This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 12/07/2019 at 05:27:16 (UTC).

DOLORES FRAIRE ET AL VS JGR TRANSPORT LLC ET AL

Case Summary

On 09/13/2016 DOLORES FRAIRE filed a Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle lawsuit against JGR TRANSPORT LLC. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are GREGORY KEOSIAN, ELAINE LU, BENNY C. OSORIO, WILLIAM F. FAHEY and DEBORAH L. CHRISTIAN. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****0977

  • Filing Date:

    09/13/2016

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

GREGORY KEOSIAN

ELAINE LU

BENNY C. OSORIO

WILLIAM F. FAHEY

DEBORAH L. CHRISTIAN

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs

FRAIRE RICHARD

FRAIRE RUBEN ANTHONY

FRAIRE DOLORES

FRAIRE DIANE

Defendants and Respondents

GALICIA SAUL

CONTAINER FREIGHT LINE INC.

RLP TRUCKING INC. (DOE 1)

PHIPPS RICHARD LEE (DOE 2)

DOES 1 THROUGH 100

PERIODIC INSPECTIONS (DOE 3)

RCS TRANSPORTATION LLC

RCS COASTER RIDES LLC (DOE 5)

JGR TRANSPORT LLC

JOHNSON BRETT (DOE 4)

RCS ENTERTAINMENT LLC

PHIPPS RICHARD LEE DOE 2

JOHNSON BRETT DOE 4

RLP TRUCKING INC. DOE 1

Cross Plaintiffs

ESTATE OF RUBEN MACARIO FRAIRE

RCS TRANSPORTATION LLC

RCS ENTERTAINMENT LLC

Decedent

FRAIRE RUBEN MACARIO

2 More Parties Available

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Cross Plaintiff Attorneys

SCOLINOS SHELDON & NEVELL

WEINER MARK R. ESQ.

JENSEN BOYD F. II

Defendant and Respondent Attorneys

ROBERT J. LYNCH

ERICKSEN ARBUTHNOT

JENSEN BOYD F. II

LEE VICTOR A. ESQ.

MANNING & KASS ELLROD RAMIREZ TRESTER

LYNCH ROBERT J.

ARBUTHNOT ERICKSEN

 

Court Documents

Notice - NOTICE CONTAINER FREIGHT LINE, INC.'S NOTICE OF TAKING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RULING ON MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT, OFF-CALENDAR

4/29/2020: Notice - NOTICE CONTAINER FREIGHT LINE, INC.'S NOTICE OF TAKING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RULING ON MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT, OFF-CALENDAR

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (JURY TRIAL)

3/17/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (JURY TRIAL)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING THIRD PARTY TO COMPLY ...)

3/2/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING THIRD PARTY TO COMPLY ...)

Order - ORDER [PROPOSED] ORDER REQUIRING T-MOBILE AND METRO BY T-MOBILE TO PRODUCE CELL PHONE RECORDS

3/2/2020: Order - ORDER [PROPOSED] ORDER REQUIRING T-MOBILE AND METRO BY T-MOBILE TO PRODUCE CELL PHONE RECORDS

Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore

1/31/2020: Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore

Motion for Order - MOTION FOR ORDER PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING T-MOBILE AND METRO BY T-MOBILE TO PRODUCE CELL PHONE RECORDS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; D

2/3/2020: Motion for Order - MOTION FOR ORDER PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING T-MOBILE AND METRO BY T-MOBILE TO PRODUCE CELL PHONE RECORDS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; D

Exhibit List - EXHIBIT LIST JOINT

1/22/2020: Exhibit List - EXHIBIT LIST JOINT

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER CONTINUING TRIAL...)

1/7/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER CONTINUING TRIAL...)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (STATUS CONFERENCE)

7/16/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (STATUS CONFERENCE)

Notice of Related Case

3/5/2019: Notice of Related Case

SUMMONS -

9/12/2016: SUMMONS -

Minute Order -

6/5/2017: Minute Order -

ORDER RE: MOTION TO TRANSFER ACTION TO THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

9/15/2017: ORDER RE: MOTION TO TRANSFER ACTION TO THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT -

12/14/2017: AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT -

AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT

2/21/2018: AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT

PLAINTIFFS' PROOF OF SERVICE OF MINUTES ENTERED 04/19/18

5/9/2018: PLAINTIFFS' PROOF OF SERVICE OF MINUTES ENTERED 04/19/18

CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT -

5/23/2018: CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT -

DECLARATION OF TODD F. NEVELL IN OPPOSITION TO RCS DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

5/24/2018: DECLARATION OF TODD F. NEVELL IN OPPOSITION TO RCS DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

179 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 06/23/2020
  • Hearing06/23/2020 at 14:00 PM in Department 61 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Trial Setting Conference

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  • 04/29/2020
  • DocketNotice (Container Freight Line, Inc.'s Notice of Taking Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling on Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement, OFF-CALENDAR); Filed by Container Freight Line, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 04/21/2020
  • Docketat 09:00 AM in Department 61, Gregory Keosian, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration - Not Held - Rescheduled by Court

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  • 04/21/2020
  • Docketat 09:00 AM in Department 61, Gregory Keosian, Presiding; Trial Setting Conference - Not Held - Rescheduled by Court

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  • 04/13/2020
  • DocketNotice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order; Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/13/2020
  • DocketNotice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order; Filed by Clerk

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  • 03/18/2020
  • DocketMotion for Reconsideration; Filed by Container Freight Line, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 03/17/2020
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 61, Gregory Keosian, Presiding; Jury Trial - Not Held - Rescheduled by Court

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  • 03/17/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Jury Trial)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 03/17/2020
  • DocketSubstitution of Attorney; Filed by RCS Transportation, LLC (Defendant)

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309 More Docket Entries
  • 09/28/2016
  • DocketDeclaration; Filed by Dolores Fraire (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/28/2016
  • DocketDECLARATION OF DILIGENCE

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  • 09/28/2016
  • DocketProof of Service

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  • 09/26/2016
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Dolores Fraire (Plaintiff); Diane Fraire (Plaintiff); Ruben Anthony Fraire (Plaintiff) et al.

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  • 09/26/2016
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 09/26/2016
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 09/20/2016
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Dolores Fraire (Plaintiff); Diane Fraire (Plaintiff); Ruben Anthony Fraire (Plaintiff) et al.

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  • 09/13/2016
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Ruben Macario Fraire (Legacy Party); Dolores Fraire (Plaintiff); Diane Fraire (Plaintiff) et al.

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  • 09/12/2016
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 09/12/2016
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FOR: (1) NEGLIGENCE (WRONGFUL DEATH); ETC

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC630977    Hearing Date: March 02, 2020    Dept: 61

Plaintiffs Dolores Fraire, Diane Fraire, Ruben Anthony Fraire, and Richard Fraire’s Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoena from T-Mobile and Metro by T-Mobile is GRANTED as to a log of incoming and outgoing calls and text messages for a timeframe of 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Pacific time on September 30, 2015, for the number (562) 271-3620.

  1. MOTION TO COMPEL — DEPOSITION SUBPOENA

“If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1, subd. (a).) A party may bring a motion under this section. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1, subd. (b)(1).)

Plaintiffs have subpoenaed T-Mobile and Metro by T-Mobile for the production of Defendant Saul Galicia’s cell phone records from September 27 through September 30, 2015. (Nevell Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. B.) T-Mobile responded that it could not produce the documents without an authorization from the account holder or a court order. (Nevell Decl. ¶ 9, Exh. C.) Although Plaintiffs obtained an authorization from Galicia, T-Mobile informed plaintiffs that the authorization was not effective because Galicia was not the “account holder.” (Nevell Decl. ¶¶ 9–10.) Plaintiffs now move to compel the production of records from T-Mobile and Metro, now limited in scope to “a log of incoming and outgoing calls and text messages for a timeframe of 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Pacific time on September 30, 2015.” (Motion at p. 8.) Plaintiffs seek the records to learn if the phone was in use at the time of the collision. (Motion at p. 8.)

In its responsive letter, T-Mobile stated that it could not provide the records without a written consent because of Public utilities Code § 2891, subd. (a), which states that no telephone company may make available to another person certain information about “residential subscriber[s]” without obtaining the subscriber’s written consent. (Pub. Util. Code § 2891, subd. (a)(1)–(4).) But Plaintiffs note that the statute applies only to “residential subscribers,” and that the testimony of Galicia establishes that the phone at issue here was a portable cellular phone, not a residential line. (Nevell Decl. Exh. I.)

The court concludes that good cause exists for acquiring the records associated with the phone number at issue, at least with respect to “a log of incoming and outgoing calls and text messages for a timeframe of 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Pacific time on September 30, 2015.” Additionally, the court determines that Public Utilities Code § 2891 does not apply to the number at issue, because Galicia’s testimony establishes that he was not a residential subscriber with respect to the line at issue.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Compliance is therefore GRANTED.

Case Number: BC630977    Hearing Date: January 31, 2020    Dept: 61

Defendant Container Freight Line, Inc.’s Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is DENIED.

  1. GOOD-FAITH SETTLEMENT

Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6(a)(1) provides:

Code of Civil Procedure § 877(c) in turn provides:

A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.

A good faith settlement determination also reduces the claims against the nonsettling defendants in the amount stipulated by the settlement. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 877(a).)

Where a motion for determination of good faith settlement is uncontested, a "barebones" motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is sufficient to support a good faith determination. (See City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 1251, 1261.) Where a motion for determination of good faith settlement is contested, the moving party must provide the court with declarations or other evidence demonstrating the facts necessary to evaluate the settlement in terms of the factors contemplated by Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 488. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 1251, 1261.) These factors are: (1) a rough approximation of the plaintiff's total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if her were found liable after trial; (5) the financial condition and insurance policy limits of the settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants. (See Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.)

A defendant's settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant's liability to be. The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue, should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far “out of the ballpark” in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a “settlement made in good faith” within the terms of section 877.6.

(Id. at pp. 499–500, internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted.)

CFL argues that is has settled with Plaintiffs for a payment of $100,000 following arms-length negotiations. (Motion at p. 3.) But RCS opposes the motion, arguing that over $15,000,000 in damages are at stake in this case, and that CFL’s potential liability, turning, it claims, purely on a question of fact concerning an agency relationship between CFL and a mechanic named Wilbert, should be left to a trier of fact. (Opposition at pp. 1–2; Baghdassarian Decl. Exh. H.)

RCS points to the case Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, in which a cross-defendant settled with an original plaintiff to guarantee the plaintiff at least a $750,000 recovery in the plaintiff’s suit against the defendant/cross-complainant that was suing the cross-defendant. (Id. at p. 1345.) The trial court’s determination that the settlement was in good faith was reversed as an abuse of discretion because substantial evidence did not demonstrate that the settlement was reasonably in the ballpark of the cross-defendant’s proportionate liability. (Id. at p. 1350.) The cross-defendant had only argued that the total damages in the underlying action against the defendant would have been about $40 million, with a 50/50 chance of prevailing, reducing the value to $20 million; and assuming the plaintiff to be 50% at fault, this reduced the damages to $10 million; and assuming that the cross-defendants were only 5–10% at fault for the remaining issue, the $750,000 max recovery was therefore in the ballpark. (Id. at p. 1350–51.) The appellate court rejected this basis for granting the settlement because it was unsupported by affidavits or other evidence. (Id. at pp. 1351–52.) The court also reasoned that the potential liability represented a small portion of the cross-defendant’s available insurance policy limits. (Id. at p. 1352.)

The court agrees with RCS’s argument, based on the above authority. Because this is a contested motion for good faith settlement, the burden is on CFL to present evidence supporting the conclusion that the settlement is in good faith. Here, that evidence consists of CFL’s contention that it owes no liability to Plaintiffs, based on the arguments presented in its motion for summary judgment to the effect that its mechanic did not perform the final repairs on the tractor before the collision. (Motion at pp. 9–11.) But this argument is unpersuasive since this court has already found that triable issues of fact exist as to whether an agency relationship existed between CFL and the mechanic. The court thus cannot conclude that there is zero probability of CFL prevailing on this issue, but CFL presents no other evidence to show what its proportion of the total liability might be.

RCS has also presented responsive evidence calling CFL’s arguments into doubt. Based on an application for entry of default, RCS shows that Plaintiffs seek about $15 million in damages, making CFL’s settlement less than one percent of the global liability. (Baghdassarian Decl. Exh. H.) And, as in Mattco Forge, RCS has presented evidence that CFL’s policy limits far exceed the amount of settlement: CFL maintains two insurance policies, one for auto insurance and one general liability policy, each with a limit of $1 million. (Baghdassarian Decl. Exhs. I, J.)

Thus CFL’s showing is insufficient to justify a determination of good faith settlement in the face of substantive opposition.

The application is DENIED.

Case Number: BC630977    Hearing Date: November 18, 2019    Dept: 61

Defendants Richard Lee Phipps and RLP Trucking, Inc.’s Motion to File Under Seal is GRANTED.

Defendants Richard Lee Phipps and RLP Trucking, Inc.’s Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is GRANTED.

Defendants to give notice.

  1. MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL

The court may order that a record be filed under seal only if it expressly finds facts that establish:

(1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record;

(2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record;

(3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed;

(4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and

(5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.

(California Rules of Court (“CRC”) Rule 2.550, subd. (d).)

A party moving to seal records must make a sufficient evidentiary showing to overcome the presumed right of public access to the documents. (see Huffy Corp. v. Superior Court (“Huffy”) (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 97, 108.)

Phipps and RLP Trucking move to file a confidential declaration of their counsel, Robert E. Murphy, under seal, on the grounds that the declaration contains descriptions of the settlement agreement sought to be validated by their concurrent application for good faith settlement, and because that settlement is confidential. (Motion at pp. 3–4.)

Based on the settlement’s confidentiality, the court determines that there exists an overriding interest in the privacy of that agreement’s terms that overcomes the public ‘s interest in access to the record, and that sealing the record is the least restrictive, narrowly tailored means of accommodating that interest.

Accordingly, the application to file under seal is GRANTED.

  1. GOOD-FAITH SETTLEMENT

Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6(a)(1) provides:

Code of Civil Procedure § 877(c) in turn provides:

A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.

A good faith settlement determination also reduces the claims against the nonsettling defendants in the amount stipulated by the settlement. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 877(a).)

Where a motion for determination of good faith settlement is uncontested, a "barebones" motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is sufficient to support a good faith determination. (See City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 1251, 1261.) The sealed declaration of Robert E. Murphy submitted in support of this application contains such information.

Phipps and RLP Trucking’s Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is therefore GRANTED.