JACLYN JANG VS LEE DONG JUN

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC583700    Hearing Date: December 03, 2020    Dept: 40

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Dong Jun Lee

OPPOSITION: Plaintiff Jaclyn Jang

Plaintiff Jaclyn Jang (“Plaintiff” or “Jang”) filed a complaint against Defendant Dong Jun Lee (“Defendant” or “Lee”) over his 2004 film Clementine, which starred the actor Steven Seagal (“Seagal”). The gist of Jang’s claims is that she was hired to secure Seagal’s participation in film and to produce the film but did not receive the compensation she was entitled to for those services.

Lee has filed the instant motion to disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel Kenneth A. Weissman on the ground that he represented Lee and his company, Pearl Star Pictures Inc. (“Pearl Star”) , in hiring Seagal and during the production of the film.

Standard: Rule 1.9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct states that “[a] lawyer who has formerly

represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a

substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of

the former client unless the former client gives informed written consent.” (Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Rule 1.9 (a).) California Code of Civil Procedure section 128(a)(5) authorizes the Court to control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it. This authority includes disqualifying an attorney. People ex. rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) Cal. 4th 1135, 1145.

In ruling on a motion to disqualify the court considers and weighs: (1) the party's right to counsel of choice; (2) the attorney's interest in representing a client; (3) the financial burden on a client of change of counsel; (4) any tactical abuse underlying a disqualification motion; and (5) the principal that the fair resolution of disputes requires vigorous representation of parties by independent counsel. Mills Land & Water Co. v. Golden West Refining Co. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 116, 126. Whether an attorney should be disqualified is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Henriksen v. Great American Savings & Loan (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 109, 113. In exercising that discretion, the trial court is required to make a reasoned judgment which complies with the legal principles and policies applicable to the issue at hand. (Ibid.)

Analysis: Lee argues that Weissman previously represented him and his company, Pearl Star. Weissman drafted a power of attorney by which Jang acted as Lee’s attorney-in-fact and was authorized to enter into entertainment related contracts on his behalf. (Decl. Lee, Ex. A.) Lee asserts Jang as his attorney-in-fact hired Weissman to represent him and Pearl Star. Lee states that Jang’s claims – related to hiring Segal and producing the film – are the same matters Weissman was retained for.

Weissman argues that he represented Jang and Lee’s company Pearl Star Pictures, Inc., but did not represent Lee, citing Lynn v. George (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 630, 642, for the proposition that an attorney for a partnership does not have an attorney-client relationship with the individual partners, whose logic he argues equally applies to corporations and their members. Weissman also argues that there was no confidential communication between himself and Lee, as the latter does not speak or read English. Weissman states that he communicated with Lee by having Jang interpret and aside from that their only communication was simple greetings. Finally, Weissman argues that Lee knew since November 2018, that he was representing Jang and that there has been an unreasonable delay in filing this motion.

The Court will grant the motion to disqualify: Weissman concurrently represented Pearl Star and Jang, but the latter was Lee’s agent through the power of attorney and the agreement/contracts Weissman was retained to negotiate and draft were for the benefit of Lee. Essentially, Weissman represented Lee as Jang’s actions were performed on his behalf. Through this previous representation Weissman received confidential information and communications from Lee, which he would now use against Lee. There is a substantial relationship between Weissman’s past representation and Jang’s current claims regarding the compensation owed for her services. Although Lee delayed for two years in filing this motion, Jang has not demonstrated that she has suffered substantial prejudice because of this delay.

Conclusion: Respectfully, Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel is GRANTED.