JESAL TORRES VS CLARK STEVENS

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: 19STLC05270    Hearing Date: February 25, 2020    Dept: 25

MOTION TO STRIKE

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Clark Stevens’ Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint is DENIED.

ANALYSIS:

1. Background

On May 31, 2019, Plaintiff Jesal Ruiz Torres (“Plaintiff”) filed an action for general negligence, premises liability and strict liability arising from a dog bite against Defendant Clark Stevens (“Defendant”).

On August 9, 2019, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint (the “Motion”). To date, no opposition or reply briefs have been filed.

1. Legal Standard

California law authorizes a party’s motion to strike matter from an opposing party’s pleading if it is irrelevant, false, or improper. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435; 436, subd. (a).) Motions may also target pleadings or parts of pleadings which are not filed or drawn in conformity with applicable laws, rules or orders. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).) Motions to strike in limited jurisdiction courts may only challenge pleadings on the basis that “the damages or relief sought are not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 92, subd. (d).)

In particular, a motion to strike can be used to attack the entire pleading or any part thereof – in other words, a motion may target single words or phrases, unlike demurrers. (Warren v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 24, 40.) California’s policy of liberal construction applies to motions to strike. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; see also Duffy v. Campbell (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 662, 666 [noting that courts must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the pleading when considering a motion to strike].) The Code of Civil Procedure also authorizes the Court to act on its own initiative to strike matters, empowering the Court to enter orders striking matter “at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 436.)

Finally, Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5 requires that “[b]efore filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a).)

1. Discussion

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the Motion is accompanied by a meet and confer declaration as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a). (Mot., Ash Decl., ¶ 4-5.) Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages on the ground that there are insufficient factual allegations of wrongful motive, intent, or purpose to support the imposition of punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code section 3294 and that the request for punitive damages constitutes irrelevant, false, or improper matter. (Mot., p. 2:1-5.)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) A request for punitive damages may be made pursuant to Civil Code section 3294 which provides that “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)

Under the statute, malice is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others” and oppression is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Code Civ. Proc., 3294, subds. (c)(1), (2).) Although not defined in the statute, despicable conduct refers to circumstances that are base, vile, or contemptible. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) Also, “[u]nder the statute, malice does not require actual intent to harm…Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences….[Citation.]” (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.)

Here, Plaintiff’s exemplary damages attachment alleges that defendant was guilty of malice and oppression as defined in Civil Code section 3294. (Compl., p. 7, ¶ EX-1.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew or should have known his dog was vicious and or had a propensity to attack persons, that defendant “willfully neglected to restrain his vicious dog to protect unknowing invitees,” that Defendant “willfully neglected to post signs” warning unknowing invitees about the vicious dog, and that “Plaintiffs intentional conduct in failing to either restrain the to [sic] dog or warn invitees of inherent danger constitutes malice and oppression.” (Compl., p. 7, ¶ EX-2.)

1. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Clark Stevens’ Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint is DENIED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.