4425 MAPLEWOOD LLC, VS JESSE PIMENTEL, ET AL.

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: 20STLC01995 Hearing Date: August 4, 2021 Dept: 48

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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER\r\nAND MOTION TO STRIKE

On February 22, 2021, Plaintiff Danielle\r\nAmara Shakur filed this action against Defendant Single Room Occupancy Housing Corporations,\r\nalleging (1) premises liability; (2) intentional tort; (3) general negligence; and\r\n(4) fraud.

On May 5, 2021, Defendant filed a demurrer\r\nand motion to strike.

DEMURRER

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and\r\nin context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015)\r\n236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) Courts also\r\nconsider exhibits attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference. (See Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d\r\n91, 94.) A special demurrer for uncertainty\r\nunder Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f) is disfavored and\r\nwill only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant or plaintiff\r\ncannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be\r\nadmitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993)\r\n14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Even if the pleading\r\nis somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)

A. Second Cause of Action\r\n– Intentional Tort

Defendants demur to the second cause of action for Intentional Tort\r\non the grounds that it does not identify the particular tort at issue and is uncertain. (Demurrer at p. 5.) Plaintiff alleges that on November 20, 2020, she\r\ncontacted law enforcement when three males entered her neighbor’s dwelling and began\r\nto converse about planning an assault. Defendant’s\r\nsecurity officer, Tim Daniels, arrived before law enforcement and “struck Plaintiff\r\nwith his hand.”

The pleadings do not allege all of the elements of a tort, and it\r\nis uncertain what tort Plaintiff is trying to allege. For example, if Plaintiff is trying to allege\r\nbattery, the second cause of action does not allege that Daniels touched\r\nPlaintiff with the intent to harm or offend her, that she did not consent to\r\nthe touching, and that she was harmed. \r\nThe cause of action also does not allege facts showing Defendant’s\r\nliability for Daniels’ alleged act.

The demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained with leave\r\nto amend.

B. Fourth Cause of Action\r\n– Fraud

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded any elements\r\nof fraud. The elements of fraud are “(a)\r\nmisrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge\r\nof falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d)\r\njustifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th\r\n170, 184.) Fraud must be pleaded with specificity. (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003)\r\n30 Cal.4th 167, 184.)

The complaint alleges that Defendant intentionally made false\r\nstatements that Plaintiff started a fist fight with a friend of Plaintiff’s next-door\r\nneighbor, when in reality Plaintiff was assaulted and battered by the neighbor’s\r\nfriend. As a result, an eviction was filed\r\nagainst Plaintiff. The complaint does\r\nnot allege the identity of the person who made the false statement and the\r\nauthority of that person to speak for defendant, Defendant’s intent to induce Plaintiff’s\r\nreliance, Plaintiff’s reasonable reliance on the statement, and damages that Plaintiff\r\nsuffered as a result of her reliance.

The complaint also alleges that on November 29, 2020, Plaintiff contacted\r\nDefendant about relocation, and Defendant promised that Plaintiff would be put on\r\na waitlist for transfer to another unit. \r\nWhen she requested to view the vacancy list, communication ceased, she was\r\nplaced on a 10-day notice, and she received a notice of eviction on January 15,\r\n2021. Plaintiff does not allege facts\r\nshowing that the promise to put her on a waitlist was false, the identity of\r\nthe person who made the promise and the authority of that person to speak for\r\nDefendant, that Defendant knew the promise was false when it was made, that Defendant\r\nintended for Plaintiff to rely on the misrepresentation, that she reasonably relied\r\non the misrepresentation, and that she was damaged as a result of her reliance.

The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is therefore sustained with\r\nleave to amend.

MOTION\r\nTO STRIKE

The\r\ncourt may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion: (1) strike out any irrelevant,\r\nfalse, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any\r\npart of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California,\r\na court rule, or an order of the court. (Code\r\nCiv. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b).)

Defendants\r\nmove to strike Plaintiff’s indication of “Common Counts” in section eight of page\r\ntwo of her form complaint. The complaint\r\ndoes not contain an attachment for common counts, nor does it allege facts supporting\r\nany common counts. Accordingly, the motion\r\nto strike is granted.

Defendants\r\nalso move to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. Punitive damages are available for fraud causes\r\nof action. Because leave to amend has\r\nbeen granted on the fraud causes of action, the motion to strike is moot.

CONCLUSION

The\r\ndemurrer is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend.

The\r\nmotion to strike is GRANTED in part as to the common counts with 20 days’ leave\r\nto amend.

Moving\r\nparty to give notice.

Parties\r\nwho intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org\r\nindicating intention to submit. Parties intending\r\nto appear are STRONGLY encouraged to appear remotely.

Case Number: 20STLC01995    Hearing Date: April 9, 2021    Dept: 48

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

On February 28, 2020, Plaintiff 4425 Maplewood LLC filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants Jesse Pimentel, Manuela Osmont, and Jason Goodlett for breach of rental agreement and holdover damages. On December 18, 2020, Osmont and Goodlett filed a demurrer, noticing a hearing on April 7, 2021. They refiled the demurrer on December 21, 2020, noticing a hearing on April 9, 2021.

On December 22, 2020, the Court denied Osmont’s request for a fee waiver. On January 6, 2021, the Court ordered Osmont stricken from the demurrer due to nonpayment of fees. The Court therefore addresses the demurrer only as to Goodlett.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Goodlett requests judicial notice of “[t]he existence of the pending appeal of the unlawful detainer matter in 4425 Maplewood, LLC v. Manuela Osmont, Jason Goodlett, Los Angeles Superior Court Appellate Division Case Number BV033328.” No records are identified or provided. The Court therefore takes judicial notice only of the existence of the appeal arising from 4425 Maplewood LLC v. Jesse Pimentel, et al., Case No. 19STUD07827, but not any records therein.

Goodlett also requests that the Court take judicial notice of the judgment, notice of appeal, and case register in 4425 Maplewood LLC v. Jesse Pimentel, et al., Case No. 19STUD07827. The request is granted.

DEMURRER

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) “Because a demurrer challenges defects on the face of the complaint, it can only refer to matters outside the pleading that are subject to judicial notice.” (Arce ex rel. Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 556.) “When court records which the court may judicially notice provide ground for objection to a complaint, a demurrer on that ground is proper.” (Britz, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 177, 180.)

A special demurrer for uncertainty under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f) is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant or plaintiff cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)

First Cause of Action – Breach of Contract

Goodlett demurs to the first cause of action for breach of contract on the grounds that there is another action pending between the parties on the same claim. (Demurrer at p. 5.) A party may demurrer to an action on the grounds that “[t]here is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (c).) “In determining whether the causes of action are the same for purposes of pleas in abatement, the rule is that such a plea may be maintained only where a judgment in the first action would be a complete bar to the second action. Where a demurrer is sustained on the ground of another action pending, the proper order is not a dismissal, but abatement of further proceedings pending termination of the first action.” (Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 787-788.) “Abatement of the second action is a matter of right. A trial court has no discretion to allow the second action to proceed if it finds the first involves substantially the same controversy between the same parties.” (Leadford v. Leadford (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 571, 574.)

The December 3, 2019 judgment in the unlawful detainer action awarded Plaintiff possession of the premises, forfeiture of the lease, and no past due rent. (RJN, Ex. A.) Goodlett has appealed the judgment in the unlawful detainer action, and the appeal remains pending. (RJN, Ex. B.) Here, Plaintiff seeks an award of past due rent from July 1, 2019 to December 3, 2019, which is the same relief the court denied in the unlawful detainer action.

Plaintiff argues that abatement is inappropriate because Goodlett is an appellant in the appeal but a defendant in this action. (Opposition at p. 7.) However, Goodlett was also a defendant in the unlawful detainer action, and that judgment is not yet final, pending the appeal. The parties are therefore in the same relationship in this action and the unlawful detainer action.

Plaintiff also argues that there were additional defendants in the unlawful detainer action. (Opposition at p. 7.) Plaintiff’s reliance on Karp v. Dunn (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 192, is unavailing. In that case, additional defendants in the second action were not named in the first action. (Id. at pp. 194-196.) The Court of Appeal found that the trial court improperly sustained a demurrer on the basis of another action pending as to the additional defendants. (Id. at p. 196.) Here, the same three people are defendants in both actions.

Because Plaintiff’s first cause of action for breach of contract seek back rent and damages from July 1, 2019 through December 3, 2019 (FAC ¶ 23), it involves substantially the same controversy as in the unlawful detainer action. Accordingly, the Court finds that abatement of the first cause of action is appropriate, pending the appeal in the unlawful detainer action.

Second Cause of Action – Hold Over Damages

Goodlett argues that there is no cause of action for “hold over damages,” and if this cause of action sounds in negligence, then Plaintiff did not allege a duty, breach of duty, causation, or damages. (Demurrer at pp. 9-10.)

Plaintiff alleges that on December 3, 2019, it was awarded possession of the premises in an unlawful detainer action, and “[t]his action is for damages for possession from December 3, 2019 through the date of vacancy of all occupants of the Subject Property.” (FAC ¶¶ 24-26.) Plaintiff does not identify a basis for these damages, such as in contract or in tort. If Plaintiff is alleging a tortious occupation of the property or failure to pay rent under a contract, it must say so and allege facts to support all required elements.

Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained on this ground with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

The demurrer is SUSTAINED on the first cause of action, and the first cause of action is abated pending the appeal in the unlawful detainer case.

The demurrer is SUSTAINED with 15 days’ leave to amend on the second cause of action.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. Parties intending to appear are STRONGLY encouraged to appear remotely.

Case Number: 20STLC01995    Hearing Date: September 22, 2020    Dept: 26

4425 Maplewood, LLC v. Pimentel, et al.

MOTION TO RECLASSIFY

(CCP § 403.040)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff 4425 Maplewood, LLC’s Motion to Reclassify Action as Unlimited is GRANTED. THIS CASE IS RECLASSIFIED AS AN UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE AND TRANSFERRED TO THE RECLASSIFICATION/TRANSFER DESK FOR REASSIGNMENT OF THE CASE TO AN INDEPENDENT CALENDAR COURT AND PAYMENT OF RECLASSIFICATION FEES.

ANALYSIS:

On February 28, 2020, Plaintiff 4425 Maplewood, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Jesse Pimentel, Manuela Osmont andJason Goodlett (“Defendants”) for breach of lease agreement and holdover damages. (Compl., ¶¶14-26.) On March 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint seeking damages in excess of $25,000.00. Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Reclassify Action on June 2, 2020. To date, no opposition has been filed.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 403.040 allows a plaintiff to file a motion for reclassification of an action within the time allowed for that party to amend the initial pleading. (CCP § 403.040(a).) If the motion is made after the time for the plaintiff to amend the pleading, the motion may only be granted if (1) the case is incorrectly classified; and (2) the plaintiff shows good cause for not seeking reclassification earlier. (CCP § 403.040(b).) In Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 262, the California Supreme Court held that a matter may be reclassified from unlimited to limited only if it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff's damages will necessarily be less than $25,000. (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257.) If there is a possibility that the damages will exceed $25,000.00, the case cannot be transferred to limited. (Ibid.) This high standard is appropriate in light of “the circumscribed procedures and recovery available in the limited civil courts.” (Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 278.)

In Ytuarte, the Court of Appeals examined the principles it set forth in Walker and held that “the court should reject the plaintiff's effort to reclassify the action as unlimited only when the lack of jurisdiction as an “unlimited” case is certain and clear.” (Id. at 279.) Nevertheless, the plaintiff must present evidence to demonstrate a possibility that the damages will exceed $25,000.00 and the trial court must review the record to determine “whether a judgment in excess of $25,000.00 is obtainable.” (Ibid.)

Discussion

Plaintiff having amended the Complaint once without leave of court, the Motion must demonstrate good cause for the timing of this Motion and that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdiction of this Court. Plaintiff’s managing agent declares that as of the filing of the Motion to Reclassify the holdover damages had increased from less than $25,000.00 to approximately $34,000.00. (Motion, Hoffman Decl., ¶¶1-5.) This corresponds to the $3,200.00 in unpaid rent allegedly charged each month from March to June 2020. (Ibid.)

Conclusion

Plaintiff 4425 Maplewood, LLC’s Motion to Reclassify Action is GRANTED. THIS CASE IS RECLASSIFIED AS AN UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE AND TRANSFERRED TO THE RECLASSIFICATION/TRANSFER DESK FOR REASSIGNMENT OF THE CASE TO AN INDEPENDENT CALENDAR COURT AND PAYMENT OF RECLASSIFICATION FEES.

Moving party to give notice.