INA MELLER, ET AL. VS CAILAN SEAVEY

ANALYSIS:

I. Background

On February 15, 2019, Plaintiffs Ina Meller and Ilya Meller (jointly, “Plaintiffs”) brought this action against Defendant Cailan Seavey (“Defendant”) asserting two causes of action for general negligence and motor vehicle negligence. Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that Defendant breached her duty of care by negligently reversing her motor vehicle, striking Plaintiffs’ vehicle.

On August 15, 2019, Defendant brought the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on the Complaint (the “Motion”). An opposition was late-filed and late-served by plaintiffs, thus the court declines to consider the opposition.

II. Legal Standard

“The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law . . . .” (CCP § 437c(c).) “A defendant’s motion for summary judgment asks the court to determine, as a matter of law, that the entire action has no merit. [Citation.] A cause of action ‘has no merit’ if one or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be established or an affirmative defense to the cause of action can be established. [Citation.]” (Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1076, emphasis added.) “To determine whether the parties have met their respective burdens, the court considers ‘all of the evidence set forth in the supporting and opposition papers, except that to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all uncontradicted inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence.’” (Nieto v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 71.)

III. Analysis

Here, Plaintiffs assert two causes of action, one for “general negligence” and another for “motor vehicle negligence.” However, Plaintiffs allege no other facts in their second cause of action to distinguish it from the first. Plaintiffs only allege that on March 28, 2018, Defendant reversed her motor vehicle and struck Plaintiffs’ vehicle, causing their injuries. (Compl., p. 4.) Thus, the court will analyze both causes of action as one cause of action for negligence.

Defendant moves the court for an order granting summary judgment based on a settlement between Defendant and Plaintiffs amounting to an accord and satisfaction pursuant to Uniform Commercial Code section 3-311. (Motion, pp. 1-2.) Defendant asserts on December 27, 2018, after some settlement discussions and requests for medical records and billings, Geico issued check number 202158618 and 202158624 to “The Kruger Law Firm and Ina Meller” and “The Kruger Law Firm and Ilya Meller” respectively. (Arquell Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; Exhs. B, C.) Both checks state on the front: “In Payment of Bodily Injury Coverage. Full & Final Settlement of any & all claims. Each side to bear their own costs.” (Arquell Decl. ¶ 9; Exhs. B, C.) On February 13, 2019, the two checks were endorsed by plaintiffs and cashed by The Kruger Law Firm. (Arquell Decl. ¶¶ 10-11; Exhs. B, C.) The money has never been returned to Geico, Defendant’s insurance company. (Arquell Decl. ¶ 13.)

First, Defendant mistakenly cites to Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) section 3-311. The state must choose to adopt the UCC for it to be applicable. (15A Am. Jur.2d Commercial Code § 1.) However, California has adopted this particular cited section and codified it as California Commercial Code section 3311. Second, it is unclear why or how the commercial code applies to this transaction as an alleged settlement agreement is not a sale of a good.

Finally, although the court understands defendant’s argument that plaintiffs released their claims, the court cannot grant the motion for summary judgment as defendant has not provided adequate evidence of a valid release. (See Rodriguez v. Oto (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1026 (“The existence of a valid release is a complete defense to a tort action against the releasee.”).) Defendant attached unsigned releases to the Motion, thus the court cannot determine whether a valid release exists, despite the fact the settlement checks were disbursed and cashed.

III. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is DENIED.

The Court also notes that since this action was file in February 2019, Plaintiffs have not filed a proof of service showing that they have served Defendant with the Summons and Complaint. Per CRC 3.110(b), Plaintiff is required to do so within 60 days. “If a party fails to serve and file pleadings as required under this rule, and has not obtained an order extending time to serve its pleadings, the court may issue an order to show cause why sanctions shall not be imposed.” (CRC 3.110(f).) Pursuant to CRC 3.110(f), the Court hereby sets an OSC Hearing re: Sanctions for Failure to Serve Defendant for MARCH 3, 2020

Moving Party is to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCdept94@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.