ANZHELINA MARONYAN VS MERCEDES-BENZ USA LLC

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: EC063837    Hearing Date: June 23, 2020    Dept: E

[CCP § 1008(a)]

Date: 6/23/20 (10:00 AM)

Case: Anzhelina Maronyan et al. v. Mercedes-Benz USA LLC (EC063837)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff Lyudmila Maronyan’s “Motion Pursuant to C.C.P. § 1008(B) for Subsequent Application to Set Aside Judgment as to Lyudmila Maronyan Based on New Law” is DENIED.

“A court may reconsider its order granting or denying a motion and may even reconsider or alter its judgment so long as judgment has not yet been entered. Once judgment has been entered, however, the court may not reconsider it and loses its unrestricted power to change the judgment. It may correct judicial error only through certain limited procedures such as motions for new trial and motions to vacate the judgment.” (Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1606.) Here, judgment was entered on January 30, 2019. The Court has no jurisdiction to reconsider the judgment. (APRI Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 176, 180.)

Plaintiff contends the Court should construe this motion as a motion to vacate the judgment under CCP § 663, arguing that the legal basis upon which judgment was entered against Lyudmila Maronyan was erroneous. However, plaintiff never moved to vacate the judgment within 180 days after entry of the judgment, which is the outermost time limit provided for by CCP § 663a(a)(2). Moreover, although plaintiff asserts in Reply that the Court possesses “the power to vacate the judgment when it is the right thing to do” (Reply at 3), plaintiff cites no relevant authority indicating the Court may consider a motion to vacate judgment outside the jurisdictional time limits based on new law. (Cf. County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1183–84 [“Even ... a consent that [the] motion be granted ... could not give the court power to act after the time had elapsed within which proceedings by motion could be instituted.”].)

In any event, even if the Court were to consider Patel v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1007, that case does not mandate vacating the judgment here. The issue before the Court of Appeal in Patel was “whether attorney fees should be limited because Patel—the lessee and party to the express warranty—initiated the case, but the jury ultimately awarded damages to Fayaz rather than Patel.” (Id. at p. 1016.) The Court of Appeal found, “The trial court erred by finding that Patel was not a prevailing party, and by limiting the attorney fee award to fees incurred only after Fayaz was added as a party.” (Id. at p. 1018.) The question of whether Fayaz (not a signatory to the lease) was a proper plaintiff was neither presented to nor addressed by the Court of Appeal. Thus, the Court of Appeal did not determine whether and/or under what circumstances a plaintiff must be a party to the lease agreement to recover under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Because “[c]ases are not authority for propositions not considered therein” (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 614), Patel v. Mercedez-Benz would not constitute new law upon which a timely brought motion to vacate judgment might rest.