This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 07/08/2020 at 09:32:18 (UTC).

LADONNA MCNEIL VS SUNNY HILLS AUTO, INC., ET AL.

Case Summary

On 08/16/2019 LADONNA MCNEIL filed a Contract - Other Contract lawsuit against SUNNY HILLS AUTO, INC . This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Spring Street Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is SERENA R. MURILLO. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    *******7639

  • Filing Date:

    08/16/2019

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Other Contract

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Judge

SERENA R. MURILLO

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

MCNEIL LADONNA

Defendants

SUNNY HILLS AUTO INC. DBA USED CAR MEGASTORES

RELIANT FINANCIAL CORPORATION DBA GOLD ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION

HUDSON INSURANCE COMPANY

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorney

SADR KASRA

 

Court Documents

First Amended Standing Order - First Amended Standing Order

8/16/2019: First Amended Standing Order - First Amended Standing Order

Notice of Case Assignment - Limited Civil Case - Notice of Case Assignment - Limited Civil Case

8/16/2019: Notice of Case Assignment - Limited Civil Case - Notice of Case Assignment - Limited Civil Case

Complaint - Complaint

8/16/2019: Complaint - Complaint

Summons - Summons on Complaint

8/16/2019: Summons - Summons on Complaint

Civil Case Cover Sheet - Civil Case Cover Sheet

8/16/2019: Civil Case Cover Sheet - Civil Case Cover Sheet

Proof of Service by Substituted Service - Proof of Service by Substituted Service

10/15/2019: Proof of Service by Substituted Service - Proof of Service by Substituted Service

Proof of Service by Substituted Service - Proof of Service by Substituted Service

10/15/2019: Proof of Service by Substituted Service - Proof of Service by Substituted Service

Request for Entry of Default / Judgment - Request for Entry of Default / Judgment

12/12/2019: Request for Entry of Default / Judgment - Request for Entry of Default / Judgment

Amended Complaint - Amended Complaint (1st)

6/17/2020: Amended Complaint - Amended Complaint (1st)

Proof of Personal Service - Proof of Personal Service

6/2/2020: Proof of Personal Service - Proof of Personal Service

Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name) - Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)

5/14/2020: Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name) - Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)

 

Docket Entries

  • 08/19/2022
  • Hearing08/19/2022 at 10:30 AM in Department 26 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Order to Show Cause Re: Failure to File Proof of Service

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  • 02/16/2021
  • Hearing02/16/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 26 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Non-Jury Trial

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  • 06/17/2020
  • DocketAmended Complaint (1st); Filed by: Ladonna McNeil (Plaintiff); As to: Sunny Hills Auto, Inc. (Defendant); Hudson Insurance Company (Defendant)

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  • 06/02/2020
  • DocketProof of Personal Service; Filed by: Ladonna McNeil (Plaintiff); As to: Hudson Insurance Company (Defendant); Service Date: 05/28/2020; Service Cost: 40.00; Service Cost Waived: No

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  • 05/14/2020
  • DocketAmendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name); Filed by: Ladonna McNeil (Plaintiff); As to: Hudson Insurance Company (Defendant)

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  • 12/12/2019
  • DocketDefault entered as to Sunny Hills Auto, Inc. On the Complaint filed by Ladonna McNeil on 08/16/2019

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  • 12/12/2019
  • DocketRequest for Entry of Default / Judgment; Filed by: Ladonna McNeil (Plaintiff); As to: Sunny Hills Auto, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 10/15/2019
  • DocketProof of Service by Substituted Service; Filed by: Ladonna McNeil (Plaintiff); As to: Sunny Hills Auto, Inc. (Defendant); Proof of Mailing Date: 09/16/2019; Service Cost: 90.00; Service Cost Waived: No

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  • 10/15/2019
  • DocketProof of Service by Substituted Service; Filed by: Ladonna McNeil (Plaintiff); As to: Reliant Financial Corporation (Defendant); Proof of Mailing Date: 09/16/2019; Service Cost: 90.00; Service Cost Waived: No

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  • 08/16/2019
  • DocketFirst Amended Standing Order; Filed by: Clerk

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  • 08/16/2019
  • DocketNotice of Case Assignment - Limited Civil Case; Filed by: Clerk

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  • 08/16/2019
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by: Ladonna McNeil (Plaintiff); As to: Sunny Hills Auto, Inc. (Defendant); Reliant Financial Corporation (Defendant)

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  • 08/16/2019
  • DocketSummons on Complaint; Issued and Filed by: Ladonna McNeil (Plaintiff); As to: Sunny Hills Auto, Inc. (Defendant); Reliant Financial Corporation (Defendant)

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  • 08/16/2019
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by: Ladonna McNeil (Plaintiff); As to: Sunny Hills Auto, Inc. (Defendant); Reliant Financial Corporation (Defendant)

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  • 08/16/2019
  • DocketOrder to Show Cause Re: Failure to File Proof of Service scheduled for 08/19/2022 at 08:30 AM in Stanley Mosk Courthouse at Department 94

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  • 08/16/2019
  • DocketNon-Jury Trial scheduled for 02/16/2021 at 08:30 AM in Stanley Mosk Courthouse at Department 94

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  • 08/16/2019
  • DocketCase assigned to Hon. Serena R. Murillo in Department 94 Stanley Mosk Courthouse

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: 19STLC07639    Hearing Date: November 12, 2020    Dept: 47


Case Number: 20STLC07639   Hearing Date: November 12, 2020     Dept: 47

Ladonna McNeil v. Sunny Hills Auto, Inc. dba Used Car Megastores, et al.

 

(1) MOTION FOR A RESTRAINING ORDER PURSUANT TO CCP § 386(F);

(2) MOTION FOR DISCHARGE OF CROSS-COMPLAINANT IN INTERPLEADER, EXONERATION OF SURETY AND BOND, AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

MOVING PARTY: (1)-(2) Defendant/Cross-Complainant Hudson Insurance Company

RESPONDING PARTY(S): (1) Plaintiff Ladonna McNeil; (2) Cross-Defendant Jazmin Gonzalez

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sunny Hills Auto misrepresented the accident and repair history of the 2008 Ford Focus she purchased. She also alleges a claim against Defendant Hudson Insurance Company as the surety on Sunny Hills Auto’s bond. Hudson has cross-claimed for interpleader.

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Hudson Insurance Company moves to enjoin an Orange County[1] proceeding brought by one of the Cross-Defendants in this action.

Defendant/Cross-Complainant also moves for discharge in interpleader, exoneration of surety and bond, and attorney’s fees and costs.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Cross-Complainant’s motion for discharge in interpleader and exoneration of surety and bond is GRANTED.

Cross-Complainant’s request for attorney’s fees and costs is GRANTED in the amount of $1840 in attorney’s fees and $265 in costs, representing the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and costs associated with the pursuit of the stakeholder remedy.

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Hudson Insurance Company’s motion for a restraining order pursuant to CCP § 386(f) is DENIED AS MOOT.

DISCUSSION:

Motion For Discharge of Cross-Complainant in Interpleader and for Related Orders

Request for Judicial Notice

In reply, Cross-Complainant requests judicial notice of (1) the arbitration award issues in favor of plaintiffs and against Sunny Hills Auto and Gold Acceptance; and (2) the proposed judgment submitted by Cross-Defendant Gonzalez after confirmation of the arbitration award.

These requests are DENIED. These documents are irrelevant to the disposition of this motion, and “judicial notice . . . is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issue at hand.” (Gbur v. Cohen (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 296, 301.)

Analysis

Cross-Complainant Hudson moves for an order discharging it from any further liability to any party to this action or relating to the funds deposited, for a judgment of dismissal as to Hudson, and for an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs to be paid from the funds on deposit.

“Any person, firm, corporation, association or other entity against whom double or multiple claims are made, or may be made, by two or more persons which are  such that they may give rise to double or multiple liability, may bring an action against the claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 386, subd. (b).) “When a person may be subject to conflicting claims for money or property, the person may bring an interpleader action to compel the claimants to litigate their claims among themselves. (Code Civ. Proc., § 386, subd. (b).) Once the person admits liability and deposits the money with the court, he or she is discharged from liability and freed from the obligation of participating in the litigation between the claimants. [Citations.] The purpose of interpleader is to prevent a multiplicity of suits and double vexation. [Citation.]” (City of Morgan Hill v. Brown (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122 [84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 361], fn. omitted.) “In an interpleader action, the court initially determines the right of the plaintiff to interplead the funds; if that right is sustained, an interlocutory decree is entered which requires the defendants to interplead and litigate their claims to the funds. Upon an admission of liability and deposit of monies with the court, the plaintiff may then be discharged from liability and dismissed from the interpleader action. [Citations.] The effect of such an order is to preserve the fund, discharge the stakeholder from further liability, and to keep the fund in the court’s custody until the rights of potential claimants of the monies can be adjudicated. [Citations.] Thus, the interpleader proceeding is traditionally viewed as two lawsuits in one. The first dispute is between the stakeholder and the claimants to determine the right to interplead the funds. The second dispute to be resolved is who is to receive the interpleaded funds.”

(Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Peterson (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 676, 681-682, bold emphasis added.)

On July 17, 2020, Hudson deposited $50,000 with the Court. (Declaration of Timothy J. Tomlin ¶ 2.)

Hudson claims no interest in the funds deposited except for reimbursement for costs and attorney’s fees and to the extent Cross-Defendants are unable to establish their right to these funds. (Cross-Complaint ¶¶ 11, 12.) The parties with competing claims to the funds are Cross-Defendants Jazmin Gonzalez and Ladonna McNeil.

Based on this evidence, Hudson has shown that it is entitled to be discharged and dismissed from the interpleader portion of this case and for the bond to be exonerated.

Cross-Defendant Gonzalez does not dispute that Hudson is entitled to be discharged, but she argues that the bond should not be exonerated and that Hudson is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees from the bond amount. Both of these arguments are without merit. Attorney’s fees are discussed below, and they are clearly authorized to be awarded from the deposited amount. (CCP § 386.6(a).) As for exoneration of the bond, the Court is not persuaded by Cross-Defendant’s argument that Hudson should not be exonerated because it faces liability beyond the $50,000 deposited with the Court. All that is before this Court is the bond, not and the claims related to it, not any other claims against Hudson. The case on which Cross-Defendant relies, Pierce v. Western Surety Co. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 83, is therefore distinguishable, where there is “noting in [the] bond indicating that the liability to pay attorney’s fees is to be in addition to the sum . . . fixed by the bond as the total liability of the surety.” (Lawrence Tractor Co. v. Carlisle Ins. Co. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 949, 954.) Pierce recognizes as much, noting that the surety’s liability is determined by the “express terms of the bond and any applicable statutes.” (Pierce, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th 83, 93.)

Thus, Hudson is entitled to be discharged in interpleader and is entitled to exoneration of the bond. The remaining question is whether Hudson is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs, and if so, the reasonable amount of the fees and costs.

Attorney’s Fees

A party to an action who follows the procedure set forth in Section 386 or 386.5 may insert in his motion, petition, complaint, or cross complaint a request for allowance of his costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in such action. In ordering the discharge of such party, the court may, in its discretion, award such party his costs and reasonable attorney fees from the amount in dispute which has been deposited with the court. At the time of final judgment in the action the court may make such further provision for assumption of such costs and attorney fees by one or more of the adverse claimants as may appear proper.

(CCP § 386.6(a), bold emphasis added.)

Here, Paragraph 12 of the Cross-Complaint is a request for an award of Cross-Complainant’s costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in connection with this proceeding this action to be paid out of the funds.

The Court has reviewed the support for the requested attorney’s fees submitted with the moving papers.[2] The Court finds that the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded in connection with Hudson’s pursuit of its stakeholder remedy is $1,840.00.

Costs

Costs will be awarded in the requested amount of $265.00.

Motion for Restraining Order

Hudson seeks to enjoin a proceeding in San Diego County on the ground that it involves the same funds that are at issue in its cross-complaint for interpleader in this action.

At the previous hearing on this motion, the Court was inclined to grant it. The motion was continued, however, to allow for optional supplemental briefing no later than November 5, 2020. (Notice of Continuance of Hearing, 10/22/2020, at p. 2.) Defendant/Counter-Claimant Hudson filed its supplemental brief late, on November 6, 2020, and its brief merely supported the Court’s prior tentative ruling. Cross-Defendants did not file any supplemental brief in opposition to the motion.

In any case, having determined that Hudson is entitled to be discharged in interpleader and to have the surety and bond exonerated, there is no longer any compelling reason to restrain any parties from instituting or further prosecuting any proceeding on the bond.

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED AS MOOT.

Moving party to give notice, unless waived.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 12, 2020 ___________________________________

Randolph M. Hammock

Judge of the Superior Court


[1] The notice of motion refers to an Orange County proceeding, but the rest of the motion and the attached documents relate to a proceeding in San Diego County.

[2] Cross-Defendant is correct that new evidence submitted in reply is generally not considered without giving the opposing party an opportunity to respond. Here, however, Cross-Complainant had already explained the requested fees in its moving papers and had estimated certain expenses in reply as to which the actual amounts are confirmed in the reply declaration. Nevertheless, the Court has relied only on the evidence submitted with the moving papers.

Case Number: 19STLC07639    Hearing Date: October 21, 2020    Dept: 47

Ladonna McNeil v. Sunny Hills Auto, Inc. dba Used Car Megastores, et al.

 

 GIVEN THE CURRENT CORONAVIRUS CRISIS, THE COURT STRONGLY ENCOURAGES REMOTE APPEARENCES BY “LACourtConnect.” PLEASE MAKE SUCH ARRANGEMENTS IF YOU WISH TO APPEAR REMOTELY AT WWW.LACOURT.ORG/LACC/. NO OTHER TYPES OF REMOTE APPEARANCES ARE AVAILABLE FOR THIS PARTICULAR COURTROOM, INCLUDING COURT CALL. IF YOU APPEAR IN PERSON AT THE HEARING, YOU WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL SOCIAL DISTANCING RULES, INCLUDING THE WEARING OF AN APPROPRIATE FACE MASK/COVERING (ABSENT ANY EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES) AS CONTAINED IN THE APPLICABLE GENERAL ORDERS ISSUED BY THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE L.A.S.C.

MOTION FOR A RESTRAINING ORDER PURSUANT TO CCP § 386(F)

MOVING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Hudson Insurance Company

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Ladonna McNeil

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sunny Hills Auto misrepresented the accident and repair history of the 2008 Ford Focus she purchased. She also alleges a claim against Defendant Hudson Insurance Company as the surety on Sunny Hills Auto’s bond. Hudson has cross-claimed for interpleader.

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Hudson Insurance Company moves to enjoin an "Orange County"1] proceeding brought by one of the Cross-Defendants in this action.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Hudson Insurance Company’s motion for a restraining order pursuant to CCP § 386(f) is GRANTED.

Cross-Defendant Jazmin Gonzalez is restrained from proceeding with her San Diego action, Case No. 2017-00042792-CU-CO-CTL as against Hudson in its capacity as surety on the motor vehicle dealer bond issued to Sunny Hills Auto Sales, Inc. until further order of this Court.

DISCUSSION:

Motion for Restraining Order

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Hudson Insurance Company (“Hudson”) requests judicial notice of the complaint in the San Diego County Superior Court action at issue, Case No. 2017-00042792-CU-CO-CTL.

The request is GRANTED per Evidence Code § 452(d) (court records).

Analysis

Hudson seeks to enjoin a proceeding in San Diego County on the ground that it involves the same funds that are at issue in its cross-complaint for interpleader in this action.

After any . . . cross-complaint in interpleader has been filed, the court in which it is filed may enter its order restraining all parties to the action from instituting or further prosecuting any other proceeding in any court in this state affecting the rights and obligations as between the parties to the interpleader until further order of the court.

(CCP § 386(f), bold emphasis added.)

As indicated by the use of the word “may,” the Court’s decision whether to enter a restraining order under CCP § 386(f) is discretionary. However, “the discretion which a trial court enjoys is not unlimited.” (Department of Education v. Superior Court (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 977, 979.) In Department of Education – one of the rare cases addressing this statutory provision – the court of appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying injunctive relief because the petitioner had “made more than a prima facie showing of the need for injunctive relief” by showing an “actual, not merely a hypothetical, danger of a multiplicity of suits.” (Ibid.) One additional action had “already been filed against” the petitioner by one of the defendants in its interpleader action, and another defendant had also “threatened to file suit against petitioner.” (Id. at 978-979.) This “unnecessary filing of multiple suits” would “inconvenience not only petitioner, but the judicial system as well.” (Id. at 979.) Moreover, the parties opposing the injunction had “not come forward with any explanation whatever of why the pending interpleader action [was] inadequate to preserve their rights to the funds in question or how they would be damaged if the preliminary injunction issued.” (Ibid.) Under these circumstances, the trial court had abused its discretion by denying the request for a preliminary injunction. (Ibid.)

Contrary to Cross-Defendant’s argument in opposition, which ignores this lone binding case, it is not true that “a restraining order should be limited to only enforcement of a judgment against the interplead funds.” (Oppo., at p. 3.) The case cited by Cross-Defendant for this proposition – Surety Co. of the Pacific v. Piver (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 29 – is not binding on this Court, though Piver may have persuasive value, especially given the dearth of case law in this area. (People v. Moore (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 489, 492 [noting that “an opinion published by the Superior Court Appellate Department, is not, of course, binding precedent, but ‘the persuasive value of such opinions has been constantly recognized’”].)

Contrary to Cross-Defendant’s interpretation of Piver, however, its holding (as opposed to its statements in dictum, discussed below) represents an even more expansive view of the propriety of a preliminary injunction than Department of Education, not a narrowing of its availability to situations in which one of the actions has already proceeded to judgment. In that case, cross-defendant Shamrock Materials had already obtained a judgment on a statutory bond in a Marin County action against a defendant and a surety. (Piver, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. at 30.) Another claimant had also brought a claim based on the same bond in Sonoma County before Shamrock moved for summary judgment in the Marin County action, and the surety had also been notified of a further claim on the same bond. (Id. at 31.) The trial court in Sonoma County granted the surety’s motion for an order restraining Shamrock from “further prosecuting the Marin County action,” and the appellate division affirmed. (Id. at 31, 32.) The court reasoned that the trial court “clearly had jurisdiction to make the orders” under CCP § 386(f) and Department of Education, and that the “circumstance that Shamrock’s claim has been reduced to judgment does not preclude such restraint.” (Id. at 31, bold emphasis added.) In other words, Section 386(f) “is not limited by its terms to unliquidated or unadjudicated claims,” which were at issue in Department of Education. (Ibid., bold emphasis added.) Rather, the statute (broadly) “authorizes an order restraining either ‘instituting’ or ‘further prosecuting’ any other proceeding.” (Ibid.) The court emphasized that any additional limitation should not be implied because a “restraint against enforcing a judgment, as here, may be essential to the protection of interpleader jurisdiction.” (Ibid.)

The court in Piver acknowledged, in dictum, that there “may be situations in which the various claimants to particular property or a fund should be permitted to proceed to judgment in a proper forum of their choice, being restrained in the interpleader action only as to the enforcement of any judgment so obtained.” (Ibid.) The court noted that “that is the established practice under rule 22, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Ibid.) Because CCP § 386 was revised in 1975 “in conformity with rule 22,” the court concluded that it should receive the same construction. (Id. at 32.) Therefore, “[j]urisdiction to restrain ‘further prosecuting’ another action includes jurisdiction to restrain collection of the judgment.” (Ibid., bold emphasis added.) In no way does Piver stand for the proposition that the trial court’s jurisdiction is limited to restraining collection of a judgment.

Indeed, even federal courts do not view their jurisdiction as so limited. The analogous federal statute to CCP § 386(f) is 28 U.S.C. § 2361, which provides as follows:

In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335 of this title, a district court may issue its process for all claimants and enter its order restraining them from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United States court affecting the property, instrument or obligation involved in the interpleader action until further order of the court. Such process and order shall be returnable at such time as the court or judge thereof directs, and shall be addressed to and served by the United States marshals for the respective districts where the claimants reside or may be found.

Such district court shall hear and determine the case, and may discharge the plaintiff from further liability, make the injunction permanent, and make all appropriate orders to enforce its judgment.

(28 U.S.C.A. § 2361, bold emphasis added.) Based on this analogous language to CCP § 386, federal courts have recognized that they have “extensive discretion . . . with respect to the issuance and scope of the order.” (Star Ins. Co. v. Cedar Valley Express, LLC (D.D.C. 2002) 273 F.Supp.2d 38, 42 [quoting Wright Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure].) Exercising this “extensive discretion,” federal courts have enjoined parties to an interpleader from proceeding with other pending actions or instituting new ones. (See, e.g., id. at 45 [enjoining defendants from “instituting or prosecuting any action in any state or federal district court affecting plaintiff’s surety obligations . . . until further order of this Court”].)

Returning, then, to the relevant considerations as explained in Department of Education, here, as in that case, there is an “actual, not merely a hypothetical, danger of a multiplicity of suits.” Cross-Defendant’s fifth cause of action in the San Diego case seeks to recover on the same bond issued to Sunny Hills Auto Sales that is at issue in this case. (Declaration of Timothy J. Tomlin, Exh. A, ¶ 84.) Hudson has also explained how allowing Cross-Defendant to proceed with that action would cause not only “inconvenience” to it and the Court, as argued in Department of Education, but “irreparable harm,” given that proceeding with that action could result in conflicting orders as to the bond funds. (Tomlin Decl. ¶ 7.)

The remaining question, according to Department of Education, is whether Cross-Defendant has “come forward with any explanation . . . why the pending interpleader action is inadequate to preserve their rights to the funds in question or how they would be damaged if the preliminary injunction issued.” Here, Cross-Defendant points to no such potential harm, other than if the Court’s order went beyond restraining the action as to the bond funds. Cross-Defendant is correct that CCP § 386(f) does not give the Court the authority to enjoin the San Diego action as a whole or to enjoin any claims Cross-Defendant may have against Hudson apart from the surety funds; rather, it gives the Court the authority to enjoin Cross-Defendant from proceeding with any action affecting Hudson’s security obligation pending further order of the Court.

As to whether an earlier-filed action can be enjoined by the Court in which a later-filed action is pending, at least one case decided even before Section 386 was amended to add subsection (f) upheld such a preliminary injunction. (Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Santa Monica Finance Co. (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 211, 215, 219 [affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction “during the pendency of the present action, from further prosecuting the earlier action which was pending in the Santa Monica Branch of the court”], bold emphasis added.) Indeed, the court emphasized that it is not even necessary “that suit shall actually have been commenced.” (Id. at 216-217.) Rather, “it is sufficient that claims shall have been made against him.” (Id. at 217.) It follows that a later-filed action can be enjoined, if a party can be enjoined from filing an action.

Accordingly, the motion for a restraining order is GRANTED. Cross-Defendant Jazmin Gonzalez is restrained from proceeding with her San Diego action, Case No. 2017-00042792-CU-CO-CTL as against Hudson in its capacity as surety on the motor vehicle dealer bond issued to Sunny Hills Auto Sales, Inc. until further order of this Court.

Moving party to give notice, unless waived.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 21, 2020 ___________________________________

Randolph M. Hammock

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing.  All interested parties must be copied on the email.  It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.


[1] The notice of motion refers to an Orange County proceeding, but the rest of the motion and the attached documents relate to a proceeding in San Diego County.

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