JERRY TORRES VS CHRISTIAN NAVARRO

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC624566    Hearing Date: November 27, 2019    Dept: C

TORRES v. NAVARRO

CASE NO.:  BC624566

HEARING: 11/27/19

JUDGE: RAUL A. SAHAGUN

#12

TENTATIVE ORDER

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint is DENIED.

Opposing Party to give Notice.

California recognizes “a general rule of…liberal allowance of amendments…” (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939.) It has also long been recognized that “even if the proposed legal theory is a novel one, ‘the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings.” (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048.) In light of great liberality employed when ruling on a motion for leave to amend, the court will not normally consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading since grounds for demurrer or motion to strike are premature. Thus, absent prejudice to the opposing party, courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint “at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial.” (emphasis added.) (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761.)

Notwithstanding the liberality associated with Motions for Leave to File an Amended pleading, Plaintiffs’ Motion is denied. DANIEL COLLARO was originally named as an individual defendant in this action, but a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend as to him after Plaintiffs’ were unable to allege sufficient facts to substantiate his personal liability. Trial is set for January 17, 2020, and the bulk of discovery has already occurred. Granting Plaintiffs’ request, at this stage in the litigation, would cause Defendants to suffer significant prejudice.

The Court notes that on November 12, 2019, Defendants FILED a Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Answer to the Third Amended Complaint. On the cover-page of their Motion, Defendants assert that the Motion for Leave is set for hearing on November 27, 2019. However, no such Motion is on calendar, and no reservation number or receipt has been provided with the Moving Papers.

Case Number: BC624566    Hearing Date: November 12, 2019    Dept: SEC

TORRES, et al. v. NAVARRO, et al.

CASE NO.:  BC624566

HEARING:  11/12/19

JUDGE: MARGARET M. BERNAL

#3

TENTATIVE ORDER

I. Defendant Collaro Property Management, Inc.’s motion to quash subpoena to Colony Specialty Ins. Co. pursuant to CCP 1987.1, or in the alternative to modify subpoena is DENIED.

II. Defendant Collaro’s motion to quash subpoena to State Farm Insurance pursuant to CCP 1987.1, or in the alternative to modify subpoena is DENIED.

Plaintiffs to give NOTICE.

Defendant Collaro Property Management, Inc.’s moves to quash the subpoena served on Colony Specialty Ins. Co. and individual Defendant Collaro moves to quash the subpoena served on State Farm Insurance pursuant to CCP 1987.1.

The operative Third Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Navarro entered the common area of Plaintiffs’ residence with his vehicle and ran over Plaintiffs while intoxicated. Plaintiffs have alleged claims against the Collaro Defendants for failure to terminate the tenancy of individuals who engaged in criminal activity.

If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands. (CCP 1987.1.)

The subpoenas seek “a copy of insurance Policy No. GL4067622, that was in effect on the day of the incident” and “any and all documents/electronically stored information that refer to, evidence, or reflect any and all reservation of rights under the policy, denial or refusal of coverage for Policy No. GL4067622, that was in effect on the day of the incident.”

Defendants contend that the “reservation of rights letters” (e.g. the reasons an insurer is denying coverage) are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

“Unless limited by order of the court ... any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved ... if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (CCP § 2017.010.) Admissibility at trial is not required. Rather, the test is whether the information sought might reasonably lead to other evidence that would be admissible. (CCP § 2017.010; see Davies v. Sup.Ct. (1984) 36 C3d 291, 301.) The 'relevance to the subject matter' and 'reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence' standards are applied liberally. Any doubt is generally resolved in favor of permitting discovery, particularly where the precise issues in the case are not yet clearly established. (Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790, fns. 7-8.)

It is unclear to this court why this information is not relevant to the action or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. The subpoena seeks any reservation of rights, denials or refusal of coverage that was “in effect on the day of the incident.” If the insurance carrier had denied prior claims or reserved certain rights based on Defendants’ actions, such may lead to the discovery of relevant evidence like notice or failure to perform.

Further, the information does not implicate Defendants’ right of privacy. Defendants have not articulated any privacy interests in the policies or the reservation of rights letters.

Finally, Defendants argue that the documents are privileged because they would “necessarily include case file notes, communications, and correspondence between Colony and Defendant, as well as counsel and others.” (Motion, 4:10-14.) However, this statement is speculative and is not supported by any evidence. Further, nothing in this statement suggests that the communications were in anticipation of litigation, or that there are any communications or notes made by counsel. If such a privileged communication exists, then Defendants may document the privilege with a privilege log.

The motions are DENIED.