This case was last updated from Fresno County Superior Courts on 03/09/2018 at 01:16:52 (UTC).

Marlene Hubbell vs Bonnie Anderson

Case Summary

On 12/10/2014 Marlene Hubbell filed a Contract - Other Contract lawsuit against Bonnie Anderson. This case was filed in Fresno County Superior Courts, Bf Sisk Courthouse located in Fresno, California. The Judges overseeing this case are Simpson, Alan, Ikeda, Dale, Snauffer, Mark, Culver Kapetan, Kristi and Black, Donald. The case status is Disposed - Dismissed.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    *******3710

  • Filing Date:

    12/10/2014

  • Case Status:

    Disposed - Dismissed

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Other Contract

  • Court:

    Fresno County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Bf Sisk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Fresno, California

Judge Details

Judges

Simpson, Alan

Ikeda, Dale

Snauffer, Mark

Culver Kapetan, Kristi

Black, Donald

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

Hubbell, Marlene A

Defendants

Anderson, Bonnie J

Anderson Law Offices PC, a Calif Corp

Cross Plaintiffs

Fletcher, Edward

Hubbell, Marlene A.

Cross Defendants

Anderson Law Offices, PC., a California corporation

Anderson, Bonnie J.

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorney

Laird, Scott D.

Wanger Jones Helsley, Pc 265 E. River Park Circle Suite 310

Fresno, CA 93720

Defendant and Cross Defendant Attorney

Lafferty, Allison Cherry

Cross Plaintiff Attorney

Seymour, Christopher E.

 

Court Documents

Request for Judical Notice

Request For Judicial Notice; Comment: in support of motion for leave to file cross-complaint

Declaration Filed

Declaration Filed; Comment: of Bonnie J Anderson

Motion filed

Motion; Comment: Motion to be Relieved as Counsel

Declaration Filed

Declaration Filed; Comment: in Support of Reply for Motion to Compel Supplemental Responses to Form Interrogatories; Request for Sanctions

Proof of Service

Proof of Service; Comment: re;Motion for Protective Order

Declaration Filed

Declaration Filed; Comment: of Christopher E Seymour in Support of Ex Parte Application for Protective Order

Ex parte Filed

Ex parte Filed; Ex parte Filed; Comment: application for relief

Declaration Filed

Declaration Filed; Comment: Scott D. Laird

Proof of Service

Proof of Service; Comment: notice of motion to compel

Motion filed

Motion (No Fee); Comment: Demurrer to Cross-Complaint

Proof of Service

Proof of Service; Comment: of Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Declarations, Separate Statements by overnight courier

Memorandum of Points and Authorities

Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Comment: in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant, Bonnie J. Anderson's Motion to Compel Supplemental Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One; and Request for Sanctions

Statement filed

Statement filed; Comment: Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant, Bonnie J. Anderson's Motion to Compel Supplemental Responses to Request for Admissions, Set One and Request for Sanctions

Opposition to Request for Pre-Trial Discovery filed

Request

Declaration Filed

Declaration Filed; Comment: In support of motion to compel supplemental responses form interrogatories; Request for sanctions.

Minute Order Attachment

Minute Order Attachment

Declaration Filed

Declaration Filed; Declaration Filed; Comment: of Karen L Lynch

Declaration Filed

Declaration Filed; Comment: of Karen L Lynch

274 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 08/04/2017
  • View Court Documents
  • Disposition: Judgment- Request for Dismissal filed; Judgment Type: Request for Dismissal filed; Party Names: Hubbell, Marlene A; Anderson, Bonnie J; Anderson Law Offices PC, a Calif Corp; Simpson, Alan; Anderson, Bonnie J.; Anderson Law Offices, PC., a California corporation; Hubbell, Marlene A.; Fletcher, Edward; Comment: With Prejudice; as to the Complaint

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  • 08/04/2017
  • View Court Documents
  • Disposition: Judgment- Dismissal - Other filed; Judgment Type: Dismissal - Other filed; Party Names: Anderson, Bonnie J.; Anderson Law Offices, PC., a California corporation; Hubbell, Marlene A.; Fletcher, Edward; Comment: With Prejiduce. As to 1st Cross-Complaint.

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  • 11/06/2017
  • Continued 225 Dismissal- Hearing Time: 1:00 PM; Cancel Reason: Dismissed

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  • 08/09/2017
  • View Court Documents
  • Notice of Entry of Dismissal filed- NOE OF DISMISSAL (X-CMP) S-08 09 17.pdf; Comment: Notice of Entry of Dismissal and Proof of Service

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  • 08/07/2017
  • View Court Documents
  • Minute Order Attachment- Minute Order Attachment

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  • 08/07/2017
  • CRC225 Dismiss After Settlement- Hearing Time: 1:00 PM; Result: Heard

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  • 08/04/2017
  • View Court Documents
  • Request for Dismissal Received - Pending Review- REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL S-080417.pdf; Comment: Request for Dismissal

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  • 08/04/2017
  • View Court Documents
  • Request for Dismissal Received - Pending Review- Request for Dismissal; Comment: Request for Dismissal

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  • 03/22/2017
  • View Court Documents
  • Notice Filed- Notice of Entry of Order; Comment: Notice of Entry of Order on Stip & Order for Dismissal

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  • 03/08/2017
  • View Court Documents
  • Stipulation and Order filed- Stipulation and Order filed; Stipulation and Order filed; Judicial Officer: Simpson, Alan; Comment: dismissing action and disbursement of Interpled Funds. Once the funds are distributed as ordered, this action shall be dismissed with prjeudice in it entirety.

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423 More Docket Entries
  • 05/18/2015
  • Financial info for Hubbell, Marlene A: Transaction Assessment $60.00

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  • 05/18/2015
  • Financial info for Hubbell, Marlene A: Counter Payment Receipt # CIVIL-2015-00005910 Laird, Scott D. $60.00

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  • 05/18/2015
  • Financial info for Hubbell, Marlene A: Transaction Assessment $60.00

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  • 05/18/2015
  • Financial info for Hubbell, Marlene A: Counter Payment Receipt # CIVIL-2015-00005907 Laird, Scott D. $60.00

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  • 05/18/2015
  • Financial info for Hubbell, Marlene A: Transaction Assessment $60.00

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  • 04/15/2015
  • Financial info for Hubbell, Marlene A: Counter Payment Receipt # CIVIL-2015-00000844 Eddings Attorney Support $30.00

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  • 04/15/2015
  • Financial info for Hubbell, Marlene A: Transaction Assessment $30.00

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  • 12/10/2014
  • Financial info for Hubbell, Marlene A: Counter Payment Receipt # 197301 Hubbell, Marlene A $435.00

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  • 12/10/2014
  • Financial info for Hubbell, Marlene A: Transaction Assessment $435.00

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  • 12/10/2014
  • Financial: Hubbell, Marlene A; Total Financial Assessment $769.50; Total Payments and Credits $769.50

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Complaint Information

E-FILED 9/8/2016

1|| CHRISTOPHER E. SEYMOUR #126330 el AMANDA G. HEBESHA #234214

2|| TUCKER CHIU HEBESHA SEYMOUR PC FRESNO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

642 Pollasky Avenue, Suite 230 3 || Clovis, California 93612 By: L. Esparza, Deputy

Telephone: (559) 472-9922 4 || Facsimile: (559) 472-9892

Attorneys for Cross-Defendant,

6|| EDWARD FLETCHER

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA — COUNTY OF FRESNO 9 UNLIMITED CIVIL DIVISION 10 * % %

11| MARLENE A. HUBBELL, Case No.: 14 CE CG 03710

12 Plaintiff,

13 Vs. CROSS-DEFENDANT EDWARD

FLETCHER’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO BONNIE

J. ANDERSON AND ANDERSON LAW OFFICES, PC’S CROSS-COMPLAINT

IN INTERPLEADER

14 || BONNIE J. ANDERSON; ANDERSON LAW OFFICES, PC, a California 15| corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,

16 Defendants.

18| LAW OFFICES, PC, a California Time: 3:30 p.m. corporation, Place: Department 503 19 Judge: Honorable Alan Simpson Cross-Complainants, 20 Vs. 21 Action Filed: July 20, 2016

MARLENE A. HUBBELL, an individual, 22 {{and EDWARD FLETCHER, an individual, and ROES 1through 20,

Trial Date: None Set

— BONNIE J. ANDERSON; ANDERSON ) Date: October 5, 2016

Cross-Defendants. )

TUCKER CHIU HEBESHA SEYMOUR PC28

642 POLLASKY AVE., # 230 CLovis, CA 93612

CROSS-DEFENDANT EDWARD FLETCHER’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

2 Page(s) 31| L INTRODUCTION. ...ttt e e e e e, ] 41| 11. LEGAL ARGUMENT ...t e e e, 1 5 A. Legal Standards for Demurrer.........ccovviiiiiiiiiiiii 1 6 B. Anderson’s Cross-Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action

for Interpleader. .. ..ot 2 ! 1. Legal Standards and Pleading Requirements for Interpleader................. 2 ’ 2. Anderson’s Cross-Complaint fails to state a claim 9 for Interpleader...... ..o 2,3 10 a. Hubbell’s claims are against Anderson only, and not against Fletcher or the funds in question.................... 3,4,5,6,7 ! C. Leave to Amend Should be Denied............ooooiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii 7 2 III. CONCLUSION. ..o7,828

Ciovis, CA 93612

CROSS-DEFENDANT EDWARD FLETCHER’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s) Cases

Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co.

(2001) 90 Cal.APP.Ath SO0 ....ociiiiieetiiesbeeestnreresneeenans 1 City of Morgan Hill v. Brown

(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1125-1126 ccueicrieeecinreccrecrceecec et 2,3,7 Collins v. Marvel Land Co.

(1970) 13 Cal. APP. 3A 34 ootttBeckwith v. Superior Court of Colusa County

(1905) 146 Cal. 406 .....vvveeeiecieeeieesbaeabeeeeeseneesneeas 5 Fundinv. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.

(1984) 152 CalLADPP.3A 951 ettt st etttesre e 1,2 Gardner v. Basich Bros. Const. Co.

(1955) 44 Cal.2d 191sabb e s e erennnes 5,7 Hancock Oil Company of California v. Hopkins

(1944) 24 Cal.2d 407 ...ttt2,3 Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

(2013) 216 Cal.APP.Ath AO7 ..oKelly v. Liddicoat

(1939) 35 Cal. APDP. 2d 559 oottt ettteneenbee s 5 Lawrence v. Bank of America

(1985) 163 Cal.APDP.3A 431 .ottt esarsbeesbt s sressste e s beseneesens 7 Le Francois v. Goel

(2005) 35 Cal. 4th TO94 ...saeesanee e 5 Ricardv. Grobstein, Goldman, Stevenson, Siegel, LeVine & Mangel

(1992) 6 Cal.APP.Ah 157 ootttettt ne e e s sane b e enre s 1 Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery

(2014) 232 Cal. APD. Ath AT7 ..otearee e 5 Van Orden v. Anderson

(1932) 122 CalLApp. 132, 9 P.2A 572 ...ttt ettt 3 Westamerica Bank v. City of Berkeley

(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 598, 608, 612-613....cccvevieeeeieiieieecec et e 2,7

CROSS-DEFENDANT EDWARD FLETCHER’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO

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Wiener v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp

(1980) 114 CalLAPP.3A 39 ettt e st assan e s 1 Yorn v. Supreme Court (1979) 90 CalLAPD. 3A 404 ...ttteeesee e, 6 Statutes Business and Professions Code Section 6148............ccoevviriviiiiniinieneinereeieerere e e e esreenes 6 Code of Civil Procedure section 339(1).....cccuivvuviciiiiiirieeeecireeeeee ettt5,7 Code of Civil Procedure section 386, SUDA. (D) ...ocviiiiviiiiiiiiiiieecre e eeeeaeeese e e e 2

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INTRODUCTION

Dragged into this case once more as a result of the actions of his former counsel, Bonnie Anderson (“Anderson”), Fletcher demurs to Anderson’s Cross-Complaint in Interpleader (“Cross-Complaint”) on the basis that the interpleader is not proper as a matter of law, as Anderson faces no double vexation. Hubbell’s claim in this action is and always has been against Anderson, not Fletcher or the interpled funds. It appears that the interpleader has been brought by Anderson for the improper purpose of using her former client’s money as a means to pay her alleged debt to Hubbell. The court should put an end to this travesty and continued abuse of Mr. Fletcher by sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. Legal Standards for Demurrer

While the Court generally accepts as true facts alleged in the complaint, the Court will not “accept the truth of contentions or conclusions of fact or law” stated in the complaint. (Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505.) Nor will the Court accept any factual allegations in the complaint that conflict with the content of exhibits attached to and incorporated into the complaint. (/d.) Instead, the Court will “rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplus age the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.” (Id.)

Further, “a demurrer reaches not only the contents of the complaint, but also such matters as may be properly considered under the doctrine of judicial notice. ‘The pleading must be read as if it contained all matters of which the court could properly take judicial notice even in the face of allegations in the pleading to the contrary.” ” (Ricard v. Grobstein, Goldman, Stevenson, Siegel, LeVine & Mangel (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 157, 160 [quoting Wiener v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 39, 47].) “[W]here an allegation is contraryfact of which a court may take judicial notice, it is to be treated as a nullity.” (Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 951, 955.) “Any allegations in the complaint which

CROSS-DEFENDANT EDWARD FLETCHER’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO

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The allegations of the Cross-Complaint, combined with its exhibits and matters of which this court may take judicial notice, establish there is no risk of double liability nor double vexation, and that Anderson is not entitled to interpleader relief or any discharge of liability in connection with the funds she has deposited into court. In fact, the Cross-Complaint appears to be a thinly- veiled attempt by Anderson to use her former client’s money she has been holding in trust to settle Hubbell’s claim against her, and Anderson has put Fletcher, her former client, in the position of having to incur attorney’s fees and costs to protect his money from being used as such, contrary to Anderson’s legal and ethical obligations to him.

a. Hubbell’s claims are against Anderson only, and not against Fletcher

or the funds in question.

If the claims do not relate to the same thing, debt, or duty, then interpleader is improper. (Van Orden v. Anderson (1932) 122 Cal.App. 132, 142, 9 P.2d 572.) As the California Supreme Court explained “the very rationale of interpleader compels the conclusion that [section 386] does not allow the remedy where each of the claimants asserts the right to a different debt, claim or duty.” (Hancock Oil Co. v. Hopkins (1944) 24 Cal.2d 497, 504.; see also City of Morgan Hill v. Brown (1999) 71 Cal. App.4th 1114, 1123.) |

Anderson attempts to set-up a “Potemkin village” dispute based on equivocal responses by Hubbell to request for admissions, contending that the fact the amount sought from Anderson is for the “same legal work” as was Hubbell’s prior bogus lien claim establishes that Hubbell’s claim against Anderson is essentially the “same claim” as Hubbell’s prior lien claim against Fletcher. (Anderson’s Cross-Complaint [Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) Exhibit 1], para. 14.) However, those allegations as to a “dispute” over the funds amount to nothing more than mere speculation and pretext, and fail as a matter of law to establish any reasonable probability of double vexation. (City of Morgan Hill v. Brown, supra., 71 Cal.App.4th at 1125-1126.)

First, there are no allegations in the Cross-Complaint regarding what duties, if any, Anderson has 1n regard to the “set-aside” other than the fact she was to keep the funds in trust until any claims of Hubbell against Fletcher (not Anderson) were finally resolved, which was agreed to by Anderson 1n regard to an indemnity obligation of Fletcher to the HPN parties in the

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agreement attached as Exhibit A to the Cross-Complaint. (RJN, Exhibit 1.) There are no allegationsHubbell would have any claim against Anderson in connection with those funds, and any duty by which Anderson would have an obligation to pay those funds over to Hubbell, or that they were being held for Hubbell’s benefit at all. Hubbell’s complaint seeks merely a damages contract remedy against Anderson based on Hubbell’s alleged contract with Anderson to provide legal services in the Fletcher v. HPN case. There are no allegations in Hubbell’s complaint seeking the specific fund represented by the settlement funds “set-aside.” Neither has Hubbell alleged in her complaint any duty of Anderson to pay those funds over to Hubbell, nor the existence of any event which would require her to do so'. (See Hubbell’s Complaint [RJN Exhibit 2].)

In any event, Hubbell has admitted unequivocally under oath that she is not seeking a claim against Fletcher or the funds in question. In her attempt to thwart Anderson’s attempt to delay trial, Hubbell opposed Anderson’s motion for leave to file the Cross-Complaint by putting to rest, under oath, any possible basis for the interpleader. (See Declaration of Marlene Hubbell in Support of Opposition to Anderson’s Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint (“Hubbell Dec”) [RJIN, Exhibit 3] paras. 3 — 7.) Those admissions were made during the motion proceedings, and therefore were known to Anderson before she filed and served the interpleader Cross-Complaint, yet she filed and served it anyway. Further, even if Hubbell had not admitted under oath she has no claim against Fletcher or the interpled funds, any claim or lien Hubbell might have had based on an oral contract between Hubbell and Fletcher would be barred by the

statute of limitations and Hubbell’s failure to comply with the Business and Professions Code

' For context, contrary to any implication from Anderson’s verified allegations in her Cross-Complaint, the funds were held not for the benefit of Hubbell, but to provide to the HPN parties “protection” against any claim by Hubbell against HPN for failing to honor her bogus lien claim to induce HPN to enter into the settlement agreement in the Fletcher v. HPN action. (See Declaration of Bonnie J. Anderson in Support of Motion for Leave to File Cross- Complaint in Interpleader (“Anderson Decl.”) [RIN Exhibit 4], “Material Term of Settlement,” section 9.) Anderson now is attempting to use those funds to pay a debt alleged against her, not Fletcher. Although ignored by her in her verified Cross-Complaint allegations, Anderson’s continuing duty to Fletcher hold those funds under the settlement agreement to prevent a breach of the settlement agreement will be exposed if and when Anderson seeks an interpleader discharge should this demurrer be overruled. 4

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written fee agreement requirements to obtain and enforce the lien. (Code Civ. Proc. §339(1); Gardner v. Basich Bros. Const. Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 191, 194.)

The case of Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2014) 232 Cal. App. 4th 477 (“"SCGC case™), cited by the court as a basis for granting Anderson’s motion for leave to file the interpleader Cross-Complaint is, in fact, distinguishable.” In the SCGC case, two plaintiffs sued Southern California Gas (SCGC) for damages resulting from a wildfire. The plaintiffs initially were represented by attorney Tepper, who was substituted out and filed a notice of lien against any recovery prior to a settlement reached between the plaintiffs and SCGC. (Id. at 481-482.) Tepper asserted his lien against the settlement amount, and SCGC interplead the settlement funds after the parties were unable to agree as to who should be paid what portions of the settlement proceeds. (/bid.)

One of the plaintiffs in the underlying suit filed an anti-SLAPP motion challenging SCGC’s interpleader, and opposed SCGC’s discharge motion, which had been granted by the trial court. (/d. at 483-484.) In affirming the trial court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion and interpleader discharge, the court determined that SCGC had met the legal requirements for a complaint in interpleader, including the requirement of double vexation. (/d., at 486-489.)

“The purpose of interpleader is to prevent a multiplicity of suits and double vexation. [Citation.] “The right to the remedy by interpleader is founded, however, not on the consideration that a [person] may be subjected to double liability, but on the fact that he is threatened with double vexation in respect to one liability.” [Citation.]” [Citation.]. (Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery, supra., 232 Cal. App. 4th at 487.)

The SCGC court found that the competing claims against the settlement funds were sufficient to create double vexation for SCGC due to the viability of a lien by the former attorney against the recovery and a demand by the client/settling party for payment by the settling defendant, SCGC. (Id. at 487-489.)

? The issue of whether to allow filing of the Cross-Complaint did not require a determination of the viability of the interpleader claim, and Fletcher was not a party to this action and therefore did not have an opportunity to address the sufficiency of the pleading. In any event, the court is not bound by that order in ruling on this demurrer, and is authorized to reconsider its ruling on legal issues up to the time judgment is entered. (See Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 1094, 1096-1097; De La Beckwith v. Superior Court of Colusa County, (1905) 146 Cal. 496; Kelly v. Liddicoat (1939) 35 Cal. App. 2d 559; Collins v. Marvel Land Co. (1970) 13 Cal. App. 3d 34) 5

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This case 1s distinguishable from the SCGC case on several grounds. First, unlike SCGC, who was in an arms-length relationship with both claimants, Anderson was a fiduciary of Fletcher, and any agreement for her to hold the funds until the Hubble claim was “resolved” was made 1n that fiduciary capacity; therefore, she is not an arms-length third party with a contractual obligation that is subject to conflicting demands, and she clearly is holding the settlement funds solely for the benefit of Fletcher as his former attorney. Her contractual and fiduciary obligations in connection with those funds held in trust did not disappear after Anderson no longer was his counsel. (See e.g. Yorn v. Supreme Court (1979) 90 Cal.App. 3d 404, 414-415.) Further, Anderson alleges in her Cross-Complaint, and argued in her motion for leave to amend, that she faces double vexation by virtue of (1) Hubbell’s contract claim, which does not seek recovery of the specific monies Anderson was holding to protect Fletcher (see Hubble Complaint [RIN Exhibit 2]), and (2) a purported “demand” for those funds by Fletcher that her own allegations and judicially noticeable facts establish never existed, or if it did, was rescinded in January 2016, and replaced with the demand by Fletcher that she hold those funds until the remainder of the settlement was performed by the HPN parties, or she obtained permission by the HPN parties to release the funds to Fletcher (Anderson Declaration in Support of Motion for Leave ([RIN Exhibit 4] Ex. E.) In fact, Fletcher rejected Anderson’s attempt to distribute those funds to his current counsel in order to avoid the threat of the HPN parties asserting the transfer of the funds out of Anderson’s account as a technical breach of the settlement agreement, instructing his current counsel to return the check to Anderson. (/bid.)

Finally, Anderson’s claim that the interpled funds are subject to a “lien” claim is a red- herring. There is no lien pending or legally possible — it was withdrawn after Anderson correctly moved to expunge the lien when she was still Fletcher’s attorney, and Hubbell simply could not, and cannot, assert a valid lien against the interpled fund due to her failure to comply with the Business and Professions Code Section 6148 requirement of a written fee agreement, a fact well- known by Anderson and cited by her in this case (see Anderson Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint [RJN »Exhibit 5] at 1:20-24; Business and Professions Code §6148.) Hubbell clearly knows this and is not asserting any lien or other right

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fo those funds in this case, and has admitted in this action that she has no claim against Fletcher that would have to exist as a underlying basis for such a lien. (See Hubbell Declaration in Support of Opposition for Motion for Leave [RIN, Exhibit 3] paras. 5-8.)

Anderson simply does not face double vexation, and was not entitled to interplead the funds. There is not even the remotest threat, much less a reasonable probability, of double vexation, and the demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend. (Westamerica Bank v. City of Berkeley (2011) 201 CA4th 598, 612-613; City of Morgan Hill v. Brown (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1125; Code Civ. Proc. §339(1); Gardner v. Basich Bros. Const. Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 191, 194.)

C. Leave To Amend Should Be Denied.

The court should deny leave to amend where the facts are not in dispute and no liability exists under substantive law. (Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 535; Lawrence v. Bank of America (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 431, 436.)

Here, leave to amend should be denied because no good faith amendment can cure the lack of double vexation necessary to state an interpleader claim as a matter of law. At the very least, Anderson should be required to explain how she can amend to state a cause of action as a condition to being granted leave to amend.

I1I.

CONCLUSION

There 1s no claim by Hubbell against the settlement funds set-aside to be held by Anderson for the benefit of her former client, Ed Fletcher, and Hubbell has admitted she is not pursuing any claim against Fletcher or the funds deposited by Anderson. Anderson has sued in interpleader not to avoid any legitimate threat of multiple lawsuits or double vexation, but

apparently to use Ed Fletcher’s money to pay the debt alleged by Hubbell against Anderson and /1 /1 /1 /1 7

CROSS-DEFENDANT EDWARD FLETCHER’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO