JOCELYNN TAYLOR VS LANA STEVENS

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: 18STLC12906    Hearing Date: August 12, 2020    Dept: 26

Taylor v. Stevens, et al.

DEMURRER; MOTIONS TO COMPEL

(CCP §§ 430.31, et seq., 2030.300, 2031.310)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Lana Stevens’ Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Defendant Lana Stevens’ (1) Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Responses to Form Interrogatories and Request for Sanctions; (2) Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Responses to Request for Production and Request for Sanctions; and (3) Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Attendance at Deposition and Request for Sanctions are PLACED OFF CALENDAR.

ANALYSIS:

On October 17, 2018, Plaintiff Jocelynn Taylor (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action for motor vehicle negligence against Defendant Lana Stevens (“Defendant”). On February 18, 2020, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to the Complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint on March 9, 2020. Defendant filed the instant discovery motions on March 27, 2020. Defendant filed the instant Demurrer to the Complaint on April 10, 2020. To date, no opposition has been filed.

Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

The First Amended Complaint alleges a single cause of action for motor vehicle negligence. The Demurrer is accompanied by a declaration that satisfies the meet and confer requirements. (Demurrer, Schmeckpeper Decl., ¶2.) Defendant demurs to the First Amended Complaint on the grounds that it is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. To date, no opposition has been filed. In support of the Demurrer, Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following:

1. Complaint filed December 19, 2017, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Jocelynn Taylor, Wakena Taylor, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 17STLC05078;

2. Request for Entry of Default filed on September 11, 2018, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Jocelynn Taylor, Wakena Taylor, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 17STLC05078;

3. Judgment by Court filed on April 2, 2019, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Jocelynn Taylor, Wakena Taylor, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 17STLC05078.

The request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Cal. Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c). The documents in LASC Case No. 17STLC05078 demonstrate that Defendant’s insurer, State Farm, brought a subrogation action against Plaintiff with respect to the same automobile accident that is at issue in this case. Namely, the collision between Plaintiff and Defendant that occurred on October 19, 2016. (FAC, ¶GN-1; Demurrer, RJN, Exh. A, ¶12.) Default judgment was entered against Plaintiff in LASC Case No. 17STLC05078 on December 13, 2018. Therefore, a judgment has already been entered in Defendant’s favor with respect to the claims arising out of the same automobile action that is the subject of this action.

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, “precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.” (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.) “ ‘The threshold requirements for issue preclusion are: (1) the issue is identical to that decided in the former proceeding, (2) the issue was actually litigated in the former proceeding, (3) the issue was necessarily decided in the former proceeding, (4) the decision in the former proceeding is final and on the merits, and (5) preclusion is sought against a person who was a party or in privity with a party to the former proceeding. [Citation.]’ (Castillo v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 477, 481.)” (Murphy v. Murphy (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 376, 398-399.)

Here, the issues in LASC Case No. 17STLC05078 and this action are the same, namely, liability for damages incurred in the subject automobile accident. The issues were litigated and determined in a final ruling on the merits: the default judgment entered on December 13, 2018 against Plaintiff. Finally, the parties are the same or in privity with the parties in LASC Case No. 17STLC05078, which was brought by Defendant’s insurer against Plaintiff. Plaintiff was the defendant in LASC Case No. 17STLC05078 and Defendant’s insurer stood in her shoes as the subrogating plaintiff. (See Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1596.) Based on the foregoing, Defendant has demonstrated that this action is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Defendant Lana Stevens’ Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Discovery Motions

In light of the ruling on the Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint, Defendant’s discovery motions are PLACED OFF CALENDAR.

Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 18STLC12906    Hearing Date: February 18, 2020    Dept: 26

Taylor v. Stevens, et al.

DEMURRER

(CCP §§ 430.31, et seq.)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Lana Stevens’ Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.

ANALYSIS:

On October 17, 2018, Plaintiff Jocelynn Taylor (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action for motor vehicle negligence against Defendant Lana Stevens (“Defendant”). The Complaint alleges that the motor vehicle accident occurred on October 19, 2018. (Compl., ¶MV-1.) The Complaint was personally served on Defendant on February 24, 2019. Defendant filed the instant Demurrer to the Complaint on January 7, 2020. To date, no opposition has been filed.

Legal Standard

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party’s pleading. It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purpose of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true, however improbable they may be.

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no “speaking demurrers”). A demurrer is brought under CCP § 430.10 [grounds], § 430.30 [as to any matter on its face or from which judicial notice may be taken], and § 430.50(a) [can be taken to the entire complaint or any cause of action within]. Specifically, a demurrer may be brought per CCP § 430.10(e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. Per CCP §430.10(a) a demurrer may be brought where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Furthermore, demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. CCP § 430.10(f).

However, in construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory allegations. (Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3rd 764, 769.) And, if the facts pled in the complaint are inconsistent with facts which are incorporated by reference from exhibits attached to the complaint, the facts in the incorporated exhibits control. Further, irrespective of the name or label given to a cause of action by the plaintiff, a general demurrer must be overruled if the facts as pled in the body of the complaint state some valid claim for relief. Special demurrers are not allowed in limited jurisdiction courts. (CCP § 92(c).)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.)

Finally, CCP section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (CCP § 430.41(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (CCP § 430.41(a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (CCP § 430.41(a)(3).)

Discussion

The Demurrer is accompanied by a declaration that satisfies the meet and confer requirements. (Demurrer, Schmeckpeper Decl., ¶¶2-6.) Defendant demurs to the Complaint on the grounds that it fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (e). In support of the Demurrer, Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following:

1. Traffic Collision Report no. 1615-20068, dated October 19, 2016;

2. Complaint filed December 19, 2017, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Jocelynn Taylor, Wakena Taylor, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 17STLC05078;

3. Request for Entry of Default filed on September 11, 2018, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Jocelynn Taylor, Wakena Taylor, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 17STLC05078;

4. Judgment by Court filed on April 2, 2019, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Jocelynn Taylor, Wakena Taylor, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 17STLC05078.

The request for judicial notice is denied. As to the police report, there is no evidence demonstrating the identity and trustworthiness of the document. (People v. Flaxman (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d Supp. 16, 22 [“The trial judge must be persuaded that [the routine official record’s] identity and trustworthiness, as evidenced by its mode of preparation … satisfy the requirements of Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h).”].) As for judicial notice of the documents in subrogation action LASC Case No. 17STLC05078, the Court finds they have not been shown to be relevant to this action, which concerns a motor vehicle accident on a different date.

However, the Court does find that the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. The Complaint seeks relief for a motor vehicle accident that allegedly occurred in the future, i.e., on a date after the Complaint had been filed. As there could not have been any such motor vehicle accident at the time the Complaint was filed, no cause of action is properly alleged against Defendant.

Defendant Lana Stevens’ Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.

Moving party to give notice.