This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 10/12/2020 at 14:56:50 (UTC).

STEPHANIE RILEY VS MONSEREAT LARA, ET AL.

Case Summary

On 09/20/2018 STEPHANIE RILEY filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against MONSEREAT LARA. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Spring Street Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is JON R. TAKASUGI. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    *******1983

  • Filing Date:

    09/20/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Spring Street Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Judge

JON R. TAKASUGI

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

RILEY STEPHANIE

Defendants

TANNING HEY KRISSTER

LARA MONSEREAT

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorney

MIFFLIN KEN

4309 S Western Ave

Los Angeles, CA 90062

Defendant Attorney

FRIEMAN DAVIDA M.

 

Court Documents

Declaration re: Due Diligence - Declaration re: Due Diligence

6/5/2020: Declaration re: Due Diligence - Declaration re: Due Diligence

Proof of Service by Substituted Service - Proof of Service by Substituted Service

6/5/2020: Proof of Service by Substituted Service - Proof of Service by Substituted Service

Judgment - Judgment [Proposed] judgment granting, Defendant Hay Krisster Tanning's MSJ

4/17/2020: Judgment - Judgment [Proposed] judgment granting, Defendant Hay Krisster Tanning's MSJ

Notice (name extension) - Notice of Entry of Judgment

5/11/2020: Notice (name extension) - Notice of Entry of Judgment

Notice of Rejection - Application for Default Judgment by Court - Contract or Tort - Notice of Rejection - Application for Default Judgment by Court - Contract or Tort

4/9/2020: Notice of Rejection - Application for Default Judgment by Court - Contract or Tort - Notice of Rejection - Application for Default Judgment by Court - Contract or Tort

Statement of Damages (Personal Injury or Wrongful Death) - Statement of Damages (Personal Injury or Wrongful Death)

3/23/2020: Statement of Damages (Personal Injury or Wrongful Death) - Statement of Damages (Personal Injury or Wrongful Death)

Declaration (name extension) - Declaration of Hay Krisster Tanning in support of MSJ

10/7/2019: Declaration (name extension) - Declaration of Hay Krisster Tanning in support of MSJ

Motion for Summary Judgment - Motion for Summary Judgment

10/7/2019: Motion for Summary Judgment - Motion for Summary Judgment

Declaration (name extension) - Declaration of Davida M. Frieman in support of MSJ

10/7/2019: Declaration (name extension) - Declaration of Davida M. Frieman in support of MSJ

Separate Statement - Separate Statement

10/7/2019: Separate Statement - Separate Statement

Proof of Service by Substituted Service - Proof of Service by Substituted Service

12/4/2019: Proof of Service by Substituted Service - Proof of Service by Substituted Service

Declaration (name extension) - Declaration Declaration of Dr. De Elward Barnes in Lieu of Direct Testimony Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 98

2/18/2020: Declaration (name extension) - Declaration Declaration of Dr. De Elward Barnes in Lieu of Direct Testimony Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 98

Minute Order - Minute Order (Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment)

2/26/2020: Minute Order - Minute Order (Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment)

Notice of Ruling - Notice of Ruling

2/27/2020: Notice of Ruling - Notice of Ruling

Proof of Service by Substituted Service - Proof of Service by Substituted Service

1/23/2019: Proof of Service by Substituted Service - Proof of Service by Substituted Service

Proof of Service by Substituted Service - Proof of Service by Substituted Service

12/14/2018: Proof of Service by Substituted Service - Proof of Service by Substituted Service

Summons - on Complaint

9/20/2018: Summons - on Complaint

Civil Case Cover Sheet

9/20/2018: Civil Case Cover Sheet

17 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 06/05/2020
  • DocketDeclaration re: Due Diligence; Filed by: Stephanie Riley (Plaintiff); As to: Monsereat Lara (Defendant)

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  • 06/05/2020
  • DocketProof of Service by Substituted Service; Filed by: Stephanie Riley (Plaintiff); As to: Monsereat Lara (Defendant); Proof of Mailing Date: 11/21/2019; Service Cost: 325.00; Service Cost Waived: No

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  • 05/11/2020
  • DocketNotice of Entry of Judgment; Filed by: Hey Krisster Tanning (Defendant)

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  • 05/04/2020
  • DocketNon-Jury Trial scheduled for 07/01/2020 at 08:30 AM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 25 Not Held - Vacated by Court on 05/04/2020

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  • 05/04/2020
  • DocketOrder to Show Cause Re: Failure to File Proof of Service scheduled for 09/23/2021 at 10:30 AM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 25 Not Held - Vacated by Court on 05/04/2020

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  • 04/17/2020
  • DocketUpdated -- Judgment [Proposed] judgment granting, Defendant Hay Krisster Tanning's MSJ: Status Date changed from 04/09/2020 to 04/17/2020; Filed By: Hey Krisster Tanning (Defendant); Result: Granted; Result Date: 04/17/2020; As To Parties: removed; Status changed from Rejected to Signed and Filed

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  • 04/17/2020
  • DocketCourt orders judgment entered for Defendant Hey Krisster Tanning against Plaintiff Stephanie Riley on the Complaint filed by Stephanie Riley on 09/20/2018 for a total of $0.00.

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  • 04/09/2020
  • DocketJudgment [Proposed] judgment granting, Defendant Hay Krisster Tanning's MSJ - Rejected; Submitted by: Hey Krisster Tanning (Defendant)

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  • 04/09/2020
  • DocketNotice of Rejection - Application for Default Judgment by Court - Contract or Tort; Filed by: Court

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  • 04/09/2020
  • DocketUpdated -- Notice of Rejection - Application for Default Judgment by Court - Contract or Tort: As To Parties: removed

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24 More Docket Entries
  • 12/14/2018
  • DocketProof of Service by Substituted Service; Filed by: Stephanie Riley (Plaintiff); As to: Hey Krisster Tanning (Defendant); Proof of Mailing Date: 11/19/2018; Service Cost: 65.00; Service Cost Waived: No

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  • 09/20/2018
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by: Stephanie Riley (Plaintiff); As to: Monsereat Lara (Defendant); Hey Krisster Tanning (Defendant)

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  • 09/20/2018
  • DocketRequest to Waive Court Fees; Filed by: Stephanie Riley (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/20/2018
  • DocketOrder on Court Fee Waiver (Superior Court); Signed and Filed by: Clerk; As to: Stephanie Riley (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/20/2018
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by: Stephanie Riley (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/20/2018
  • DocketSummons on Complaint; Issued and Filed by: Clerk

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  • 09/20/2018
  • DocketNotice of Case Assignment - Limited Civil Case; Filed by: Clerk

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  • 09/20/2018
  • DocketCase assigned to Hon. Jon R. Takasugi in Department 94 Stanley Mosk Courthouse

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  • 09/20/2018
  • DocketNon-Jury Trial scheduled for 03/19/2020 at 08:30 AM in Stanley Mosk Courthouse at Department 94

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 09/20/2018
  • DocketOrder to Show Cause - Failure to File Proof of Service scheduled for 09/23/2021 at 08:30 AM in Stanley Mosk Courthouse at Department 94

    Read MoreRead Less

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: 18STLC11983    Hearing Date: February 26, 2020    Dept: 25

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(CCP § 437c)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Hay Krisster Tanning’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

ANALYSIS:

  1. Background

On September 20, 2018, Plaintiff Stephanie Riley (“Plaintiff”) filed an action for general negligence and premises liability against Defendants Monsereat Lara (“Lara”) and Hay Krisster Tanning (“Tanning”) (collectively “Defendants”). On February 6, 2019, Defendant Tanning filed an Answer.

On October 7, 2019, Defendant Tanning filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”). To date, no opposition or reply briefs have been filed.

  1. Legal Standard

“[A] defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or more elements of the [plaintiff's] cause of action ... cannot be established....” (§ 437c, subd. (o)(2); Union Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 585, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 653.) Once the moving defendant has satisfied this obligation, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to the existence of the element or elements challenged by the defendant. (§ 437c, subd. (o)(2); Union Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at pp. 583, 590, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 653.) To do so, the plaintiff may not rely upon the “mere allegations ... of its pleadings” and instead must show by “specific facts” that the requisite triable issue of material fact is present. (§ 437c, subd. (o)(2).)”

(Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1594.)

  1. Discussion

1. First Cause of Action – General Negligence

To establish a claim for general negligence, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant owed plaintiff a legal duty, that defendant breached that duty, and that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of injuries suffered by plaintiff.” (Ambriz v. Kelegian (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1530-31.) “[I]t is well-established that a landlord does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from his or her tenant’s dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent them. [Citation.]” (Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 413.).

Here, as set forth in the Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Plaintiff was bit by a small dog owned by Defendant Lara in front of an apartment building located at 1262 Browning Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90037 (the “Apartment Building”). (Mot., SSUMF Nos. 4, 7, 30.) Defendant Tanning presents evidence in the form of a declaration that he owns the Apartment Building but does not, nor has he ever owned, the dog that bit Plaintiff. (Id. at Nos. 31, 32.) He also states that he did not control the dog, was unaware of any information suggesting that the dog at issue had ever bitten anyone else before, and that he was unaware of any information that would otherwise suggest or cause him to believe that the dog had an unusually dangerous nature or tendency. (Id. at Nos. 34, 36, 38.) Thus, Defendant Tanning has demonstrated he lacked knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities..

Notably, Plaintiff appears to base her claims of liability on the basis that Defendant Tanning knew Defendant Lara’s dog was small enough to fit through the front gate of the Apartment Building and on the basis that Defendant Tanning knew or had reasons to know that the dog could have exited through the gaps of the front gate and harm passersby. (Id. at No. 39.) However, as explained above, actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities, not knowledge of the dog’s ability to fit through the gaps of the front gate, is required before imposing a duty.

Defendant Tanning has carried his initial burden to demonstrate that no triable issues of material fact exist as to the element of duty. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to this element. As the Motion is unopposed, however, Plaintiff has not carried her burden.

2. Second Cause of Action – Premises Liability

“The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)

a. Negligence

Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates that she is alleging premises liability on the basis that Defendants negligently owned, maintained, managed and operated the property where the accident occurred. (Comp., p. 5, ¶ L-2.) Landowners and landlords have a duty to use reasonable care to protect people who come onto their property. (Stone v. Center Trust Retail Properties, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 608, 612; Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) However, “[t]he general duty of care owed by a landowner in the management of his or her property is attenuated when the premises are let because the landlord is not in possession, and usually lacks the right to control the tenant and the tenant’s use of the property.” (Chee v. Amanda Golt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1369.) In addition, as noted above, it is well established that a landlord does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from their tenant’s dog unless the landlord has knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities and the ability to prevent or control them. (Id.; Yuzon v. Collins (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149, 152; Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 413) Furthermore, “a landlord is under no duty to inspect the premises for the purpose of discovering the existence of a tenant’s dangerous animal; only when the landlord has actual knowledge of the animal, coupled with the right to have it removed from the premises, does a duty of care arise.” (Yuzon v. Collins (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149, 163.)

It is undisputed that Defendant Tanning owns the Apartment Building in front of which the incident occurred and that he does not live at said Apartment Building. (Mot., SSUMF Nos. 31, 29.) As already noted, Defendant Tanning states that he did have control over the dog, was unaware of any information suggesting that the dog at issue had ever bitten anyone else before, and that he was unaware of any information that would otherwise suggest or cause him to believe that the dog had an unusually dangerous nature or tendency. (Id. at Nos. 34, 36, 38.) This carries Defendant Tanning’s initial burden to demonstrate that no triable issue of material fact exists as to the element of duty. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to this element. As the Motion is unopposed, however, Plaintiff has not carried her burden.

b. Willful Failure to Warn

Plaintiff’s form Complaint also indicates that she is alleging premises liability on the basis of a willful failure to warn pursuant to Civil Code Section 846. (Compl., p. 5, ¶ 3.)

Civil Code section 846 provides:

“(a)An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory, owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose or to give any warning of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on those premises to persons entering for a recreational purpose, except as provided in this section.

(d) This section does not limit the liability which otherwise exists for any of the following:

  1. Willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity.

(Civ. Code § 846, subds. (a), (d).)

As already noted, Defendant Tanning states in his declaration that he was unaware of any information suggesting that Defendant Lara’s dog had ever bitten anyone before or of any information that would suggest or cause him to believe that the dog had an unusually dangerous nature or tendency. (Mot., SSUMF Nos. 36, 38.) Because Defendant Tanning was unaware of any dangerous tendency possessed by the dog, he carried his initial burden to show that he did not willfully or maliciously fail to warn. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to this element. As the Motion is unopposed, however, Plaintiff has not carried her burden.

  1. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Hay Krisster Tanning’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.