NATALIE NGUYEN VS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: 20STLC01379    Hearing Date: August 10, 2020    Dept: 25

HEARING DATE: Mon., August 10, 2020 JUDGE /DEPT: Blancarte/25

CASE NAME: Nguyen v. County of Los Angeles COMPL. FILED: 02-10-20

CASE NUMBER: 20STLC01379 DISC. C/O: 07-10-21

NOTICE: OK MOTION C/O: 07-25-21

PROCEEDINGS: DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant County of Los Angeles

RESP. PARTY: None

DEMURRER

(CCP § 430.10, et seq.)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

SERVICE:

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK

[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK

[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) OK

OPPOSITION: None filed as of August 6, 2020 [ ] Late [X] None

REPLY: None filed as of August 6, 2020 [ ] Late [X] None

ANALYSIS:

1. Background

On February 10, 2020, Plaintiff Natalie Nguyen (“Plaintiff”) filed a form complaint, in pro per, against Defendant County of Los Angeles (“Defendant”) for waiting time penalties.

On March 18, 2020, Defendant filed the demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. No opposition was filed. On July 1, 2020, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer and granted Plaintiff 20 days’ leave to amend. (7/1/20 Minute Order.)

On July 15, 2020, Defendant, apparently having received a First Amended Complaint before it was filed with the Court, filed the instant Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (the “Demurrer”). On July 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed the FAC with the Court.

To date, Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.

1. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Los Angeles County Code of Ordinances, Chapter 8.100 and 8.101. (RJN, p. 1, ¶ 1, Exh. A.) The request is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (b).)

1. Legal Standard

“The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its

case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to

affect substantial rights.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.)

“A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of

America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) The Court looks to whether “the complaint alleges

facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Id.) The Court does not

“read passages from a complaint in isolation; in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we read the

complaint ‘as a whole and its parts in their context.’ [Citation.]” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,

N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 804.) The Court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded

factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of

which judicial notice has been taken.” (Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th p. 240.) “The court does not,

however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v.

Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)

A general demurrer may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted or under section 430.10, subdivision (a), where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Special demurrers are not allowed in limited jurisdiction courts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 92, subd. (c).)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.)

Finally, Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).)

1. Discussion

Defendant’s Demurrer is accompanied by a meet and confer declaration as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subd. (a). (Demurrer, Turner Decl., ¶¶ 2-4, Exh. 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that by failing to timely pay her all wages owed, Defendant violated Labor Code sections 119.4, 216, 225.5, 226, subdivision (a), 226.3, 512 and County Ordinance 8.101.150. (FAC, ¶¶ 8, 9.) Like the initial Complaint, the FAC does not include any cause of action attachments providing additional factual allegations. (See Comp., ¶ 8 [“each complaint must have one or more causes of action attached”].) Thus, Plaintiff’s FAC is incomplete. The Court also notes the following regarding the Labor Code and Ordinance sections allegedly violated.

First, the Court notes that Labor Code section 119.4 does not exist. In addition, Labor Code sections 215 through 219 “do not apply to the payment of wages of employees directly employed by any county, incorporated city, or town or other municipal corporation.” (Lab. Code, § 220, subd. (b).) (Emphasis added.) Thus, Plaintiff, as an employee of Defendant, a county, cannot assert a cause of action under Labor Code section 216 as it is inapplicable.

Labor Code section 225.5 imposes a civil penalty against any person who unlawfully withholds wages in violation of Sections 212, 216, 221, 222, or 223. However, as noted above, Section 216 does not apply to Defendant. (Lab. Code, § 220, subd. (b).)

Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a) requires an employees’ check, draft, or voucher used to pay employees’ wages to contain certain information. Subsection (i), however, specifically states that it “does not apply to the state, to any city, county, city and county, district, or any other governmental entity.” (Lab. Code, § 226, subd. (i).) Section 226 applies here only to the extent that if a governmental entity uses a check, voucher, or draft to pay an employees' wages, then that document must use no more than the last four digits of the employees’ social security number or an identification number other than a social security number. (Id.) Section 226.3 imposes a penalty for violation of Section 226, subdivision (a). Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was not timely paid, not that her check, draft, or voucher did not contain the information required by Section 226, subdivision (a). (FAC, ¶¶ 8, 9.) Because the remaining portions of Section 226 do not apply to counties such as Defendant, Plaintiff cannot obtain relief under these sections.

Labor Code section 512 provides for required meal periods. (Lab. Code, § 512, subd. (a).) However, Defendant is a charter county. (Dimon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1280.) The “[California] state constitution’s express grant of authority to charter counties necessarily implies that the Legislature lacks the authority to provide for compensation of [Los Angeles County] employees” and thus “the determination of wages to be paid to employees of charter counties ‘is a matter of local rather than statewide concern.’ [Citation.]” (Id.) Accordingly, the provisions of Section 512 are inapplicable to a charter county such as Defendant. (See id. at p. 1283; See also Curcini v. County of Alameda (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 629, 645.)

Finally, Los Angeles Ordinance, Chapter 8.100 governs minimum wages. Section 8.101.150 provides for administrative fees for violations of the chapter. (RJN, Exh. A; Ord. 2016-0026, § 2, 2016.) However, Section 8.100.100 states that “[p]ublic entities, including State, federal, County, and city entities” are specifically exempt from the minimum wage ordinance. (RJN, Exh. A; Ord. 2015-0039, § 3, 2015.) As Defendant is a county, it is exempt from the ordinance under section 8.100.100. (Id.)

Thus, Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action under the Labor Code and Ordinance sections cited. In addition, Plaintiff has not filed an opposition demonstrating otherwise. Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

1. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 20STLC01379    Hearing Date: July 01, 2020    Dept: 25

DEMURRER

(CCP § 430.10, et seq.)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

SERVICE:

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK

[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK

[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) OK

OPPOSITION: None filed as of June 29, 2020 [ ] Late [X] None

REPLY: None filed as of June 29, 2020 [ ] Late [X] None

ANALYSIS:

1. Background

On February 10, 2020, Plaintiff Natalie Nguyen (“Plaintiff”) filed a form complaint, in pro per, against Defendant County of Los Angeles (“Defendant”) for waiting time penalties.

On March 18, 2020, Defendant filed the instant Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint (the “Demurrer”). To date, no opposition has been filed.

1. Legal Standard

“The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its

case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to

affect substantial rights.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.)

“A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of

America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) The Court looks to whether “the complaint alleges

facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Id.) The Court does not

“read passages from a complaint in isolation; in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we read the

complaint ‘as a whole and its parts in their context.’ [Citation.]” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,

N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 804.) The Court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded

factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of

which judicial notice has been taken.” (Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th p. 240.) “The court does not,

however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v.

Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)

A general demurrer may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted or under section 430.10, subdivision (a), where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Special demurrers are not allowed in limited jurisdiction courts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 92, subd. (c).)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.)

Finally, Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).)

1. Discussion

Defendant’s Demurrer is accompanied by a meet and confer declaration as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subd. (a). (Demurrer, Turner Decl., ¶¶ 2-4, Exh. 1.)

First, the Court notes that the Complaint did not include any cause of action attachment. (See Comp., ¶ 8 [“each complaint must have one or more causes of action attached”].) Plaintiff alleges her last day of work was May 21, 2019, that her final paycheck was issued in December 2019, and claims late penalties of $9,984.00. (Comp., ¶¶ 9, 10(a).) Based on these allegations, it appears that Plaintiff seeks waiting time penalties under Labor Code sections 201 through 203.

Labor Code section 201 provides, in pertinent part, that, “[i]f an employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately.” (Lab. Code., § 201, subd. (a).)

In addition, Labor Code section 202 provides, in pertinent part:

“If an employee not having a written contract for a definite period quits his or her employment, his or her wages shall become due and payable not later than 72 hours thereafter, unless the employee has given 72 hours previous notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case the employee is entitled to his or her wages at the time of quitting. Notwithstanding any other law, an employee who quits without providing a 72-hour notice shall be entitled to receive payment by mail if he or she so requests and designates a mailing address. The date of the mailing shall constitute the date of payment for purposes of the requirement to provide payment within 72 hours of the notice of quitting.”

(Lab. Code, § 202, subd. (a).)

If an employer willfully fails to pay wages in accordance with the above sections, the wages of the employee shall continue to accrue as a penalty from the due date at the same rate until the wages are paid, but not for a period of longer than 30 days. (Lab. Code, § 203, subd. (a).) However, Labor Code sections 200 through 211 “do not apply to the payment of wages of employees directly employed by any county, incorporated city, or town or other municipal corporation.” (Lab. Code, § 220, subd. (b).) (Emphasis added.)

Because Labor Code sections 201 and 202 do not apply to county employers, Plaintiff cannot allege any facts to constitute a cause of action against Defendant, a county, for waiting time penalties. Thus, Defendant’s unopposed Demurrer is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

1. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.