This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 11/15/2021 at 01:30:11 (UTC).

ALVIN POPE VS LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY

Case Summary

On 11/07/2018 ALVIN POPE filed a Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle lawsuit against LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Spring Street Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is JON R. TAKASUGI. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    *******3597

  • Filing Date:

    11/07/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Judge

JON R. TAKASUGI

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

POPE ALVIN

Defendant

LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorney

TIOMKIN ELLIOTT NICHOLAS

Defendant Attorney

HORACE WAINFELD GABRIEL

Court Documents

Court documents are not available for this case.

 

Docket Entries

  • 01/13/2022
  • Hearing01/13/2022 at 08:30 AM in Department 25 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Jury Trial

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  • 10/19/2021
  • DocketMinute Order (Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment)

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  • 10/19/2021
  • DocketHearing on Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled for 10/19/2021 at 10:30 AM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 25 updated: Result Date to 10/19/2021; Result Type to Held - Motion Denied

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  • 10/12/2021
  • DocketReply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment; Filed by: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Defendant)

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  • 10/06/2021
  • DocketUpdated -- Declaration of Elliott N. Tiomkin: Name Extension changed from Declaration of Elliott N. Tiomkin to of Elliott N. Tiomkin; As To Parties: removed

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  • 10/04/2021
  • DocketOpposition Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment; Filed by: Alvin Pope (Plaintiff)

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  • 10/04/2021
  • DocketDeclaration Declaration of Elliott N. Tiomkin; Filed by: Alvin Pope (Plaintiff)

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  • 10/04/2021
  • DocketSeparate Statement; Filed by: Alvin Pope (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/23/2021
  • DocketNotice of Ruling; Filed by: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Defendant)

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  • 09/20/2021
  • DocketUpdated -- Ex Parte Application to Continue Trial; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of Joshua Adelpour: Filed By: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Defendant); Result: Granted; Result Date: 09/20/2021

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51 More Docket Entries
  • 02/04/2019
  • DocketCase reassigned to Stanley Mosk Courthouse in Department 94 - Hon. James E. Blancarte; Reason: Inventory Transfer

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  • 11/07/2018
  • DocketOrder to Show Cause Re: Failure to File Proof of Service scheduled for 11/10/2021 at 08:30 AM in Stanley Mosk Courthouse at Department 94

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  • 11/07/2018
  • DocketNon-Jury Trial scheduled for 05/06/2020 at 08:30 AM in Stanley Mosk Courthouse at Department 94

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  • 11/07/2018
  • DocketCase assigned to Hon. Jon R. Takasugi in Department 94 Stanley Mosk Courthouse

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  • 11/07/2018
  • DocketNotice of Case Assignment - Limited Civil Case; Filed by: Clerk

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  • 11/07/2018
  • DocketSummons on Complaint; Issued and Filed by: Clerk

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  • 11/07/2018
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by: Alvin Pope (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/07/2018
  • DocketOrder on Court Fee Waiver (Superior Court); Signed and Filed by: Clerk; As to: Alvin Pope (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/07/2018
  • DocketRequest to Waive Court Fees; Filed by: Alvin Pope (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/07/2018
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by: Alvin Pope (Plaintiff); As to: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Defendant)

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Tentative Rulings

b'

Case Number: 18STLC13597 Hearing Date: October 19, 2021 Dept: 25

PROCEEDINGS: MOTION\r\nFOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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MOVING PARTY: Defendant\r\nLos Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority

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RESP. PARTY: Plaintiff Alvin Pope

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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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(CCP § 437c)

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TENTATIVE RULING:

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Defendant Los Angeles County\r\nMetropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

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SERVICE: \r\n

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[X] Proof of Service Timely\r\nFiled (CRC 3.1300) OK

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[X] Correct Address (CCP 1013,\r\n1013a) OK

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[X] 75/80 Day Lapse (CCP 12c\r\nand 1005 (b)) OK

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OPPOSITION: Filed on October 4, 2021 [ ] Late [ ] None

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REPLY: Filed on October\r\n12, 2021 [ ] Late [ ] None

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ANALYSIS:

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I. \r\nBackground\r\n

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On November 7, 2018, Plaintiff Alvin Pope (“Plaintiff”)\r\nfiled an action against the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation\r\nAuthority (“Defendant”). Defendant filed an Answer on December 14, 2020.

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Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment\r\n(the “Motion”) on July 22, 2021. Plaintiff filed an opposition on October 4 and\r\nDefendant filed a reply brief on October 12.

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II. \r\nLegal\r\nStandard

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A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of\r\nproducing evidentiary facts sufficient to entitle him/her to judgment as a\r\nmatter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153.) The moving party must make an\r\naffirmative showing that he/she is entitled to judgment irrespective of whether\r\nor not the opposing party files an opposition. (Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733.)

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When a Defendant or Cross-Defendant seeks summary\r\njudgment, he/she must show either\r\n(1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established; or (2) that there is a complete\r\ndefense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) When\r\na Plaintiff or Cross-Complainant seeks summary judgment, he/she must produce\r\nadmissible evidence on each element of each cause of action on which judgment\r\nis sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) The moving party’s\r\n“affidavits must cite evidentiary facts, not legal conclusions or ‘ultimate’\r\nfacts” and be strictly construed. (Scalf\r\nv. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519; Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d\r\n629, 639.)

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The opposing party on a motion for\r\nsummary judgment is under no evidentiary burden to produce rebuttal evidence\r\nuntil the moving party meets his or her initial movant’s burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Insurance Company (1999)\r\n75 Cal.App.4th 832.) Once the initial movant’s burden is met, then the burden\r\nshifts to the opposing party to show, with admissible evidence, that there is a\r\ntriable issue requiring the weighing procedures of trial. (Code Civ. Proc., §\r\n437c, subd. (p).) The opposing party may not simply rely on his/her allegations\r\nto show a triable issue but must present evidentiary facts that are substantial\r\nin nature and rise beyond mere speculation. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151.) As to any\r\nalternative request for summary adjudication of issues, such alternative relief\r\nmust be clearly set forth in the Notice of Motion and the general burden-shifting\r\nrules apply but the issues upon which summary adjudication may be sought are\r\nlimited by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) “A motion for\r\nsummary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause\r\nof action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”\r\n(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

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III. \r\nDiscussion\r\n

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Plaintiff alleges a single motor vehicle negligence cause\r\nof action against Defendant. (Compl., pp. 3-4.) He alleges that, on October 10,\r\n2017, Defendant’s employees were negligent in operating a motor vehicle and\r\nthat that negligence resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries. (Id.)

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Defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis that\r\nPlaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Mot.,\r\np. 2.) Specifically, Defendant argues this action was not filed within six\r\nmonths of the mailing of a notice of rejection as required by Government Code\r\nsection 945.6, subdivision (a)(1). (Id.)

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A. Service of the Moving Papers

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As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues the Motion was\r\nnever properly served because it was sent to an incorrect email address,\r\nspecifically, tiomkin@gmail.com, and that this email address does not belong to\r\nPlaintiff’s attorney, is not the email address that appears on the Complaint,\r\nand is not registered with the State Bar. (Oppo., p. 2, fn. 1.) The email\r\naddress that appears on Plaintiff’s Complaint and other papers is etiomkin@gmail.com. However, the proof of service\r\nattached to the Notice of Motion and Motion indicates those documents were\r\nemailed to the correct address, that is the etiomkin@gmail.com email address (Notice of Mot. and\r\nMot., Proof of Service.) The Separate Statement and supporting declaration do\r\nstate those supporting documents were emailed to the incorrect email address, tiomkin@gmail.com, which appears to be a typo. (Sep.\r\nStmt. & Olson Decl., Proofs of Service.)

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However, Plaintiff filed a full opposition on the merits,\r\nwaiving any deficiency in notice. (See Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77\r\nCal.App.4th 690, 697.)

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B. Government Claims Requirements

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A plaintiff seeking to sue a public entity for money or\r\ndamages must first present a government claim to that public entity within six\r\nmonths after the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov’t Code § 905; § 915,\r\nsubd. (d); § 911.2, subd. (a).) A claim presented must include:

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“(a) The name and post office address of the claimant.

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(b) The post office address to which the person presenting the claim\r\ndesires notices to be sent.

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(c) The date, place, and other circumstances of the occurrence or\r\ntransaction which gave rise to the claim asserted.

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(d) A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury,\r\ndamage, or loss, if known.

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(e) The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the\r\ninjury, damage, or loss, if known.

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(f) The amount claimed if totals less than ten thousand dollars\r\n($10,000) as of the date of presentation of the claim, including the estimated\r\namount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as it may be known\r\nat the time of the presentation of the claim, together with the basis of\r\ncomputation of the amount claimed. If the amount claimed exceeds ten thousand\r\ndollars ($10,000), no dollar amount shall be included in the claim. However, it\r\nshall indicate whether the claim would be a limited civil case.”

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(Gov’t Code, § 910.)

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No\r\nsuit for money damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of\r\naction if no government claim has first been presented and acted upon by the\r\ngoverning body of the local public entity (the “Board”) or has been deemed\r\nrejected. (Gov’t Code, §§ 900.2; 945.4.)

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The\r\nBoard must act within 45 days of receiving a claim, and if the Board fails or\r\nrefuses to do so, then the claim is deemed to have been rejected by the Board\r\non the last day of the period within which the Board was required to act on\r\nthat claim. (Gov’t Code, § 912.4, subds. (a), (b).)

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If\r\na claim is rejected, the notice of rejection must include specific language,\r\nincluding a warning that the claimant generally only has six months from the\r\ndate the notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail to file a\r\ncourt action. (Gov’t Code, § 913, subds. (a), (b).) If a rejection notice is\r\nmailed or personally delivered in accordance with Section 913, then a suit\r\nagainst a public entity must be filed not later than six months after the date\r\non the rejection notice. (Gov’t Code, § 945.6, subd. (a).) If notice of the\r\nrejection is not properly mailed or personally delivered to the claimant, then\r\nthe action must be filed within two years from the accrual of the cause of\r\naction. (Id.)

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As\r\nthe Court in Dowell v. County of Contra Costa (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 896,\r\n901 observed:

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“ ‘[A] claimant who fails to receive notice of a public entity’s action\r\non the claim within reasonable time after the end of the 45-day period for its\r\nconsideration, should make inquiry to determine whether and, if so, when, the\r\nnotice was in fact served. The two-year period of limitations obtains only\r\nwhen the notice was not served; the six-month rule applies if notice was\r\nserved, even though not actually received by the claimant.’ [Citation.]”

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C. Defendant’s Burden

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It is undisputed that Plaintiff timely presented his pre-filing\r\nclaim for damages on April 2, 2018 (the “Claim for Damages”). (Def. UMF No. 1;\r\nOlson Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. A; Reply, Adelpour Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. D.) The substance of\r\nthe Claim for Damages is not at issue. (Id.) The Court notes that the claims\r\nform includes a section that states, “IF YOU HAVE AN ATTORNEY PLEASE COMPLETE\r\nTHIS SECTION.” (Id.) This section was completed with Plaintiff’s\r\ncounsel’s information. (Id.)

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It is also undisputed that on April 24, 2018, Defendant sent\r\na Notice of Rejection of Plaintiff’s Claim for Damages via mail. (Def. UMF No.\r\n2; Olson Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. B.) The Notice of Rejection, sent by Carl Warren\r\n& Company, Defendant’s third-party administrator, indicated the letter was a\r\nnotice that the claim presented to Defendant on April 2, 2018 was rejected on\r\nApril 24, 2018. (Id.) It also contained an express warning that\r\nPlaintiff only had six months from the date of the notice to file an action in\r\nsuperior court. (Id.) The Notice of Rejection also includes a proof of\r\nservice signed under penalty of perjury demonstrating it was mailed to\r\nPlaintiff’s attorney, Elliot Tiomkin, at 16133 Ventura Blvd., Suite 700,\r\nEncino, CA 91436. (Id.)

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Plaintiff argues he submitted an amended claim which was\r\nnever rejected, and thus, the two-year, not the six-month, statute of\r\nlimitation applies. (Oppo., pp. 4-6.) Plaintiff presents evidence that, on\r\nApril 9, 2019, Defendant’s third-party administrator sent Plaintiff a Notice of\r\nInsufficiency to Plaintiff’s counsel’s office. (Id., Tiomkin Decl., ¶ 3,\r\nExh. A.) The Notice of Insufficiency noted missing information and directed\r\nPlaintiff to resubmit his claim within 15 days after the notice date. (Id.)\r\n

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As to the amendment of claims, Government Code section\r\n910.6, subdivision (a), provides:

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“A claim may be amended at any time before the expiration\r\nof the period designated in Section 911.2 or before final action thereon is\r\ntaken by the board, whichever is later, if the claim as amended relates to the\r\nsame transaction or occurrence which gave rise to the original claim. The\r\namendment shall be considered a part of the original claim for all purposes.”\r\n

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(Emphasis added.)

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If a claim is amended, the board must act on it within 45\r\ndays after the amended claim is presented. (Gov’t Code, § 912.4, subd. (a).)

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Plaintiff presents evidence that he filed an amended\r\nclaim on April 20, 2018. (Oppo., pp. 5-6, Tiomkin Decl., ¶ 5, Exh B.) Relying\r\non Norwood v. Southern California Rapid Transit District (1985) 164\r\nCal.App.3d 741, Plaintiff argues the Court of Appeals held the operative date\r\nis when an amended claim is filed. (Id.) The Court is unpersuaded.

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In Sofranek v. County of Merced (2007) 146\r\nCal.App.4th 1238, 1246-47, the court of appeal considered when the six-month\r\nstatute of limitations begins to run following an amended claim. The plaintiff\r\nin Sofranek filed two claims, both within the requisite period, but\r\nfiled the lawsuit more than six months after the defendant county denied his\r\nfirst claim. (Id.) The Court explained:

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“Section 910.6, subdivision (a), provides that although a\r\nclaim may be amended any time before the expiration of the six-month period or\r\nbefore the public entity takes final action on the claim (whichever is later),\r\n‘if the claim…relates to the same transaction or occurrence which gave rise to\r\nthe original claim…[t]he amendment shall be considered a part of the\r\noriginal claim for all purposes.’ (Italics added.) Under the plain language\r\nof this code section, an amendment is considered part of the original claim\r\n‘for all purposes[,]’ which necessarily includes prior notifications regarding\r\naction or non-action taken on the claim as well as claim-filing deadlines.\r\nThere is nothing in the applicable code sections creating an express or implied\r\nexception to this rule. Thus, a denial of the first government tort claim\r\nserves as the mandatory trigger for the six-month limitations period and this\r\ntime period is unaffected by an amendment to that claim.” (Emphasis added.)\r\n

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(Id.)

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Thus, the amendment filed on April\r\n20, 2018 is considered part of the original claim, and the rejection served by Defendant\r\non April 24, 2018 equally applies to the amendment.

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The Sofranek court also\r\ndiscussed Norwood, the case on which Plaintiff relies. (Id.)

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In Norwood, a decedent who\r\nsuffered injuries on December 3, 1980 passed away several days later. (Norwood\r\nv. Southern California Rapid Transit District, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p.\r\n742-43.) One of three heirs filed a claim through an attorney on January 7,\r\n1981, which was rejected on February 2, 1981. (Id.) The first attorney\r\nwas terminated on January 29, 1981. (Id.) Thereafter, an amended claim by\r\na new attorney was filed on behalf of all family members of the deceased. (Id.)\r\nThis amended claim was rejected by operation of law on April 23, 1981, but the\r\ndefendant public entity served written notice of rejection on July 22, 1981. (Id.)\r\nA lawsuit was filed in superior court on September 22, 1981. (Id.) In\r\nreversing the trial court’s order granting a motion for summary judgment by the\r\ndefendant public entity, the court of appeals reasoned that the proper claim\r\nwas the amended claim, which notified the respondent “for the first time of the\r\nlegally correct plaintiffs to the action,” that is, the first claim that\r\nincluded all necessary heirs. (Id. at p. 744.) Thus, the rationale\r\nunderlying the Norwood decision applies when the first claim filed is\r\nlegally insufficient. (See id.)

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The court in Sofranek noted that Norwood has\r\nnever been extended beyond its narrow facts and that nothing in that case\r\n“suggests that public entities must always respond to amended claims as if they\r\nwere new claims, or that plaintiffs can disrupt already-running statutes of\r\nlimitation by presenting repetitious claims.” (Sofranek v. County of Merced,\r\nsupra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1249.)

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Plaintiff did not argue his initial April 2, 2018 claim\r\nwas legally insufficient making the amended claim the operative claim. Even if Plaintiff\r\nhad, the second claim would be untimely. That is because Plaintiff’s claim accrued\r\non October 10, 2017, requiring him to file a government claim at most six\r\nmonths later, that is, April 10, 2018. Because the amended claim was not submitted\r\nuntil April 20, 2018, even if the Court were to consider this the operative and\r\nonly legally sufficient claim, it would be untimely.

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Finally, Plaintiff argues Defendant did not properly\r\nserve the Notice of Rejection as required by Government Code section 915.4 and\r\nthus, the two-year statute of limitation applies. (Oppo., p. 7.)

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Government Code section 915.4 provides:

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“(a) The notices provided for in Sections 910.8, 911.8,\r\nand 913 shall be given by any of the following methods:

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(1) Personally delivering the notice to the person\r\npresenting the claim or making the application.

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(2) Mailing the notice to the address, if any, stated in\r\nthe claim or application as the address to which the person presenting the\r\nclaim or making the application desires notices to be sent or, if no\r\nsuch address is stated in the claim or application, by mailing the\r\nnotice to the address, if any, of the claimant as stated\r\nin the claim or application.

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(3) If the claim or application is submitted\r\nelectronically, by sending the notice to the electronic address from which the\r\nclaim or application was received unless the person presenting the claim or\r\nmaking the application requests notice to be sent to an alternative electronic\r\naddress.

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(b) No notice need be given where the claim or\r\napplication fails to state either an address to which the person presenting the\r\nclaim or making the application desires notices to be sent or an address of the\r\nclaimant.”

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(Emphasis added.)

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Pursuant to Government\r\nCode section 915.2, any notice given by mail “shall be deposited in the United\r\nStates post office, a mailbox, sub-post office, substation, mail chute, or\r\nother similar facility regularly maintained by the government of the United\r\nStates, in a sealed envelope, properly addressed, with\r\npostage paid.” (Gov’t Code § 915.2, subd. (a).) (Emphasis added.) The notice is\r\ndeemed to be received at the time of deposit. (Id.)

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Relying on Him v. City and County\r\nof San Francisco (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 437, Defendant argues that, when a notice\r\nof rejection is not received or delivered, it is the claimant’s burden to\r\ninquire about the denial and determine the statute of limitations period. (Him\r\nv. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 444-45.)\r\nHowever, Defendant’s reliance on Him is misplaced. The court of appeals\r\nin that case did not discuss whether the place of mailing for notices was\r\nproper. A recent case, Cavey v. Tualla, et al. (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 24,\r\n2021, No. F080153) 2021 WL 4343719 at p. 2-4, is instructive on this point.

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In Casey, a plaintiff retained an attorney on June\r\n13, 2017 to pursue her personal injury claim against the defendants. (Id.)\r\nApproximately one week later, the law firm informed the defendant public\r\nentity’s adjuster of the plaintiff’s legal representation in writing. (Id.) The plaintiff’s attorney then filed\r\na government claim on behalf of the plaintiff on September 20, 2017. (Id.)\r\nBefore that, the plaintiff had unknowingly signed several documents given to\r\nhim by his chiropractor, which included a government claim form. (Id.) The\r\nchiropractor faxed the claims form signed by the plaintiff on June 5, 2017. (Id.)\r\nThis first government claim included only the plaintiff’s P.O. Box address. (Id.) The defendant sent a notice of rejection\r\nof the first government claim on July 19, 2017 and mailed it to the plaintiff’s\r\nattorney’s law firm, not to the P.O. Box address that had been listed in the first\r\nclaim presented by the chiropractor. (Id.) Both of the claims\r\nwere submitted within the six-month period, but the defendant did not respond\r\nto the second claim presented by the plaintiff’s attorneys. (Id.) The second claim was deemed rejected on November 6, 2017 under\r\nGovernment Code section 912.4, subdivision (c). (Id.) On April 2, 2018, less\r\nthan five months after the November 2017 deemed rejection date, the plaintiff’s\r\nattorney filed an action for damages in superior court. (Id.)

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The court of appeals in Casey largely focused on the filing of an unauthorized\r\ngovernment claim by the chiropractor and found that claim was a nullity and\r\ntherefore invalid with no force or effect. (Id. at p. 17.)\r\nThe court also considered and agreed with the plaintiff’s alternative argument\r\nthat, even if the claim presented by the chiropractor was valid, the notice of rejection\r\nwas not given in the manner prescribed by Section 915.4 so the two-year statute\r\nof limitations applied. (Id.) The court reasoned that\r\nSection 915.4 requires notices to be sent by any of three specified methods. (Id. at p. 18.) “The statute allows ‘[m]ailing the notice to the address, if\r\nany, stated in the claim…as the address to which the person presenting the\r\nclaim…desires notices to\r\nbe sent or, if no such address is stated in the claim…, by mailing the notice\r\nto the address if any, of the claimant as stated\r\nin the claim…’ [Citation.]” (Id.) (Emphasis added.) Because\r\nthe first claim submitted by the chiropractor did not state an address at which\r\nthe claimant desired notices to be sent, the mailing address required by\r\nstatute was the address of the claimant as stated in the claim. (Id.) In so reasoning, the court explained it adopted the plain meaning of\r\nSection 915.4. (Id.)

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Here, Defendant argues mailing\r\nthe Notice of Rejection was proper because the rules of professional conduct\r\npreclude a lawyer from communicating with a represented party. (Reply, p. 2.) Indeed, California Rule of\r\nProfessional Conduct, Rule 4.2 states that “[i]n representing a client, a\r\nlawyer shall not communicate directly or indirectly about the subject of the\r\nrepresentation with a person* the lawyer knows* to be represented by another\r\nlawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer.” However,\r\nthere is no indication that the third-party administrator that sent the Notice\r\nof Rejection in this case was an attorney. Thus, RPC rule 4.2 is inapplicable.

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Having examined the Claim for Damages form submitted by\r\nPlaintiff, it does not identify the address at which he desired notices to be\r\nsent. (Mot., Olson Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. A; Oppo., Tiomkin Decl., ¶ 3. Exh. A;\r\nReply, Adelpour Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. D.) Although Plaintiff’s attorney was\r\nidentified, there was no indication on the Claim of Damages form that Plaintiff\r\ndesired all notices to be sent to her attorney’s address. Under the plain\r\nmeaning of Section 915.4, absent a specified address at which Plaintiff desired\r\nnotices to be sent, notices were required to be mailed to Plaintiff’s, i.e., the\r\nclaimant, address which was identified as 1307 W. 105 St., Los Angeles, CA\r\n90044 on both the original claim and the amended claim. (Id.) The Notice\r\nof Rejection, however, demonstrates it was sent only to Plaintiff’s attorney’s\r\noffice at 16133 Ventura Blvd., Suite 700, Encino, CA 91436. (Mot., Olson Decl.,\r\n¶ 4, Exh. B.)

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Thus, because the Notice of Rejection was not served in\r\naccordance with Section 915.4, the two-year, not the six-month, statute of\r\nlimitation applies. Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED.

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IV. \r\nConclusion\r\n& Order

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For the foregoing reasons, Defendant\r\nLos Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion for Summary\r\nJudgment is DENIED.

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Moving party is ordered to give\r\nnotice.

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