SACHA MURRAY VS CITY OF EL SEGUNDO, ET AL.

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: 19STLC01420    Hearing Date: September 17, 2020    Dept: 25

HEARING DATE: Thu., September 17, 2020 JUDGE /DEPT: Blancarte/25

CASE NAME: Murray v. City of El Segundo, et al. COMP. FILED: 02-08-19

CASE NUMBER: 19STLC01420 DISC. C/O: 11-07-20

NOTICE: OK MOTION C/O: 11-22-20

(2) DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant City of El Segundo

RESP. PARTY: Plaintiff Sacha Murray

DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE

(CCP § 430.41, et seq.)

TENTATIVE RULING:

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant City of El Segundo’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Defendant’s motion to strike is MOOT.

SERVICE:

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK

[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK

[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) OK

OPPOSITION: Filed on August 7, 2020 [ ] Late [ ] None

REPLY: Filed on September 10, 2020 [ ] Late [ ] None

ANALYSIS:

1. Background

On February 8, 2019, Sacha Murray (“Plaintiff”) filed an action against Defendants City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, and City of El Segundo (“Defendant”) due to her motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff alleges negligence and dangerous condition of public property. Defendant was served with the complaint on February 12, 2020. (Camden Decl., ¶ 3.)

On May 8, 2020, Defendant filed the Instant Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Demurrer”), Request for Judicial Notice, and Motion to Strike. On August 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Opposition and Request for Judicial Notice. Defendant filed a reply on September 10, 2020.

On August 10, 2020, Plaintiff’s complaint against County of Los Angeles was dismissed without prejudice.

1. Meet and Confer

A party filing a demurrer or motion to strike must “meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to” demurrer or the motion to strike. (CCP §§ 430.41(a), 435.5(a). The purpose of the meet and confer is to determine “whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the” demurrer or motion to strike. (Id.) The court notes that the Demurrer and Motion to Strike are accompanied by a meet and confer declaration as required. (Campen Decl., ¶¶ 4-6, 9, 13; Exh. 1-2, 4.)

1. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests that the court take judicial notice of (1) legislative enactments of public

entities, (2) portions of maps and official plans maintained by governmental entities, (3) contents of a government claim, and (4) Plaintiff’s civil complaint in the instant action. Defendant makes these requests pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (b), (c), (d), (g), and (h). Defendant’s request is GRANTED.

Plaintiff requests that the court take judicial notice of the Maintenance Agreement entered into by Defendant and the City of Los Angeles, which concerns the area in which Plaintiff had her motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff makes this request pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (b) and (c). Plaintiff’s request is GRANTED.

1. Legal Standard (Demurrer)

“The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its

case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to

affect substantial rights.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.) “A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of

America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) The court looks to whether “the complaint alleges

facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Id.) The court does not

“read passages from a complaint in isolation; in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we read the

complaint ‘as a whole and its parts in their context.’ [Citation.]” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,

N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 804.) The court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded

factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of

which judicial notice has been taken.” (Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th p. 240.) “The court does not,

however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v.

Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.)

1. Discussion (Demurrer)

Plaintiff was driving eastbound on Imperial Highway. She was struck by a vehicle when she attempted to make a U-Turn at a green signal at the Main Street Intersection. Plaintiff had attempted to make a U-turn at that intersection because there was no “no U-turn” sign. (Compl., p. 4.) Plaintiff later learned that the intersection’s “no U-Turn” sign had fallen off a few months before her accident, but it had not been replaced. (Opp., 2:12-13.)

“[A] public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, [and] that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred.” (Gov. Code § 835.) “Public property” is defined as “real or personal property owned or controlled by the public entity.” (Id. at § 830(c).)

Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that it fails because Defendant had no ownership or control of the area in which Plaintiff alleges Defendant was negligent and maintained a dangerous condition. Rather, the area in question is located in the City of Los Angeles. (Demurrer, 2:2-5, 3:16-27.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the area in question falls in the border between Defendant and City of Los Angeles. Responsibility over this area has been disputed between the two cities since the beginning of the case because the two cities have entered into a maintenance agreement (“Agreement.”) The Agreement details that both cities will be responsible for the intersection on which Plaintiff’s accident occurred. (Opp., 3:3-28.)

The court finds that Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to show that Defendant had control over the area in question. First, Defendant has provided evidence that it does not own the area in question. The Imperial Highway and Main Street intersection on which Plaintiff attempted the U-turn lie within the City of Los Angeles. (Campen Decl., Exhibit 1, p. 3; Defendant’s RJN, Exh. H, p. 3; Exh. I, p. 3) Second, Defendant’s Agreement with the City of Los Angeles does not mandate a joint liability finding under Government Code § 895.2. Per the Agreement, “Los Angeles will furnish services for and perform such maintenance work at Locations shown in Appendix “A,”” which includes Imperial Highway at Main Street. Defendant and City of Los Angeles are to share costs, with City of Los Angeles taking on 66 2/3% and Defendant taking on 33 1/3% of the costs. (Plaintiff’s RJN, Exh. A, ¶ 1, Appendix A.) Under these terms, only City of Los Angeles is responsible for maintaining and repairing Imperial Highway at Main Street. Defendant is only responsible for paying City of Los Angeles for its services. In other words, Defendant did not have authority to engage in maintenance and repairs of Imperial Highway at Main Street. Thus, Defendant is not liable. (See Paterno v. State of California (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 998, 1033-1034 [no liability imposed on district that did routine maintenance for the State, where district had no authority to reconstruct levee and any liability did not occur during performance of the district and State’s agreement]; C.f. Talbott v. Turlock Irr. Dist. (1933) 217 Cal. 504, 506 [joint liability imposed against irrigation district and improvement district for damages involving irrigation ditch, where both districts were in joint charge of the public works].)

Based on the above, the court finds that Defendant did not own or control the area in which Plaintiff’s accident occurred and is not liable for Plaintiff’s injuries. Given this finding, Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

1. Legal Standard and Discussion (Motion to Strike)

Courts may, upon a motion, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (CCP § 436(a).) Courts may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., §¿437.)  

Given the court’s ruling on Defendant’s demurrer, Defendant’s motion to strike is MOOT.

1. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant City of El Segundo’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Defendant’s motion to strike is MOOT.

Defendant is ordered to give notice.