This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/24/2021 at 22:30:34 (UTC).

DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN VS UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS AN

Case Summary

On 06/22/2016 DR LAUREN PINTER-BROWN filed a Labor - Wrongful Termination lawsuit against UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS AN. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are MICHAEL P. LINFIELD and CURTIS A. KIN. The case status is Not Yet Classified.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****4838

  • Filing Date:

    06/22/2016

  • Case Status:

    Not Yet Classified

  • Case Type:

    Labor - Wrongful Termination

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

MICHAEL P. LINFIELD

CURTIS A. KIN

 

Party Details

Petitioner, Plaintiff and Respondent

PINTER-BROWN LAUREN DR.

Respondents, Defendants and Appellants

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES

SVEN DE VOS DR

DE VOS SVEN DR.

SVEN DE VOS DR.

DOES 1 TO 100

PINTER-BROWN LAUREN DR.

Not Classified By Court

PITVOREC HEATHER

L.A. DEPOSITIONS INC

SAMPLES ROSA

L.A. DEPOSITIONS INC.

TEST PARTY FOR TRUST CONVERSION

BICAD CYNTHIA S

BICAD CYNTHIA S.

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Petitioner and Plaintiff Attorneys

SHEGERIAN & ASSOCIATES INC.

SHEGERIAN CARNEY R.

Respondent, Defendant and Appellant Attorneys

FITZGERALD BARBARA A. ESQ

WEISSKOPF STEPHEN D. ESQ.

RONK STEPHEN E.

 

Court Documents

PLAINTIFF DR. LAUREN PINTER-BROWN'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE TESTIMONY, OR REFERENCE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITA

12/29/2017: PLAINTIFF DR. LAUREN PINTER-BROWN'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE TESTIMONY, OR REFERENCE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITA

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 7 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF OR REFERENCE TO A SCRIPT ERROR IN THE TREATMENT OF A PATIENT

12/29/2017: DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 7 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF OR REFERENCE TO A SCRIPT ERROR IN THE TREATMENT OF A PATIENT

Minute Order -

2/8/2018: Minute Order -

JUDGMENT ON GENERAL VERDICT

3/22/2018: JUDGMENT ON GENERAL VERDICT

DEFENDANTS REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES OF $1,036,658.75, PLUS A LODESTAR MULTIPLIER OF 1.75, FOR A TOTAL OF $1,814,152.81

7/9/2018: DEFENDANTS REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES OF $1,036,658.75, PLUS A LODESTAR MULTIPLIER OF 1.75, FOR A TOTAL OF $1,814,152.81

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE: STIPULATION TO CONTINUE THE JUNE 2021 HEARING...)

6/9/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE: STIPULATION TO CONTINUE THE JUNE 2021 HEARING...)

PLAINTIFF DR. LAUREN PINTERBROWN?S MOTION INLIMINE NO.5 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF OR REFERENCE TO DR. DENNIS SLAMON?S NOBEL PEACE PRIZE NOMINATION. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AIJTHORITIES DECLARATION OF CA

12/19/2017: PLAINTIFF DR. LAUREN PINTERBROWN?S MOTION INLIMINE NO.5 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF OR REFERENCE TO DR. DENNIS SLAMON?S NOBEL PEACE PRIZE NOMINATION. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AIJTHORITIES DECLARATION OF CA

PLAINTIFF DR. LAUREN PINTERBROWN?S MOTION INLIMINE NO.7 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF OR REFERENCE TO A SCRIPT ERROR IN THE TREATMENT OF A PATIENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES DECLARATION OF CARNEY

12/19/2017: PLAINTIFF DR. LAUREN PINTERBROWN?S MOTION INLIMINE NO.7 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF OR REFERENCE TO A SCRIPT ERROR IN THE TREATMENT OF A PATIENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES DECLARATION OF CARNEY

Minute Order -

7/18/2017: Minute Order -

PLAINTIFF DR. LAUREN PINTER-BROWN'S EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION; VOLUME 2 OF 5

8/3/2017: PLAINTIFF DR. LAUREN PINTER-BROWN'S EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION; VOLUME 2 OF 5

 

Docket Entries

  • 10/04/2021
  • Hearing10/04/2021 at 10:00 AM in Department 72 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Jury Trial

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  • 09/24/2021
  • Hearing09/24/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 72 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Final Status Conference

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  • 07/27/2021
  • Hearing07/27/2021 at 2:00 PM in Department 72 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses

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  • 07/27/2021
  • Hearing07/27/2021 at 2:00 PM in Department 72 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses

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  • 07/27/2021
  • Hearing07/27/2021 at 2:00 PM in Department 72 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses

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  • 07/27/2021
  • Hearing07/27/2021 at 2:00 PM in Department 72 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery")

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  • 07/27/2021
  • Hearing07/27/2021 at 2:00 PM in Department 72 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses

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  • 07/27/2021
  • Hearing07/27/2021 at 2:00 PM in Department 72 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses

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  • 06/22/2021
  • Docketat 09:00 AM in Department 72, Curtis A. Kin, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses (to Special Interrogatories (Set Four)) - Not Held - Continued - Stipulation

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  • 06/22/2021
  • Docketat 09:00 AM in Department 72, Curtis A. Kin, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses (to Form Interrogatories-General) - Not Held - Continued - Stipulation

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601 More Docket Entries
  • 07/25/2016
  • DocketDeclaration; Filed by Defendant/Respondent

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  • 07/25/2016
  • DocketDECLARATION OF LISA M. CARRILLO REGARDING RE INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH MEET AND CONFER REGARDING DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 430.41 (A)(2)

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  • 07/12/2016
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

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  • 07/12/2016
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 07/12/2016
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

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  • 07/06/2016
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

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  • 07/06/2016
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/22/2016
  • DocketPLAINTIFF DR. LAUREN PINTER BROWN S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FOR: (1) DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IN VIOLATION OF FEHA; ETC

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  • 06/22/2016
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Lauren Pinter-Brown, Dr. (Plaintiff)

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  • 06/22/2016
  • DocketSUMMONS

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Tentative Rulings

b'

Case Number: BC624838 Hearing Date: August 5, 2021 Dept: 72

MOTION FOR LEAVE

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TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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Date: 8/5/21\r\n(2:00 PM)

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Case: Pinter-Brown v. University of\r\nCalifornia at Los Angeles et al. (BC624838)

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TENTATIVE\r\nRULING:

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Plaintiff Dr. Lauren Pinter-Brown’s Motion for Leave to File\r\na First Amended Complaint is DENIED.

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All requests for judicial notice are DENIED as irrelevant\r\nfor the disposition of this motion. (Mangini v. R.J.\r\nReynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063.)

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Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to file a First Amended\r\nComplaint to add five causes of action: (1) Failure to Prevent Discrimination\r\nunder the FEHA; (2) Violation of California Labor Code § 232.5; (3) Violation\r\nof California Government Code § 8547.10; (4) Violation of California Government\r\nCode § 8547.11; and (5) Violation of Mandatory Reporting Duty under Government\r\nCode § 815.6.

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Requests for leave to amend pleadings will normally be\r\ngranted unless (a) the party seeking to amend has been dilatory in bringing the\r\nproposed amendment; and (b) the delay in seeking leave to amend will cause\r\nprejudice to an opposing party. (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118\r\nCal.App.3d 486, 490.)

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The Court finds that plaintiff was dilatory in seeking leave\r\nto amend. As plaintiff admits, the new causes of action are based on facts\r\nexisting long before this motion, including facts contained in plaintiff’s\r\ndeclaration submitted in opposition to defendant The Regents of the University\r\nof California’s motion for summary judgment in 2017. (Reed Decl. ¶ 24; see\r\nalso Mot. at 5:9-12 [“Here, very few, new, factual allegations were added\r\nto her complaint, making it indisputable Plaintiff’s proposed causes of actions\r\nrest almost entirely on the same operative facts, i.e., the same general set of\r\nfacts, the same injury (discrimination, harassment, and retaliation at the\r\nworkplace), and the same instrumentality (Plaintiff’s employment with UCLA)”].)\r\nAccordingly, plaintiff was able to seek leave to amend before defendant moved\r\nfor summary judgment in 2017 or before trial in 2018. Moreover, remittitur was\r\nissued and filed with the Court on July 17, 2020. Nevertheless, despite\r\nplaintiff’s knowledge for the bases of the proposed new causes of action,\r\nplaintiff delayed until July 2021 to seek leave to amend, approximately three\r\nmonths before trial.

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Plaintiff explains the delay by stating that a new handling\r\nattorney recognized the viability of additional causes of action. (Reed Decl. ¶\r\n23.) That is insufficient to justify the multi-year delay in seeking leave.\r\nEvery associate at counsel for plaintiff’s office could communicate with their\r\nclient to obtain the basis for the proposed new causes of action. (Chadwick\r\nv. Superior Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 108, 116 [The imputed knowledge\r\ntheory holds that knowledge by any member of a law firm is knowledge by all of\r\nthe attorneys in the firm, partners as well as associates”].) Moreover, every\r\nattorney at counsel for plaintiff’s office could conduct research to allege\r\nevery plausible cause of action at the commencement of this action or, at the\r\nleast, before motions for summary judgment. (Smith v. Lewis (1975) 13\r\nCal.3d 349, 358, disapproved of on other grounds by In re Marriage of Brown\r\n(1976) 15 Cal.3d 838 [attorneys are expected “to possess knowledge of those\r\nplain and elementary principles of law which are commonly known by well\r\ninformed attorneys, and to discover those additional rules of law which,\r\nalthough not commonly known, may readily be found by standard research\r\ntechniques”].) “[E]ven if a good amendment is proposed in proper form,\r\nunwarranted delay in presenting it may—of itself—be a valid reason for denial.\r\n[Citation.]” (Huff v. Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732, 746,\r\ninternal quotations omitted.) Although plaintiff offers an explanation for the\r\ndelay in seeking leave to amend the pleading, based on the circumstances,\r\nplaintiff does not sufficiently justify the delay.

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The Court also finds that the delay in seeking leave to\r\namend would cause prejudice to defendant. Even if the proposed causes of action\r\nwere based on facts which defendant knew before this motion, defendant would\r\nstill possess the right and need to conduct contention discovery, file motions\r\nattacking the pleadings, and file dispositive motions. Indeed, plaintiff admits\r\nthat she sought new discovery in connection with bringing the proposed causes\r\nof action. (Reed Decl. ¶ 23 [“Thereafter, it was decided that Plaintiff would\r\nfirst uncover further facts to support the believed bases for the newly\r\nproposed cause of action via written discovery and depositions”].) Further,\r\ndefendant identifies various bases to challenge the proposed causes of action\r\nwhich would compel defendant to engage in additional discovery and motion\r\npractice while preparing for trial. The\r\nlitigation in this proceeding has lasted five years. Considering that plaintiff\r\nwas fully capable of presenting the proposed causes of action before the first\r\ntrial, forcing defendant to litigate new causes of action at this stage of the\r\nproceedings would be unduly prejudicial. Plaintiff maintains that “‘[i]f the\r\nsame set of facts supports merely a different [legal] theory . . . no prejudice\r\ncan result’ from an amendment of the pleadings.” (Mot. at 14 [citing Garcia v. Roberts\r\n(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 900, 910].) That standard,\r\nhowever, is relevant to whether the Court should permit amendment of the\r\npleadings in the midst of trial. Here, the\r\nCourt considers and evaluates the prejudice to defendant more broadly in view\r\nof all the circumstances, including the actions defendant must take to defend\r\nagainst the newly proposed claims. Based on the history of this proceeding, the\r\nadditional litigation required by the proposed causes of action constitutes\r\nunfair prejudice.

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The motion is DENIED.

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MOTION TO COMPEL

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FURTHER RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY (5)

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MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITIONS

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Date: 8/5/21\r\n(2:00 PM)

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Case: Pinter-Brown v. University of\r\nCalifornia at Los Angeles et al. (BC624838)

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TENTATIVE RULING:

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In five separately filed motions, plaintiff Dr. Lauren\r\nPinter-Brown seeks to compel further responses from defendant The Regents of\r\nthe University of California to: (1) Requests for Production, Set Four; (2) Special\r\nInterrogatories, Set Four; (3) Requests for Admission, Set One; and (4) two\r\nsets of Form Interrogatories. Plaintiff also seek an order compelling the\r\ndeposition of six witnesses.

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On July 27, 2021, the Court ordered the parties to meet and\r\nconfer further and issued guidance to assist the parties in meeting and\r\nconferring meaningfully. The Court ordered the parties to file a joint\r\nstatement indicating the discovery still at issue, if any, by four court days\r\nbefore the hearing, or July 30, 2021. The joint statement was filed on this\r\ndate.

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Based on the joint statement, the Court resolves the following\r\ndiscovery still in dispute.

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I. \r\nSTATUS OF AGE HARASSMENT AND AGE DISCRIMINATION\r\nCAUSES OF ACTION

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On July 27, 2021, the Court requested supplemental briefing\r\nconcerning whether the reversal of the judgment by the Court of Appeal in Pinter-Brown\r\nv. Regents of University of California (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 55 revived\r\nplaintiff’s age discrimination and age harassment claims, which is pertinent to\r\nthe extent of “me too” discovery to which plaintiff is entitled.

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With respect to whether plaintiff is entitled to “me too”\r\ndiscovery concerning age harassment, plaintiff dismissed this cause of action\r\nduring the trial. (Shao Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. G at 3301-3302.) “After the actual\r\ncommencement of trial, the court shall dismiss . . . any causes of action\r\nasserted in [the complaint] . . . with prejudice, if the plaintiff requests a\r\ndismissal, unless all affected parties to the trial consent to dismissal\r\nwithout prejudice or by order of the court dismissing the same without\r\nprejudice on a showing of good cause.” (CCP § 581(e).) Defendant did not agree\r\nto dismissal of the age harassment claim without prejudice, and the prior trial\r\ncourt did not dismiss the claim without prejudice upon a showing of good cause.\r\n(Shao Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. G at 3301-3302.) In plaintiff’s supplemental brief\r\nfiled on July 30, 2021, plaintiff appears to concede that the age harassment\r\nclaim is dismissed. (7/30/21 Pl. Supp. Brief at 1, fn. 1.) Accordingly, the\r\nCourt finds that plaintiff is not entitled to “me too” discovery pertaining to\r\nage harassment.

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With respect to whether plaintiff is entitled to discovery concerning\r\nage discrimination, plaintiff maintains that her age discrimination claim is\r\nrevived because the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment without\r\nqualification. (Pinter-Brown, 48 Cal.App.5th at 101 [“The judgment is\r\nreversed”].) Plaintiff cites to case law for the proposition that the effect of\r\nan unqualified reversal of judgment is that the case is remanded for trial and\r\nplaced in the same position as if the case had never been tried. (See, e.g., Weightman\r\nv. Hadley (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 831, 835.) Plaintiff also points to\r\nportions of the notice of appeal, opening brief, and reply brief indicating\r\nthat defendant appealed the entire judgment. (Reed Supp. Decl. Exs. 3-5.)

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However, “the rule that an unqualified reversal without\r\ndirections remands the case and sets it at large for further trial is a General\r\none.” (Stromer v. Browning (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 513, 518.) “The fact\r\nthat the rule we discuss is a ‘general’ rule implies that it has limitations.\r\nOne limitation is that a case is to be set at large for retrial only when that\r\nis the intent of the appellate court. ‘Judgment reversed’ at the end of an\r\nopinion is, of course, strong indication of such intent. But when the opinion\r\nas a whole establishes a contrary intention, the rule is inoperative. To hold\r\notherwise would be to make a fetish of form.” (Id. at 518-19.)

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In describing the issues considered on appeal, the Court of\r\nAppeal stated: “The jury found in favor of UCLA on the age discrimination\r\nclaims and Dr. Pinter-Brown does not appeal these verdicts. Accordingly, we\r\nomit discussion of the facts underlying these claims and the theories upon\r\nwhich both parties argued them”].) (Pinter-Brown, 48 Cal.App.5th at 60.)\r\nIndeed, because defendant prevailed on the age discrimination claim, defendant\r\nhad no reason to appeal the judgment as to this cause of action.

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The propriety of the judgment in favor of defendant with\r\nrespect to the age discrimination claim was never considered by the Court of\r\nAppeal. Accordingly, when the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment from which\r\ndefendant appealed, the Court of Appeal logically reversed the portions of the\r\njudgment that were adverse to defendant, i.e. the gender discrimination and\r\nretaliation claims.

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Moreover, plaintiff had her own obligation to appeal any adverse\r\njudgment, if she chose to do so. Cal. Rule of Court 8.104(a) states that a\r\nnotice of appeal must be filed by the earlier of 60 days after service of the\r\nnotice of entry of judgment or 180 days of entry of judgment. “‘Unless the\r\nnotice is actually or constructively filed within the appropriate filing\r\nperiod, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to determine the merits of\r\nthe appeal and must dismiss the appeal.’ [Citations.]” (Silverbrand v.\r\nCounty of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106, 113.) Plaintiff cites to Red\r\nMountain, LLC v. Fallbrook Public Utility Dist. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 333\r\nfor the assertion that she was not obligated to appeal the judgment of the\r\nage discrimination claim against her. (Red Mountain, 143 Cal.App.4th at\r\n351, fn. 12.) Red Mountain is inapposite because that case did not\r\ncontain any judgment in favor of the appellant, as opposed to the respondent. (Id.\r\nat 342-43 [judgment in favor of plaintiff respondent, appeal filed by defendant\r\nappellant].) Further, the age discrimination claim here is distinct and\r\nseverable from the gender discrimination claim because the protected class at\r\nissue in each claim is different. The two causes of action were “separately\r\npled, separately covered on the verdict form, and subject to separate\r\ninstructions.” (Valentine v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (1999) 68\r\nCal.App.4th 1467, 1479.) Plaintiff was not entitled to rely on the results of\r\ndefendant’s appeal in deciding to sit on her rights. The Court therefore has no\r\njurisdiction to retry the age discrimination claim.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that plaintiff is\r\nnot entitled to “me too” discovery pertaining to age discrimination.

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II. \r\nMOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUEST\r\nFOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET FOUR

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With respect to Request for Production (“RFP”) Nos. 234 and\r\n237, which seek documents related to internal UCLA audits of Clinical Research\r\nTrials conducted by male physicians, defendant notes that these documents were\r\nsought in RFP Nos. 114 and 115, which requested documents evidencing research\r\naudits that The Regents conducted on Dr. Sven de Vos and Dr. Dennis Slamon from\r\n2010 to the present. (Shao Decl. ¶ 19 & Ex. G.) However, RFP Nos. 234 and 237\r\ndo not contain any time limitation. To the extent that Nos. 234 and 237 seek\r\ndocuments before 2010, the Court finds that plaintiff is entitled to documents\r\nencompassed in the requests from June 2005 to December 2009, when plaintiff was\r\nemployed at UCLA. Plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery to show disparate\r\ntreatment with respect to the suspension of her research privileges based on\r\nher gender. (Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166\r\nCal.App.4th 952, 991 [plaintiff may present indirect evidence of intent,\r\nincluding that “similarly situated persons who were not members of the\r\nprotected class did not suffer the same adverse employment action”].) Plaintiff,\r\nhowever, is not entitled to documents from 2010 to the present because\r\nplaintiff failed to compel a further response to RFP Nos. 234 and 240. (Professional\r\nCareer Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 207\r\nCal.App.3d 490, 494 [“[I]t would be an absurdity to say that a party who fails\r\nto meet the time limits of section 2030 [to compel further responses to\r\ndiscovery] may avoid the consequences of his delay and lack of diligence by\r\npropounding the same question again. Such a construction of the statute would\r\nobviously encourage delay and provide no incentive to attempt to resolve any\r\ndispute with the opposing party”].)

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With respect to RFP No. 240, which seeks documents related\r\nto internal UCLA audits of Clinical Research Trials conducted by Dr. John\r\nGlaspy, while plaintiff previously asked for documents evidencing any research\r\naudits that ISPRC or JCCC conducted on Dr. Glaspy from 2010 to the present in\r\nRFP Nos. 110 and 113, RFP No. 240 is broader to the extent that there are other\r\norganizations within UCLA that conduct audits. Unlike Dr. de Vos and Dr.\r\nSlamon, plaintiff did not previously request documents evidencing research\r\naudits that The Regents conducted on Dr. Glaspy. Accordingly, plaintiff is\r\nentitled to a further response to RFP No. 240. However, the time period for\r\nproduction is limited to June 2005 to December 2015, the period of plaintiff’s\r\nemployment at UCLA.

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With respect to RFP Nos. 235, 236, 238, and 241, these\r\nrequests seek documents relating to Food and Drug Administration audits, not\r\npreviously requested documents concerning internal UCLA audits. As stated\r\nabove, plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery into disparate treatment concerning\r\nthe suspension of her research privileges. However, the time period for\r\nproduction is limited to the period of plaintiff’s employment from June 2005 to\r\nDecember 2015.

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With respect to RFP Nos. 239 and 242, these requests seek documents\r\nand communications relating to audit failures of Clinical Research Trials\r\nconducted by Drs. de Vos and Glaspy. As previously discussed, plaintiff is\r\nentitled to conduct discovery into disparate treatment concerning the\r\nsuspension of her research privileges. \r\nThe requested discovery may bear on that purported disparate\r\ntreatment. However, the time period for\r\nproduction is limited to the period of plaintiff’s employment from June 2005 to\r\nDecember 2015.

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With respect to RFP Nos. 247-250, which seek documents\r\npertaining to Audit Reports by Elaine Howle regarding sexual misconduct, “me\r\ntoo” evidence is limited to similar claims against the same individuals to show\r\nintent and motive. (Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children\'s\r\nFound. of Los Angeles & Ventura Ctys. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740,\r\n759-60.) RFP Nos. 247 and 250 are not limited to individuals, groups, or\r\ndecision makers whom plaintiff contends wronged her. Moreover, the subject of\r\nsexual misconduct is too removed from plaintiff’s claims of gender\r\ndiscrimination to be reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. No\r\nfurther responses are required for RFP Nos. 247-250.

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With respect to RFP Nos. 251 and 252, which seek records and\r\ninvestigation reports of Title IX investigations conducted between January 2013\r\nand April 2016, plaintiff is entitled to these documents relating to gender\r\ndiscrimination and only as to individuals, groups, or decision makers whom\r\nplaintiff contends wronged her.

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For the foregoing reasons, the motion is GRANTED as to\r\nRequest for Production Nos. 234-242, 251, and 252 with the limitations set\r\nforth above and DENIED as to Request for Production Nos. 247-250. Patient names\r\nand identifying information can be redacted to protect privacy concerns.

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III. \r\nMOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL\r\nINTERROGATORIES, SET FOUR

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With respect to Special Interrogatory (“SI”) Nos. 108-119,\r\nwhich seeks the names of individuals who worked with Dr. de Vos, plaintiff is\r\nentitled to the identification of potential witnesses who can attest to Dr. de\r\nVos’ intent and motive to discriminate based on gender. (Puerto v. Superior\r\nCourt (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249.) The 10-year time period stated in\r\nthe interrogatories is appropriate based on plaintiff’s length of employment\r\nwith defendant. However, defendant is not obligated to identify the\r\nindividuals’ race or national origin because plaintiff’s discrimination claims\r\nare not based on these protected classes.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to SI Nos. 120-129, which seek information\r\nrelated to audits on Clinical Research Trials, these interrogatories are\r\nprobative of disparate treatment with respect to the suspension of plaintiff’s\r\nresearch privileges based on her gender. (Nadaf-Rahrov, 166 Cal.App.4th\r\nat 991.) Even if the doctors who were audited were female, plaintiff would be\r\nable to compare the results of the audits of female physicians versus male\r\nphysicians. However, further responses shall be limited to audits involving individuals,\r\ngroups, and/or decision makers whom plaintiff contends wronged her. Further,\r\nfor SI Nos. 120-122, because plaintiff’s age-based discrimination and\r\nharassment claims were not revived on remand, defendant is not obligated to\r\nstate the doctors’ ages for these interrogatories.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to SI Nos. 145-149, which seek information\r\nrelating to gender related cases mentioned in Public Accountability Reports 1.0\r\nthrough 5.0, plaintiff is entitled to this information, but the information is\r\nlimited to individuals, groups, and/or decision makers whom plaintiff contends\r\nwronged her.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to SI Nos. 150-176, which seek information\r\nregarding workplace investigations conducted by Dr. Jan Tillisch, Dr. Alan\r\nFogelman, Dr. Judith Currier, and Dr. Janet Pregler, this information, including\r\nthe training for workplace investigations, are probative of the adequacy of the\r\ninvestigation into plaintiff’s complaints of gender discrimination. (See Mendoza\r\nv. Western Medical Center Santa Ana (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1344,\r\nciting Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243,\r\n278–283 [“inadequate investigation is evidence of pretext”].) The Court does\r\nnot limit these interrogatories to plaintiff’s claims of gender discrimination,\r\nas these interrogatories pertain to the relevant issue of whether these\r\nindividuals were qualified to conduct any sort of workplace investigations.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to Special Interrogatory Nos. 183-185, which\r\nseek a description of each audit conducted by the Data Safety and Monitoring\r\nBoard (“DSMB”) between 2005 and 2015, plaintiff may conduct discovery to\r\ndetermine whether the DSMB, by way of Dr. de Vos, had a role in the ISPRC’s\r\nsuspension of plaintiff’s research privileges. (Reeves v. Safeway Stores,\r\nInc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 100.) However, a description of each audit\r\ndoes not appear to be tailored to that purpose. These interrogatories shall be\r\nlimited to audits relating to plaintiff.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to Special Interrogatory Nos. 186 and 190-194, which\r\nseek the identification of doctors discussed in the specified depositions, plaintiff\r\nis correct that she may seek discovery using the separate and distinct method\r\nof special interrogatories, even if plaintiff did not move to compel further\r\nanswers from deposition. (Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993)\r\n14 Cal.App.4th 733, 738-39 [“A party is permitted to use multiple methods of\r\nobtaining discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under one\r\nmethod is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery\r\nunder another method”].) Accordingly, even if plaintiff failed to move to\r\ncompel further answers to questions in deposition, plaintiff is entitled to\r\nseek the same information via written discovery. Further, the requested\r\ninformation pertains to witnesses who may yield evidence relevant to\r\nplaintiff’s claims of disparate treatment regarding the suspension of her\r\nresearch privileges. However, no further response is required to SI No. 186\r\nbecause plaintiff did not allege that anyone from the UCLA Neurology Department\r\nwronged her.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to SI No. 187, Dr. Chmielowski’s date of birth\r\nand age are not relevant because plaintiff’s age discrimination and harassment\r\nclaims were not revived on remand. No further response is required to SI No.\r\n187.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

For the foregoing reasons, the motion is GRANTED as to\r\nSpecial Interrogatory Nos. 108-129, 145-176, 183-186, and 190-194 with the\r\nlimitations set forth above and DENIED as to Special Interrogatory No. 187.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

IV. \r\nMOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUEST\r\nFOR ADMISSIONS, SET ONE AND MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM\r\nINTERROGATORIES-GENERAL, SET ONE

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Plaintiff seeks further responses to Requests for Admission\r\n(“RFA”) Nos. 8-10, 12-23, 44-47, 80, 83, and 84 and the corresponding Form\r\nInterrogatory (“FI”) No. 17.1 as to these RFAs. Accordingly, the ruling\r\naddresses the motions concerning these RFAs simultaneously.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to RFA Nos. 8-16, 22, and 23 which seek\r\nadmission regarding whether certain situations comply with UCLA policies, “[a]\r\ndefendant\'s failure to follow its own policies or procedures may also provide\r\nevidence of pretext.” (Moore v. Regents of University of California\r\n(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 216, 239.) Thus, evidence relating to defendant’s\r\nfailure to adhere to its policies and procedures concerning gender\r\ndiscrimination is discoverable.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to RFA Nos. 17-20, which seek admissions\r\nregarding the requirements of specified policies, adherence to policies, or\r\nlack thereof, is relevant to pretext. However, with respect to RFA Nos. 17, 19,\r\nand 20, these admissions shall be limited to complaints and/or accusations of\r\ngender discrimination.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to RFA No. 21, which seeks an admission that\r\nstandard practice in the field of Human Resources requires that conclusions on\r\nallegations of wrongdoing should not be reached until the factual\r\ninvestigations have been completed, this is relevant to the adequacy of\r\ndefendant’s investigation into plaintiff’s complaints of gender discrimination.\r\n(Mendoza, 222 Cal.App.4th at 1344.) However, this admission\r\nshall be limited to complaints and/or accusations of gender discrimination.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to RFA Nos. 44 and 45, which seek admissions\r\nthat it is a conflict, or perceived conflict, of interest for a member of the\r\nISPRC against whom accusations of retaliation and/or discrimination have been\r\nmade to be involved in decision making affecting the privileges of the person\r\nmaking the accusations, these requests are relevant to plaintiff’s contentions\r\nregarding the inadequacy of the investigation into plaintiff’s clinical\r\nresearch trials, defendant’s adherence to ethical standards concerning\r\nworkplace investigations, and pretext. However, these admissions shall be\r\nlimited to complaints and/or accusations of gender discrimination.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to RFA Nos. 46 and 47, which seek admissions\r\nregarding the severity of suspension of research privileges, these requests are\r\nrelevant to the justification of defendant’s suspension of plaintiff’s research\r\nprivileges.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to RFA No. 80, which seeks an admission that\r\nplaintiff conducted clinical trials at UCLA Olive View Medical Center without\r\nincident, this request is relevant to the justification of defendant’s\r\nsuspension of plaintiff’s research privileges. Interpreting “without incident”\r\nas “without problem,” this request is clear and capable of a complete and\r\nstraightforward response.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to RFA Nos. 83 and 84, which seek admissions\r\nregarding Dr. de Vos’s second wife’s purported work with Translational Research\r\nIn Oncology (TRIO), a company where Drs. Slamon and Glaspy are involved, no\r\nfinancial privacy interests are implicated here. If Dr. de Vos is connected to\r\nan interest in TRIO, along with Drs. Slamon and Glaspy, this discovery is\r\nreasonably calculated to show possible motive to act against plaintiff.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

For the foregoing reasons, the motion is GRANTED as to Request\r\nfor Admission Nos. 8-10, 12-23, 44-47, 80, 83, and 84. Defendant shall admit or\r\ndeny the requests. To the extent defendant believes the questions pose\r\nincomplete and/or ambiguous hypotheticals, defendant shall admit so much as it\r\nbelieves to be true, deny so much as it believes to be untrue, and/or explain\r\nits lack of sufficient information or knowledge to answer the hypothetical\r\nposed, as required by CCP § 2033.220(b).

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

V. \r\nMOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM\r\nINTERROGATORIES-GENERAL, SET TWO

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 pertaining to\r\nRequest for Admission No. 7, which seeks an admission that when the Lymphoma\r\nProgram was moved to UCLA’s Santa Monica location, plaintiff and Dr. de Vos\r\nwere asked to share an office, despite management’s knowledge of plaintiff’s\r\npoor relationship with Dr. de Vos, defendant responded: “Responding party is\r\nunaware of the specific time frame this request is referring to and disputes\r\nthat Responding Party was aware at some juncture or should have been aware of a\r\n‘poor relationship’ between plaintiff and Dr. de Vos.” This response does not\r\ncomply with CCP § 2030.220. On the face of the request, defendant is capable of\r\nconducting “a reasonable inquiry” regarding when the Lymphoma Program was moved\r\nto UCLA’s Santa Monica location, as required by CCP § 2033.220(c). As\r\nrequired by CCP § 2033.220(a-c), if defendant disputes being aware of a poor\r\nrelationship between plaintiff and Dr. de Vos at the time the Lymphoma Program\r\nwas moved to UCLA’s Santa Monica location, defendant shall “[d]eny so much of\r\nthe matter involved in the request as is true” and, after conducting a\r\nreasonable inquiry into the matter, “[s]pecify so much of the matter involved\r\nin the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient\r\ninformation or knowledge.”

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

The motion is GRANTED as to Form Interrogatory No. 17.1\r\npertaining to Request for Admission No. 7, including all subsections to Form\r\nInterrogatory No. 17.1.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

VI. \r\nMOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITIONS

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to the deposition of Dr. Jan Tillisch, the\r\nCourt will review in camera documentation that defendant lodges to support its\r\ncontention that Dr. Tillisch is unable to competently sit for deposition.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to the depositions of Joyce Fried and Richard\r\nFinn, M.D., defendant agrees to produce these individuals for deposition.\r\nPursuant to the discussion in Section I above, the questioning and testimony\r\nshall be limited to plaintiff’s claim of gender discrimination only.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to the depositions of Jerry Kang (Vice\r\nChancellor for Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion) and Kathleen Salvaty (Title IX\r\nCoordinator), the testimony to be provided by these individuals is relevant to\r\ndefendant’s adherence to policies and procedures regarding handling of\r\ncomplaints of gender discrimination. Even if these individuals were not\r\ninvolved with plaintiff, they can testify based on their personal knowledge and\r\nexperience concerning UCLA’s handling of complaints of discrimination.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to the Person Most Knowledgeable regarding the\r\nUCLA HS 7313 policy, the testimony to be provided by this individual is relevant\r\nto the adequacy, or lack thereof, of Dr. Tillisch’s investigation of\r\nplaintiff’s complaints of gender discrimination. Lack of investigation may\r\nserve as evidence of pretext.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

The motion is GRANTED, subject to the Court’s determination\r\nregarding whether Dr. Jan Tillisch shall sit for deposition.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

VII. \r\nCONCLUSION

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses to\r\nPlaintiff\'s Request for Production of Documents (Set Four) to the Regents of\r\nthe University of California is GRANTED IN PART.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses to\r\nSpecial Interrogatories (Set Four) is GRANTED IN PART.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses\r\nfrom Defendant the Regents of the University of California to Plaintiff\'s\r\nRequest for Admissions is GRANTED.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Plaintiff’s First Motion to Compel Further Discovery\r\nResponses to Form Interrogatories-General (ID: 130829730574) is GRANTED.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Compel Further Discovery\r\nResponses to Form Interrogatories-General (ID: 859043100338) is GRANTED.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further\r\nDiscovery") is GRANTED, subject to the Court’s determination regarding\r\nwhether Dr. Jan Tillisch shall sit for deposition.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Within twenty-one (21) days hereof, defendant The Regents of\r\nthe University of California shall provide verified further responses, without\r\nobjection, to the written discovery for which the motions were granted, in\r\naccordance with the limitations and directions set forth above.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

With respect to the depositions, the parties shall meet and\r\nconfer regarding a deposition schedule.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

All requests for sanctions are DENIED.

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