This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 01/30/2021 at 00:44:03 (UTC).

DOUGLAS RANDALL ET AL VS CITIGROUP INC ET AL

Case Summary

On 11/05/2013 DOUGLAS RANDALL filed an Other - Complex Tort/Class Action lawsuit against CITIGROUP INC. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is HOLLY E. KENDIG. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****6888

  • Filing Date:

    11/05/2013

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Other - Complex Tort/Class Action

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

HOLLY E. KENDIG

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs and Petitioners

GENNARO MARK

HERNANDEZ ANTONIO

RANDALL DOUGLAS

RANDALL LOLITA

ROGERS MICHELLE

SEDILLOS MANUEL

ARCADI VICTORIA

ARCE JAIME

ARDALAN SHILA

BACKS MICHAEL

BAILEY KATHY

BAILEY THOMAS

BECKER DEBORAH

BOGDEN DIANA

CABRERA LORENZO

CABRERA ROSA

CANCHOLA DOLORES

CHAU STEVEN

CHRIPCZUK GEORGE

COFFEY SHIRLEY

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorney

BROOKSTONE LAW PC

Other Attorneys

AMAN KALLEY R. ESQ.

BRYAN CAVE LLP

MOYNIHAN KERRY ANN

SHAUMYAN ALFRED

LIVINGSTONE EVAN

 

Court Documents

Demurrer - without Motion to Strike

4/10/2020: Demurrer - without Motion to Strike

Declaration - DECLARATION OF KYLA D. WYATT

4/10/2020: Declaration - DECLARATION OF KYLA D. WYATT

Notice of Intent to Appear by Telephone

8/27/2020: Notice of Intent to Appear by Telephone

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

1/6/2014: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

2/4/2014: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

2/4/2014: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

4/28/2014: NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Minute Order -

8/21/2014: Minute Order -

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

9/10/2014: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

Minute Order -

9/29/2014: Minute Order -

NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL

3/4/2015: NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL

Minute Order -

5/12/2015: Minute Order -

Minute Order -

5/12/2015: Minute Order -

Minute Order -

6/12/2015: Minute Order -

Minute Order -

8/10/2016: Minute Order -

NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

2/7/2017: NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

2/7/2017: NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

ORDER ON COURT FEE WAIVER

2/15/2017: ORDER ON COURT FEE WAIVER

94 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 03/16/2021
  • Hearing03/16/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 78 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Demurrer - without Motion to Strike

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  • 03/16/2021
  • Hearing03/16/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 78 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Case Management Conference

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  • 01/29/2021
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Motion to be Relieved as Counsel)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 01/29/2021
  • DocketOrder Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil; Filed by Evan Livingstone (Attorney)

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  • 12/21/2020
  • DocketMotion to Be Relieved as Counsel; Filed by Evan Livingstone (Attorney)

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  • 10/23/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 78; Case Management Conference - Held - Continued

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  • 10/23/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Case Management Conference)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/23/2020
  • DocketDemurrer - without Motion to Strike; Filed by N.A., Citibank (Defendant)

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  • 10/23/2020
  • DocketDeclaration (OF KYLA D. WYATT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITIBANK, N.A.?S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF?S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT); Filed by N.A., Citibank (Defendant)

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  • 10/23/2020
  • DocketNotice (OF CONTINUANCE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE); Filed by N.A., Citibank (Defendant)

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191 More Docket Entries
  • 01/06/2014
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 01/06/2014
  • DocketNotice of Stay of Proceedings (Bankruptcy); Filed by Citigroup, Inc (Defendant)

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  • 01/06/2014
  • DocketNOTICE TO ADVERSE PARTY OF REMOVAL OF ACTION TO FEDERAL COURT

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  • 01/06/2014
  • DocketNOTICE OF STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

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  • 12/17/2013
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 12/17/2013
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons

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  • 12/17/2013
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 11/05/2013
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Douglas Randall (Plaintiff); Lolita Randall (Plaintiff); Mark Gennaro (Plaintiff) et al.

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  • 11/05/2013
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR: 1. INTENTIONAL PLACEMENT OF BORROWERS INTO DANGEROUS LOANS THEY COULD NOT AFFORD THROUGH COORDINATED DECEPTION IN THE NAME OF MAXIMIZING LOAN VOLUME AND THUS PROFIT COUNT 1- FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT; ETC

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  • 11/05/2013
  • DocketSUMMONS

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC526888    Hearing Date: January 29, 2021    Dept: 78

Case Number: BC526888    Hearing Date: August 31, 2020    Dept: 78

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 78

DIANA GRAY F/K/A DIANA BOGDAN A/K/A DIANA BOGDEN;

Plaintiff,

vs.

CITIBANK, N.A.; et al.

Defendants.

Case No.:

BC526888

Hearing Date:

August 31, 2020

[TENTATIVE] RULING RE:

DEFENDANT CITIBANK, N.A.’S DEMURRER TO the COMPLAINT

Citibank, N.A.’s Demurrer to the Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend; and OVERRULED as to the First and Fifth Causes of Action.

Factual Background

This is a foreclosure/fraud/wrongful debt collection action. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges as follows. In November 2006, Plaintiff Diana Gray f/k/a Diana Bogden (“Bogden”) entered into negotiations to purchase a residential property in West Hollywood (the “Property”). (FAC ¶ 12.) Bogden spoke with non-party Jana Kohl (“Kohl”) of First Financial Mortgage, a financial advisor with a special relationship with Defendant Citibank, N.A. (“Citibank”). (FAC ¶¶ 13-15.) Kohl was an agent for Citibank and she arranged two loans for Bogden for the Property and made various representations to Bogden regarding the loans including that the loans were the best that she could get, that they were affordable, and that Bogden would be able to re-finance them. (FAC ¶¶ 20-27.) The FAC alleges that the representations were false and that Kohl inflated Bogden’s income to allow her to qualify. (FAC ¶¶ 26-35.) Bogden later tried to re-finance the loans to better terms but could not and filed an action in May 2012 with other plaintiffs against Citibank, but the case was dismissed by Plaintiffs’ attorney. (FAC ¶¶ 39-43.) Citibank charged Bogden various fees between 2010 and 2010 of $15-20 per month that were not authorized by the contract. (FAC ¶ 55.) Bogden defaulted on her payments, but Citibank never sent Bogden the required notice has continued to charge her “inspection” and “bankruptcy” fees. (FAC ¶¶ 54-57.)

procedural history

Citibank has failed to provide any procedural history in its Demurrer. The Court deduces the following history from its records.

Bogden and numerous other Plaintiffs filed Complaint on November 5, 2013, alleging five causes of action with 24 “counts” against Citibank and various other Defendants:

  1. Intentional placement of borrowers into dangerous loans they could not afford through coordinated deception in the name of maximizing loan volume and thus profit

    1. Fraudulent concealment

    2. Intentional misrepresentation

    3. Negligent misrepresentation

    4. Negligence

    5. Unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices

  2. Individual appraisal inflation

    1. Intentional misrepresentation

    2. Negligent misrepresentation

    3. Negligence

    4. Unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices

  3. Market fixing

    1. Fraudulent concealment

    2. Negligence

    3. Price fixing

    4. Unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices

  4. Deception in loan modifications

    1. Collection of debt after foreclosure

    2. Fraudulent concealment

    3. Intentional misrepresentation

    4. Negligent misrepresentation

    5. Recission of contract

    6. Breach of contract

    7. Violation of Crier Rule

    8. Unfair debt collection practices

    9. Unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices

  5. Intentional unauthorized foreclosures pursued in the name of profit

    1. Wrongful foreclosure

    2. Unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices

On September 10, 2014, Citibank and other Defendants filed a Demurrer to the Complaint.

Plaintiffs’ counsel did not file an Opposition.

On May 12, 2015, the Court in Dept. 42 dismissed the claims of all Plaintiffs except plaintiff Earl Luevano without prejudice after the Plaintiffs’ did not file a timely file an amended complaint.

On July 15, 2015, Luevano requested Dismissal of the Complaint without prejudice.

On July 21, 2015, the instant Plaintiff, Bogden filed a Motion for Reconsideration because plaintiffs’ counsel was suspended from the bar and ceased acting as counsel. The Motion states that Plaintiffs’ counsel was suspended from the bar by at least May 17, 2015.

On August 10, 2016, the court denied the request to vacate orders of dismissal.

On October 7, 2016, Bogden filed a Notice of Appeal.

On July 31, 2019, the Court received a remittitur from the Courts of Appeal, reversing the dismissal as to Bogden against Citibank, N.A., Citigroup, Inc., Citi Residential Lending, Inc., CitiMortgage Inc., Associates First Capital Corpl., and CR Title Services (collectively Citibank) and ordered Citibank to pay Bogden’s costs on appeal.

On February 20, 2020, Bogden filed the FAC, alleging six causes of action against Citibank, N.A. and Does 1-10:

  1. Breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

  2. Fraud

  3. Negligence

  4. Breach of fiduciary duty

  5. Violation of unfair debt collection practices act

  6. Violation of unfair competition law

On April 10, 2020, Citibank filed the instant Demurrer to the FAC.

On August 18, 2020, Bodgen filed an Opposition.

On August 24, 2020, Citibank filed a Reply.

Discussion

  1. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c) and (h).)

Citibank requests judicial notice as to two Deeds of Trust recorded on November 22, 2006. The Court GRANTS these requests.

Bogden requests judicial notice of the minutes of this case dated May 12, 2015. The Court GRANTS this request.

  1. DEMURRER

A demurrer should be sustained only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 430.30, et seq.) In particular, as is relevant here, a court should sustain a demurrer if a complaint does not allege facts that are legally sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See id. § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) Cal.3d 311: “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Id. at p. 318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. [Citation.]”)

“In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer … if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Such demurrers “are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.)

A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)

Citibank demur to all three causes of action.

  1. Statute of Limitations

Citibank argues that the Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action are time-barred. (Notice at pp. 1-2.)

Statute of Limitations

For the Second Cause of Action, there is a three-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d.)¿

For the Third Cause of Action, “A cause of action for professional negligence is generally governed by the two-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 339, subdivision (1) for an ‘action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing.’ [Citations.] ... The ... two-year statute of limitations ... has been consistently applied to a range of professional negligence actions from those against accountants to those against real estate appraisers. [Citation].” (Cyr v. McGovran (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 645, 651.)

For the Fourth Cause of Action, the “Code of Civil Procedure does not specify a statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty. The cause of action is therefore governed by the residual four-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 343 governing ‘[a]n action for relief not hereinbefore provided for’ in the code. (Thomson v. Canyon (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 594, 606.)

For the Sixth Cause of Action, the three-year statute of limitations for fraud applies because Citibank challenges it “to the extent it is based on the fraudulent loan origination allegations.” (Motion Notice at p. 2.)

Here, the Complaint was filed on November 5, 2013 and the actions in these causes of action are alleged to have taken place in November 2006 by Kohl when Bogden purchased the Property. Accordingly, on its face, all causes of action would be time-barred by 2010 at the latest.

Discovery Rule

Because these claims would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule, the Plaintiff must plead facts to show that the discovery rule applies. 

On a demurrer, the court must take as true statements such as that as plaintiff “did not discover, nor suspect, nor was there any means through which her reasonable diligence would have revealed, or through which she would have suspected,” the cause of an injury was the defendant in question. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797811.) However: “A plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.” (Id. at p. 808.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer. (Ibid.)

The “discovery rule. . . postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” (Id. 807.) “A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she ‘has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements.’” (Ibid.) Courts “look to whether the plaintiffs have reason to at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing has injured them.” (Ibid.) The accrual of a cause of action in relation to the discovery rule is normally a question of fact. (Id. at 810.)

Here, the FAC alleges that Bogden did not “discover the actual nature of the loans on her property until September 2011, when plaintiff’s attorney, Brookstone Law, reviewed the documents and explained to plaintiff the actual characteristics of plaintiff’s loans.” (FAC ¶ 38.) Bodgen alleges that Kohl made misrepresentations regarding the nature of the loans and rushed her through the signing process without time to read the contract. (FAC ¶¶ 31-36.)

These allegations, alone, are not sufficient to overcome the limitations bar: “[W]hen a plaintiff relies on the discovery rule or allegations of fraudulent concealment, as excuses for an apparently belated filing of a complaint, ‘the burden of pleading and proving belated discovery of a cause of action falls on the plaintiff.’” (Czajkowski v. Haskell & White, LLP (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 166, 174 citing Investors Equity Life Holding Co. v. Schmidt (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1533.)

The standard is¿not¿whether¿plaintiff¿actually suspected¿the improper conduct/cause of action, but whether a reasonably prudent person would have been put on notice to investigate:¿A plaintiff is required to undertake a reasonable and diligent investigation. (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services,¿supra,¿153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1322.) “Subjective suspicion” is not required to start the statute of limitations, but rather the period begins “once the¿plaintiff has notice or information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry.” (Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp.¿(1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1125, 1150.)¿“If a person becomes aware of facts which would make a reasonably prudent person suspicious, he or she has a duty to investigate further and is charged with knowledge of matters which would have been revealed by such an investigation.” (Id.)¿

In this case, Bodgen signed the mortgage documents in November 2006, but the FAC does not plead any facts as to why Bogden did not bother to read the documents for nearly five years until her attorney read them in September 2011. The allegation that – “Because Plaintiff believed Kohn was her financial advisor, plaintiff believed there was no need to review any of the loan documents to verify the accuracy of Kohl’s representations” – does not exempt Bodgen from her responsibility to undertake a reasonable and diligent investigation. Bogden presumably was on-notice of the information regarding her loans from the moment she signed them. “[T]he law effectively presumes that everyone who signs a contract has read it thoroughly, whether or not that is true.” (Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 87, 93, as modified (Sept. 18, 2013).) “Moreover, courts must also presume parties understood the agreements they sign, and that the parties intended whatever the agreement objectively provides, whether or not they subjectively did.” (Id.)

The FAC does not allege any facts between 2006 and 2011. However, even if Bodgen did not read or understand the contract, if the principal balance would not “pay down” during the first five years of the loan, as Bodgen alleges (FAC ¶ 26), then Bogden should have been on-notice shortly after signing by noticing that the balance was not dropping despite making payments.

Accordingly, the Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action are time-barred. The Demurrer to the Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

  1. First Cause of Action – Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith

The implied covenant of good faith operates “as a supplement to the express contractual covenants, to prevent a contracting party from engaging in conduct which (while not technically transgressing the express covenants) frustrates the other party's rights to the benefits of the contract.” (Cobb v. Ironwood Country Club (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 960, 966.) 

Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing “involves something beyond breach of the contractual duty itself and it has been held that bad faith implies unfair dealing rather than mistaken judgment.” (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1394, as modified on denial of reh'g (Oct. 31, 2001).) 

The FAC alleges that Citi beached this implied covenant by charging Plaintiff between 2010 and 2020 “various charges not permitted by the contract including inspecting fees and bankruptcy fees which were either not permitted by the contract, or defendant did not give plaintiff the required notice of these fees and charges.” (FAC ¶ 64.) The FAC further alleges that Citi breached the covenant by not considering Bogden’s loan modification application. (FAC ¶ 76.)

Citibank argues that the assessed fees are permitted by the Deed of Trust and thus “cannot serve as the factual predicate for any claim under the implied covenant.” (Motion at p. 5.) Citibank also contends that a lender has no duty to modify a loan. (Motion at p. 5.)

The Court finds that the FAC has sufficiently pleaded a cause of action. Whether the assessed fees were permitted under the loan terms, and the circumstances surrounding whether Citibank “refused to consider Plaintiffs loan modification” are determinations of fact that are not appropriate on demurrer. The Deed of Trust sections cited by Citibank, allegedly entitling it to assess the fees (RJN, Exh. A, ¶¶ 7, 9), do not plainly on their face authorize assessments without a determination of fact as to the surrounding circumstances. Accordingly, the FAC states a claim for a breach of implied covenant of good faith.

The Demurrer to the First Cause of Action is OVERRULED.

  1. Fifth Cause of Action – Unfair Debt Collection Practices Act

Citibank argues that the Fifth Cause of Actions fails as a matter of law because Citibank is not a “debt collector” as required under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “FDCPA”). (Motion at p. 10.) Citibank contends that loan servicer is not a debt collector if it acquired the loan before default. (Motion at p. 10.)

The FDCPA prohibits unfair and deceptive practices, sets forth the responsibilities of debtors and the obligations of debt collectors, and provides remedies for violation. (Civil Code §§ 1788, et seq.)

“The FDCPA defines ‘debt collector’ in relevant part as ‘any person who uses an instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.’ (15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).)” (Fonteno v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1375.)

The Court disagrees with Citibank, however, that it cannot be a debt collector, and that residential mortgages are not applicable debt, as a matter of law. (Reply at p. 8.) Recent case law holds that the Act’s “definition of ‘debt collector’ applies to a mortgage servicer who engages in debt collection practices in attempting to obtain repayment of mortgage debt[.]” (Davidson v. Seterus, Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 283, 304, review denied (June 13, 2018).) “Indeed, mortgage debt has been held to constitute consumer debt, the collection of which may be governed by the FDCPA.” (Id. at 298.) According, residential mortgage servicers may be “debt collectors,” residential mortgages are “consumer debt,” and whether Citibank is a debt collector in this case is a determination of fact not appropriate on demurrer.

Citibank also reiterates its argument that Citibank did not violate the Act because the “inspection fees” were permitted by the Deed of Trust. (Motion at p. 10.) However, as discussed above, whether these fees were permitted by the Deed of Trust is a determination of fact.

The FAC alleges that Citibank violated the FDCPA by “repeatedly sending Plaintiff statements charging plaintiff for amounts which were not permitted by contract or were charged without proper notice[.]” (FAC ¶ 123.) The FAC further alleges that Citibank violated the Act by sending plaintiff communications about a time barred debt without notifying her that collection of the debt was time barred. (FAC ¶ 124.)

The Court finds that the FAC sufficiently alleges a cause of action for violations of the FDCPA.

Accordingly, the Demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action is OVERRULED.

DATED: August 31, 2020 ________________________________

Hon. Robert S. Draper

Judge of the Superior Court

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