On 04/30/2019 INTERINSURANCE EXCHANGE OF THE AUTO CLUB filed a Personal Injury - Uninsured Motor Vehicle lawsuit against PV HOLDING CORP. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Spring Street Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is JAMES E. BLANCARTE. The case status is Other.
JAMES E. BLANCARTE
INTERINSURANCE EXCHANGE OF THE AUTO CLUB
PV HOLDING CORP
MENDELSON LEE M
KRUPPE MICHAEL A.
Court documents are not available for this case.
DocketNon-Jury Trial scheduled for 10/27/2020 at 08:30 AM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 25 Not Held - Vacated by Court on 10/13/2020Read MoreRead Less
DocketOrder to Show Cause Re: Failure to File Proof of Service scheduled for 05/03/2022 at 10:30 AM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 25 Not Held - Vacated by Court on 10/13/2020Read MoreRead Less
DocketOn the Complaint filed by Interinsurance Exchange Of The Auto Club on 04/30/2019, entered Request for Dismissal without prejudice filed by Interinsurance Exchange Of The Auto Club as to the entire actionRead MoreRead Less
DocketMinute Order (Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment)Read MoreRead Less
DocketHearing on Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled for 07/29/2020 at 10:30 AM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 25 updated: Result Date to 07/29/2020; Result Type to HeldRead MoreRead Less
DocketOn the Complaint filed by Interinsurance Exchange Of The Auto Club on 04/30/2019, entered Request for Dismissal with prejudice filed by Interinsurance Exchange Of The Auto ClubRead MoreRead Less
DocketNotice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order; Filed by: ClerkRead MoreRead Less
DocketUpdated -- Request for Dismissal Filed Not Entered: Name Extension: Filed Not Entered; As To Parties changed from PV Holding Corp (Defendant) to PV Holding Corp (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
DocketAddress for Lee M Mendelson (Attorney) updatedRead MoreRead Less
DocketERROR with ROA message definition 129 with DismissalParty:1974312 resulted in empty messageRead MoreRead Less
DocketAnswer; Filed by: PV Holding Corp (Defendant); As to: Interinsurance Exchange Of The Auto Club (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
DocketDemand for Jury Trial; Filed by: PV Holding Corp (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
DocketProof of Service by Substituted Service; Filed by: Interinsurance Exchange Of The Auto Club (Plaintiff); As to: PV Holding Corp (Defendant); Proof of Mailing Date: 05/09/2019; Service Cost: 92.00; Service Cost Waived: NoRead MoreRead Less
DocketOrder to Show Cause Re: Failure to File Proof of Service scheduled for 05/03/2022 at 08:30 AM in Stanley Mosk Courthouse at Department 94Read MoreRead Less
DocketNon-Jury Trial scheduled for 10/27/2020 at 08:30 AM in Stanley Mosk Courthouse at Department 94Read MoreRead Less
DocketCase assigned to Hon. James E. Blancarte in Department 94 Stanley Mosk CourthouseRead MoreRead Less
DocketNotice of Case Assignment - Limited Civil Case; Filed by: ClerkRead MoreRead Less
DocketSummons on Complaint; Issued and Filed by: Interinsurance Exchange Of The Auto Club (Plaintiff); As to: PV Holding Corp (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by: Interinsurance Exchange Of The Auto Club (Plaintiff); As to: PV Holding Corp (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
DocketComplaint; Filed by: Interinsurance Exchange Of The Auto Club (Plaintiff); As to: PV Holding Corp (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
Case Number: 19STLC04229 Hearing Date: July 29, 2020 Dept: 25
HEARING DATE: Wed., July 29, 2020 JUDGE /DEPT: Blancarte/25
CASE NAME: Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club v. PV Holding Corp.
CASE NUMBER: 19STLC04229 COMP. FILED: 04-30-19
NOTICE: OK DISC. C/O: 09-27-20
MOTION C/O: 10-12-20
TRIAL DATE: 10-27-20
PROCEEDINGS: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
MOVING PARTY: Defendant PV Holding Corp.
RESP. PARTY: None
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
(CCP § 437c)
Defendant PV Holding Corp.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK
[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK
[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) OK
OPPOSITION: None filed as of July 27, 2020 [ ] Late [X] None
REPLY: None filed as of July 27, 2020 [ ] Late [X] None
On April 30, 2019, Plaintiff Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (“Plaintiff”) filed an action for subrogation and indebtedness against Defendant PV Holding Corp. (“Defendant”). On July 15, 2019, Defendant filed an Answer.
On February 27, 2020, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”), which was originally scheduled for hearing for May 26, 2020 at 10:30 a.m. On April 21, 2020, the Court continued the hearing to June 29, 2020. (4/21/20 Notice re Continuance of Hearing and Order.) Plaintiff was ordered to give notice of the continuance and file a proof of service demonstrating it gave such notice.
To date, Plaintiff has not filed a proof of service for the continuance or an opposition to the Motion.
A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of producing evidentiary facts sufficient to entitle him/her to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153.) The moving party must make an affirmative showing that he/she is entitled to judgment irrespective of whether or not the opposing party files an opposition. (Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733.)
When a Defendant or Cross-Defendant seeks summary judgment, he/she must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established; or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) When a Plaintiff or Cross-Complainant seeks summary judgment, he/she must produce admissible evidence on each element of each cause of action on which judgment is sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) The moving party’s “affidavits must cite evidentiary facts, not legal conclusions or ‘ultimate’ facts” and be strictly construed. (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519; Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.)
The opposing party on a motion for summary judgment is under no evidentiary burden to produce rebuttal evidence until the moving party meets his or her initial movant’s burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Insurance Company (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832.) Once the initial movant’s burden is met, then the burden shifts to the opposing party to show, with admissible evidence, that there is a triable issue requiring the weighing procedures of trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p).) The opposing party may not simply rely on his/her allegations to show a triable issue but must present evidentiary facts that are substantial in nature and rise beyond mere speculation. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151.) As to any alternative request for summary adjudication of issues, such alternative relief must be clearly set forth in the Notice of Motion and the general burden shifting rules apply but the issues upon which summary adjudication may be sought are limited by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the March 26, 2017 California Highway Patrol Collision Report and Counter Report Questionnaire (the “CHP Report”). (RJN, p. 2.) The CHP Report identifies a White Toyota Corolla, license plate no. 7MLL313 as one of the vehicles involved in an accident on March 26, 2017. (Id. at Exh.)
However, a police report does not fall into any of the enumerated categories of Evidence Code sections 451 or 452. In addition, taking judicial notice of police reports is improper because the truth or accuracy of statements in them are reasonably subject to dispute. (People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 171 fn. 17 [disapproved on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823].)
Thus, Defendant’s request is DENIED.
A. Subrogation and Indebtedness
Plaintiff alleges that, following an accident between its insured and a vehicle owned by Defendant, Plaintiff made payments of $5,168.04 to its insured under an existing insurance policy for the repair of property and other expenses. (Compl., ¶¶ 5-13.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges, Defendant is indebted to Plaintiff in that amount. (Id.)
“The essential elements of an insurer's cause of action for equitable subrogation are as follows:  the insured suffered a loss for which the defendant is liable, either as the wrongdoer whose act or omission caused the loss or because the defendant is legally responsible to the insured for the loss caused by the wrongdoer;  the claimed loss was one for which the insurer was not primarily liable;  the insurer has compensated the insured in whole or in part for the same loss for which the defendant is primarily liable;  the insurer has paid the claim of its insured to protect its own interest and not as a volunteer;  the insured has an existing, assignable cause of action against the defendant which the insured could have asserted for its own benefit had it not been compensated for its loss by the insurer;  the insurer has suffered damages caused by the act or omission upon which the liability of the defendant depends;  justice requires that the loss be entirely shifted from the insurer to the defendant, whose equitable position is inferior to that of the insurer; and  the insurer's damages are in a liquidated sum, generally the amount paid to the insured.” (Interstate Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Wrecking Co. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 23, 33-34.)
Having denied judicial notice of the CHP Report, the Court does not consider it. The following are the remaining undisputed material facts:
The action arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on March 26, 2017 between Plaintiff’s insured and a vehicle owned by Defendant (the “Accident”). (UMF No. 1; Compl., ¶¶ 5-11.) Plaintiff did not name an individual driver as a defendant and did not specify the year, make, or model of Defendant’s vehicle involved in the Accident. (See Compl.) A Toyota Corolla with license place no. 7MLL313 (the “Corolla”) was rented by Jonathan Delnegrolove (“Delnegrolove”) on March 23, 2017 pursuant to Rental Agreement Number 923746784 (the “Rental Agreement”). (UMF No. 3; Mot., Volpetti Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. A.) Delnegrolove returned the Corolla on May 8, 2017, without any noticeable damage to the vehicle. (UMF No. 6.) Delnegrolove also did not report any accident. (Id.) The Rental Agreement contains a provision stating that “[n]o additional drivers [are] allowed without prior written consent.” (Mot., Volpetti Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. A.) The typed statement disallowing other drivers is followed by a set of initials. (Id.)
Vehicle Code section 17150 provides that “[e]very owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.” However, the question of permission cannot be left to speculation or assumed; rather, the plaintiff must affirmatively demonstrate that the vehicle’s owner permitted the driver to use the vehicle. (Marquez v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 319, 322.) In addition, “in an action against an owner…on account of liability imposed by Sections 17150, 17154, or 17159 for the negligent or wrongful act or omission of the operator of the vehicle, the operator shall be made a party defendant if service of process can be made in a manner sufficient to secure personal jurisdiction over the operator. (Veh. Code, § 17152.) (Emphasis added.)
Defendant argues that because Plaintiff cannot establish who was driving the Corolla at the time of the Accident, Plaintiff cannot establish the driver had permission to operate the Corolla, and thus it is entitled to summary judgment. (Mot., p. 8:27-9:19.) However, based on the evidence considered, Defendant has not demonstrated the Corolla was the vehicle involved in the Accident. In addition, Defendant has not demonstrated that Plaintiff cannot reasonably discover the year, make, and model of the vehicle involved, or the identity of the person driving the vehicle at the time of the Accident through additional discovery. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Corp. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854-855 [noting that “a defendant moving for summary judgment [must] present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence”].)
Alternatively, Defendant argues that, even if Plaintiff can establish Delnegrolove was driving the Corolla at the time of the Accident, it is not vicariously liable for damages caused by him under the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. section 30106. (Mot., pp. 9:24-10:1.)
Section 30106 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) In general. --An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if--
(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and
(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner).
(49 U.S.C. § 30106, subd. (a).) (Emphasis added.)
Defendant submits a declaration from Lindsay Volpetti, a Litigation Consultant with Sedgwick CMS. (Mot., Volpetti Decl., ¶ 1.) Ms. Volpetti manages litigation claims for Defendant and states that Defendant is in the vehicle rental business. (Id.) However, as noted above, Defendant has not established that the Corolla was the vehicle involved in this accident. Because of this, the Court cannot determine the vehicle involved was rented or leased. In addition, Defendant’s separate statement and supporting evidence are silent as to whether there is any negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the vehicle’s owner. The Court cannot infer this element is met.
As a third alternative, Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not possess, and cannot obtain, evidence that the Corolla was defective or malfunctioning, but admits the Complaint does not allege a product defect cause of action. (Mot., p. 7:20-26.) Because the pleadings do not allege a defect or malfunction, the Court does not consider this argument.
Thus, the Court finds that Defendant has not met its initial movant’s burden.
Conclusion & Order
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant PV Holding Corp.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Moving party is ordered to give notice.
 The Separate Statement of Material Facts, fact no. 3 refers to a Taurus, rather than a Corolla, as the vehicle involved. However, based on the evidence cited, the Court understands Defendant intended to say Corolla. (Mot., Volpetti Decl., ¶ 3.)
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