This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/13/2019 at 00:27:07 (UTC).

JANET ROE VS DAVID PARK ET AL

Case Summary

On 04/01/2016 JANET ROE filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against DAVID PARK. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Pomona Courthouse South located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are PETER A. HERNANDEZ and DUKES, ROBERT A.. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****5789

  • Filing Date:

    04/01/2016

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • Courthouse:

    Pomona Courthouse South

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

PETER A. HERNANDEZ

DUKES, ROBERT A.

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner

ROE JANET

Defendants and Respondents

DOES 1-25

MCREYNOLDS CHELI

PARK DAVID

HACIENDA LA PUENTE UNIFIED SCHOOL

HACIENDA LA PUENTE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRIC

HACIENDA LA PUENTE UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST.

HACIENDA LA PUENTE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

ESTEY & BOMBERGER LLP

ESTEY ESQ. STEPHEN

ESTEY STEPHEN JOHN

Defendant Attorneys

WINET RANDALL LAWRENCE

WINET RANDALL L.

 

Court Documents

ANSWER?PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH

1/2/2018: ANSWER?PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH

REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

1/5/2018: REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

DECLARATION OF SERVICE [C.C.P. 1013A AND 2015.5]

1/31/2018: DECLARATION OF SERVICE [C.C.P. 1013A AND 2015.5]

DECLARATION OF STEPHEN J. ESTEY, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL AND DISCOVERY CUT-OFF DATE

1/31/2018: DECLARATION OF STEPHEN J. ESTEY, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL AND DISCOVERY CUT-OFF DATE

Motion to Compel

3/13/2018: Motion to Compel

Reply

4/4/2018: Reply

ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

4/11/2018: ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

Minute Order

4/11/2018: Minute Order

DECLARATION OF STEPHEN J. ESTEY, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS'ANSWER AND ENTER THEIR DEFAULT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO IMPOSE ISSUE SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANTS

4/19/2018: DECLARATION OF STEPHEN J. ESTEY, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS'ANSWER AND ENTER THEIR DEFAULT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO IMPOSE ISSUE SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANTS

MEMORADUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND ENTER THEIR DEFAULT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO IMPOSE ISSUE SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANTS

4/19/2018: MEMORADUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND ENTER THEIR DEFAULT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO IMPOSE ISSUE SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANTS

Memorandum

5/2/2018: Memorandum

Declaration

5/2/2018: Declaration

Proof of Service by Mail

5/3/2018: Proof of Service by Mail

Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore

7/23/2018: Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore

Supplemental Declaration

10/9/2018: Supplemental Declaration

Minute Order

10/29/2018: Minute Order

STIPULATION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DISCLOSURE OF STUDENT NAMES, CONTACT INFORMATION, AND DOCUMENTS PRODUCED IN LITIGATION

12/9/2016: STIPULATION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DISCLOSURE OF STUDENT NAMES, CONTACT INFORMATION, AND DOCUMENTS PRODUCED IN LITIGATION

PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF JURY FEE DEPOSIT

7/26/2017: PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF JURY FEE DEPOSIT

75 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 02/26/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department O, Peter A. Hernandez, Presiding; Jury Trial - Not Held - Advanced and Vacated

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  • 02/14/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department O, Peter A. Hernandez, Presiding; Further Status Conference (ReStay) - Held - Continued

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  • 02/14/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department O, Peter A. Hernandez, Presiding; Final Status Conference - Not Held - Advanced and Vacated

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  • 02/14/2019
  • Minute Order ( (Further Status Conference Re: Stay;)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/29/2018
  • at 08:31 AM in Department O, Peter A. Hernandez, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings - Held

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  • 10/29/2018
  • Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore; Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/29/2018
  • Order (Court's Ruling on Tentative); Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/29/2018
  • Minute Order ((Defendants, Hacienda La Puente Unified School District and Ch...)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/22/2018
  • Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint) (Re: Memorandum of Points and Opposition); Filed by Hacienda La Puente Unified School Dist. (Defendant); HACIENDA LA PUENTE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (Defendant); Cheli McReynolds (Defendant)

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  • 10/22/2018
  • Memorandum of Points & Authorities; Filed by Hacienda La Puente Unified School Dist. (Defendant); HACIENDA LA PUENTE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (Defendant); Cheli McReynolds (Defendant)

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193 More Docket Entries
  • 05/16/2016
  • ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

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  • 05/16/2016
  • Answer; Filed by Hacienda La Puente Unified School Dist. (Defendant); Cheli McReynolds (Defendant)

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  • 05/06/2016
  • Proof-Service/Summons; Filed by Janet ROE (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/06/2016
  • PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 04/01/2016
  • NOTICE OF RELATED CASE

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  • 04/01/2016
  • SUMMONS

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  • 04/01/2016
  • COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES

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  • 04/01/2016
  • Complaint; Filed by Janet ROE (Plaintiff)

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  • 04/01/2016
  • Notice of Related Case; Filed by Janet ROE (Plaintiff)

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  • 04/01/2016
  • Complaint Filed

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC615789    Hearing Date: November 30, 2020    Dept: O

INTRODUCTION

On August 25, 2020, Defendants Hacienda La Puente Unified School District and Cheli McReynolds (“HLPUSD” or “McReynolds” and collectively, the “Defendants”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Motion was made on the grounds that there are no triable issues of material facts that Defendants knew that Defendant David Park (“Defendant Park”) was a danger to Plaintiff Janet Roe (“Plaintiff”) and no triable issues of material facts that Defendant Park’s conduct was foreseeable to Defendants.

On October 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed her Opposition, and Defendants filed their Reply on November 4, 2020. A hearing was held on November 9, 2020 and the Court continued the hearing to November 30, 2020. At the hearing on November 30, 2020, the Court took the matter under submission. The Court now rules as follows:

FACTUAL SUMMARY

This action arises out of the alleged sexual assault of Plaintiff, a student at Los Altos High School, by a teacher, Defendant Park. Los Altos High School is part of Defendant HLPUSD and Defendant McReynolds was the principal of Los Altos High School. Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that Defendant Park repeatedly sexually assaulted Plaintiff against her will. (Comp. ¶ 8.) Defendants are only named in the Complaint’s Third Cause of Action, which alleges they were negligent in the supervision of Defendant Park while he was employed at Los Altos High School.

  1. THERE ARE NO TRIABLE ISSUES THAT THE DEFENDANTS KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN DEFENDANT PARK POSED A RISK OF HARM

  2. Defendants moving for summary judgment have met their burden of showing a cause of action has no merit if the defendants can show one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) “A defendant can satisfy its burden by presenting evidence that negates an element of the cause of action or evidence that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably expect to obtain evidence needed to support an element of the cause of action.” (Superior Dispatch, Inc. v. Insurance Corp. of New York (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 175, 186.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) The court must liberally construe evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

The salient element in the Third Cause of Action, Negligent Supervision, that Defendants focus on concerns whether Defendants knew or should have known that Defendant Park posed a risk of harm to students at Los Altos High School. (CACI 426; C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 702-03 (“In a cause of action for negligent supervision, plaintiff alleges [] that defendants, through their employees, knew or should have known of [school employee’s] ‘dangerous and exploitive propensities’ and nevertheless ‘failed to provide reasonable supervision’ over [him] and ‘failed to use reasonable care in investigating’ him.” (emphasis added).) Defendants contend that administrators or supervisors owe a duty to their students when the assailant’s conduct was reasonably foreseeable, but to determine as such, they must have actual knowledge of the “assaultive propensities of the assailant.” (See Motion at 9; Romero v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1082 (conduct that shows propensity for assault can be deemed foreseeable).)

The Court does not agree with such narrow construction. (D.Z. v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 210, 230.) In D.Z., the court held that “to support her claim, [plaintiff] had to prove both that [the school employee] posed a risk of harm to students and that the risk was reasonably foreseeable, i.e. that [the school district] knew or should have known of the risk.” (Ibid.) As Plaintiff points out in her Opposition, the primary case cited by Defendants for the use of the actual knowledge legal standard, Romero v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1068, has received negative treatment and more recent court decisions have refused to follow the reasoning of the Romero court. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1097; see also C.A., supra, 53, Cal.4th at 868; S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 543, 553-54.) Thus, this Court will apply the standard whether Defendants knew or should have known that Defendant Park posed a risk of harm to students and the risk was reasonably foreseeable to Defendants.

Defendants’ contends that they did not have actual knowledge of Defendant Park’s “assaultive propensities” toward Plaintiff. (See Motion at 7-10.) Defendants attempt to meet their burden by demonstrating facts that none of its administrators or supervisors had notice that Park was a danger to students. Plaintiff acknowledged that she never reported her relationship with Defendant Park to any school officials, the principal, or even her parents. (See Plaintiff Janet Roe’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“PSS”) 34 (incorporating Defendants’ Separate Statement).) Plaintiff also admits that Defendant Park did not say anything inappropriate to Plaintiff while she was in his class or do anything inappropriate to Plaintiff in front of the class or with anybody present. (PSS 9-11, 36.) There is also no evidence that any other school staff had any knowledge of any inappropriate relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant Park. (PSS 32.) It was only years after the incident, when another student came forward alleging sexual misconduct of Defendant Park that Plaintiff reported her relationship to the officials. (PSS 29-32). All the alleged sexual misconduct occurred when they were out of school, such as asking Plaintiff sexually explicit questions through text outside of school hours or touching and kissing her without her consent at his home. (PSS 12, 21.)

Therefore, Defendant has met its burden, and the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show a dispute of fact under section 437c.

The Court is now charged with determining if there are any material facts that demonstrate triable issues that would provide the Court to deny Defendants’ motion. In such a case, “all material facts must be set forth in the separate statement.” (LAUSD v. Torres Construction Corp., et al. (2020) ______. “[W]hen the fact is not mentioned in the separate statement, it is irrelevant that such fact might be buried in the mound of paperwork filed with he court, because the statutory purposes are not furthered by unhighlighted facts.” (Id. at ___ (citing North Coast Business Park v. Nielsen Construction Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 22, 30-31.) “The corollary for an opposing party, unless it wishes to advance additional disputed or undisputed material facts, is that it clearly indicates which of the facts contained in the moving party’s separate statement it disputes. (citation omitted.) Each party also must supply a ‘reference to the supporting evidence’ in its separate statement ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 437c, subd. (b)(1), (3)).” (Id. at ___ (citing Parkview Villas Assn. v. State Farm & Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1214) (emphasis added).)

After the hearing on November 9, 2020, the Court attempted to match the references in the PSS with the corresponding citation supporting each fact in her Opposition. For example, in support of her Opposition, Plaintiff contends that employees working for Defendant HLPUSD knew or suspected that Defendant Park may have been engaging in sexually inappropriate behavior with Plaintiff by citing to PSS 16, 17, 19 and 33. A review of the evidence in those statements do not support Plaintiff’s contention. For example, PSS 16 states “[Plaintiff] had lunch with [Defendant Park] everyday, and most of the time they were alone.” Defendant disputed this statement and stated that “Defendant Park asked [Plaintiff] to eat with him at lunch. She had lunch with him every day, and most of the time they were alone.” Both statements in PSS 16 cite to Plaintiff’s deposition but a review of the deposition testimony does not support Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant HLPUSD employees knew or suspected that Defendant Park may have been engaging in sexually inappropriate behavior with Plaintiff. Moreover, the statements themselves in PSS 19 and 19 do not support the assertion either. Finally, in PSS 33, Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ statements that Defendant McReynolds advised Defendant Park that it was inappropriate to give a student a purse and stated that a parent had called the executive assistant to the superintendent to inform them to “watch out” for Defendant Park. However, Plaintiff’s statement that Defendant Park bought an expensive purse for a student does not provide evidence that Defendant HLPUSD knew or suspected that Defendant Park may have been engaging in sexually inappropriate conduct with a student. Without more and “liberally construed” such an inference would create an unreasonable inference that would impugn bad motives to teachers who provided any gifts to their students.

Plaintiff also assert that a teacher, Mr. Ackerman “frequently observed Plaintiff alone with Defendant Park behind closed doors in his classroom” and cites to PSS 10, 18 and 36 in support of this statement. In support of this statement, Plaintiff cites to her deposition:

Q: So was Mr. Ackerman aware that you were spending lunches in Mr. Park’s classroom?

A: Yes.

Q: Did he talk to you about that?

A: No.

Q: But you would see him from time to time?

A: Yes.

(Plaintiff Janet Roe’s Notice of Lodgment of Exhibits in Support of her Opposition (“Lodgment of Exhibits”), Exhibit (“Exh.”) A at 42:15-21.)

Q: Okay. Did [Defendant Park] ever walk into Mr. Ackerman’s AP chemistry class during the first semester of your sophomore year and actually start talking to you?

A: Yes.

Q: How many times did that occur?

A: Maybe like four out of the – four or five out of the entire semester.

Q: When he would – when he would do that, when [Defendant Park] would walk in to Mr. Ackerman’s class and talk to you, what would he be talking about?

A: It was just kind of causal stuff, like “Hey, how it’s going? Do you understand this?”

Q: Okay. Did you ever have any discussions with Mr. Ackerman about [Defendant Park]?

A: Only that I sat in his class during summer – so

Q: In other words, the fact that you had – you had prepared for AP chemistry by sitting in [Defendant Park’s] class?

A: Yes

Q: Other than that conversation, did you ever have any discussions with Mr. Ackerman about [Defendant Park]?

A: No.

(Id. at 42:12-43:7.)

Q: Okay. Let me ask you a very broad question. Did [Defendant Park] ever do anything inappropriate to you with other persons present?

A: No.

Q: Okay. And you understand I’m – I’m saying this during the whole time that you dealt with [Defendant Park], did he ever do anything inappropriate with you that was in front of any other person?

A: In front of any other person directly?

Q: Yes.

A: -- or indirectly? Because there was a teacher also on the other side of [Defendant Park’s] classroom.

(Id. at 34:9-24.)

These citations do not provide admissible evidence that Mr. Ackerman frequently observed Plaintiff alone with Defendant Park in his classroom.

Finally, Plaintiff provided evidence attributable to another teacher, Mr. Hughes, that Defendant Park had improper infatuation with female students and general disinterest toward male students in PSS 16 and 17. However, again, the citations for these statements are supported by references to Plaintiff’s deposition. The Court did review the small “mound of paperwork” attached in Exhibit D of Mr. Hughes’s deposition and finds it only support the contention that Defendant Park had a general disinterest in his male students. (Id., Exh. D at 22:15.) Moreover, Mr. Hughes never saw Defendant Park acting inappropriate with a female student:

Q: [] Did you ever see [Defendant Park] interact with a female student in a way you thought there might be something more than teacher/student relationship?

A: No.

(Id. at 22:16-19.)

As a result, the Court finds Plaintiff has not presented evidence that suggests there are triable issues of material fact that Defendants knew Defendant Park posed a risk of harm to students or should have foreseen the risk of his alleged propensity to target female students.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion of Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Case Number: BC615789    Hearing Date: November 09, 2020    Dept: O

Defendants Hacienda La Puente Unified School District and Cheli McReynolds’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Introduction

This action arises out of the alleged sexual assault of Plaintiff by Defendant David Park (“Park”) while he was a teacher at Los Altos High School and while Plaintiff was a student at the school. Los Altos High School is part of Defendant Hacienda La Puente Unified School District (“Defendant School”), and Defendant Cheli McReynolds (“Defendant McReynolds”) was the principal of Los Altos High School. On August 25, 2020, Defendants Hacienda La Puente Unified School District and Cheli McReynolds (collectively “Defendants”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the third and only cause of action named against them for negligent supervision in the Complaint of Plaintiff Janet Roe (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff filed her Opposition on October 23, 2020, and Defendants filed their Reply on November 4, 2020. The Court held a hearing on November 9, 2020, and took the matter under submission. The Court hereby finds as follows:

Legal Standard

A defendant moving for summary judgment/adjudication has met his burden of showing a cause of action has no merit if the defendant can show one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) “A defendant can satisfy its burden by presenting evidence that negates an element of the cause of action or evidence that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably expect to obtain evidence needed to support an element of the cause of action.” (Superior Dispatch, Inc. v. Insurance Corp. of New York (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 175, 186.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) The court must liberally construe evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Foreseeability - Negligent Supervision

Defendants contend that they did not have actual knowledge of Park’s inappropriate conduct toward Plaintiff. Defendant attempts to meet its burden by demonstrating facts that none of its administrators or supervisors had notice that Park was a danger to students. Plaintiff acknowledged that she never reported her relationship with Park to any school officials, the principal, or even her parents. (DSS 34.) Plaintiff also admits that Park did not say anything inappropriate to Plaintiff while she was in his class, or do anything inappropriate to Plaintiff in front of the class or with anybody present. (DSS 9-11, 36.) There is also no evidence that any other school staff had any knowledge of any inappropriate relationship between Plaintiff and Park. (DSS 32.) It was only years after the incident, when another student came forward alleging sexual misconduct of Park that Plaintiff reported her relationship to the officials. (DSS 29-32). All the alleged sexual misconduct occurred when they were out of school, such as asking Plaintiff sexually explicit questions through text outside of school hours, or touching and kissing her without her consent at his home. (DSS 12, 21.)

Therefore, Defendant has met its burden, and the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show a dispute of fact under CCP § 437c.

Plaintiff contends that narrowly construing the legal standard to require that administrators or supervisors must have actual knowledge of the abuse for Defendant to trigger a duty to Plaintiff misconstrues the law because there is no such requirement: Defendant can also be held to have constructive notice through its other employees by the special relationship that exists between school personnel and the students within their care. (Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1855; John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438; M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, 518-519; Jennifer C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1320, 1329.)

The court agrees that such a narrow construction of duty to actual knowledge would not serve the public policy in preventing the sexual misconduct of teachers against students. (See also Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 526; Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, 751.) As Plaintiff points out in her Opposition, the primary case cited by Defendants for the use of the actual knowledge legal standard, Romero v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1068, has received negative treatment and more recent court decisions have refused to follow the reasoning of the Romero Court. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1097; see also C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53, Cal.4th 861, 868; S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 543, 553-54; D.Z. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 210, 230.) Thus, this court will apply the standard that has been used more frequently and with longer precedence in case laws on this matter, which is whether Defendants knew or should have known of the foreseeable risk to students of sexual abuse by an employee and inadequately supervised that employee.

Plaintiff demonstrates facts to show that other employees working for Defendant knew or suspected that Park may have been engaging in sexually inappropriate behavior with Plaintiff. (PSS 57-58.) One such employee was Mr. Ackerman [NO FULL NAME GIVEN IN PAPERS] who was another teacher of Plaintiff’s. (Disputed DSS 10; PSS 18.) Another was Mr. Hughes [NO FULL NAME GIVEN IN PAPERS], the Science Department Chair, who frequently expressed complaints and concerns to administration regarding Park’s behavior where Park would show disinterest in his male students, while giving too much attention to his female students. (PSS 16-17.) School district employees also regularly saw Park driving Plaintiff in his car. (PSS 66-67.) Defendant McReynolds also knew that Park had given an expensive purse to a different female student for her birthday. (Disputed DSS 33.)

Defendants also required Park and other employees to undergo yearly training regarding boundaries between students and teachers. (PSS 1-7, 12-13.) Defendants also had a policy at Los Altos High School stating that a teacher should not be alone one-on-one with a student behind closed doors, and required fellow teachers to report such instances. (PSS 8-9.) Defendant McReynolds took part in enforcing this policy by walking the halls to prevent students being alone with teachers behind closed doors, but Defendant McReynolds walked past Park’s classroom routinely during lunch periods. (PSS 10-11.)

Thus, Plaintiff has presented sufficient disputes of material fact as to whether Defendants lacked notice about Park’s alleged propensity to target female students, and therefore has shown that Defendants may have failed to appropriately supervise Park and protect Plaintiff from such harm. Because there is a dispute of fact whether Defendants knew or should have foreseen Park’s inappropriate behavior, summary adjudication on these issues would be improper. Thus, the motion is DENIED.

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