ALLIANCE GUEMING NENKAM VS PASADENA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC565424    Hearing Date: October 25, 2019    Dept: A

Nenkam v Pasadena Unified School District

Motions to Enforce Settlement (2)

Motion to Enforce Settlement

Motion to Enforce Settlement

ALLEGATIONS:

Plaintiff Alliance Gueming Nenkam (“Plaintiff”) is a 49-year old, African American female and her national origin is from the country of Cameroon, Africa. She commenced this action against Defendants Pasadena Unified School District, Mark Anderson, Steven Gustin, Yolanda Mendoza, Jose Alarcon, and Steven Miller (“Defendants”), alleging she was harassed and discriminated against based on her race, national origin, skin color, gender, and age.

PRESENTATION:

The action was purportedly settled between the parties on June 06, 2019, after several days of trial. The instant motions to enforce the settlement agreement were filed, respectively, by Plaintiff on September 25, 2019, and by Defendants on October 02, 2019. Defendants and Plaintiff respectively opposed the other’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement on October 11, 2019, and October 16, 2019 (Plaintiff’s opposition is 2 Court days late); and submitted reply briefs on October 16, 2019 (by Plaintiff), and October 18, 2019, (by Defendants).

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Plaintiff and Defendants each request that the Court adopt the proposed settlement agreement in accordance with their individual interpretation of the agreement regarding Plaintiff’s ‘retirement’.

CONTEXT: The matter proceeded to a jury trial and after a number of days, the parties reached a settlement of their dispute. The case was at issue on the Second Amended Complaint for damages deemed filed May 5, 2017. Although the complaint is quite prolix, the prayer sets forth: 1. General, compensatory, and special damages, according to proof; 2. Punitive damages according to proof; 3. Reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; 4. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 5. For prejudgment interest according to statute; 6. For costs of suit according to statute; and 7. For any other relief that is just and proper. A search of the document does not find any reference to the terms “retire” or “retirement.”

The court views the settlement proceedings as set forth in the transcripts as it would a contract. “California recognizes the objective theory of contracts (Berman v Bromberg (1997) 56 Cal.App. 4^th 936, 948, under which “[i]t is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation” (Titan Group, Inc. v Sonoma Valley County Sanitation Dist. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1127. The parties undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.” Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App. 4^th 944.”

DISCUSSION:

Standard of Review – The instant motions relate to an unsigned settlement agreement, whose basic terms were negotiated in open Court, one of which being subject to the instant dispute. Both parties move the Court to enforce their interpretation of the oral agreement reached between the parties in Court, based on information that the parties learned following that agreement that has caused the instant dispute, pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §664.6. Pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §664.6, the Court may enforce the terms of an agreement stipulated “orally before the court” in order to enforce the full performance of the agreement.

The terms of the agreement are: 1) Plaintiff is to receive a monetary settlement of $285,000.00 and a 1099 therefor. 2) The plaintiff is to have retired as of the date of her signature on the formal settlement agreement. 3) Any calls received by Pasadena Unified School District will indicate the date of start of employment and end date of employment. 4) All benefits due plaintiff will be determined as of April 8, 2016. [Mr. Anyia, counsel for plaintiff stated at the transcript page 3, lines 23 – 26 “What we’re trying to clarify is that the benefits that she was – she will be entitled to whatever benefits she was entitled to as of the date of accruement, which is April 8, 2016.” Mr. Wadlington, counsel for the District agreed, and Mr. Anyia stated at page 3:28 through 4:3 “And that the – the term we’re using is retirement, not resignation. She will retire as of the date we sign the agreement from the county. (sic) Not resignation.”

On review of the transcript of the orally agreed terms of the settlement, the Court concludes that, at the time the settlement occurred, the parties had adopted an agreed meaning of the term “retirement” in that the term referred only to ‘not returning to work.’ That the term had a special meaning is clearly implied in the statement “ . . . the term we’re using is retirement, not resignation . . .” That was the court’s understanding, i.e., plaintiff’s motivation in using that term was not to garner some benefits determined by law, but to be able to say truthfully in seeking further employment or other contexts that she had not resigned, but had retired. There was no final expressed intent of either party to include the period of time between April 8, 2016 and the time of signing as any form of calculation of time towards retirement benefits, or to accrue any other legal benefit to Plaintiff. Rather, the parties agreed in open Court that all the benefits due and owing to Plaintiff would be affixed to the April 8, 2016 date, with any retirement terms subject to the determination of PERS and STRS. [Mr. Anyia at page 3 line 2: “No. I’m not talking about PERS and STRS.”]

The dispute now is that if the April 8, 2016 date is used as a benefit accrual date, then no early retirement benefits are accrued, but if the date of signature is used, then plaintiff will have a claim for early retirement benefits, but not regular retirement benefits. The term “early” was not used anywhere in the transcript. While this may have been in the mind of one of more of the persons speaking on the record, it is not objectively discernable from the totality of words that were used at the time.

Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to enforce settlement and deny Plaintiff’s motion to enforce settlement.

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RULING: Deny plaintiff’s motion; Grant Defendant’s motion.

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records.

ORDER

Plaintiff Alliance Gueming Nenkam’s and Defendants Pasadena Unified School District; Mark Anderson; Steve Gustin; Yolanda Mendoza; Jose Alarcon; and Steven Miller’s separate Motions to Enforce Settlement came on regularly for hearing on October 25, 2019, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows:

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IS GRANTED; AND

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IS DENIED.

DATE: _______________ _______________________________

JUDGE