]mendments adding additional judgment debtors are appropriate only where it can be demonstrated that the newly added party in fact had control of the previous litigation and thus was virtually represented in the lawsuit. But where no claim was made against the new party personally and the new party did not participate in the defense of the action or have any duty to appear and personally defend in that action, the new party cannot be added as a judgment debtor by a postjudgment amendment. In all of the cases in which amendments have been allowed . . ., the newly added judgment debtor was involved with and controlled, to one degree or another, the defense presented by the original defendant. Without control, considerations of due process preclude the addition of a party after the judgment is a fait accompli.” (Id. at 632 [citations omitted].)

Discussion

Plaintiff moves the court for an order amending the judgment entered on March 10, 2020 to add Qingyu and Gao as additional judgment debtors.

The following ruling is contingent upon Plaintiff’s counsel’s filing of a proof of service, at of before the time of the hearing, reflecting that Qingyu and Gao were given CCP § 1005(b)-compliant notice of the July 10, 2020 hearing date/time:

This case proceeded to a bench trial on August 13, 2019. On September 3, 2019, Plaintiff filed “Plaintiff’s Request and Motion to Re-Add Doe Defendants Dismissed as a Result of False Statements Under Oath” (“Motion to Re-Add”) wherein Plaintiff sought to re-add Zhao, Qingyu and Gao as Doe Defendants, on the basis that “(1) these persons were erroneously dismissed based upon their prior perjured declarations denying their involvement, which they submitted in support of prior motions, and (2) Plaintiff only recently discovered facts which establish such perjury . . .” (Motion, 2:15-18.) Plaintiff’s Motion to Re-Add was argued and denied by the court on September 4, 2019. On October 2, 2019, the “Order of Judgment” was filed.

The instant motion appears to improperly seek reconsideration of the court’s September 4, 2019 denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Re-Add, without complying with the requirements set forth in CCP § 1008. Additionally, “after entry of judgment, a trial court has no . . . power to rule on a motion for reconsideration. ‘A court may reconsider its order granting or denying a motion and may even reconsider or alter its judgment so long as judgment has not yet been entered. Once judgment has been entered, however the court may not reconsider it and loses its unrestricted power to change the judgment. It may correct judicial error only through certain limited procedures such as motions for new trial and motions to vacate the judgment.’” (Ramon v. Aerospace Corp. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1236, quoting Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1606.)

The motion, then, is denied for lack of jurisdiction.


[1] The motion was filed and mail/email-served on April 13, 2020 and originally set for hearing on May 20, 2020. On April 20, 2020, a “Notice of Continuance Due to COVID-19 State of Emergency Declarations” was filed, wherein the court, on its own motion, continued the hearing to July 10, 2020 at 10:00 a.m.; notice was given to all counsel. There is no indication on ecourt, as of June 30, 2020 at 10:24 a.m., that Qingyu and/or Gao were given notice of the July 10, 2020 hearing date/time.

Case Number: KC068561    Hearing Date: March 10, 2020    Dept: J

HEARING DATE: Tuesday, March 10, 2020

NOTICE: OK

RE: Qi v. Bluestar Express Group, Inc. (KC068561)

______________________________________________________________________________

 

Plaintiff Jiang Qi’s MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES, COSTS AND PREJUDGMENT

INTEREST

Responding Party: Defendants, Yidan Zhang and Bluestar Express Group, Inc.

Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Jiang Qi’s Motion for Attorneys Fees, Costs and Prejudgment Interest is GRANTED as follows: Attorney’s fees in the amount of $243,523.50 and prejudgment interest in the amount of $45,810.02.

Background

Wage/hour violations lawsuit. On June 29, 2016, Plaintiff Jiang Qi (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against Defendants Bluestar Express Group Inc. (“Bluestar”), Yidan Zhang (“Yidan”) and Does 1-20 for:

1. Failure to Pay Minimum Hourly Wages and Overtime Wages [Cal. Labor Code §§ 510, 1194]

2. Failure to Provide Meal and Rest Periods [Cal. Labor Code § 226.7]

3. Knowing and Intentional Failure to Comply with Accurate Itemized Employee Wage Statement Provisions [Cal. Labor Code § 226]

4. Waiting Time Penalties [Cal. Labor Code §§ 201, 203]

5. Unfair Competition [Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.]

6. Civil Penalties for Labor Code Violations [Cal. Labor Code § 558]

On August 19, 2016, Bluestar filed a cross-complaint, asserting a cause of action against Plaintiff and Does 1-20 for:

1. Breach of Contract

On September 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed six “Amendment[s] to Complaint,” wherein Tom Zhang was named in lieu of Doe 1, Tao Zhang was named in lieu of Doe 2, Qingyu Zhang (“Qingyu”) was named in lieu of Doe 3, Shuqin Gao (“Gao”) was named in lieu of Doe 4, Yang Zhao was named in lieu of Doe 5, and Ketian Yue was named in lieu of Doe 6.

On January 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed another “Amendment to Complaint,” wherein New Diamond Trucking, Inc. was named in lieu of Doe 7. On January 22, 2018, Plaintiff dismissed Qingyu and Gao without prejudice.

This case proceeded to trial on August 13, 2019. On October 2, 2019, an “Order of Judgment” was filed. On October 3, 2019, Judgment was filed. On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed and mail-served a Notice of Entry of Judgment.

Legal Standard

CCP § 1021 provides, in relevant part, that “[e]xcept as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties. . .”

“In any action brought for the nonpayment of wages, fringe benefits, or health and welfare or pension fund contributions, the court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party if any party to the action requests attorney’s fees and costs upon the initiation of the action . . .” (Labor Code § 218.6(a).)

“Notwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee if entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” (Labor Code § 1194(a).)

Discussion

Plaintiff moves the court for an order granting Plaintiff attorney’s fees, costs and prejudgment interest in the amount of $684,430.29 [i.e., $308,858.00 in attorney’s fees, plus a 2.0 multiplier, plus $16,369.34 in costs, plus $50,344.95 in prejudgment interest].

Entitlement to Fees

On October 30, 2019, Judgment was filed; Page 3, lines 9-13 state as follows: “Plaintiff shall recover $137,179.72 against Defendants BLUESTAR EXPRESS GROUP INC., NEW DIAMOND TRUCKING INC., YIDAN ZHANG, and TOM ZHANG a.k.a. TAO ZHANG, jointly and severally, plus pre-judgment interests as of June 29, 2016. Plaintiff is also entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.”

Bluestar and Yidan do not challenge Plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney’s fees. No other defendant has opposed the motion. The court determines that Plaintiff has established his entitlement to attorney’s fees based on Labor Code §§ 218.5 and 1194 and the quoted language in the Judgment.

Apportionment

 

“Attorneys fees need not be apportioned between distinct causes of action where plaintiff’s various claims involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories.” (Drouin v. Fleetwood Enterprises (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 486, 493.) Further, “[a]pportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney’s time into compensable and noncompensable units.” (Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 687.) “[A]pportionment . . . rests within the court’s sound discretion.” (Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 498, 505.)

Plaintiff concedes that Plaintiff’s third, fifth and sixth causes of action were withdrawn and that, as to the fourth cause of action, the court did not find that Defendants willfully failed to pay all wages due by January 15, 2016. Plaintiff, however, urges that Plaintiff’s fee award should not be reduced for lack of success on some claims because the claims involved a common core of facts. The court agrees. The court further notes that Bluestar and Yidan do not argue apportionment.

 

Reasonableness of Fees

The issue remaining, then, is whether the fees sought via this instant motion are reasonable. “[O]nce a party has established he or she is entitled to fees, the lodestar method is generally presumed to be the starting point in analyzing the appropriate amount of attorney fees. Under this method, a court first calculates the number of hours reasonably spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate for each billing professional, and then may adjust the amount based on various relevant factors to ensure the fee reflects ‘”the fair market value [of the attorney services] for the particular action.”’” (K.I. v. Wagner (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425 [citations omitted].) “Using the lodestar as the basis for the attorney fee award ‘anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of an attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.’” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-1394 [citation omitted].)

“[V]erified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

Again, Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $308,858.00. These attorney’s fees are broken down as follows:

Attorney Time Expended Hourly Rate

Anthony Chu 565.2 $395.00

Maureen Baker (“Baker”) 99.1 $350.00

Pamela Anderson (“Anderson”) 44.2 $350.00

James Howard (“Howard”) 120 $295.00

Plaintiff’s counsel Anthony Chu (“Chu”) has submitted a declaration, wherein he corroborates aforesaid hourly rates of counsel and attaches billing records. (Chu Decl., ¶¶3-8, Exh. 1.) Chu represents that he has 12+ years of litigation and trial experience in the area of employment law, that Baker and Anderson have extensive motion practice and civil litigation experience since 1993 and 2000, respectively, and that Howard has taken many civil cases to trial since 2013. (Id., ¶¶3 and 5-7.)

Based on the court’s own experience and knowledge, as well as on the experience and qualifications of counsel as set forth in Chu’s Declaration, and legal skills demonstrated in court, the court finds that the requested hourly rate of $395.00 for Chu as excessive. The court reduces Chu’s hourly rate to $295.00. The court also finds Anderson’s $350.00 hourly rate as excessive and reduces Anderson’s hourly rate to $275.00. The court reduces Baker’s hourly rate to $295.00. The court finds Howard’s hourly rate of $295.00 as reasonable.

As to the number of hours claimed to have been expended, Bluestar and Yidan claim a reduction of 75% is warranted. Plaintiff, in return, points out that Bluestar’s and Yidan’s requested reduction is excessive, given that Bluestar and Yidan only specifically challenge 92.5 hours, or 11.16% of the total time requested (i.e., 828.5 hours). (Opposition, 3:14-4:11; Reply, 3:19-23.) Bluestar and Yidan, moreover, generically complain, without more, that certain fees listed on pages 3-4 of their opposition are excessive. The court determines that Bluestar and Yidan have not met their burden in challenging any of the specific time entries.

Accordingly, the court will award a Lodestar of $243,523.50.

Multiplier

The court, however, declines Plaintiff’s request for a multiplier. “[T]he lodestar. . . may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, . . . (1) the novelty and difficult of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131-1132.)

Plaintiff concedes that “this matter did not involve extraordinarily unusual or novel points of law” (Motion, 10:19-20), but urges that a multiplier of 2.0 should nonetheless be awarded on the basis that counsel took the matter on contingency and that the economic damages were low. The court declines to award a multiplier on this basis.

 

 

Costs

 

Plaintiff’s request for costs is addressed via the memorandum of costs procedure.

Prejudgment Interest

 

Labor Code § 218.6 provides that, “[i]n any action brought for the nonpayment of wages, the court shall award interest on all due and unpaid wages at the rate of interest specified in subdivision (b) of Section 3289 of the Civil Code[1], which shall accrue from the date that the wages were due and payable . . .”

The October 30, 2019, Judgment specifically provides that Plaintiff is entitled to “pre-judgment interests as of June 29, 2016.” The calculation provided by Plaintiff is from January 15, 2016. It is 1,219 days from and including June 29, 2016 to and including October 30, 2019. Interest calculated based on these dates is as follows: $137,179.72 x 10%= $13,717.97, divided by 365= $37.58, x 1,219= $45,810.02. Bluestar and Yidan do not oppose the motion as to prejudgment interest. The court will award $45,810.02 in prejudgment interest.


[1] Civil Code § 3289(b) provides that “[i]f a contract entered into after January 1, 1986, does not stipulate a legal rate of interest, the obligation shall bear interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum after a breach.”